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The aim of this study is to shed light on the military organization during the first
century of the 'Abbasid caliphate (AH 132-228 / AD 750-843). It is divided into an
Introduction, seven chapters, and a Conclusion.
The Introduction provides a review of the method and plan that are followed in the
study.
The first chapter deals with the elements that constituted the early 'Abbasid armies.
It traces their introduction, development, and their most common characteristics.
The second chapter is concerned with the Diwan al-Jund. First, it gives a review of
the institution of the Diwan from its inception to the end of the Umayyad Caliphate.
Next, it traces the changes that occurred to the Diwan under the early 'Abbasids,
including the method of enlisting the soldiers into the Diwan and distributing their
pay, and the development in the systems of 'ata' and arzaq. It also discusses the
conditions of enlistment in the Diwan under the early 'Abbasids, the rate of pay of
the 'Abbasid troops, and the size of the 'Abbasid army.
The third chapter is concerned with the military units and support services employed
by 'Abbasid armies. It provides details about their development, their special role,
and the equipment used by each of them.
fv
The fourth chapter is devoted to the military administration. It provides information
on means of military communication, army supplies and provisioning, levies,
volunteers, and other supernumerary fighters, exchange of captives, and army
command and ranks.
The fifth chapter deals with the mobilization and tactics followed by the 'Abbasid
forces during the march, encampment, battle, and during the summer and winter
raids.
The sixth chapter provides details about Muslim sea warfare under the early
'Abbasids. It discusses the 'Abbasids' naval power in the Mediterranean as well as
in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Also, it provides a description of the
'Abbasids' naval organization, including dockyards and naval bases, warships and
naval tactics, the crew of the warship, and the responsibilities of the commander of
the fleet.
The seventh chapter traces the 'Abbasid military bases and their most distinctive
martial characteristics.
Finally, the Conclusion states some of the main outcomes of the research.
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The importance of studying the military history of the early 'Abbasid Caliphate
springs from the fact that it marked a turning point in the history of Muslim armies.
This is due to fact that the early 'Abbasids abandoned many customary practices
relating to the organization of the army and introduced fundamentally new systems,
whether in regard to the men employed in the army, the way Muslim fighters were
recruited and organized, or even the way they planned their cities and settled troops
in them.
It is not intended that this study should provide a history of war under the early
'Abbasid Caliphate. Instead, it focuses primarily on studying aspects of military
organization within the historical context. It should further be noted that it is not our
intention to produce a comparison between the military organizations under the early
'Abbasids and that which preceded it during the early days of Islam and the
Umayyad Caliphate. However, for the sake of a better understanding of the roots of
the 'Abbasid military organizations and in order to clarify the extent of change that
occurred during the period of study, brief reviews of some aspects of the military
organizations during the early days of Islam and the Umayyads are included as
deemed relevant.
Islamic military organization is a very broad subject to study. It has been, and still is,
the focus of interest of many western Orientalists and Arab scholars. A number of
books and articles have been published on different aspects of Islamic military
organization, covering, for example, warfare tactics, military administration, arms,
the arts of cavalry training, and military technology. It seems, however, that it is the
early days of Islam, and also the Ayyubid, and Mamluk periods that have received
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most attention in these works. Meanwhile, early 'Abbasid military organization,
especially during the period covered by the present study (132-228/750-843), has
received comparatively less attention. This, however, should not obscure the fact
that, although their primary purpose has been to make clearer some political,
economic, or social point, many of the modern historians interested in the early
'Abbasid Caliphate have explored and discussed, to a varying extent, some very
important particular aspects of early 'Abbasid military organization. Among those
whose contributions have been frequently cited in this study are M. A. Shaban, D.
Ayalon, C. E. Bosworth, J. Lassner, F. Omar, H. Kennedy, M. Sharon, M. Ahsan,
and F. Amabe.
One of the main difficulties facing the researcher of early 'Abbasid military history,
particularly the organizational aspects, is the fact that although the first century of
'Abbasid rule produced an abundance of treatises dealing with different aspects of
Islamic warfare and matters related to it, most of these are now lost. Even those
which have survived - such as part of K. al-Hiyal of al-Harthaml al-Sha'ranl, the
companion of Caliph al-Ma'mun, or other treatises found as chapters in some books
on jurisprudence (fiqh) or finance, such as K. al-Athar and K. al-Kharaj by Abu
Yusuf (d. 182/798), or K. al-Siyar al-Kablr by al-Shaybanl (d. 189/804) - cannot be
relied on exclusively to draw a genuine description of the early 'Abbasid military
organization. This is first and foremost because most of the information in these
treatises reflects only an idealistic view of the art of war, its law, its administration,
as well as mentioning some conventional information on arms, horsemanship, and
military tactics. In fact, many details of the information found in these works do not
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derive so much from the reality of the time their authors lived so much as they do
from theoretical manuals on the art of war. This fact leaves the researcher no other
alternative except to widen the scope of the search to include all available historical
and literature writings dating to the first century of the 'Abbasid rule.
Despite the evident importance of the brief and fragment information relating to the
early 'Abbasid army that can be found in the writings of a few contemporary authors
such as Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 138/756), Ibn Khayyat (d. 240/854), al-Jahiz (d.
255/868), such information is still insufficient to discover all the organizational
aspects of the 'Abbasid army. This fact forces the researcher to extend his search
wider to include all sorts of writings dating from later centuries. The vast bulk of
information about the first century of the 'Abbasid rule is found in the historical and
literature works produced in the late third, fourth, and fifth AH (ninth, tenth and
eleventh AD) by renowned historians such as al-Baladhuri (d. 279/892), DInawarl (d.
282/895), al-Ya'qubl (d. 284/897), al-Tabari (d. 310/922), and al-Mas'udl (d.
346/957). However, even with these documents, the information on military affairs
only comes in the form of brief fragments of information mentioning names, or
events from the period of this study. This fact places the researcher in a rather
difficult situation. The difficulty derives both from the paucity of information in the
sources and from the long time needed to discover them by searching through
various categories of literature. Moreover, what complicates the situation even
further is the fact that the brief fragments of information that are available about a
specific military organizational aspect are not always sufficient to construct a
comprehensive picture, as further important clues appear still to be missing. As one
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means of reconstructing the missing details, we are sometimes forced to compare the
fragmentary information available of the period of study with that similar
information concerning the same matter from earlier and latter periods in order to
draw a reasonable conclusion regarding the matter being discussed.
This study is divided into seven chapters, followed by the Conclusion, and an
Arabic-English Glossary.
Chapter One discusses the introduction, development, and the most notable
characteristic of the elements that composed the early 'Abbasid armies. It is divided
into six sections, each of which deals with one element of the 'Abbasid forces: the
Khurasanls, the Abna', the Arabs, the Mawall, the Turks, and finally some minor
military elements.
Chapter Two is concerned with the Diwan al-Jund. It is divided into two parts.
The aim in the first is to furnish a review of the institution of the Diwan al-Jund and
the systems of ata' and arzaq from their inception to the end of the Umayyad
Caliphate. The second part examines the Diwan al-Jund under the early 'Abbasids
when fundamental initiatives were introduced regarding many of its organizational
procedures, including the method of enlisting the soldiers into the Diwan. It also
discusses the procedures employed in distributing the soldiers' pay, developments in
the system of 'ata' and arzaq, the conditions of enrolment into the Diwan, the rate of
the pay of the 'Abbasid troops, and some details about the size of the 'Abbasid army.
Chapter Three provides details about the most distinguished personnel of the early
'Abbasid military units, including the cavalry, infantry, archers, siege-engineers,
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pioneer and labour corps, and anny police force. It also discusses the non-combatant
groups who supported the army from the outset of the march up to the conclusion of
the fighting and the division ofbooty.
Chapter Four deals with military administration. It provides information relating to
military communication, the army supplies and provisioning system, and the use of
levies, volunteers and other supernumerary fighters in the army. Within the context
of this chapter, the issues involved in exchanging captives, and the army command
and ranks are also discussed.
Chapter Five contains details about the mobilization and military tactics employed
by the early 'Abbasid armies during the march, encampment, and in the battlefield.
It also provides information regarding the summer and winter raids, considering their
timing, geographical location, their extent, and the purpose of these seasonal raids.
Chapter Six provides details about Muslim sea warfare under the early 'Abbasids.
It discusses the 'Abbasid naval power in the Mediterranean as well as in the Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean, reviewing the measures that the early 'Abbasid Caliphs
took to counter the naval challenges of their enemies in these two maritime regions.
In addition, it provides a description of the 'Abbasid naval organization, including
dockyards and naval bases, warships and naval tactics, and, finally, the crew of the
warship and the responsibilities of the commander of the fleet.
Chapter Seven deals with the 'Abbasid military bases. It provides information
regarding military objectives, the defence systems, and the pattern of military
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settlement that the early 'Abbasids applied in their capitals as will as in their frontier
strongholds (thughur).
In the Conclusion the most important outcomes reached by the study are
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Introduction
One of the distinctive features of the Muslim armies during the early days of Islam
and the Umayyad Caliphate was their being composed almost exclusively of Arab
tribesmen. Although some non-Arab groups from amongst the people of the
conquered lands such as Persians, Berbers, Turks, or Sindis had joined Muslim
armies, nonetheless neither their number nor their role amounted to those of the
Arabs, who continued to the end of the Umayyad Caliphate to form the backbone of
Muslim annies. Arab dominance in the army, however, was broken with the
succession of the 'Abbasids to power, as their armies came to include a variety of
ethnic groups from different regional and cultural backgrounds. Although the first
century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate began with an army made up primarily of Arab
tribesmen, along with a considerable number of Muslim Iranians, it ended with a
Mamluk army, whose members were slaves bought or brought from slave centres in
Baghdad and Central Asia. In this chapter we will describe the introduction,
development, and most salient characteristics of the elements that composed the
early 'Abbasid armies. For convenience, this chapter is divided into six sections,
each of which deals with one element of the 'Abbasid forces: the Khurasanls, the
abna\ the Arabs, the mawall, the Turks, and, finally, some minor military elements.
1.1 TheKhurasams
During the formative years of their Caliphate, the 'Abbasids relied heavily on a
professional fighting force composed almost exclusively of a revolutionary army
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recruited in Khurasan. Speaking of the 'Abbasid revolution, sources tend to argue
that it was a revolution that was carefully planned. From the inception of their
da'wall (propaganda), the 'Abbasid leadership seemed to recognize the fact that a
successful revolt would have to begin in a province where a large proportion of the
population felt for one reason or another discontent with the Umayyad rule. Despite
the large discontented community in Iraq, and in particular in Kufah, where a
considerable number of the people were politically primed with Shi'ite ideas,
especially the legitimacy ofAhl al-Bayt to Rile, the 'Abbasids did not wish to make it
the centre of their da'wah. This was because the 'Abbasids were fully aware that the
tendency of its people was always in favour of the 'Alid family, in which it would be
difficult for them to find much support among these people for their claim to rule
after the revolution succeeded.1 Additionally, Kufah, like many other hotbeds of
unrest such as the cities of Basrah and Makkah, was under close observation by the
Umayyads. Hence, it would be extremely difficult for any new revolt to operate
without being noticed. Most important, however, was the fact that the Kufites had
proven time after time that they were the sort of people who never fulfilled their
promises in supporting their revolutionary leaders when put to the test in time of
crisis.2 Looking for an alternative to Iraq, the 'Abbasids found their long-cherished
base of operations in Khurasan. The province was an ideal arena for their activities.
It was far from the centre of the Umayyad government, which meant that the
government surveillance there was relatively weaker than in other provinces,
' Akhbar al- 'Abbas wa Waladih, pp. 193-4; al-Tha'alibi, Lata'ifal-Ma'arif p. 169.
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especially since Khurasan had never previously been identified with any of the main
political groups that strove for power. Moreover, it had a large discontented
population, not only amongst the local mcrwali, but also amongst the large Arab
community who was transplanted into the region and who had different reasons to
feel dissatisfied with the Umayyads and their representatives there.3
During the period of clandestine propaganda (99-129/718-747) and the years of the
open revolt which followed (129-132/747-750), the 'Abbasid da'wah in Khurasan
succeeded in attracting into its ranks every discontented element regardless of their
political, ideological, or self-interested motivation. However, contrary to the
assumptions of late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century historians led by Van
Vloten and Wellhausen, who interpreted the 'Abbasid revolution as a mass Iranian
uprising against the Arab ruling class and their domination, prevailing scholarly
opinion in recent times stresses the mixed character of the revolutionary troops that
lifted the 'Abbasids to power.4 Thus, in addition, to the Arab elements, who formed
the backbone of the revolutionary forces, there were a considerable number of local
mawali (Iranians) and even slaves who found in the Abbasid revolution the vehicle
for their emancipation.
2Akhbar, pp. 193, 230; Sharon,'Abbasid Revolution, p. 140.
3Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 37, 43; Sharon, Black Banners, p. 53.
4For a full review of the different views of modem historians about the identity of the 'Abbasid
revolutionary forces, see Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 155-7; Omar, 'Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 57-
8; Lassner, Shaping, pp. 3-5; Fukuzo, 'AbbasidAutocracy, pp. 31-2.
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The process of the Arab settlement in Khurasan can be dated as early as the time of
its conquest in 31/652 by 'Abdallah b. 'Amir, the governor of Basrah, during the
reign of Caliph 'Uthman b. 'Affan.5 With the collapse of the Sassanian armies in
Iraq and in the western parts of Iran, the Arabs seemed to face no real resistance in
establishing their authority over the eastern part of Sassanian Khurasan. Unlike the
west, which was under the direct control of the Sassanian central authority, the
eastern provinces consisted of many small and highly independent principalities,
many of which were ruled by local Iranian lords who in the past had not accepted the
Sassanian mastery.6 Finding it pointless, many of the local lords, such as those in
NIshapur, Nasa, Ablward, Tus, Harat, and Marw, choose to make peace treaties with
the new ruler. Under the terms of these treaties, the Arabs agreed to leave those
lords in control of their own affairs, especially financial administration, as well as to
make no efforts to convert the local people to Islam. In return, the local lords would
pay tribute to the Arabs and would allow Arab immigrants to settle in their villages.7
Nevertheless, the situation in Khurasan did not remain as peaceful as the Arabs had
expected. Soon after the return of the bulk of the conquering army, under the
command of'Abdallah b. 'Amir, to Iraq in 132/653, a widespread insurrection broke
out in Khurasan, exploiting the opportunity presented by the small garrison that the
5Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 499; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol, 4, p. 300; Yaqut, Mujam, vol. 2, p. 401; Qudamah,
Kharaj, p. 400.
^Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 36; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 9-11.
7Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 502; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 402; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, pp. 310-1; Shaban,
'AbbasidRevolution, pp. 20-1; Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 36-7.
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Arabs had left behind, estimated to number some 4,000 men.8 Although 'Abdallah
b. 'Amir was able to return in 133/653 and to re-establish Arab authority in the
region, this did not restrain the ambition of many of the local lords to revoke the
treaties, especially during the civil war between 'All and Mu'awiyah when the Arabs
were fully preoccupied with their internal affairs.9
With the end of the civil war and the succession of the Umayyads to power in
41/661, the central government in Damascus had to pay attention to Khurasan. To
affirm Muslim foothold in the region, the Umayyads adopted a complex two-pronged
plan. First, they determined to resume the conquest operations to subjugate not only
cities and areas within Khurasan but, more important, in Sistan, which had played in
the past a vital role in agitating the disturbances in the east. Second, they decided to
settle permanently a substantial number of Arab tribesmen in Khurasan to act as a
security force and provide the manpower needed for further expansion.10 However,
while the Umayyads were cautious not to dissipate their Syrian forces in filling the
security gap in Khurasan, they found ideally suited to their needs the Arab tribesmen
of Iraq and in particular those living within the great garrison cities of Kufah and
Basrah. In addition, to reduce the overcrowding in these cities, the Umayyads found
it also a good opportunity to drain the two cities of many of their Arab manpower
sTabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 314; Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 123; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 3, p. 28; Ibn
Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 7, p. 61.
9Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 557-8; Baladhurl, Futuh, pp. 505-6; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, p. 26.
l0Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 28, 32.
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who were politically discontented with the Umayyad rule.'1 Thus, as part of a long
demilitarization process, the Umayyads sought from 51/671 onward to send in
gradual waves substantial numbers of Kufan and Basran Arab tribesmen to
Khurasan not only to serve, but also to settle there permanently.12
In Khurasan, many of the early Iraqi Arab immigrants settled in various cities
including Marw, Tus, NTshapur, Balkh, Marw al-Rudh, Taliqan, and Harat.13 In
course of time, however, with the relative stability in Khurasan, many of these Arab
settlers started to abstain from taking part in the military expeditions. Instead, they
started to acquire lands and practise trade. Moreover, their long stay in close
proximity with the local population helped the process of assimilation between the
two. In Khurasan, they mingled with the native Iranian population, married among
them, adopted many of their customs, and even spoke Persian among themselves in
addition to Arabic.14 While the feeling of discontent among these Arab settlers
"Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 36.
"Baladhuri, Fittub, p. 507; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 286; vol. 6, pp. 326-7, 335,484; vol. 7, p. 79; Ibn
al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 3, p. 259; vol. 4, pp. 193, 399. The demilitarization of the cities of Basrah and
Kufah, which started in 51/671 with the transfer of 50,000 families, half from Basrah and the other
half from Kufah, to settle in Khurasan, seems to have been completed in 83/702 with the failure of
'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad b. al-Ash'ath's revolt and the founding of the Syrian garrison town of
Wasit, midway between Kufah and Basrah. Nevertheless, Basrah and Kufah were militarily
reactivated in 126/744 when 'Abdallah b. 'Umar II, the governor of Basrah and Kufah, resumed the
distribution of the 'ata' among their Arab tribesmen after a long interval during which such payments
had ceased. For further information relating to the demilitarization of Kufah and Basrah during
Umayyad times, see Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 54, 68, 133-4; Fukuzo, 'AbbasidAutocracy, pp.
17,21-2.
l3Ya'qubI, Buldan, pp. 42-60; idem, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 301; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, pp. 546-7, 549; vol.
6, pp. 77,446; vol. 7, p. 41; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 502, 506-9; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 46-7;
Omar, al-'Abbasiyun al-Awa'il, pp. 42-50.
I4jahiz Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 40.
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toward the central government revived when the Umayyad authority decided to
eliminate their names from the army register and discontinue their stipends on
account of their non-participation in the military expeditions,15 this feeling only
deepened when these Arab tribesmen left their garrisons and became farmers and
traders outside. By so doing they came under the authority of the non-Arab, non-
Muslim indigenous lords (dahaqm, sing, dihqari), to whom they had to pay taxes.16
At this point, these Arab tribesmen felt a sense of unfairness not only for being
deprived of their privileges as part of the Arab ruling class, but also for being treated
as second-class Muslims.17 It was under these circumstances that the 'Abbasid
da 'wah was able to penetrate into the ranks of the Arab settlers, persuading them of
the need for a fundamental change not only in Khurasan but in the whole empire,
and that there were no better people than the Ahl al-Bayt to lead such a change.
The next element, who were also the focus of attention of the 'Abbasid da 'wah from
its earliest days, were the local mawall (Iranians),18 whose dissatisfaction with the
Umayyad authority had been shown by their military contribution to previous
l5Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 80; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 399; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp.
115-6.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 316; Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 37; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp.
47, 116.
17 Shaban 'AbbasidRevolution, pp. 47, 156.
l*Akhbar, pp. 204, 285. For more discussion on the social and legal status of a person described as a
mawla in early Islam, see pp. 58 ff.
revolts.'9 Like the Shi'ites of Kufah, many of the indigenous Muslims of Khurasan
were deeply sympathetic toward the cause of the Ahi al-Bayt and their right to lead
the Muslim community instead of the illegitimate Umayyad regime. Nevertheless, in
contrast to the Kufite Shi'ites, whose loyalty was always toward the 'Alid family,
these Iranians did not, in fact, distinguish between the 'Alids and other members of
Banu Hashim. Rather, they viewed them all as Ahl al-Bayt without any special
preference for one branch of the family over another.20 Thus, it was very convenient
for the 'Abbasids to have their support during their revolt and after the revolution
come to a conclusion. In addition to the ideological aspect, many of the local mawall
in Khurasan also had other reasons to feel dissatisfied with the Umayyads and their
representatives in the region, especially when it came to the taxation policy
employed there. With the Arab conquest of Khurasan, the indigenous lords
'9The importance of the mawall in Khurasan was obvious during the rebellion of al-Harith b. Surayj
of Tamlm in Khurasan in 116/734, in which they formed a significant part of his advocates. On al-
Harith's revolt, see Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 94-8; Wellhausen, Arab Kingdom, pp. 450-6; Shaban,
'AbbasidRevolution, pp. 118-22; Sharon, Revolt, pp. 27-33.
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(dahaqm) of the different towns and districts in Khurasan concluded peace treaties
with the Arab rulers, according to which the former agreed to pay a fixed sum of
money annually to the Arabs as tribute. Also, according to the terms of these
treaties, the assessment and the collection of the taxes were left absolutely to the
dahaqm without interference from the Arabs. In other words, although Khurasan
came under the Muslim authority, its financial administration remained in the hands
of the dahaqm, who not only decided how the burden of the tribute would be divided
among the local population, but also determined the kinds of taxes imposed. With
this absolute financial authority, the dahaqm continued to carry out the old Sassanian
taxation policy, according to which the local population had to bear the burden of
primary taxes such as poll tax, land tax, trade tax, and occupation tax and also of
secondary taxes such as marriage tax, petitions tax, and special taxes at the time of
the Nawrvz fastival.21 As conversion to Islam would eventually free people from
many of these taxes including poll tax (jizyah) and land tax (kharaj), widespread
20The sincere feeling of the Iranian Muslims toward the Ahl al-Bctyt and their right to rule, as well as
the indiscriminate view of these mawall in favouring members of the Ahl al-Bayt, is well illustrated in
a very interesting passage in the Akhbar source, which has been surprisingly overlooked by modern
scholars. The passage says: "Bukayr b. Mahan states that while he was sitting with Qays b. al-Sari in
Jurjan he met a non-Arab man who said in Persian, 'We have never seen any people more astray than
the Arabs, who, following the death of their Prophet (peace be upon him), shifted their allegiance to
others than his family.' Bukayr continued, 'Then the man wept and 1 could not restrain myself from
weeping with him and 1 said, "May Allah's mercy be upon you. How often you have witnessed
falsehood superseding the right. The Arabs have been misled and diverted towards worldly gains, by
which many have been fascinated. Some, however, have recovered and recognized their mistakes.'"
The man then asked, 'What then prevents you from advocating their cause, as I can assure you of the
pledge of my people to support you in this.' Bukayr inquired, 'Can you do this?' The man answered,
'Yes. Stretch out your hand so I may make a pledge to you on this.' Bukayr said, '1 put my hand
forward' and the man voiced his pledge, though we have never before thought of propagating our
cause in Khurasan" (Akhbar, pp. 198-201). The account continues by noting that the Persian man was
Zayd b. al-Nuhayd, from Jurjan, and that he was the second individual in the eastern provinces to give
allegiance to the 'Abbasids. Moreover, although Zayd himself died before the start of the revolt, his
promise was wholly fulfilled when his people of Juijan supported the revolutionary forces against the
Umayyad army under the leadership of Nubatah b. Hanzalah (ibid., pp. 198-9, 201, 285).
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conversion would be contrary to the financial interests of the dahaqih as well as the
Central Treasury in Damascus. Therefore, throughout most of the time of their rule,
the Umayyads not only overlooked the heavy taxes imposed on non-Muslims in
Khurasan, but also denied the newly converted Iranians their legitimate right to be
exempted from paying much of the no longer applicable taxes, including jizyah.22
What deepened the feeling of injustice among these converts was the fact that the
non-Muslim dahaqih, under the noses of the government agents, used their taxation
authority to favour their own people who maintained their faith and at the expense of
Muslims, whose burdens of taxation were unjustly increased.23 In addition to the tax
problems, many of the Iranians who accepted Islam and joined the Muslim armies
also struggled for equal rights with their Arab co-religionists, especially in regard to
2lKhan, "Taxation in Persia", p. 736; Shaban, 'AbbasidRevolution, pp. 36, 91-2.
22Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 559; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 302; Ibn al-Athlr, KamiI, vol. 4, p. 321. It
should be noted, however, that there were three attempts to remove taxation abuse experienced by the
mawall in Khurasan. The first of these was made by Caliph 'Umar II (99-101/717-720); the second
by Caliph Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik (105-125/724-743), carried out by his governor in Khurasan,
Ashras b. 'Abdallah al-Salml; and the third by the governor of Khurasan, Nasr b. Sayar (120-
131/738-749). Nevertheless, the effects of none of these attempts lasted long owing to the
unfavourable consequences that ensued, most notably the decline of sums coming from this tax to the
government's Treasury. Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 559; vol. 7, p. 173; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 526. For
more on taxation reform in early Islam, see D. C. Dennett, Conversion and the Poll-Tax in Early
Islam, Cambridge, Mass., 1950; H. A. R. Gibb, 'The Fiscal Rescript of 'Umar II", Arabica, vol. 2
(1955), pp. 1-16; Wellhausen, Arab Kingdom, pp. 267-311, 477-82; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp.
76-91, 129-30.
21This was indicated by Nasr b. Sayar when he said, "Verily, Bahramsls was the protector of the
Magians (way us); he favoured them, protected them and put their burdens (taxes) on the Muslims.
Verily, Ashbdad son of Gregory was the protector of the Christians, just as Aqiva the Jew protected
the Jews. But 1 am the protector of the Muslims. I will defend them and shield them and make the
polytheists carry their burdens." The account concludes by stating that there were 30,000 Muslims
who had unjustly been paying the jizyah and there were 80,000 unbelievers who had been exempted
from this tax. Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 173 (English translation quoted from Hillenbrand, The History
ofal- Tabarl, vol. 26, p. 24).
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the 'ata\ right to which the Umayyads also sought to deny them.24 As a result of the
Umayyads' policies in Khurasan, many of the local mawall found in the 'Abbasid
da 'wah, with its broad Islamic socio-political agenda, the hope of a leadership that
would replace the Umayyads, who had failed to implement true Islamic ideals.25
It is worth noting, however, that not all the mawall in Khurasan supported the
'Abbasids. In fact, in the case of those mawall who had affiliation (wala) with an
Arab tribe, it was typical that while the mowallof the southern tribes (mostly anti-
Umayyad) would support their Arab patrons, the mawall of the northern tribes
(mostly pro-Umayyad) would maintain their wala' and fight against the
revolutionaries.26
The least significant element of the 'Abbasid revolutionary forces was the slaves.
The use of slaves in combat was not an 'Abbasid innovation as they had been used
by Muslims as early as the first battle fought in Islam.27 Nonetheless, while the use
of slaves by the central government was on a small scale, only in most critical
24This was clearly indicated in the complaint delivered to Caliph 'Umar II that there were 20,000
mawall in Khurasan who were participating in military campaigns without receiving stipends (a/a).
Tabari, TarMt, vol. 6, p. 559; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 302; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 321.
25Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 37.
26Sharon, 'Abbasid Revolution, p. 6; Omar, Buhuth fi al-Tarikh al-'AbbasI, p. 49; Fukuzo, 'Abbasid
Autocracy, pp. 39-40, 44.
27Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 255; WaqidI, Maghazi, vol. 1, pp. 104-5; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 34;
Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 1, p. 478; Pipes, Slaves, p. 110.
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moments, and mainly against non-Muslim foes,28 slaves seem to have played a far
greater role on the rebels' side fighting against the government forces.29 During the
first two centuries of Islamic history, while slaves were used mainly in the civil
service, many of them were highly skilled in martial arts and could endure extreme
hardness, virtues which qualified some of them to win their freedom after
demonstrating their prowess on the battlefield.30 Learning from the lessons and
mistakes of earlier revolts, the 'Abbasids fully apprehended the need to attract such
men, who could supply the revolution with additional manpower once it started.
Consequently, from the outset of their movement in Khurasan, the 'Abbasids
• • * I
devoted part of their propaganda efforts to the slave community in particular.
Despite this attention, however, the 'Abbasid da'wah did not, in fact, find at the
beginning any real support among the slave population. In fact, only one runaway
slave is reported to have joined the ranks of the rebels during the first two months
after the outbreak of the revolt on the 24 Ramadan 129/8 June 747.32 However, the
flow of slaves in large numbers to the revolutionary side only came later, especially
2STaban, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 457; vol. 7, pp. 78, 81; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 398; Azdi, Tarikh, p.
72.
29See e.g. Pipes, Slaves, pp. 110-31. It is worth noting, however, that in dealing with the revolt of
'Abdallah b. Mu'awiyah in 129/747, Pipes seems to misinterpret the Arabic text as he says,
"Although the Kufans joined 'Abdallah's revolt, their slaves fought against him and lost." Yet
looking to the same source (Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 371), we find that the account runs as follows:
"When 'Abdallah b. Mu'awiyah was driven out of Kufah, he went to Mada'in, where the people
swore allegiance to him and a group from Kufah joined him. He then went to Jibal and seized control
there as well as in Hulwan, Qumis, Isbahan and Rayy. The slaves of the Kufans ran away to join
him."
30Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 78; Azdi,Tarikh, p. 72.
3lIt is reported that Mus'ab b. Qays, one of the 'Abbasid du'ah, was assigned to the sole task of
attracting slaves and no others (Akhbar, p. 280).
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after the proclamation sent by the revolutionary leader, Abu Muslim, that any slave
who joined the ranks would not only win his freedom, but also be treated equally
1-1 ... , .
with the rest of the da'wah people. This sensitive message had a deep impact
among slaves, who saw this as a golden opportunity to win their freedom.
It is worth noting, however, that not all slaves were welcomed by the 'Abbasid
da'wah as it appears that there were certain qualifying factors for such acceptance.
In dealing with slaves, the 'Abbasid leadership, at least in the early stage of their
revolution, seem to have put forth two conditions. First, adherence to the Islamic
faith was made a requisite. Although this might also have included freemen within
its scope, it was a principle much more strictly applied with regard to slaves. Thus,
one of the questions the runaway slave would be asked before being allowed to join
the ranks of the revolutionaries was whether he was a Muslim or not as, most likely,
any non-Muslim would be turned away.34 The reason for this condition sprang from
the fact that the 'Abbasid da'wah wanted to demonstrate legitimate foundation in
Islam in order to justify its action of seizing the properties (slaves) of co-religionists,
something which it would have been almost impossible to justify if those slaves were
non-Muslims. Indeed, when their masters demanded the return of their slaves, the
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opposed their masters for a noble Islamic cause, the love of Al Muhammad,35 The
revolutionaries went even further, asserting that it was not the da 'wah that had freed
those slaves, but, they said, "Allah is the one who set them free."36 The second
condition put forth by the 'Abbasids was the race of the slave, as it appears that
blacks were not eligible to enter the ranks of the da 'wah. The reason for this stood
on a directive (wasiyyah) issued by the 'Abbasid Imam, Ibrahim, to his
propagandists (du 'ah) in Khurasan, instructing them not to accept into the ranks of
the da'wah ten sorts of people, among whom were those described as al-ja'd al-
qapat, meaning literary people with short curly hair.37 What confirms the selective
policy of the revolutionary leadership in dealing with slaves, who wished to join the
ranks of the revolutionary army, was the fact that some slaves are reported to have
10
turned back to their masters." As for those who were accepted, subsequently, to
prevent their being oppressed by freemen in the ranks, the slaves who did join the
revolution were separated in their own military unit, which later took part in fighting
the Umayyad supporters in Ablward and Nasa.39
iSIbid.
36Ibid:
31Ibid., p. 387. The whole wasiyah will be discussed in Ch. 2. As various Arabic dictionaries and
other types of sources indicate, the meaning of the term ja'd is 'curly hair', which is one of the
distinctive features of black peoples. Thus, if we assume that this wasiyah concerned free people who
might have black features, as one of their parents was black, then it would be more restricted to pure
black slaves. On the term al-ja'd al-qatat, see for example Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 3, p. 405 (s.v. "al-
ja'd"); Ibn Sallam, Gharib al-Hadith, vol. 3, p. 27 (s.v. "al-ja'd"); 'AsqalanI, Fath al-Ba/I bi-sharh
Sahlh al-Bukharl, vol. 10, p. 357; Suyuti, Sharh Muwatta' Malik, vol. 2, p. 219.
^Akhbar, p. 284.
''ibid., pp. 281, 284; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 366.
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The last and surely most significant element of the KhurasanI armies was the Arab
tribal forces (muqatilah) stationed in the region. Although these Arab fighters
maintained their Arab tribal identification, their long residence in Khurasan
developed among them a very strong sense of regional loyalty. Thus, they not only
observed themselves as Arabs, but also as Khurasanls.40 In the early days of the
open revolt, the 'Abbasids adherents were not as many or as strong as some sources
indicate, perhaps numbering only between 3,000 and 4,000, most of whom were
infantry and poorly equipped.41 Despite their political commitment to the cause, this
army, in a practical sense, lacked the potential manpower and the martial skills to
match the Syrian armies. Clearly, a much better trained and more experienced force
was badly needed for the revolution to succeed. Through very masterful political
manoeuvres exploiting the tribal struggle that had just started to intensify in the
province, the 'Abbasid da'wah, under the leadership of Abu Muslim, managed to
gain the support of the muqatilah, especially those of Yaman and Rabl'ah.
Both the Arab tribes as integral political units and their muqatilah as individuals had
reason to be dissatisfied with the Umayyads' administrative and fiscal policy in the
region. For the muqatilah, the persistent attempts of the Umayyad Caliphs in concert
with their Syrian governors in the region to appropriate much of the booty captured
40In addition to their nisbah to their Arab tribes, many of the Arab tribesmen in Khurasan assumed a
lineage derived from the areas they were stationed in Khurasan. For more information on the
assimilation of the Arabs in Khurasan, see Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 46-51; 114-6; 156-7.
4'Akhbai\ p. 277; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 356-8; DInawari, Akhbar, p. 361. With an element of
exaggeration K. al-'Uytin (p. 183) states that 10,000 men, some of whom were cavalry and some
infantry, joined Abu Muslim on the first day of the open revolt.
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through the military campaigns in Ma wara' al-Nahr (Transoxania) were enough to
anger them. They viewed these actions not only as conflicting with Islamic teachings
and consequently depriving them of their legal rights, but, more importantly, as
affecting their livelihood, especially since these spoils were a prime financial source
of income in addition to their annual stipends ('ata ).42 A similar abusive policy was
also practised with regard to the taxes (fay') raised in the province. While the central
government viewed these taxes as an excellent financial source for the Central
Treasury in Damascus and therefore endeavoured to extract as much as it could, the
people of Khurasan resisted such a policy, feeling that the money ought rather to be
spent in the province.43 Another reason for the muqatilah to feel discontented was the
tajmir policy adopted by the regional government in Khurasan, in consequence of
which the muqatilah lived a very harsh military life. The incessant attacks of the
Turks on Islamic frontiers and the attempts of the local rulers in Transoxania to
revoke the Arab treaties led the Umayyads not only to send these troops on military
campaigns during spring and summer, which was the common practice in Arab
warfare, but also to keep them in these distant and difficult frontiers during winter
without their being rotated (hence the term tajmir, used to donate this practice) with
fresh troops.44
42Jahiz, Bayart, vol. 2, pp. 296-7; Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 221; Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 62; Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 5, pp. 251-2; Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 361.
41Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 20-1, 427; Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, pt. 2, p. 142; Shaban, 'Abbasid
Revolution, pp. 37-8, 103; Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 37.
44Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 20; Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 141; Bosworth, "Recruitment", p. 61;
Omar, a!- 'Abbasiyun al-Awa'il, p. 50. On the term tajmir, see EI2, s.v. "Tadjmlr".
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What further made Khurasan suitable for the 'Abbasid revolution was the intense
feuding and conflict that went on between the Arab tribesman there, which was, in
fact, part of the inter-tribal struggle happening in other parts of the Islamic Empire,
especially in Iraq and Syria. In a historical perspective, this was one of the primary
reasons for the Umayyads' downfall. With no connection to pre-Islamic feuding, the
tribal feuds in Urnayyad times seem to have been due to economic and social factors
going back to the time of the conquest and the settlement of the Arab tribes in the
conquered lands. In their new environment, the central issue was now no longer the
domination of pasture land and caravan routes, but instead the wielding of power and
controlling the wealth of some of the most prosperous regions in the East.45 The
tribal conflict in Khurasan, as else where in the Islamic Empire, centralized in
general terms between the two major camps: Mudar (northern tribes) on the one hand
and Yaman along with its ally Rabl'ah (southern tribes) on the other. This tribal
strife was sharpened by the favouritism of the Umayyad Caliphs toward one group of
tribes at the expense of another. Most often, this preferential treatment would be
reflected in the Umayyad Caliphs' selection of men of a particular tribal origin to
hold governmental high offices, especially the post of governorship,46 an office of
45There are, in fact, different views regarding the origin of the strife between Arab tribes in the time of
the Umayyads. While Goldziher (Muslim Studies, vol. I, p. 91) thinks that the struggle between the
Southern and Northern Arab tribes derived from the rivalry between Quraysh and Ansar, Wellhausen
(Arab Kingdom, p. 47) believes that the hostility "did not exist before the capture of Syria by Muslims
and the immigration thither of Qais." On the tribal strife in Khurasan, Syria, and Iraq, see Sharon,
Banner, pp. 60-70; idem, Revolution, pp. 25-7, 34-8, 51-3; Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, pp. 12-27;
Kennedy, 'The Origin of the Qays-Yaman Dispute in Bilad al-Sham", in Proceedings of the Second
Symposium on the History ofBilad al-Sham during the Early Islamic Period to 40 AH / 650 AD, vol.
1, ed. M. Bakhit (Amman, 1987), pp. 168-74; Crone, "Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad
Period Political Parties?", Der Islam, 71/1(1994, pp. 1-57).
^'Dlnawari, Akhbir, pp. 340-1; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 156.
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particular importance since it would determine the political, economic, and even
social privileges of a particular group of tribes. In other words, if the appointment of
a governor from among the northern tribes entailed the rise of all northern tribes and
at the same time the suppression and decline of influence of the southern tribes, then
the opposite would also be true.47 However, if a particular tribal member's holding
of a state office entailed both a rise in that tribe's status and its support for the
Caliphate, by contrast such a person's fall from grace entailed, if not his tribe's
affiliation with the opposition, then at least an accord with disaffected groups. This
was clearly illustrated by the Azd tribe in particular and the southern tribes in general
in Khurasan, who gained a high status and privileges during the governorship of al-
Muhallab b. Abl Sufrah and his sons (beginning in 78/ 697). Nevertheless, the
southern tribes lost this status with the final fall of the Muhallab family in 99/717,
after which they became second in place to the northern tribes, who held this office
during most of the remaining period of Umayyad aile and pursued an anti-Yamanite
policy, which in turn prompted the Yamanites to side with the opposition against the
central government and its Mudarite representative in Khurasan.4*
Although these tribal forces of Yaman and Rabl'ah joined the 'Abbasid revolt for
reasons of self-interest rather than on ideological grounds, they eventually integrated
47Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 351; Sharon,'Abbasid Revolution, p.26.
4STabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 558; vol. 7, pp. 321, 337-8, 364, 370; DInawari, Akhbar, p. 352; Sharon,
Banners, pp. 55f.; idem.,'Abbasid Revolution, p. 27; Blankinship, " 'Abbasid Revolution", p. 600.
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with the rest of the revolutionary elements in one military bloc commonly referred to
in the sources as ahl Khurasan or the Khurasaniyah (Khurasanls).49
After the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty and the accession of the 'Abbasids to
power, the Khurasani forces seem to have passed through a formative stage during
which they were transformed from a revolutionary militia into a very well-organized,
well-disciplined, and professional army. A notable early description of the 'Abbasid
military institution in its early stages is found in a monograph written by Ibn al-
Muqaffa' and entitled Risalahfi al-Sahabah.50 The significance of this work springs
not only from the fact that it was written during the formative years of al-Mansur's
reign as a compendium of advice on how to govern but, more importantly, from the
fact that it gives a clearly defined picture of the Khurasanls in respect of their
character, loyalty, and the relationship of their warriors with the head of the state.
What gives the work of Ibn al-Muqaffa' credibility is the fact that the author himself
had lived very closely within the inner circle of the 'Abbasid Caliph's court and
family. Thus, a man with such intelligence and capable of such brilliant analysis
must have been acutely aware of what was happening within the court as well as in
mAkhbar, p. 375; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 7, pp. 407, 418, 434-5, 449, 453, 475; Azdl, TarM, pp. 149,
150, 153; Dinawari, Akhbar, pp. 367, 390.
50Goitcin (Studies in Islamic History, p. 153) points out that the text was written sometime between
136/754, the year in which al-Mansur came to power, and 142/760, the year in which Ibn al-Muqaffa'
was executed. Lassner (Shaping, p. 106) gives the more precise date of 137/755, sometime between
the end of the revolt of'Abdallah b. 'All and the execution of Abu Muslim.
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the military institution.51 In his text, the author reveals his clear and deep admiration
for the Khurasan! troops over tire Arab tribal armies such as the Syrians. He says of
the Khurasanls, "This is an army the like of which has never before been seen in
Islam." In character they are, as he illustrates, loyal, generous, incorruptible, and
obedient to the authorities. He adds, "We do not know any other warriors who
possess such characteristics." ~ Although the overall purpose of the Risalah, written
as a series of advices directed to the Caliph, is to assist the Caliph in keeping firm
control over all government institutions, the author devotes a great part of his treatise
to a discussion in series of the ideological, social, and fiscal problems that the
Khurasan! army suffered from, which in turn affected not only its military discipline,
but also created a serious threat to the Caliph's authority. The first and most serious
problem the author discusses concerns the misinterruption by some of the Khurasan!
officers of the limits of the loyalty that they owed to their Caliph. Although genuine
devotion is required from the army, yet Ibn al-Muqaffa' indicates that the loyalty of
those officers went beyond healthy limits so that it actually constituted a real threat
to the Caliph's authority since it went so far as to entertain extreme and dangerous
notions. Exemplifying such notions, Ibn al-Muqaffa' writes, "There are officers
among them who believe that if the Caliph were to order the mountains to move,
they would move, and if the Caliph were to order one to turn his back to the qiblah
"For more details about Ibn al-Muqaffa', see Jahshiyari, al-Wazara', pp. 79, 103-10; Ibn Khallikan,
Wafayat, vol. 2, pp. 151-5; Ibn Nadlm, al-Fihrist, p. 172; EI2, s.v, "Ibn al-Mukaffa' "; Ch. Pellat, Ibn
al-Muqaffa', mort vers 140/757, «conseilIear» du calife, Paris, 1976.
52lbn al-Muqaffa', "Risalah", p. 119.
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[the direction of prayer, i.e. toward Makkah] during prayer, he would do."53 For Ibn
al-Muqaffa', these radical views not only caused confusion and wonder among other
Khurasanis, but also might become the occasion of ideological confrontations
tending to undermine the unity of the army.54 In addition, excessive zeal with no
clear guide to conduct might spell a greater danger for the Caliph than for his
enemies. It is, as Ibn al-Muqaffa' describes it, "like the rider of a lion who terrifies
those who see him but the rider himself is the most terrified."55 As a solution to this
problem, Ibn al-Muqaffa' advises the Caliph to write down a short directive covering
everything the soldiers should do or abstain from doing. This text should be learned
by the high-ranking officers of the army so that they can command those in the lower
ranks in accordance with its provisions.56
The next problem Ibn al-Muqaffa' discusses is that, for practical reasons, and also to
preserve the goodwill of the Khurasanis and to keep them subject to the authority's
control, the Caliph should not give them the responsibility of collecting taxes
(kharaj), since that would eventually lead to their corruption. The main concern here
is the expectation that if the Khurasanis did this work on any kind of a permanent
basis, it would lead them to develop another source of revenue. This would lead in
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capacity for striking out on their own, a particular danger when their personal interest
was in conflict with the Caliph's decisions.57
Ibn al-Muqaffa' also indicates that there were among the lower-ranking troops
individuals whose qualities and qualifications were far better than those of their
officers. Therefore, promoting these unrecognized troopers through the ranks would
not only be extremely useful for the common soldiers themselves, but also for the
leaders over them in the ranks.58 This advice would seem to suggest that some of the
Khurasan! commanders were not as competent as they should be and that their ties
with the 'Abbasid da'wah had been the chief reason for their being promoted in
political and military status.
Furthermore, it seems that among the Khurasanls there were many who were
ignorant or had limited knowledge of Islamic teaching. Therefore, in order to take
full advantage of their innate capabilities, Ibn al-Muqaffa' stresses the necessity for
religious education among the soldiers. This would be by learning the Qur'an, the
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Ibn al-Muqaffa' also suggests that the troops be encouraged to look to the humble
lifestyle of the Commander of the Faithful as an example to be followed in their own
social life.59
Finally, to avoid any aversion among the troops for financial reasons, Ibn al-
Muqaffa' suggests that the Caliph should draw up a timetable for the troops who are
registered in the Diwan to receive their arzaq (salaries). The period could be every
three or four months, or as the Caliph felt it proper. Furthermore, because
fluctuations in the market might have an effect on the price-wage factor, Ibn al-
Muqaffa' recommends that some of the pay be given in the form of food and some as
fodder, yet to be given on a regular basis in order to keep the army from complaining
and thus always ready to face the enemies.60 The overall financial strategy of the
army in lbn al-Muqaffa"s thesis is very clear. To prevent the army from developing
another source of income, which would give them the scope of becoming
economically independent, and to maintain their absolute financial dependence on
the authority, the Caliph had to pay the soldiers regularly, which entailed the
complete subordination on the part of the army to its provider.
The loyalty of the Khurasanls, which was well galvanized during the reign of al-
Mansur, enabled the 'Abbasid Caliphs to rely on them in the most critical times.
Besides their military value in defending the frontiers of the state against outsider
threats or when occasionally sent on short military campaigns to wage the jihad
59Ibid.
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against the Byzantines' territory, their role was very noticeable at the internal level.
The 'Abbasids used the Khurasanls not only to affirm their sovereignty in Arab
regions such as the Hijaz and Iffiqiya, known for their antagonism attitude toward
the central government, but also to crush revolts led by other disaffected Khurasan!
leaders.61 Moreover, engagement in batde was not the only role for the Khurasanls
to play, as the 'Abbasid Caliphs employed them to achieve their own political
ambition, especially with regard to the matter of succession. For example, when al-
Mansur wrote to Tsa b. Musa in 147-764 asking him to step down from the line of
succession in favour of al-Mahdl, he urged him to bow to the wish of God and the
people of Khurasan, "whose affection for him [al-Mahdi]," he claimed, "had reached
a point when they speak of nothing but his virtue, refuse to do anything except by his
name, and recognize nothing but his right."62 Because of the unrivalled loyalty of
the Khurasanls, we see Caliph al-Mansur recommending them to his son and heir
apparent al-Mahdi, saying:
I recommend the people of Khurasan to you. They are your
supporters (ansaruk) and partisans (shTatuk), who have spent
their fortune to establish your rule, and shed their blood for your
sake. To keep your love in their hearts, you should favour them,
forgive those who have transgressed, reward them for what they
have done, and care for the families of those who have died.63
60Ibid., p. 124.
6lTabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 461-2, 464, 497, 508.
62Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 15-6.
631bid., pp. 102-3.
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For much of the first century of 'Abbasid rale, the Khurasan! forces continued to be
the predominant and most distinguished unit of the central army in Baghdad. During
that period the Khurasan! unit was able to renew itself militarily through two
sources. First, the region of Khurasan itself proved to be a vital source of new
recruits as, for nearly three quarters of a century (until the accession of al-Mu'tasim
in 218/833), it continued to supply the central government in Baghdad with its
needed manpower. In this respect, it is reported that during the reign of Caliph
Harun al-Rashid in 176/793, al-Fadl b. Yahya al-Barmaki, while he was engaged in
a military campaign beyond the Oxus, recruited a large army of non-Arab
Khurasanis (jund min al- 'ajam). According to reports, this army numbered 500,000
men and was known by the name al-'Abbasiyah. From this army, 20,000 men were
later sent to Iraq, where they settled and became known as al-Karnabiyah.64 The
second source of recruits was the descendants of the old Khurasan! veterans in
Baghdad, who were known by the name of al-abna' ('the sons'). While we shall
treat this group in greater detail in the following section, we may note here that many
of these descendants not only inherited from their ancestors Baghdad as a homeland,
but also military service as a career. Although the first reference in the sources to the
abna' in this particular sense is found as early as the time of Caliph al-Mahdi, yet the
abna' as a military force continued to serve as an unidentifiable body within the
framework of the old Khurasan! unit up until the end of the reign of al-Amin.
Mfbid., p. 257; K. al-'Uyun, p. 296; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 172; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Mtinlazam,
vol. 9, pp. 35-6. For some suggestions on the origin of the word Karnabiyah, see Bosworth, The
History of Tatari, vol. 30, p. 144, n. 529.
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Starting from the reign of al-Ma'mun, however, the abna' emerged as a military
group distinct from the Khurasan! forces of that time.65 The separation of the abna'
came as a result of a profound change that occurred within the Khurasan! unit,
especially with regard to the ethnic identity of the elements who composed it during
the reign of al-Ma'mun. This change started with the civil war (194/810-198/814)
between Caliph al-Amin and his brother al-Ma'mun, the governor of Khurasan.
Whereas al-Amin relied on the abna' of the Khurasan! veterans, who now
represented the standing army in Baghdad, al-Ma'mun counted on regional forces
recruited from Khurasan and Transoxania. Nevertheless, in contrast to the early
Khurasanis who had raised the 'Abbasid family to power, the new Khurasanis
consisted mostly of non-Arab elements, including Bukhariyah, Khwarizmiyah,
Daylamis, and Turks, who jointly were simply described in Muslim chronicles as
'ajam ahl Khurasan.66 Following the defeat of al-Amin and al-Ma'mun's accession
to power, the new Caliph sought to employ more of these eastern non-Arab elements
within his army. In this regard, it is reported that al-Ma'mun used to send envoys to
65In a comparison of the best and most courageous groups of his army, al-Ma'mun classified his army
into four groups: 'ajam ahl Khurasan, mawHi, abna', and A Irak. Ibn Tayfur, Kitah Baghdad, p. 80.
Further, al-Jahiz (Manaqib, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 36-40), who states that he was writing in the days of al-
Mu'tasim about events that took place during the reign of al-Ma'mun, reports on the structure of the
jund al-Khilafah (the army of the Caliphate), stating that this army was composed of five groups:
Khurasanis, Arabs, Turks, mawall, and the abna'. This clearly indicates the separation of the abna'
from the Khurasanis as they first became a distinct group among others.
66Ibn Tayfur, Kitab Baghdad, pp. 80, 147; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 391-3; Ayalon, "Reforms", p. 5;
Sharon, "Reforms", p. 140; Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, pp. 99-102. Ironically, while the abna'
looked on the new Khurasanis in al-Ma'mun's army as 'ajam, the Arab tribesmen of Syria and Jazlrah
viewed both the abna' and the new Khurasanis as 'ajam. Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 141, 426, 652.
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the people of Transoxania, offering salaries to those who wished to be enlisted in the
Dman.67
Although the KhurasanI unit, with its predominantly new non-Arab element,
remained the preponderant military group within the 'Abbasid central army
throughout the reign of Caliph al-Ma'mun, it lost this military distinction soon after
the succession of al-Mu'tasim to the throne in 218/836. Not only did al-Mu'tasim
diverge from the practice of his predecessors by recruiting slave Turks on a large
scale into the anay, but, more importantly, he gave them preference and distinction
• — i •
over all the other groups in his army, including the Khurasanls. Such excessive
preference led eventually to great resentment on the part the KhurasanI commanders,
who sought an occasion to assassinate al-Mu'tasim and replace him by his nephew
al-'Abbas as a means of regaining their former status.69 Nevertheless, their
unsuccessful attempt resulted in the execution of many of the Khurasanls' most
prominent commanders and consequently the eclipse of the Khurasanls as one of the
main units within the 'Abbasid central forces in Iraq.70
',7BaladhurT, Futuh, pp. 528-9.
^Mas'udl, Tanbih, p. 354; idem, Muruj, vol. 4, pp. 53-5; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 29; Tabari, TarMi, vol.
9, p. 71; Ibn Miskawayh, Tajarib, p. 495.
69Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p . 71.
7aIbid., pp. 71-8; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, pp. 46-8; Ibn Kathir, Bidayuh, vol. 10, pp. 288-9;
Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 476; Ibn al-JawzI, Muntazam, vol. 11, pp. 83-5.
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1.2 Th eAbna"'
During the first century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the term abna' was applied to the
descendants of the Khurasan! forces who brought the 'Abbasids to power and later
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settled in Iraq. In addition to being referred to as abna' (sing, abnawi or banawi),
their most common name, they were also known as abna' al-dawlah, abna' al-
shPah, abna' al-kifayah,14 abna' da'wah.75 and abna' al-jund al-Khurasaniyah,76
Moreover, because the early Khurasanis were of mixed race, including both Arabs
and Iranians, the abna' were descended from both stocks. Thus, they were also called
as abna' Khurasan al-muwalladunJ1
Although the abna' were born and raised in Iraq and underwent further Arabization,
they continued to maintain a great deal of pride in their Khurasan! origins. While
they regarded Baghdad as their homeland, Khurasan for them was the nucleus of
71
Literally, the term abna' means 'sons' or 'descendants'. In pre-Islamic history this expression was
used to denote members of the Persian community born in Yaman whose ancestors came first as
soldiers to defend the country against the Ethiopian intervention in AD 575. Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol.
5, pp. 534-6. For further information, see al-Mid'aj, 'Abd al-Muhsin, "al-Abna' rnundhu Dukhulihim
al-Yaman hatta Nihayat al-Qarn al-Thalith al-Hijn: Dirasah II Awda'ihim al-Siyasiyah aw al-
Iqtisadiyah", Dirasat TarBchiyah, no. 37 (Damascus, 1990) pp. 19-46; EI2, s.v. "Abna"'.
T2DInawari, Akhbar, p. 390; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 147, 290.
73Jahiz, Rasai'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 9, 25, 31, 34.
74TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 147, 430.
75Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. I, pt. 1, p. 8.
76IsfahanI, AghanI, vol. 21, p. 61.
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their existence and it was their origins there that, from their point of view, gave them
distinction over other ethnic and regional groups.78 The banawi characteristically
described his place of origin (asl) as Khurasan, the region from which the 'Abbasid
dynasty (dawlah) sprang. However, if Khurasan was the place of origin, then
Baghdad was, for the banawi, the branch (far') and the seat of the Caliphate where
the remaining people of the 'Abbasid da 'wah and the sons of the shi'ah resided, and
as such was viewed by the abna' as 'the Khurasan of Iraq'.79 As he was bom and
raised close to the circle of the Caliph's court, the banawi typically boasted that his
connection to the dynasty was more prestigious than that of his father or grandfather.
In this regard, a banawi states, "We are raised by the Caliphs and we are the
neighbours of the Viziers. We were bom in the court of our kings and under the
wings of our Caliphs."80
The first appearance of the abna' as a distinct military group came with the outbreak
of the civil war between al-Amln and al- Ma'mun in 194/810, during which the
abna' formed the nucleus of al-Amln's army, which was known as ahl Baghdad or
jund ahl Baghdad, vis-a-vis al-Ma'mun's anny, which was described as 'ajam ahl
77Ibn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 80. The author explains further by saying, "Their fathers were those who
led the dawlah.'" Ijjli ^JUt /. The term muwalladun means 'people of mixed origins';
see Ayalon, "Reforms", p. 6. Al-Jahiz (Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 31) states, 'The banawi is a
KhurasanI by virtue of birth." (.«V_jlt y jt-iy- ^yJi)
78Interestingly, the abna' regarded themselves as a distinct group set apart from both the Arabs and
the mawall. Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 26.
191bid., pp. 25-6.
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Khurasan.8I It should be noted, however, that when sources speak of the abna' in
the time of the civil war, they clearly distinguish between two groups, each of which
had its own military commanders and its own specific political agenda. This division
within the abna' community seems to have been based on two key factors: first, the
geographical location of their settlements in Baghdad; and, second, the variations in
position and privileges enjoyed by each within the 'Abbasid court and the army. A
search for the origins of this split suggests that it dated to the year J 51/769. This was
the year when Caliph al-Mansur decided to found al-Rasafah, or 'Askar al-Mahdi,
on the east bank of the Tigris, to serve as a military encampment for his son and heir
apparent, al-Mahdi.82 According to historical sources, the insurrection of the
standing troops in Baghdad in 151/759 had made al-Mansur aware of the expediency
of dividing his army in Baghdad. Thus, while he stationed part of it in al-Rasafah,
the other part remained on the left bank of the city. By this arrangement, he could
use one division against the other in the event of an insurrection by either.83 By this
expedient, the Caliph created in effect two distinct centres of military encampment in
Baghdad: one in the north-west suburb of al-Harbiyah, on the western bank of the
mibid„ p. 28.
s'lbn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 147. There is no doubt that not all the members of the army of ahl Baghdad
were descended from the early Khurasanls. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide us with many
clues that would help in determining the identity of the different groups in this army. However, what
we may be certain of is that the abna' constituted the backbone of this army. Al-Tabari (Tarikh, vol.
8, pp. 412, 423) reports that after the defeat of 'All b. 'isa b. Mahan, al-Amln dispatched another
army consisting of 20,000 abna' under the command of'Abd al-Rahman al-Abnawi. With the defeat
of this army, al-Amln dispatched a third army consisting of 20,000 abna' under the command of
'Abdallah b. Qahtabah, in order to try to halt the advance of al-Ma'mun's forces towards Baghdad.
S2Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 37
i3lbid., pp. 37-9; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 198.
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Tigris, and the other in the suburb of al-Rasafah, on the east bank. According to
topographical sources, just as had happened on the western side, many prominent
Khurasan! commanders received land grants in al-Rasafah and their numbers there
seemed to increase over time and that for two reasons. First, it was because al-
Rasafah became the administrative centre of the government and the residence of the
'Abbasid Caliphs from the time of al-Mahdl. Second, al-Rasafah had more space
available for new constniction than the west side, which was a tightly constricted
peninsula located between the rivers Euphrates and the Tigris.84 In recognition of
this topographical separation, the abna' who inhabited the east side came to be
oc
referred to as ahl al-janib al-sharqi ('the people of the east side'), while the abna'
who remained on the west side were known as al-harbiyah,H6 ahl al-janib al-gharbl
('the people of the west side'), 87 or abna' al-arbad ('the abna' of the suburbs').88
Regarding their leaders, although sources indicate that Khuzaymah b. Khazim,
Muhammad b. al-'Abbas, and others were among the leaders of the abna' of the east
side, 'All b. 'Isa b. Mahan, and later his son, al-Husayn, were the key figures around
^Ya'qubi, Buldan, pp. 22, 25.
85Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 546, 566, 571.
86Ibid., pp. 429-30, 535, 543, 544; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 439^t0. In a geographical context,
Harbiyah refers to the quarter of Baghdad so called, north of the Syrian Gate of the Round City,
balancing Karkh to its south. Originally the quarter was named after al-Mansur's commander Harb b.
'Abdallah. See Le Strange, Baghdad, pp. 107-35; Lassner, Topography, pp. 68, 112, 254.
s7Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 546.
mlbid„ p. 497.
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whom the entire company of the abna' of the east side congregated.89 On the other
hand, there were two distinguished leaders amongst the abna' of the west side. The
first and most important was Muhammad b. Abl Khalid al-MarwazI, who is
described by Ya'qubl as "the chief commander of the harbiyah and the most obeyed
amongst them."90 The second was Asad al-Harbl. Although there is no reference in
the relevant sources to his family or origin, he was probably the son of Aba Asad, a
mawla of Caliph al-Mansur and one of his commanders, after whom the river near
the Batlhah area of Baghdad was named.91
The second indicator of the distinction between the two factions of abna' seems to
relate to the position and privileges enjoyed by each at that time in both the army and
the court. This fact is well illustrated throughout a passage in al-Tabari which
™Ibid., pp. 405, 411, 428-30. For some historical background to the family of 'All b. 'isa b. Mahan
during and after the 'Abbasid revolution, see Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 104, 106.
<x,Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 439. ".(v+j J-** ^y j " . Muhammad belonged to a very
prominent family who settled in Khurasan in Marw al-Rudh. His father, Abu Khalid, was described
as one of the revolutionary commanders who fought against the Umayyad forces first in Khurasan and
later in Iraq. After the establishment of Baghdad, Abu Khalid, along with other followers from Marw
al-Rudh, received a portion of land (fief) in the north-west of the Round City. His name continues to
be mentioned in the sources as one of the 'Abbasid commanders, and the last mention of him relates
to the year 171/788 when he defeated al-Fadl b. Sa'Id, one of the Khari jite rebels. Presumably he died
soon after that date. Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 105; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 391, 418; vol. 8,
pp.41,113, 235.
91
Baladhurx, Futuh, pp. 359-60; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 384. The administrative and military
separation between the two camps in Baghdad became evident as early as the reign of al-Mahdl.
Jurisdictional sources, for example, point out that starting from the time of Caliph al-Mahdl, each side
had its own judges. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 140; K. al-'Uyun, p. 281; Khatib, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 389;
vol. 12, p. 308; Waki', Akhbar al-Qtidah, vol. 3, p. 25. With regard to the military separation, the
clearest testimony to this comes in an account by al-Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 431) relating to events in
the time of the civil war. In it al-Tabari notes that after Caliph al-Amin had pardoned al-Husayn b.
'All b. 'Isa b. Mahan for his attempt to overthrow him, the latter simply became "the sole master of
both camps in Baghdad" (jiJ*—A\ o_^).
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describes the events that took place during the attempt of al-Husayn b. 'All b. 'Isa b.
Mahan to depose and imprison al-Amin in 196/812:
Muhammad b. Abi Khalid stood up at the Syrian Gate and said,
'Men! By God, I do not know why al-Husayn b. 'All is acting as
if he were our commander and taking charge of this affair instead
of us. He is not the oldest among us, nor the one among us with
the greatest claim to honor, nor the highest among us in rank.' ...
Asad al-Harbl stood up and said, 'People of Harbiyah, this is a
day of great consequence. You have been asleep, and your sleep
has lasted a long time. You have lagged behind, and others have
been given precedence over you. Some people have taken the
position that Muhammad [al-AmTn] should be deposed and
imprisoned; as far you, go and take the position that he should be
released and set free.'... '[The troops from] Harbiyah arose, and
with them arose most of the people of the suburbs, with drawn
swords and good equipment. They fought fiercely against al-
Husayn b. 'Alt and his forces from mid-morning until the rays of
the sun grew weak, inflicting many wounds upon his forces. Al-
Husayn was taken prisoner. Asad al-Harbl went in to Muhammad,
broke his fetters, and seated him in the caliph's seat. Muhammad
noticed some men who were not wearing military or army
clothing and who were not carrying weapons; he gave them
orders, and they took what they needed from the weapons that
were in the storerooms.92
As in the case of the first factor previously described, the origin of this distinction in
privilege between the abna' seems also to go back to the reign of al-Mansur and the
foundation of al-Rasafah. According to sources that discuss the foundation of al-
Rasafah, al-Mansur not only sought to break up the unity of his army in Baghdad by
dividing it along the banks of the Tigris, but also to sow seeds of rivalry between the
men of the two camps. The purpose of this was, as mentioned above, to enable him
to use one against the other when the need arose. Nevertheless, while Caliph al-
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Mansur must have realized that, to be able to play this risky game, he had first to
distance himself from their disagreements and maintain a delicate balance between
the men of the two camps, his successors seem not to have been quite so aware of
this requirement. Instead, they tended to rely more on the people of the east side.
This can be largely attributed to the crucial political role that some of the
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commanders of the east side played, particularly in the matter of succession.
Consequently, as one may conclude, the rise in status of these commanders must
have reflected favourably on the abna' who followed them and who lived on the
same side of the city, to the extent that they came to represent the elite of the
standing army in Baghdad, who consequently were able to maintain, if not gain more
of, the social and financial privileges that their fathers had enjoyed before them.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the river, many of the abna' there not only found
themselves outside of the 'Abbasid military establishment, but also lost much of the
high status and privileges that their ancestors possessed at the beginning of 'Abbasid
rule.94
The ultimate effect of this distinction in position and privileges was not only the
social divide that occurred between the abna' population, but, more important, the
development over time of jealousy and dissatisfaction, especially among the
<hTabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 429-30. (English translation quoted from, M. Fishbein, The History of
Taborl, vol. 31, pp. 110-12.)
93 The three Khurasanl families who played the most vital role in the matter of succession after the
reign of al-Mansur were those of 'All b. fsa b. Mahan, Yahya b. Khalid al-Barmaki, and Khazini b.
Khuzaymah. On the role they played, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 206, 209, 232, 455. According to
topographical sources, all of these were residents ofal-Rasafah. See e.g. Ya'qubl, Buldan, pp. 22-4.
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Harbiyah, who, during the civil war, saw the abna' of the east side acting contrary to
their own interests.95
Describing the role they played during the civil war, sources clearly indicate that
both elements of abna' sided with al-Amln more for their own interests than because
of their love for and loyalty to the Caliph. While the eastern abna' fought to protect
their privileges which they perceived to be under threat from al-Ma'mun's new
Khurasanis, the western abna' did so as a means to regain the position which they
had lost. Therefore, both sides were ready not only to withdraw their support from
the Caliph, but also to turn against him, when they perceived him to be acting
contrary to their interests.96
With the defeat of al-Amin and the fall of Baghdad, the abna' continued to form the
bulk of the 'Abbasid fighting force in Baghdad.97 But, with their well-honed
military skills and their uncertain commitment to the new authority, the abna'
became a very disruptive element in Baghdad, especially with the inability of the
94 This is clearly illustrated by the speech of Asad al-Harbi. See Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 29-30.
95See e.g. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 429-30.
96Sources indicate that the abna' of the east side, under the leadership of al-Husayn b. 'All, turned
against Caliph al-Amln when they felt that he started to show some signs of favouring the Arabs
(.Zawaqil) at their expense. Meanwhile, the abna' of the west side, under the leadership of
Muhammad b. Abl Khalid, who had experienced a rise in status after they had saved the Caliph from
al-Husayn, soon turned against him later when they felt that their position was beginning to be
threatened by the inclination of the Caliph toward his new Baghdadi recruits. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8,
pp. 430-2, 493-4. For more details on the abna' during the civil war, see Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate,
pp. 142-8. As for the Zawaqil, they were largely of Qaysl tribesmen, who were known for brigandage.
As for the term itself, it seems to be derived from the way they tied their turbans. See discussions on
pp. 56-57.
97Sources estimate their number at the end of the civil war at 125,000, comprising both cavalry and
infantry. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 550; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 430.
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disruptive element in Baghdad, especially with the inability of the new authority to
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pay their salaries regularly.
After his return to Baghdad in 204/819, Caliph al-Ma'mun tried to establish his
authority and bring order to the city, which had been in disarray since the time of the
civil conflict. To achieve this end, he sought first a reconciliation with the abna' by
winning over the side of 'isa b. Muhammad b. Abl Khalid, who became, after the
end of the civil war, the most influential person among the abna' community in
Baghdad. Nevertheless, al-Ma'mun seems also to have understood the expediency
of draining as much as possible of the abna"s energy, and there was no better way to
do so than to send them on far-flung military campaigns against the Caliphate's
enemies. Thus, in 205/821, al-Ma'mun appointed 'isa b. Muhammad as governor of
Armenia and Adharbayjan, and instructed him to take with him all of the abna' who
resided on his side of Baghdad and who were involved in local disturbances, to face
the rebel forces of Babak in Adharbayjan.99 Despite their defeat and the great losses
they suffered at the hands of Babak's forces, the abna' continued to be present as a
distinct military group within the 'Abbasid central army until the time of al-
Mu'tasim, when they started to become eclipsed by the growing numbers and
98Tabari, TarM, vol. 8, pp. 495-7, 543-4, 546, 548-9, 553-5, 557, 570-1.
99
Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 462; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 580; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 356.
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influence of the Turks in the army and the shift of the capital from Baghdad to
Samarra'.100
13 The Arabs'01
The cause of the success of the 'Abbasid revolution in overthrowing the Umayyads
can be safely attributed to the disturbed balance of power that existed between the
northern tribes (Mudarites) and the southern tribes (Yamanites), and the inclination
of the latter to the 'Abbasid side first in Khurasan and later in Iraq and Syria.'02
The campaigns of conquest were naturally disruptive of the long-settled patterns of
Arabian society, as they entailed a shift from Bedouin to urban ways of life, as
different tribes settled together, first in garrison towns and later in the cities of the
conquered lands. It might have been expected that this disruption and resettlement
would tend to weaken tribal loyalty and so work to diminish rivalries and jealousies
between the different tribes that were now forced to live together. However, since
l00Tabari, TarAh, vol. 9, p. 17; Azdl, TarAh, p. 416. As far as one can tell, the last mention of the
abna' within the formation of the 'Abbasid regular forces was in 220/835, when, as al-Tabari relates
(Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 12, 14), a person known as 'Alwayah al-A'war (the One-Eycd), one of the abna'
commanders, was amongst the military leaders who participated in the war against Babak al-
Khurraml and was killed in action at the same.
101It is almost certain that when Muslim historians such as al-Tabari mention the Arab tribal forces of
Mudar, Yaman, and Rabi'ah as part of the 'Abbasid central forces in the time of Caliph al-Mansur,
they are referring to the Arab tribesmen of Iraq and Syria who joined the 'Abbasids at a later stage
and not to the Arabs of Khurasan, who, even after the establishment of the 'Abbasid regime, remained
a distinct group within those known as ahl Khurasan or the Khurasanivah. On the politico-social
distinction between the Arabs of Khurasan and the Arabs of Iraq and Syria, see Sharon, "Reform", p.
131.
l02Goitein (Studies, p. 155) notes that the Umayyad State fell apart once the Syrian imperial army lost
its esprit de corps when tribal conflicts leaked into its ranks.
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the settlement in these cities was organized on a tribal basis, each tribe living in its
own quarter, tribal cohesion was in fact strengthened rather than weakened.103 This
tribal organization of the cities consolidated the tribes as distinct units as it prevented
much inter-tribal mixing. However, the new closeness of the tribes in their separate
quarters made friction inevitable between the tribes, which caused in turn unrest and
feuding among them. In Syria, tribal feuding arose between the dominant Yamanites
and the Qaysites of Mudar.104 This tribal feuding began when the two tribes
competed with each other to gain the favour of the authority in the region and so
obtain appointments to governmental posts, which were a source of both wealth and
influence. In actual practice, the authority chose most often to rely on the Yamanites
as they were the stronger of the two factions. Although this strengthened relations
between the Yamanites and the authority, it caused the Qaysites, who found
themselves deprived of office and influence, to turn against the authority as well as to
increase in their hostility toward the Yamanites.
The policy of Mu'awiyah (41-60/661-680), the first Umayyad Caliph, had been in
the same vein. He had favoured the Yamanites so that he could rely upon them in
lo;,Baladhun, Futuh, pp 338-50; Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 4, pp. 44-5; at-'AG, Tanzmtat, pp. 34-40;
Deihani, al-Khufa, pp. 101-16.
104 A look at the pattern of settlement of Arab tribes in Syria shows that the Yamanites constituted the
majority of the Arab population, especially in areas such as Palestine, Jordan, Damascus, Hints, and
Hamat. Meanwhile, the Qaysites were dominant only in Qinnasrin and its environs as well as in
Jazlrah. The prior occupation of the region by Yamanite tribes meant that it held a special interest for
the conquering Yamanites. When a group of Yamanites came to Caliph 'Umar I asking him to allow
them to participate in the conquest, 'Umar asked them which fronts were preferable to them. The
Yamanites replied, "Syria, the land of our ancestors." Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 462.
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confronting 'All b. Abi Talib in the battle of Siffin in 337/658.105 This reliance on
and favouritism towards the Yamanites was only enhanced after the battle of Marj
Rahit in 64/684, in which the northern tribes, who were bitterly disappointed by the
Umayyads' pro-Yamanite policy, gave their full support to Ibn al-Zubayr, while the
Yamanites retained their loyalty to the Umayyad family.106 Although Caliph 'Abd
al-Malik (65-86/685-705) was able to attract the Qaysites to the Umayyad side,
particularly after reaching an agreement with their leader, Zufar b. al-Harith al-
Kilabl, he was careful that this was not at the expense of the Yamanites and their
privileges.107
However, the tradition of Yamanite support for the Umayyads was broken under
Caliph Yazid II (101-105/720-724), who initiated an openly pro-Qaysite policy at the
expense of the Yamanites, who were devastated by the death of Yazid b. al-Muhallab
and the collapse of his attempted revolt in 102/720.108 Yazid II was succeeded by his
brother Hisham (105-125/724-744). As a means of breaking the growing power of
the Qays tribes that developed under his brother, Hisham began his rule by
instituting a pro-Yamanite policy. Nevertheless, later, in 120/738, he tended more
105 Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, pp. 11-32; Minqarf, Siffin, p. 232. Concerning the favour shown by
Mu'awiyah to the Yamanites, see Isfahan!, Aghani, vol. 18, pp. 69-70; Minqari, Sifjin, pp. 292-3.
10(5
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 537; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p.258; Ibn IChayyat, Tarikh, pp. 199-200.
107 'Abd Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, p. 96.
108
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, pp. 595-7; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 310-1. On the nature of Yazld's
revolt, see Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 81-2, 93-5. On the history of the family of al-Muhallab,
see Naf!', al-'Abbud, Al al-Muhallab b. AbiSafrah wa Dawrihim fial-Tarikh hatta al-Qarn al-Rabi'
al-Hjri (Baghdad, 1979).
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towards the Qaysites. His suddenly new anti-Yamanite policy was clearly illustrated
by the dismissal of Khalid al-Qasri and the appointment of Yusuf b. 'Umar of Qays
as the governor of Iraq and all of the Eastern Provinces.109 The anger and frustration
of the Yamanite tribes in Syria as well as in Iraq reached its climax in the time of
Caliph al-Walid II (125-126/744-744), whose hatred of the Yamanites caused him
virtually to sell Khalid b. al-Qasri to Yusuf b. 'Umar, who tortured and executed him
in Kufah in 126/743.110 In addition to his quarrel with the Yamanites, al-Walid also
took a hostile stance against other members of the Umayyad family, particularly the
sons of 'Abd al-Malik, Walid and Hisham.111
It was not long, however, before a serious revolt broke out, headed by Yazid b.
Walid b. 'Abd al-Malik, who was supported by the Yamanite tribes in Syria. This
revolution ended with the death of Walid II and the inauguration of Yazid III in
126/744. Six months later, Yazid died and was succeeded by his brother Ibrahim,
who followed in the footsteps of his brother by recognizing only the Yamanite tribes.
Ibrahim, however, was soon opposed by Marwan b. Muhammad, the governor of
Armenia, who was supported by the Qaysites, whose interests had suffered during
the short reign of Yazid III. In 127/745, Marwan was able to seize power and, as a
token ofhis admiration for his Qaysite supporters, he decided to shift his capital from
109 Tabari, TarMi, vol. 7, pp. 142-50; Ya'qubl, vol. 2, pp. 322-4; Ibn Khaldun, al-'lbcir, vol. 3, p. 205;
Sharon, 'Abhasid Revolution, p. 39.
""islamic sources indicate that Yusuf b. 'Umar paid the Caliph 50 million dirhams to have Khalid
handed over to him. Tabari, Tza-ikh, vol. 7, pp. 233-4; DInawari, Akhbar, pp. 347-8; DhahabI, Kitab
al-'Ibar, vol. I, p. 162.
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Damascus to Harran in Jazirah. At this point the Yamanite tribes found that they had
no other option but to side with the opposition, who happened to be the 'Abbasids,
less for the love of their cause, than for their hatred of the Qaysites and Marwan who
supported them."2
The critical role that the Yamanite tribes played for the 'Abbasids was evident, not
just in Khurasan, but also during their confrontation with the Umayyad armies in
Iraq and Syria. The fall of many important cities such as Kufah, Basrah, Wasit, and
Damascus without any real resistance came above all as a result of the support of the
Yamanite tribesmen for the 'Abbasids. The 'Abbasids in their turn were able to win
their support, on the one hand by exploiting the traditional enmity between the
Yamanites and Marwan, and on the other by promising them high status in the new-
113bom dynasty.
With respect to the Qaysite tribes, who were the main supporters of Caliph Marwan
b. Muhammad, they seemed to realize that the end of the Umayyad rule was
imminent. The hopelessness of any further resistance became clear after the collapse
of the Umayyad defences in Khurasan and later in Iraq, and the subsequent defeat of
'"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 231.
"2Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, pp. 246-7.
113Dmawari, Akhbar, p. 368, Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 417, 453-4; Akhbar, pp. 371-2; Ibn Qutaybah,
Imamah, pt. 2, p. 151; Azdl, Tarikh, pp. 158-71; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 261; Ibn Athlr, Karnil, vol.
5, p. 16.
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the vast and well-equipped forces of Marwan in the battle of Zab in 132/750."14
Therefore, fearing the consequences that would result form such support, many of
the Qaysites in cities such as Mawsil, Qinnasrin, and Harran chose to withdraw their
support from Marwan and declare their full subordination to the new regime."5
With the end of the revolutionary period and immediately upon their accession to
power, the 'Abbasids had to deal with the Arab tribal forces, who for convenience
can be classified into two categories. First, there were the Arab warriors in the
various provinces who were already enrolled in the Umayyads' Diwan and whose
role in supporting the 'Abbasids was confined mainly to matters of politics and
logistics. The second category was a combination of two groups of Arab fighting
forces: first, those who once had been part of the active Syrian army (ahl al-Sham)
prior to their deserting to the 'Abbasid side, especially during the fighting in Iraq"6
and, second, a considerable number of urban Arab tribesmen, mostly Iraqis, who,
despite their expert martial skills, were not, in fact, enrolled in the Diwan, at least at
that time."7 Unlike the Arab warriors of the first category, the latter combination of
fighting forces did join the ranks of the Khurasan! forces in the actual fighting
n4The battle of Zab is discussed in great detail in Azdl, Taiikh, pp. 125-33.
ll5Ma'sudI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 260; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 439-40.
"6DInawari, Akhbar-, p. 368; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 419, 454.
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against the Umayyad forces in Iraq and in the pursuit of Caliph Marwan b.
Muhammad. In this regard, for example, the actual slaying of Marwan in the short,
sharp battle that took place in the village of Abu Buslr in Egypt is attributed to a
Basran, while his subsequent beheading is attributed to a Kufan pomegranate
seller."8
During the reign of the first 'Abbasid Caliph, the 'Abbasid authority continued to
adhere to the policy, that had been instituted during the revolution, of maintaining the
status quo and accepting the co-operation of all those who agreed to support them.
Thus, the Arab warriors in the various provinces such as Jazlrah, Syria, and Egypt
retained many of their former positions and privileges, including that of the 'ata\
which continued to be paid in accordance with the lists of the Umayyad Diwans that
were kept in each region."9 On some occasions these provincial tribal forces even
joined forces with the 'Abbasid central army, the Khurasanls, in military campaigns
against the Byzantines at this early stage of the 'Abbasid rule. Sources, for example,
point out that 'Abdallah b. 'All, an uncle of Caliph Abu al-'Abbas and al-Mansur,
,l7We know, for example, that Muhammad b. Khalid al-Qasri along with his follow Yemenite
tribesmen in Kufah, who had joined the 'Abbasid revolutionary forces, were not at that time enrolled
in the Umayyad Diwan. DInawari, Akhbar, p. 368. As to their number, while Akhbai- (pp. 355-6)
estimates it at 1,000, Baladhurl (Ansab, vol. 3, p. 138) exaggerates it, citing 11,000. For more on the
role of the Iraqis in supporting the 'Abbasids against the Umayyads in Iraq, see Tabari, Tai Mi, vol. 7,
pp. 417-8, 420, 426, Akhbar, pp. 355-6, 366-8.
ll8Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 441-2.
119On the Iraqi warriors, see Tabari, Tai-ikh, vol. 7, p. 426; Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 143; K. al-
'Uyun, p. 200; Abt, Nathr al-Durar, vol. 3, p. 80; Ibn Abi Hadld, Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah, vol. 7, p.
157. On the Syrian warriors, see Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 147. On the Egyptians, see Kind!, Wulat,
p. 122.
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led a great army on a summer expedition (sa'ifah) against the Byzantines in 136/754.
This force was made up of Khurasanis, Syrians, and men from Jazirah and
Mawsil.120
With regard to the Arab warriors of the second category, their integration with the
Khurasanis was not confined to the revolutionary period, but continued after the
establishment of the 'Abbasid regime. Both the Khurasanis and those Arab elements
who came to form the central army of the new-bom 'Abbasid state, were enrolled in
one Dhvan under the framework of the term 'Khurasanl'.121 This compound military
bloc seems to have remained intact until the year 151/768 when, for unclear reasons,
the different elements composing it rioted against Caliph al-Mansur in Baghdad.
Historical sources point out that during this event al-Mansur expressed to Qutham b.
al-'Abbas, an old member of the 'Abbasid family, his great concern that the army
might reunite and turn against him. When al-Mansur asked for his advice, the latter
asked the Caliph to give him until the following day to come up with a scheme that
would prevent such an alliance between the troops. Qutham went home and ordered
his slave (ghulam) to wait until the next day, when he would be at the Caliph's court
among high-ranking courtiers (ashab al-maratib), and then persistently ask the
following question: "Which of the tribes is more noble (ashraf), Yaman or Mudar?"
When the slave asked this question at court, as part of the plan, Qutham tried to
avoid answering the question, but when the slave persisted in demanding an answer,
l20TabarI, TarMi, vol. 7, p. 472.
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Qutham responded by saying, "Mudar is more honourable because the Prophet came
from among them, the Qur'an is among them, the house of Allah [the Ka'bah] is in
their land, and from them comes the Caliph of Allah."122 This answer outraged the
Yamanite tribesmen and aroused great tension between the two tribes. The tradition
concludes that by this skilful political manoeuvre, which was appreciated by al-
Mansur, the army was divided into four factions: Mudar, Yaman, Khurasan!, and
Rabl'ah. Also, acting on advice from Qutham, the Caliph divided his troops between
Baghdad and al-Rasafah, on the east bank of the river Tigris. Therefore, should the
forces on one side rebel, the Caliph would be able to use those on the other side to
oppose them.123
Although Caliph al-Mansur was able to fragment the unity of his troops, he must
have fully understood the risks involved in such a tactic, as it was one of the main
organizational factors that had led to the dissolution of the Umayyad standing army
and consequently the state itself. Al-Mansur, therefore, seems to have sought a
permanent solution to this danger by sifting from his army those tribal troops, who
proved to be still affected by 'the plague of tribalism' ('asabiyah). He wished
thereby to keep close at hand and at his disposal only the Khurasanis, who, since
taking up residence in Khurasan, had left behind their tribal fanaticism and adopted
121
Jahshiyarf, Wuzara', p. 94; Ibn al-Muqaffa', Rasa'il, pp. 124-5.
'"Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 38-9.
mTabarI, Tarjkh, vol. 8, p. 39.
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instead a regional unity.124 This solution appears to have been initiated in 154/771
when, as it seems responsible to deduce, al-Mansur dispatched all of the tribal
troops, along with others from Iraq and Syria, under the command of Yazld b. Hatim
al-Muhallabi of Azd on a military campaign against the Kharijites in Ifriqiya.125
Unlike the conclusion of previous campaigns, however, when the anny would return
to its homeland, this time the troops would settle there permanently after the
campaign.126 By this measure Caliph al-Mansur not only removed the tribal
elements from his central army in Baghdad, but most importantly, he put an end to
any future admission of tribesmen from Iraq, Jazlrah, and Syria into the 'Abbasid
military institution.
It is worth noting that al-Mansur's stipulations vis-a-vis the Arab forces in Baghdad
were part of an overall policy that he implemented with regard to the Arab provincial
forces, particularly those of Iraq, Jazirah, and Syria. The end of the conquests,
especially on the Byzantine front, meant that the 'Abbasid central government no
longer needed a large reserve of manpower. Rather, it needed only a central army
who could suppress any internal uprisings and mount occasional expeditions against
the Byzantines. Moreover, unlike his Umayyad predecessors, al-Mansur, and indeed
all of the 'Abbasid Caliphs after him, tended to rely increasingly on the non-Arab
elements in their armies, who, in contrast to the Arab tribesmen, were far more
l24Sharon, Black Banners, pp. 51-2; Lassner, Shaping, p. 122.
l25Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 8, p. 44; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 206.
l26Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 191-2.
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disciplined and free of any tribal 'asabiyah. All of these issues incited Caliph al-
Mansur to undertake the demilitarization of the Arab provinces, particularly Iraq,
Jazlrah, and Syria. The policy was carried out in two ways: first, by emptying these
areas of as much as possible of their military manpower by permanently transferring
large numbers of them to the frontier zones with Byzantium, India, Ifriqiya,
Armenia, and Adharbayjan;127 and, second, by abandoning the old system of 'ata'
and voluntary service, which had been the main mechanism in the recruitment of
Muslim armies since the time of 'Umar, and replacing it with a new system of
artizaq and professionalism. In other words, this meant that only those who
participated practically in military service would be eligible to receive stipends.128
This dramatic change in the organization of the Muslim military institution, which
was accompanied by the halt of the conquests and increased reliance by the
'Abbasids on non-Arab elements in the army, led to a situation where many of the
Arab tribesmen who remained in their homelands, particularly in Syria and Jazlrah,
found themselves suddenly without stipends, food subsidies, and booty. In other
words, the main source of income, which these Arab tribesmen had relied on since
the rise of Islam, was cut off. This led over time to the transformation of many of
these highly skilled former troops (who were found mainly among the Qaysites in
Jazirah and Syria) into brigands or what came to be known in Islamic sources as
l27Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 371-2,426; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 199, 223, 236, 246.
128The recipients were called murtazaqcih (sing, murtazaq). More detailed discussion of this issue can
be found in Ch. Two, where we discuss the Dman and soldiers' pay.
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zawaqil.'29 This was a way of life that they seem to have adopted not only as a
means of livelihood, but also in order to express their bitterness and disaffection with
the central authority.130
The absence of Arab tribal elements within the main body of the 'Abbasid central
armies remained noticeable from the time of Caliph al-Mansur until the time of the
civil war. While al-Ma'mun put all his weight behind the new Khurasanls, Caliph
al-Amin was compelled, after the series of defeats suffered by the abna', to turn
desperately for support to the Arab blocs in Syria and Jazirah as the final resort in
preventing the deterioration of his military position. Nevertheless, his attempt was
129 The term Zawaqil is associated in the Islamic sources with the word mutalasasah (robbers). See,
for example, Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 262, 425-7. What indicates that the zawaqil were Arabs,
mainly Qaysites, and that they were once part of the regime is the names of their leaders. The two
most renowned of their leaders were al-'Abbas b. Zufar al-Hilall and Nasr b. Shabath al-'Uqayll, both
of whom were of Qays. As for al-'Abbas, he was most probably the son of Zufar b. 'Asim al-Hilall,
who was the governor of Halab in the time of Caliph Abu al-'Abbas. Although Zufar supported
'Abdallah b. 'All against al-Mansur, he was later pardoned and became one of the closest courtiers of
al-Mansur. His high status endured until the end of al-Mahdl's reign when, in 163/780, he was
discharged from his position as governor of Jazirah. Thereafter we find no mention of him in the
sources and it seems most probable that his status and that of his sons deteriorated during al-Rashld's
time, especially after the tribal struggle between Yaman and Qays in Jazirah and Syria in 176/793. As
for Shabath, al-Azd! (Tarikh, p. 328) indicates that he was the governor of Jazirah in the time of al-
Amin and was discharged from his post in 198/814. On Zufar, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 475; vol.
8, pp. 50, 53,132,147,149, 427. On Nasr, see ibid., vol. 8, pp. 427, 527, 579, 580-1, 598-9. For more
details on the Zawaqil, sec EI2, s.v. "ZawaqiFPaul M. Cobb, White Banners. Contention in 'Abbasid
Syria, 750-880. Albany, 2001.
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faced by great resistance from the abna', who viewed these Arabs as rivals whose
presence would constitute a great threat to their privileges and interests both in the
army and in the 'Abbasid court.131 Therefore, it was not long after, when both
parties came together to form an alliance in order to face al-Ma'mun's army, that a
quarrel broke out between the two, which ended in bloody fighting, after which the
Syrians decided to withdraw their support and return to their homeland.132 As a
result of this decision, the Arabs of Syria lost the long-awaited opportunity to regain
their position in the military institutions, which had been lost since the days of Caliph
al-Mansur.
It is worthy of note, however, that while the Syrian Arab tribes failed to establish a
foothold in the 'Abbasid military institution, another obscure Arab element
succeeded in emerging as a major component of the army of Baghdad during the
civil war. These were the Bedouin (A 'rab, sing. A 'rabi), whose mode of life
consisted of constant movement from one place to another in search of better
l30The best example of this is the revolt in Jazirah of Nasr b. Shabath al-'Uqayll, the leader of the
zawaqil in Raqqa. His revolt, the main supporters of which were Arabs, started in 198/814 and
intensified during the reign of al-Ma'mun and until the year 209/825. Nasr's revolt expressed the
widespread grievance and resentment that the Arabs felt toward the 'Abbasid policy of favouring non-
Arabs over the Arabs. This was clearly shown when a group of Talibis tried to persuade Nasr to
support their cause, but Nasr refused saying, "My inclination is toward the 'Abbasid family and the
reason I am fighting them is only to defend the Arabs, because they [the 'Abbasids] have put the
'a/am over them [the Arabs]." Azdl, Tarikh, p. 334. For more on the revolt of Nasr, see Shakir, BanI
al-'Abbas, vol. 1, pp. 724-30; Kennedy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 168. On the role of the zawaqil during
the civil war, see Ayalon, "Reform", pp. 18-20; Kennedy, 'Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 142-3. On the term
zawaqil, see Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab, s.v., "zaqal"; FiruzabadI, al-Qamus ul-Muhit, p. 1305.
131Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 429; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 385.
l32Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 426-7; Ibn al-Atlur, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 384-5.
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pastures for their flocks.'33 Although the A'rab were amongst the earlier Arab
factions in Arabia to embrace Islam, yet they were never been part of the Muslim
regular armies. This was owing to the fact that, since the days of the Prophet, the
A 'rab had always resisted the desire of the Muslim authority that they abandon their
nomadic life and join their urban-dwelling Muslim brothers (ahl al-hadarah) in a
unity in which all would share equally in their collective responsibilities, including
that of jihad.134 On this account, the A 'rab were always viewed by the urbanized
Muslims, as well as by Muslim jurists, as the most inferior group in Muslim society,
as they were not only ignorant of the Islamic teachings (SharTah) but were also
reluctant to follow them.135
With the expansion of Muslim conquests beyond the confines of Arabia, many of the
A 'rab tribes were persuaded to leave their homelands and move toward the fertile
areas of Iraq and Syria. Yet, unlike other Muslims who settled in the garrison towns
(amsar), many of the A 'rab tribes chose to continue their nomadic way of life,
wandering around the outskirts of some of the main cities such as Kufah, Basrah,
Mawsil, and Damascus. Like the Arab tribal townsmen, the A 'rab in Umayyad times
* * 136
served both on the side of rebel forces as well as in the Umayyad armies.
Nevertheless, even those who served in the Umayyad armies continued to be denied
mZubay<E, Taj al-Arus, vol. 2, p. 214; Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 224, 227, 232, 240, 243.
,34Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 240.
l3SIbid.
l36Kennedy, The Caliphate, p. 286.
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the right to enlistment in the Diwan and thus receipt of regular stipends.137 Instead,
in return for their services, the Umayyad authority either offered them their legal
share of the plunder or, at times, would subsidize them to come and serve when
called upon.138
In early 'Abbasid times, the first reference to the A 'rab comes during the advance of
the revolutionary forces westward toward Iraq. Some of the 'Abbasid commanders,
such as Abu Salamah al-Khalal, are reported to have appealed to the A'rab who
populated the areas around cities such as Kufah, Basrah, and Mawsil to join the
'Abbasids' forces in their fight against the Umayyads.139 Those A 'rab who are
recorded as having responded to the appeal to join with the 'Abbasid forces did so
more for the love of plunder than on account of their devotion to the 'Abbasid cause
and, soon after the end of the revolutionary period, they disappeared completely from
the ranks of the 'Abbasid army.140 But, during the civil war, sixty years after their
first appearance on the 'Abbasid side, the A 'rab suddenly re-emerged as a major
element within the army of Baghdad.141 Their numbers were large and in a single
campaign against al-Ma'mun's forces they were able to put more than 20,000 men
1,7lbn Sallam, Amwal, p. 240.
138Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 90.
iy>Akhbar, pp. 355, 368.
I40ln fact, the A 'tab, especially those in Iraq, emerged in the early years of the 'Abbasid rule as an
unruly element engaging in highway robbery. Basawl, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 1, p. 157.
l4lTabari, TarJkh, vol. 8, pp. 409, 412.
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into the battlefield.142 Unlike the abna', whose loyalties fluctuated, the A 'rab stood
firmly to the end behind Caliph al-Amln. They defended him not only against
outside threats but also against the abna' and their attempts to blackmail the
Caliph.143 The role of the A 'rab in the 'Abbasid central forces, however, soon ended
with the fall of Baghdad and the death of al-Amln. In fact, under al-Ma'mun both
the A 'rab and the Arab townsmen of Syria and Jazlrah were dismissed completely
from the 'Abbasid military establishment. In the case of the former, it was sufficient
for one to be accused of being an A 'rabl for the 'Abbasid authority to dismiss him
without hesitation.144 Meanwhile, with regard to the urbanized Arabs of Syria and
Jazlrah, al-Ma'mun pursued a policy of turning them out of his military institutions
irrespective of the tribes they belonged to.145
The final blow to the Arabs in the 'Abbasid military institution fell in the time of al-
Mu'tasim, the Caliph who was responsible for introducing Turks into the army on a
large scale. Al-Mu'tasim not only pursued the policy of turning the Arabs of Syria,
,41Ibid. p. 440.
mIbid. p. 412.
144Jahiz, Rcisa'il, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 206-7.
"^'Sources reports that a man persistently appealed to Caliph al-Ma'mun to regard the Arabs of Syria
in the same manner as he regarded the 'a/am of ahl Khurasan. Al-Ma'mun responded by saying, "By
Allah, I did not dismount the Qaysites from the backs of their horses until I saw that not a single
dirham was left in my Treasury. As for Yaman, 1 have never loved them nor do they love me at all.
As for Quda'ah, its chiefs are still waiting in anticipation of the Sufyanid and his revolt so they can
become his partisans. As for Rabi'ah, they have been angry with Allah ever since he sent his Prophet
[Muhammad] from among the Mudar tribe. Of every two Kharijites who revolt, one must be from
Rabi'ah. Let me go, and may Allah curse you... !" Tabari, Tirlkh, vol. 8, p. 652; Azdi, Tarflch, p.
408.
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Jazirah, and Iraq out of the military establishment, but also dismissed the Arabs of
Egypt, who, until his accession to power, had been the only Arab group that had been
able to maintain its position in the old Diwan.m By this decision, al-Mu'tasim was
simply taking the final step in abolishing the old Drwan, the martial mechanism of
which had, in fact, been deactivated a long time before. Accordingly, when
contemporary writers such as al-Jahiz describe the composition of the 'Abbasid
fighting forces in the time of al-Mu'tasim, they only mention three elements: the
Khurasaniyah, the abna\ and the Turks.147 It should be noted, however, that
although the Arab tribal forces almost disappeared from the composition of the
'Abbasid central armies, their presence was, nevertheless, obvious within the frontier
armies in places such as Syria, Adharbayjan, Yaman, and Sind.
1.4 The Mawall
Like many other terms of that time, the term mawla (pi. mowall) had a broad range
of connotations and it is often extremely difficult to determine the social and legal
status of a person described by this term in the early chronicles. The mawla could be
a friend, confidant, kinsman (ibn 'amm), supporter, neighbour, ally by marriage,
l46Kindi, Wulat, p. 217; Maqnzi, Khitat, vol. 1, p. 94.
l47See e.g. Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. t, pt. 1, p. 62.
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manumitter, protector, freeman, lover, religious master, non-Arab convert to Islam,
as well as Lord or God within the Qur'anic perspective.148
During the early period of Islam, it is possible to distinguish two main categories of
persons called mawall. The first were mawall al-'itaqah (clients by manumission).
These consisted of the freed slaves who, although manumitted, continued to retain a
special relationship (in legal terminology referred to as walS) with the family and
the tribe of their former masters.'49 The second category of mawall were those
known as mawall al-muwalah {mawall under contractual clientage) or mawall al-
Islam. Basically, this type of wala' or clientage derived its main principles from the
system of mawla al-hilf or mawla al-yamm (confederate by oath), which existed in
pre-Islamic times. Nevertheless, its nature was altered after the rise of Islam and the
subsequent conquests. In pre-Islamic times, those seeking clientship in an Arab tribe
were usually full-blooded Arabs from a weaker group seeking protection from a
stronger group. However, in the time of the Islamic conquests, the term mawla was
no longer applied to foreigners with full Arab status, but was employed in reference
to those free persons from among the conquered people who converted to Islam and
affiliated to an Arab tribe.150 One of the prime legal differences between the mawall
l4SQur'an, 47: 11; 6: 62; 19: 5; Ibn AthTr, Gharib al-Hadnh, vol. 5, p. 227; Ibn Manzur, Lisan, s.v.
"wly"■
14<) The freed slave in his case would be designated a mawla and would have the status of slave and
freeman. The manumitter, on the other hand, was also designated a mawla, but, in order to distinguish
between the two, the freeman would sometimes be referred to as the inferior (al-mawla al-asfal),
while the manumitter would be called the superior mawla (al-mawla al-a La). Forand, "Relation", p.
59.
i50£72 , s'.v. "Mawla"; Pipes, "Mawlas", p. 138; Forand, "Relation", p. 60; al-'Ali, Tanzmat, p. 67.
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of the two categories was that while the walS of manumission was binding, the
wala' al-muwalah was not. Therefore, the people who fell within the second
category were able to terminate their clientage ties with their Arab patron whenever
they wanted, but the position became permanent thereafter.151 Meanwhile, in both of
types of clientage, the mowall had to acquire an affiliation with an Arab family or
tribe if they wanted membership in Arab society. Also, both of them had to bear the
title mawla as a means to distinguish them from the pure Arab tribesman (samltn or
sarlh).
Although the settlement of the Arabs in the subdued territories and the adoption of an
urban mode of life eased to some extant the power of the wala', yet it did not lose
much of its social, fiscal, and political value throughout Umayyad times. This could
be attributed to the fact that during this period the tribe continued to be the
fundamental basis for the organization of Muslim society, as well as the main
passage to public as well as governmental privileges.152 Nevertheless, with the
coming of the 'Abbasids to power, the institution of wala' underwent a radical
transformation. From the outset of their rule, the 'Abbasids deprived the Arabs of
their conventional social, political, and fiscal privileges as the tribal factor lost its
distinguishing value in the 'Abbasid military and political life. Access to
governmental offices, privileges, and power was no longer the exclusive prerogative
of Arabians, but rested to a great extent on participation in the 'Abbasid revolution as
151 Al-'AII, Tanzimai, p. 68; Forand, "Relation", p. 60; El2, s.v, "Mawla".
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well as ties to the 'Abbasid household. Within this new framework non-Arab
Muslims held high positions in all state institutions, while at the same time the
majority of the Arabs and mawall found equality as ordinary citizens. Because
Muslim society no longer constituted by Arab privileges, non-Arab Muslims no
longer felt the need to acquire a patron for membership of it. Freedmen continued to
become clients of their manumitters, but non-Arab Muslims no longer aspired to
acquire a tribal clientage.153 Accordingly, the term mawla ("client") in the 'Abbasid
society of Baghdad became a word applied to a great extent to a manumitted slave
more than to non-Arab Muslim free person.154
To identify the mawallwho served in the early 'Abbasid armies, it is convenient to
classify them into two categories according to the patrons to whom they pledged
their absolute loyalty and on whose behalf they entered into warfare. The first
category consisted of those who were attached to the 'Abbasid Caliphs. Like the
Umayyads, the 'Abbasid Caliphs also acquired vast numbers of slaves. Caliph al-
Mansur, for example, who is said to have started the custom of collecting slaves in
large numbers, is reported to have said in a conversation with his son and heir, al-
Mahdl, that he had gathered for the latter more mawa/7 than any other Caliph before
152A1-'A1I, Tanzirnai, pp. 77f.; EI2, s.v, "Mawla".
i53EY2, s.v. "Mawla"; Pipes, "Mawlas", p. 153.
l54Ayalon, "Reform", p. 1. Pipes ("Mawlas," p. 153) correctly comments on this by saying, "While
the mawla-convcrt status lost its significance almost overnight, the persons called mawla-converts
probably kept this title until their death. Persons who converted after 132/750 did not become mawlas
unless they were slaves, but it took decades (till the 170/790's, say) for the mawla-convert status to
disappear."
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him.155 One report estimates their number at 40,000.156 Another example of a
similarly large number of slaves belonging to an 'Abbasid Caliph relates to the time
of Caliph al-Rashld. After his death, an inventory of his possessions listed 50,000
swords of the shakiriyah (personal guards)157 and g/?w/aws.158 Generally, 'Abbasid
Caliphs acquired slaves through three different means: through war, when the
victorious commanders sent a khums, one fifth of the spoil due to the Caliph;159
through arrangements with local authorities in the Islamic provinces to send part of
the taxes in the form of slaves;160 and, finally, through purchase, which was the
principal means of acquiring slaves in 'Abbasid times.161 In contrast to the Central
Asian slaves in the time of al-Mu'tasim, who came almost exclusively from a single
region, early 'Abbasid slaves were of many origins, including Turks, Nubians,
Persians, Rumis, Ethiopians, Berbers, and even Arabian captives.162
The military role played by the 'Abbasid Caliphs' mawallduring the early years of
the 'Abbasid Caliphate was almost totally confined to commanding the troops. The
l55Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 106.
156Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Dhakha'ir wa al-Tuhaf, p. 213.
l57For more on the term shakiriyah, see EI2, s.v. "Shakiriyya"; Bosworth, The History of Tabari, vol.
33, p. 179, n. 506; Shaban, 'Abbasid Revolution, p. 58.
158 Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Dhakha'ir wa al-Tuhaf p. 217.
l59Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 363.
l60Jahshiyari, Wuzara', pp. 283, 286; Ibn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 95; Ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 39;
MuqaddasI, Ahsan, p. 340; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Muntazam, vol. 5, p. 71; Ibn Khallikan, IVafayat, vol. 1,
p. 173.
l61Ya'qubI, Buldan, p. 27; Mas'udt, Muruf vol. 4, p. 53; MuqaddasI, al-Bad', vol. 6, p. 112; Ibn
Taghribirdi, aTNujum al-Zahirah, vol. 2, p. 233.
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first reference to their playing such a role comes in 137/755, when al-Mansur sent
his mawla, al-Muhalhil b. Safwan, at the head of 2,000 elite troops to put down the
Kharijite rebellion led by al-Mulabbid b. Harmalah al-Shaybani.163 In 145/763, Aba
al-Asad, who is described as a mawla of Caliph al-Mansur, is reported to have been
one of the commanders who were sent against Ibrahim b. 'Abdallah in Basrah.164
Moreover, in 155/772, al-Layth, who is also described as a mawla of Caliph al-
Mansur, led an army to contain the rebellion of Farghanah's ruler.165 By the time of
Caliph al-Mahdl, however, the number of the mawallseems to have increased to the
point where the authority was able to turn them into a distinct military bloc within
the central armed forces. In a military campaign against the Byzantines in 159/776,
the 'Abbasid army's vanguard was composed exclusively of mawall recruits led by
al-Hasan al-Wasif, a mawla of Caliph al-Mahdl.166
In addition to the large group of mawallwho were linked directly to the 'Abbasid
Caliphs, there were other large bodies of mawall who served in the army and were
affiliated to certain individuals, especially amongst the state dignitaries, including
members of the 'Abbasid family and army commanders. Among those was 'Isa b.
'All, whose mawall in the time al-Mansur are said to have numbered around 4,000
l62Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 8, p. 99.
mIbid., vol. 7, p. 495.
164
Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 360.
165
Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 387.
l66Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 116; Ibn TaghribirdI, al-Nujum al-Zahirah, vol. 2, p. 34.
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and to have lived with him in his official dwelling.167 The first reference to their
being used in a military campaign comes in 162/779, when 'Isa b. 'All led a corps of
his mawalF, along with the local people of Mar'ash, in the defence of the city against
the Byzantines, during which eight of his mawall arc reported to have lost their lives
in battle.168 Another important figure was Khazim b. Khuzaymah al-Tamlml. In
134/752, Khazim set out at the head of an army to put down the uprising of Shayban,
the Kharijite rebel in 'Uman. Besides the 700 men sent by Caliph Abu al-'Abbas,
Khazim's army also included many men of his house, cousins, his mawali, and men
from Marw al-Rudh whom he knew and trusted.169 As for his son Khuzaymah, who
most likely inherited the loyalty of the mawall of his father, it is indicated that his
mawalFnumbered about 5,000 men, whose martial skills he employed not only for
military purposes but also for political objectives.170 Ma'n b. Za'idah al-Shaybam,
one of the most distinguished military commanders in the time of Caliph al-Mansur,
was amongst those 'Abbasid commanders who controlled vast numbers of mawalF,
whom he used in most of his military campaigns. The last occasion on which he
used them was before his death in 151/768, against the Kharijites in Khurasan.171
After his death, the affiliation and loyalty of these mawalF were transferred to his
l67Yaqut, Mu jam, vol. 4, p. 361.
168 Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 225.
l69Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 462; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 93.
l70Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 232; Azdi, Tarikh, p. 262.
171 Ya'qubl, Tai ikh, vol. 2, pp. 384-5.
Rakem al-Muiairi | PhD Thesis [ Chapter / 1 The Composition ofthe 'AbbasidArmy 68
nephew, Yazid b. Mazyad.172 'Abbasid governors are also reported to have
controlled a large numbers of mawali. The governor of Qinnasrin in the time of
Caliph al-Mansur, Salih b. 'All b. 'Abdallah al-'Abbas, had so many mawall under
his control that it caused Caliph al-Mansur to fear such strength.173 Muhammad b.
Sulayman b. 'All b. al-'Abbas, the governor of Kufah between the years 147/764
and 155/772 is, in similar fashion, reported to have had 50,000 mawallm
The absolute loyalty of the mawali to their patrons in the battlefield was
unquestioned as they would stand by their manumitters in the most critical moments
and share their sorrows. In a losing battle against al-Ma'mun's forces in 196/812,
Muhammad b. Yazid al-Muhallabl, al-Amin's governor of the province of Ahwaz, is
said to have offered his mawali the chance to escape from the battlefield and leave
him alone to fight to the bitter end. Nevertheless, his mawallfirmly rejected the idea
of abandoning him in the battlefield, asserting their infinite gratitude to him for
manumitting them from slavery, elevating them from humble position, and raising
them from poverty to riches. Consequently, without regret, they stood firm, fought,
and died by his side in battle.175
mIbid.
mIbid„ p. 383.
I74lbn al-Zubayr, al-Dhakha'ir wa al-Tuhaj.\ p. 222. There is no doubt that such numbers are
exaggerated. Nevertheless, they do give a general indication of the large numbers of mawall under
the control of the 'Abbasid governors.
l75Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 433-4; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 387.
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1.5 The l urks (Atrak)
One of the difficulties presented by the Islamic sources that chronicle the first two
centuries of Islam is the precise connotation of the term Atrak, or Turks. Muslim
historians such as al-Tabarl, al-Baladhuri, al-Ya'qubl, and al-Khatlb frequently mean
different things when using the term, reflecting usage during the time in which they
lived, proximity to Central Asia, and their demographic, historical, and geographical
knowledge of that region.176 Thus, the term may oftentimes easily expand in
meaning to include other eastern ethnic names such as Faraghinah, Ushrasaniyah,
Khazar, Bukhariyah, Ishtikhanjiyah, and sometimes even with the Khurasaniyah.177
Hence, for those who served in the early 'Abbasids army, it seems that the term was
used comprehensively to denote all the Central Asian troops, whose common
characteristic was that the vast majority of them were slaves bought or brought from
slave trade centers in the eastern provinces as well as from Baghdad itself.178
Although the use of Turks in the Muslim armies was a feature of 'Abbasid times and
of the reign of Caliph al-Mu'tasim in particular, their presence within the ranks of
Muslim armies can be traced back to as early as the first decades of the Umayyad
Caliphate. The first reference to the use of Turks relates to 55/675, when
'Ubaydallah b. Ziyad brought with him to Basrah 2,000 men from the people of
l76Pipes, "Turks", p. 85; Ismail, "Mu'tasim and the Turks", pp. 14-5; Fukuzo, 'AbbasidAutocracy, pp.
149-50.
l77Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, p. 148; Pipes, "Turks", p. 85.
l7SFukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, pp. 148-50; Pipes, Slave Soldiers, pp. 146-7, 205-10; idem, 'Turks",
pp. 85-90.
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Bukhara whom he had taken captive a year earlier after his successful raid against
the city of Bukhara and its Turkish allies.179 After being set free, these captives
settled in Basrah, where they formed a first-class auxiliary force under the governor
of Basrah and were renowned for their great skill in the use of the bow.180 Turks also
found their way into the Umayyad forces serving in Syria. In 97/716, Caliph 'Abd
al-Malik is reported to have sent one of his Turkish regiments to search for and
detain al-Harith b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Dimashql, who proclaimed himself a prophet
in Jerusalem.181 Turks are also mentioned to have been among Qutaybah b. Muslim's
army in 96/715, when they were praised for their skills in archery.182 In 125/743,
when Nasr b. Sayar, the governor of Khurasan, wanted to assemble an army to raid
Transoxania, he instructed his deputies in the region to attract and recruit the
Turks.183
Under the 'Abbasids, the first reference to the Turks relates to the time of the second
'Abbasid Caliph, al-Mansur.184 Nevertheless, their role seems to have been confined
mainly to the Caliph's personal service and to some of the state administrative affairs
l79Taban, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 298.
l80Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 463; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 298; vol. 7, p. 454; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, cil-'lqd,
vol. 1, p. 195; Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhbar, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 132.
I8llbn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, pp. 35-6.
l82Pipes, "Turks", p. 86.
IS3Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 226; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 471.
lft4Tha'alibi, Lata'if p. 20.
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such as collecting taxes.185 The number of Turks at the disposal of the 'Abbasids
seems to have augmented quickly, to the point that they found their way into the
army in the time of Caliph al-Mahdi. In 160/777, the Turkish troops serving in the
'Abbasid army are credited with crushing the Kharijite rebel forces led by 'Abd al-
Salam al-Yashkarf.186 Likewise, under Caliph al-Rashld, the presence of Turks
serving in the army is also recorded. In a reception ceremony organized for
ambassadors arriving from India, al-Rashld is reported to have ordered the Turks to
form two rows and anned them so heavily that only the pupils of their eyes were
revealed, before he let the ambassadors enter.187 During the civil war, Turkish
elements were among the manpower who fought in each camp.188 It should be noted,
however, that until this stage, the number of Turks serving in the 'Abbasid army was
still relatively small and their recruitment was merely incidental more than a
designed policy by the 'Abbasid Caliphs.
However, after the end of the civil war and the accession of al-Ma'mun, the number
of Turks serving in the army increased dramatically. This could be attributed to the
crisis of manpower that al-Ma'mun experienced in the face of internal rebellions
such as those in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Khurasan, and Adharbayjan, or the Byzantines'
l8STaban, TarMi, vol. 7, pp. 617-20; vol. 8, pp. 63, 103; Mas'udl, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 309; Jahshiyan,
Wuzara', p. 134.
,86Ibn Khayyat, Tartkh, p. 361.
I87lbn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd, vol. 2, p. 203.
l88Tabari, TarM, vol. 8, pp. 452, 461.
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threat on the northern frontiers.189 hi order to compensate for this shortfall in
manpower, al-Ma'mun sought to recruit a considerable number of Central Asian
slaves, most of whom were brought from the slave trade centres in Iraq or those
scattered in towns of the eastern provinces like Samarqand, or as part of the annual
tribute sent by the 'Abbasids' governors in Khurasan to Baghdad.190
Although al-Ma'mun was the first Caliph to recruit Turks in considerable numbers,
this practice became much more obvious with his brother and successor, al-
Mu'tasim. This should be set against the fact that the Turks did not achieve such a
predominant military role in the time of al-Ma'mun as they would later achieve
under al-Mu'tasim. Upon his accession, al-Mu'tasim followed the example of his
brother, al-Ma'mun, by acquiring Turkish slaves, a practice he had begun during the
reign of his brother.191 Nevertheless, the novel practice introduced by al-Mu'tasim
upon his accession, was that he made a concentrated effort to recruit Turks, to the
point that they came to constitute the bulk of the 'Abbasid central army in his
time.'92 Sources estimate their number at 20,000,193 50,000,194 or 70,000.195 Another
l89Ismail, "Mu'tasim", p. 14; Pipes, Slave Soldiers, pp. 168-9; idem, "Turks", p. 88; El-Hibri, Caliph
al-Ma'mun, pp. 268-84.
l90Jahshiyari, Wuzara', pp. 283, 286; Ibn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 95; Ibn Khurradadhbih, Mosalik, p. 39;
MuqaddasI, Ahsan, p. 340; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 5, p. 71; Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Nujum al-
Zahirah, vol. 2, p. 233; Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat, vol. 1, p. 173.
''"While al-Ya'qubi (Buldan, p. 27) estimates the number of Turkish slaves at die disposal of al-
Mu'tasim in the time of al-Ma'mun at 3,000, al-Kindi (Widat, p. 188-9) gives the number as 4,000.
l92Khatib, Tarlkh, vol. 3, pp. 344-6; Ibn al-Tmranl, al-Anba', p. 106.
' "ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 325.
l94KhatIb, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 346.
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novelty regarding the recruitment of Turkish slaves was that although they had been
used in the Muslim armies since the time of the Umayyads and increasingly in the
time of al-Ma'mun, there is no indication that they were enlisted in the Diwan
(military register). In fact, historical reports indicate that al-Mu'tasim was the first
Caliph to enter the Turks in the military register.196 Al-Mu'tasim's policy in
employing Turks did not stop at recruiting them on a large scale and registering their
names in the Diwan, but extended to his giving them preference over other ethnic
and regional groups in his army.'97 This preferential treatment started by
distinguishing them through their uniform from the rest of his soldiers. He attired
them in brocade, golden girdles, and gilded armaments.198 Caliph al-Mu'tasim went
a step further in his policy of distinguishing his Turks from other military groups by
deciding, having built his new capital in Samarra', to separate his Turkish troops
from the rest of the population, including other military racial groups.'99 To
discourage any interaction between his Turkish troops and other sectors of the
population, the Turkish quarters were provided with their own shops, bath-houses,
markets, and mosques.200 Moreover, in order to preserve their ethnic purity, al-
l95Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 174; Qazwlnl, Athar al-Bilad, pp. 318, 385; Nizam al-Mulk,
Siyasatnamah, p. 85.
l96SuyutI, Tarikh al-Khulafa', pp. 24, 519; MaqrizI, Kitah al-Suluk, vol. 1, p. 16.
197Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 53; idem, TanbJh, p. 354.
198Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 53; idem, TanbJh, p. 354; Ibn Taghrlbirdi, al-Nujum al-Zahirah, vol. 2,
p. 233.
'"Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 55; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 29.
200Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 26.
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Mu'tasim forbade his Turkish soldiers to marry outside their own ethnic stock.201
For that purpose, he bought Turkish slave girls and had them marry his Turkish
troops, so that when their children grew up, they would in turn intermarry
exclusively amongst themselves. Finally, to make it impossible for his Turkish troops
to divorce or abandon the wives that had been assigned to them, the Caliph entered
the name of the slave girls in a register and allotted them fixed allowances (arzaq
qa'imah).202
1.6 Minor Military Elements
From the outset of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, service in the Muslim armies ceased to be
an Arab privilege. As we have seen, alongside the Arabs, a large number of mawalT
from different ethnic backgrounds served in the 'Abbasid military institution. The
account of the composition of the 'Abbasid army mentioned in the previous parts of
this chapter does not in fact include all the elements of the early 'Abbasid army.
Rather, we have discussed only the major military groups, their development, and the
transfer of predominance from the Arabs to the Iranians, before it finally rested with
the Turks. In addition to these three elements that constituted the backbone of the
'Abbasids' army during the first century of their rule, there were other elements that
played a negligible role in the 'Abbasid military establishment. Among these
secondary fighting forces mentioned as parts of the 'Abbasid army were 'black
Africans', generally referred to in Islamic sources either as Africans (Zunuj, sing.
701Ibid.
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Zinj), Abyssinians (Ahbash, sing. Habashi), or blacks (sudan, sing, aswad).203 The
use of black African soldiers in the Muslim armies was not an 'Abbasid innovation,
as they had been used as early as the first battle fought in Islam.204 Under the
'Abbasids, the first reference to the use of black Africans relates to 133/751, as
sources report that the 'Abbasid army in Mawsil included among its ranks 4,000
Africans (Zunuj). How and when these black soldiers entered the army remains
obscure, but, sources note that they were soon put to death after the massacre that
they committed by the order of Yahya b. Muhammad, governor of Mawsil, against
the city's inhabitants.205 During the civil war, the Abyssinians (.Ahbash) and the
blacks {sudan) are reported to have fought ferociously on the side of al-Amln.206
In addition to the black Africans, there were also other ethnic groups, many of whom
are mentioned to have served previously in the Umayyad war machine, before
transferring to the 'Abbasids. Among these were the Sayabijah,207 Asawirah,208
*>2Ibid.
203Pipes, "Black", pp. 87-8.
10Albid., p. 90; idem, Slave Soldiers, p. 109.
205AzdI, TarM, p. 149.
206Taban, TarM, vol. 8, p. 448.
207A non-Arab group originally from Java and Sumatra, who had migrated in pre-lslamic times to Iraq,
where they had been used as guards and frontier auxiliaries by the Sassanian. After the Arab conquest
of Iraq, the Sayabijah became Muslims and attached themselves as mawall to the Arab tribe of
Tamlm. EI2, x.v. "Sayabidja".
208They were Persian cavalrymen who joined the Muslims after the conquest of Iraq and settled in
Basrah, where they attached themselves as mawall to the tribe of Tamlm. See EI2, s.v. "Asawira"; EIr,
s.v. "Asawera."
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Saqalibah209, Indians, Sindis, Nubians, Berbers,210 and Khazars, the last being
mentioned as one of the components of al-Mu'tasim's army.211 Moreover, by the end
of the first century of 'Abbasid rule, the 'Abbasid central army comprised also a
group of Magharibah. Although sources indicate the Arab origin of the Magharibah
as being from among the factions of Qays and Yemen, inhabiting the east and west
of the Nile delta (hawf)2[2 the group most likely also included some Copts who
converted to Islam and some Berbers from North Africa.
It should be noted, however, that many of these minor elements may have composed
part of the mass of people known as the 'Caliphs' mawall', who were former slaves
and were used as guards and reserves in warfare. Nevertheless, the term 'Caliphs'
mawair was much more broad, for it comprised also groups of free Iranians and
others who were politically bound to the 'Abbasid Caliphate's household.213
2<l9The term seems to denote fair-skinned and fair-haired people of various races within northern
Europe and West Asia. See EI2, s.v. "Sakaliba."
2l0TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 117, 448-500.
2UYa'qubi, Buldan, p. 29.
212Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 53; idem, Tanbih, p. 356.
213Having lost its social significance under the 'Abbasids, the institution of the wala' acquired a new
political importance. With no legal basis, the political wala' or the wala' of agency most often existed
between the 'Abbasid Caliphs and some of their men with political significance. Irrespective of their
social origins, the Caliph would, therefore, bestow upon the mawla-agent the title mawla ami- al-
mu 'minirt as an honorific gesture. For more on the wala' of agency, see Pipes, "Mawlas", pp. 154-6;
Crone, P., The Mawall In The Umayyad Period, Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London, 1973, pp. 140-1;
idem., Slaves on horses. The evolution ofthe Islamic Polity. Cambridge, 1980.
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Summary
In this chapter we have examined the element that composed the early 'Abbasid
armies, including the Khurasanis, the abna', the Arabs, the mcrwali, the Turks, and
other minor military elements.
During the formative years of their Caliphate, the 'Abbasid heavily relied on a
professional fighting force based almost exclusively on the revolutionary armies
from Khurasan. Contrary to the assumption of a mass indigenous Iranians uprising
against the Arab domination, the backbone of the revolutionary forces was the Arab
tribesmen transplanted into the region who had different reasons to fell dissatisfied
with the Umayyads and their representatives in the Khurasan. In addition to the
Arabs, the revolutionary armies also included a considerable number of local mawall,
and even slaves, who found in the 'Abbasid revolution the vehicle for their
emancipation.
After the accession of the 'Abbasids to power, the Khurasan! forces passed through a
formative stage during which they were transformed from a revolutionary militia into
a professional army. The earliest discussion and analysis of the Khurasanis
characteristics and the problems that they faced during the early years of the
'Abbasid Caliphate is to be found in a pertinent monograph by Ibn al-Muqaffa'
entitled Risalah fi al-Sahabah. Among other things to which Ibn al-Muqaffa"s
treaties testifies are the dangers that confronted the Caliph by an excess of zeal
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among the Khurasanis, their tendency to find alternative means of income if their
salaries were not paid regularly, and their lack of instruction in Islamic teaching.
For much of the first century of 'Abbasid rule, the Khurasan! forces continued to be
the predominant and most distinguished unit of the 'Abbasid central army in
Baghdad. During that period, however, the ethic identity of the Khurasan! forces
was dramatically changed. While the Khurasan! forces that brought the 'Abbasids to
power consisted mostly of Arabs, from the time of al-Ma'mun they consisted
predominantly of non-Arab element.
Among the components of the early 'Abbasid army in Baghdad were the descendants
of the old Khurasan! veterans, who were known by the name al-abna' ('sons').
Many of these descendants not only inherited from their ancestors Baghdad as a
homeland, but also military service as a career. It is clear however, that when
sources speak of the abna' in the time of the civil war between al-Am!n and al-
Ma'mun, they distinguish between two groups, each of which had it military
commanders and its political agenda. This division within the abna' community
seems to have been based on two key factors: first, the geographical location of their
settlement in Baghdad; and second, the variations in position and privileges enjoyed
by each within the 'Abbasid court and army. The abna', as a military group,
continued to form a very important element of the composition of the central army in
Baghdad until the time of al-Mu'tasim, when they started to become marginalized on
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account of the growing number of the Turks and the shift of the capital from
Baghdad to Samarra'.
During the early stage of their rule the 'Abbasids accommodated within their central
armies many Arab tribesmen, mostly Iraqi, who had joined the revolutionary forces
in their struggle against the Umayyad forces in Iraq. Nevertheless, their role seems
to have ended in the time of Caliph al-Mansur, when they were dispatched to Ifriqiya
not only on army service but also as permanent settlers. Thereafter, except for a
short period during the civil war, the 'Abbasids put in effect an end to any further
admission of Arab tribesmen from Iraq, Jazlrah, and Syria into their central armies.
The same policy was also applied with regard to the Arab provincial forces. The halt
of the conquest campaigns and the increase reliance on the non-Arab elements in
their armies were all factors that led the 'Abbasids from the time of Caliph al-
Mansur to demilitarize the Arab provinces, particularly Iraq, Syria, and Jazlrah. This
policy was carried out in two ways: first, by draining those areas of as much as
possible of their military manpower by transferring many of their fighting forces to
the frontier zones where they could serve and settle pennanently; and, second, by
abolishing the old system of 'ata' and voluntary service and replacing it with the
new system of artizaq and professionalism. In other word, henceforth, only those
who participated practically in the military service would be eligible to receive
stipends. The final blow to the Arabs in the 'Abbasid military establishment came in
the time of Caliph al-Ma'tasim, who took the ultimate step of eliminating whatever
Arabs still remained in the old Dman.
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Among the early components of the early 'Abbasid army were the mawall, who
predominantly were manumitted slaves rather than non-Arab free persons. The
mawall who served in the early 'Abbasid armies were of two groups: first, those who
were attached to the 'Abbasid Caliphs themselves; and second, those who were
attached to individual state dignitaries, including members of the 'Abbasid family
and army commanders.
The last important contingents of the early 'Abbasid army were the Turks (Atrak).
During the first century of the 'Abbasid rule, the term Atrak was used
comprehensively to donate all the Central Asian troops, whose common
characteristic was that the vast majority of them came from slave centres in the
eastern provinces as well as from Baghdad itself. Although the 'Abbasid Caliphs
employed Turks in their armies as early as the time of Caliph al-Mahdl, the Turks did
not achieve any predominant military role until the region of al-Mu'tasim, by which
time they constituted the bulk of the 'Abbasid central army.
In addition to the Khurasanls, abna', Arabs, mawall, and Turks, the 'Abbasids also
employed in their armies a number of minor elements including black Africans, the
Sayabijah, Saqalibah, Nubians, Indians, and other groups of people from the margins
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Introduction
One of the significant reforms that took place in the early 'Abbasid Caliphate and
had deep impact on the way the Muslim armies were organized and recruited was the
method used in enlisting the soldiers into the Diwan and the change in the principle
of 'afa' and arzaq. In addition to tracing these changes in the early 'Abbasid era,
this chapter will attempt also to shed light on many other matters related to the
'Abbasids' Diwan, including the method of distributing the soldiers' pay,
developments in the traditional systems of 'ata' and arzaq, the conditions of
enlistment in the Diwan, the rates of pay of the 'Abbasid troops, the reaction of
soldiers to their pay falling into arrears, and the size of the 'Abbasid army.
2.1 The Diwan Al-Jund and the Systems of 'A TiP and Arzaq from Their
Inception to the End of the Umayyad Caliphate
During the early years of the establishment ofjihad (2/624), the booty taken from the
Quraysh and their allies, either in combat or in successful raids against their
caravans, constituted the main source of revenue for the Muslim community in
Madlnah. However, by the end of the Prophet's life, in around 9/631, another source
of revenue emerged. This was represented by the jizyah (tribute or poll tax) imposed
on the Ahl al-Kitab (the "People of the Book"), i.e. Christians, Jews, and Magians,
living within the confines of Arabia in areas such as Tabuk, Madlnah, Makkah,
Najran, Bahrain, and Yemen. The amount of the jizyah depended very much on the
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area, the number of people, and the financial situation of each person.1 Although
Islamic sources indicate that there was some sort of record containing the names of
those Muslims who took part on each of the military expeditions in the time of the
Prophet, there are no such indications that records were kept of the revenue (fay )2
flowing into Madlnah. Instead, it was simply gathered in the Mosque and distributed
equally amongst all Muslims in Madinah within a period ofno more than three days.
One of the problems that arose after the death of the Prophet concerning the revenue
was the principle of equality in dividing it. This principle seemed to generate
dissatisfaction amongst the early Muslims, mainly the Ansar and Muhajirun. Under
the justification of their being the first to take up the burden and make sacrifices for
the sake of Islam and the Prophet, they demanded of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, that
he give them financial preference over those who embraced Islam at a later stage,
especially after the fall of Makkah (9/631), and whose motives for entering the new
'The jizycih was paid either in money, as for example, by the people of Adhruh, or in kind, as, for
example, by the people of Maqna, who agreed to pay a quarter of their crops. Baladhuri, Futuh, pp.
71-104; WaqidI, MaghazI, vol. 3, pp. 1027-32; Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 45-6.
2A debate seems to exist among Muslim jurists over the precise definition offay'. Nevertheless, the
majority view is that fay' means the sources of revenue taken from the conquered areas, including
kharaj, jizyah, and taxes on trade. But the main emphasis was on kharaj as it was the largest source.
According to Muslim jurists, all fay' goes to the State Treasury, to be used for the benefit of the state.
Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 24; Qudamah, al-Kharaj, pp. 204-6. For more details on the Islamic taxation
system and the state's financial affairs in general, see Simonsen <£ Forlag, Studies in the Genesis and
Early Development of the Caliphal Taxation System; B. Johansen, The Islamic Law and Land Tax and
Rent; Shemesh, Taxation in Islam; Lakkegard, F., Islamic Taxation in the Islamic Period', al-Rayyis,
al-Kharaj wa al-Nuzum al-Maliyah; Levy, Social structure, pp. 308-14; Samadi, "Some Aspects", pp.
133-7.
3Jahshiyari, Wuzara, pp. 12-3; Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 4, p. 119.
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faith were suspect.4 Nevertheless, Abu Bakr refused any such distinction, stating
that all Muslims were the same here and that Allah would reward everyone
according to what he really deserved in the hereafter. Thus, he continued to divide
the revenue equally amongst all Muslims, whether young or old, slave or free, male
or female.5 Abu Bakr also did not make any effort to specify the sum given to
Muslims. Rather, the rate continued to be dependent very much on the amount of
revenue coming to the capital, Madlnah.6 However, the principle of equality in
sharing the revenue soon changed after the death of Abu Bakr, mainly as a result of
the financial and administrative measures introduced by the second Caliph, 'Umar b.
al-Khattab (12-634/22-644). These measures were the establishment of the Diwan
al-Jund (the army register) and the system of the 'apa' (stipend).7 According to the
different Islamic sources that speak about the formation of the Diwan and its
characteristics, the immense wealth flowing into Madlnah as a result of the Islamic
conquest was the main reason behind the establishment of the Diwan. It became
difficult for the Caliph personally to administer and distribute the huge fortune
4According to Islamic sources, 'Umar b. al-Khattab was amongst those who questioned the principle
of equality in distributing revenue. It is reported that he said to Abu Bakr, "How would you equate
between him who migrated twice and prayed facing the two qiblahs and him who embraced Islam in
the year offath (the fall of Makkah) for fear of being killed?" Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 277; Abu Yusuf,
Kharaj, p. 45; MawardI, A hitam. p. 201; Qalqashandl, Subhal-A 'sha, vol. 13, p. 116.
3Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 45; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 193; Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 276.
6It is repotted that in the first year of his rule Abu Bakr gave 10 dirhams to every Muslim, whether
man or woman, free or slave. In the following year he granted them 20 dirhams each. Ibn Sa'd,
Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 193; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 45; MaqrizI, Khitat, vol. 1, p. 169.
7A debate exists in the sources about the year in which 'Umar decided to establish the Divan, but the
majority of sources state that this was in the year 20/640. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 613, 615; vol. 4,
pp. 42-3; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 153; Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 436; al-Dhahabl, Tarikh al-lslam, pp.
2-5; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 296.
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amongst the warriors, whose numbers not only became enormous but were also
scattered over all the various war fronts in Iraq and Syria.8 Thus, the aim in
establishing the Diwan was primarily to administer the public revenue and to
organize the warriors and distribute their 'ata' on a regular basis, so that they would
not have to labour for their bread and their continual participation in the conquest
movement would be assured. The method followed by Caliph 'Umar in listing
people in the Diwan was according to their nasab or tribal genealogy.9 On this basis
each tribe, whether it remained in Arabia or emigrated to the garrison towns in the
conquered areas, was specified with its own Diwan, in which all its members along
with their mawaliweve enlisted.10
The financial measures introduced by Caliph 'Umar were characterized by his refusal
to treat the conquered lands, such in Iraq and Syria, as booty, which, if they had been
so regarded, would have had to be divided amongst the warriors who seized them.
Instead, he considered these lands as public domains whose original owners would
continue to cultivate them and pay in return a rent, known as kharaj}1 Thorough this
policy thefay' or tribute taken from these lands, in addition to thejizyah, constituted
a permanent and unceasing fund for the 'ata' and arzaq (food subsidies) of all
sJahshiyari, Wuzctra', p. 17; Mawardi, Ahkam, p.199; Maqrizi, Khitnt, vol. 1, p. 169.
'For this purpose, the Caliph commanded 'Aqil b. Abi Talib, Makhramah b. Nawfal, and Jubayr b.
Mut'im, who all belonged to Quraysh and were experts in matters of genealogy or nasab, to list the
men according to their tribal origin. Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 235-6; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 550.
10Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 247; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqai, vol. 5, p. 13. Those who did not have a tribe or
were not mawla of a tribe had to enlist themselves within the register of one of the Arab tribes. People
of this sort were distinguished from the mawaliby being designated a 'dad (lit. "numbers"). MaqdisI,
al-Bad', vol. 5, p. 168.
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Muslims warriors, their families, and those who would come after them.12
Nevertheless, the allotment of the 'ata' no longer stood on a basis of equality but
according to a new system, which took account of kinship with the Prophet, priority
•• , ill ♦ ••
of conversion, service to Islam, and necessity to Islam. According to these criteria,
the Prophet's widows (Ummahat al-Mu'minm) received 10,000 dirhams each. The
prophet's uncle, al-'Abbas, received 12,000 dirhams, which was the largest 'ata'
ever awarded to any man. To categorize the grades and thus the 'ata' of the rest of
Muslims according to their early conversion and service to Islam, certain famous
battles were chosen as marks between one period and another. Beginning with the
Muhajirm and the Ansar who had fought with the Prophet in the battle of Badr,
these were allotted a stipend of 5,000 dirhams each. Those who embraced Islam after
the battle of Badr and were present at the battle of Uhud, as well as the emigrants to
Ethiopia, received 4,000 dirhams each. Those who emigrated to Madlnah before the
fall of Makkah received 3,000 dirhams each. Those who were present at the battle of
"Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 124; Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 267-8.
12Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 64-5; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 124; Mawardi, Ahkam, p. 126; Baladhuri,
Futuh, p. 179.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 211; Baiadhuri, Futuh, pp. 548-51, Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 236-8.
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Qadisiyyah and Yarmuk in Syria (ahl al-ayyam) received 2,000 dirhams and the rest
of the Muslims received between 500 and 300 dirhams each.14
Although all sources agree that Caliph 'Umar continued to the end of his life to
adhere to the policy of precedence in allotting the 'or/a', there are some indications
that in the last year of his life he started to consider a return to the old policy of
equality.15 This change of view seems to have been due to the discontent that
appeared amongst the recipients of the lower ''ata', whose numbers seem to have
multiplied constantly as a consequence of the new converts from among the
inhabitants of the conquered territories. This resentment became openly manifest in
the time of the third Caliph, 'Uthman, especially with the slowing in the rate of
l4Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 550-6; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 614; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 153;
MaqdisT, Bad', vol. 5, p. 168. According to these criteria, not all the Arabs were eligible for the 'ata'.
Initially, the 'ata' was allotted only to the people of Madlnah, the Ansar and Muhajirun, and the tribes
who embraced Islam and joined the conquered armies. Among those who were denied this privilege
were the a 'rab or bedouin, who remained in the their homeland of Arabia and did not take part in the
conquest operations. Also, initially, the people of Makkah were not allotted 'ata' in the time of
'Umar because he used not to send them on military campaigns. Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 240-4;
Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 561. Also, according to these criteria, the mawall enjoyed equal status with the
Arabs. They were included in the Dtwan and allotted 'ata' according to the rate paid to the Arab tribes
they belonged to or were registered with. In this context, it is reported that 'Umar wrote to the
commanders of the armies as follows: "Those of the lumra' whom you manumitted and who adopted
Islam should be joined to their clients on terms of equality in regard to their privileges as well as
duties. However, if they want to form a separate tribe, they are entitled to do so, but then you should
also make them equal to them [their Arab clients] in regard to their 'ata."
.—".J..-— , C.J yol IjJ—1 01J , jjg- 1> U A .-Jj/Li-U si[Jyu jCjrVl >a' di
"siUJt j Ar-i.) Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 247; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 563. As for the mamluks or slaves,
although they had been allotted 'ata' in the time of Abu Bakr if they were fighters, they were denied
this right in the time of 'Umar, who only gave 'ata'to those slaves who took part in the battle of Badr.
Ibn Sallam, Amwal. pp. 240-4; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 561.
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conquests and, consequently, the reduction of revenue coming from the booty, which
constituted a prime source of income.16 Although 'Uthman continued to follow the
policy of precedence in allotting the 'afa', he endeavoured at the same time to cope
with the problem by minimizing the distinctions between the iata' classes. Thus, on
the one hand he raised the 'a/a' of those who received less and, on the other, reduced
some of the high stipends.17 Yet, once again, this action provoked the wrath of the
1X
tribal chiefs and the recipients of the high stipends.
After the death of 'Uthman, the new Caliph, 'All, tried to resolve this dilemma by
returning to the concept of equality amongst all Muslims regardless of their origin,
social status, or date of conversion.19 Although 'Uthman's reform satisfied the late
converts, whether they were Arabs or mawall, it angered the early Muslims as well
as the tribal chiefs, many of whom expressed their resentment not only by abstaining
15It is reported that after seeing the money grow to immense proportions, Caliph 'Umar promised that
if he lived until the time of the distribution of the next 'ata' (i.e., until the beginning of 24/644), he
would restore the policy of equality and give every soldier 4,000 dirhams, made up of 1,000 dirhams
for his family, 1,000 dirhams for his travelling expenses, 1,000 dirhams for his weapons, and 1,000
dirhams for his riding beasts. Ibn Sallam, Arnwal, p. 277; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 50; Ya'qubi,
Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 154; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 297; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 615; Qalqashandl,
Subhal-A'sha, vol. 13, p. 116.
l6Duri, Muqaddimah, pp. 55-6.
]7It is reported, for example, that Sa'Id b. al-'As, the governor of Kufah in the time of 'Uthman,
reduced the stipends of the elite women (ashrafal-nisa') of Kufah by 100 dirhams and sought also to
reduce the stipends of those who had witnessed the battle of Qadisiyyah by 500 dirhams. Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 331.
x%lbid.
!9Ya'qubI (Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 183) says, " 'All allotted to the people equally and did not prefer one
over another. He gave to the mawallas he gave to the full-blooded Arab (Scdibi)."
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from taking part in the expeditions but also by siding with his political opponent,
Mu'awiyah.20
Under the Umayyads, the registering in the Diwan continued to be carried out
according to the rules laid down by Caliph 'Umar, so that enrolment continued to be
according to the Arab nasab.2x As for the system of the 'ata', it no longer stood on a
basis of equality, nor did it regard seniority or service to Islam. Instead, it developed
toward subordination to the Caliph's wish and personal motives. Thus, if heroism on
the battlefield was one of these motives, then loyalty to the Umayyad house and
seniority in its service was the most important motive and the criterion that not only
determined the rate of the 'ata' but also the eligibility to receive this right. In other
words, since the commencement of their rule, the Umayyad Caliphs utilized the 'ata'
both as a reward to attract supporters and enhance their loyalty and as a punishment
"79 . . .
for any who would oppose them." Within this framework, it was no wonder that
under the Umayyads the Syrian forces, known for their profound loyalty to the
Umayyads, were allotted a higher 'ata' than the rest of the Arab annies in other
provinces.23 It is mentioned, for example, that Mu'awiyah, in 32/652, raised the
20Ibn A'tham, Futuh, vol. 4, p. 194.
2>EI2,s.v. "Diwan"; Sharon, "Reform", p. 61.
"It is noted, for example, that as a way to suppress the supporters of al-Husayn b. 'All in Kufah in
60/680, 'Ubaydallah b. Ziyad, the governor of Kufah, resorted to the threat of stopping the 'ata' of
any group ('arafah) that contained within its ranks an adversary and failed to report him to the
authority. Tabari, Tai-Jkh, vol. 5, p. 359. For further information on how the Umayyads exploited the
'ata' as a means of reward and punishment, see Tritton, "Notes", pp. 170-2.
23Blay, "From Damascus", p. 30.
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'ata of the Syrians to 200 and reduced that of the Iraqi troops to only 30 dirhams?A
The continual discriminatory policy against the Iraqis in allotting the 'ata' is also
confirmed by al-Tabari while describing the events of 82/702. He points out that
during the negotiations with the rebellious forces of Ibn al-Ash'ath al-Kindl, Caliph
'Abd al-Malik (65-685/75-705) offered the Iraqis an 'ata' equal to that of the
Syrians.25 It is worth noting, however, that the discrimination in allotting the 'ata'
was not a matter limited to the Arab forces outside the Syrian province, as it touched
even the Syrian armies themselves. This was because the Syrian Arab tribes, mainly
Yemenites and Qaysites, did not have the same degree of enthusiasm for and loyalty
to the different Umayyad Caliphs. Rather, the dimension of their loyalty was subject
to increase and decrease according to the inclination of each Caliph toward one tribal
bloc over another and so it followed that their 'ata' was similarly affected by such
inclinations.26 As for the mawalf, although they constituted a considerable force
within the Muslim army in the time of the Umayyads, except for some isolated and
exceptional cases of mawalF being among the recipients of the 'ata', the vast
24Tritton, "Notes", p. 172; Wellhau.sen, Arab Kingdom, p. 131.
25Tabari, TarAh, vol. 6, p. 347. The preferential treatment of the Syrian soldiers over the Iraqis seems
to have continued until the end of the Umayyad rule. This is confirmed by Dinawari {Akhbar, p. 360),
who notes that Yazid b. 'Umar b. Hubayrah, the last Umayyad governor in Iraq, said in a letter sent to
Caliph Marwan, "The Syrian soldiers are better than the Iraqis, because the latter are not loyal to the
Umayyad Caliphs and their hearts are full of grudge."
26This is well illustrated by the Kalbite tribes of Yemen, who, at least until the time of 'Abd al-Malik,
seem to have been given a higher 'ata' than the rest of the Syrian tribes. Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p.
95. This fact is also emphasized by al-Isfahanl {Aghani, vol. 20, p. 223) and al-DInawari (Akhbar, p.
368). While al-Isfahanl points out that the Yemenites were the only people to be allotted an 'ata' in
the time of Mu'awiyah, al-DInawari indicates that they were denied this privilege in the time of
Marwan b. Muhammad and that this was one of the reasons that led the Yemenites, who once had
served within the Syrian army in Iraq, to desert their former allegiance and join the 'Abbasids.
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majority of them, especially in Iraq and Khurasan, were denied this right.27 The
ultimate effect of the Umayyads' policy in allotting the 'ata' was only to deepen the
factionalism, division, enmities, and disputes between the various elements of the
tribal forces on the one hand, and between the tribal forces along with the non-Arab
elements in the army and the central government on the other hand.
One of the rules that had been laid down by Caliph 'Umar I and continued to be
employed throughout Umayyad times was the succession of the right to 'ata'.
According to al-Baladhuri, the inheritance of the 'ata' stood on the basis that when a
man died, his 'ata' could only be inherited by his heirs who were not already
recipients of the 'ata'.2* It seems, however, that during Umayyad times, as a way of
circumventing this condition, the near heirs of the dead who were recipients of the
'ata', sought in connivance with the 'urafa\ who were responsible for the
distribution of the 'ata' among the soldiers, not to inform the authority of the names
of their deceased relatives. Therefore, the 'ata' of the dead would be taken as if the
person were alive and then unlawfully be divided between the two connivers. 9
Despite the serious attempts made by the Umayyad authority to control this type of
fraud, such as reviewing the pay-roll of the army and eliminating the names of the
27Tabari, Tar&h, vol. 6, p. 559; Wellhausen, Arab Kingdom, p. 97.
2XBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 561.
29Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, p. 154.
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missing or dead people, in practice it failed to put an end to such abuses.30 This
situation was probably the reason why Caliph 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'AzIz (99-101/717-
720), at the beginning of his rule, seriously considered abandoning the whole idea of
inheriting the 'ata'. According to reports, he refrained from doing so after he was
advised by one of his associates, who said to him, "I fear lest future generations
follow your footsteps by cutting off inheritance rather than following your example
concerning general religious obligations."31 However, in order to encourage the
people to come forward and report their dead, which would enable the authority in
turn to update its records, Caliph 'Umar decided to entitle heirs to inherent the 'ata'
• • « l1)
of their dead even if those heirs were already recipients of the 'ata
One of the main obligations of those men who were enlisted on the Diwan and
subsequently received the 'ata' was to join the military expeditions and wage jihad if
their services were needed. However, there is clear evidence that during the reign of
the Umayyads, as a consequence of their settlement in the conquered territories and
their becoming city-dwellers, many of those men became reluctant to carry out their
military duties. This led the Umayyad authority to use compulsion in recruiting the
manpower needed for war, using the threat to cut off the 'ata' and even at some point
"'According to Ibn 'Abd Rabbih (cil-'Iqd, vol. 5, p. 8 ), Ziyad b. Ablhi, the governor of Iraq during the
reign of Mu'awiyah, was the first to review the registers CU-AA" y Jj' "). According to al-
Zamakhshari (Asas al-Balaghah, p. 126, .v. v. hasala), the meaning of tahsil al-dawawirt is to
distinguish between the present and the absent and between the dead and the living.
"Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 561.
32Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 5, p. 346.
the threat of the death penalty against those laggards.33 But if the Umayyads' new
policy succeeded in achieving its aim through capable and ruthless administrators
such as Ziyad b. Ablhi and al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf, it failed under others who lacked the
same power and forcefulness of character. As a means of escaping military service,
the tribesmen and others in receipt of the 'ata', such as members of the Umayyad
house, resorted to hiring substitutes who would carry out their military duties on their
behalf.34 Others sought to escape military service by taking up certain professions
that freed them from this obligation, such as employment in government offices
{dawawm)?5
Associated with the establishment of the Diwan in the time of Caliph 'Umar, the
Muslim warriors, along with every member of their households, used also to receive,
in addition to their annual 'ata', food subsidies (arzaq). In order to set a standard
measurement for the quantity of food that should be distributed to each person,
Caliph 'Umar first ordered a jarib36 of wheat to be kneaded, baked, and then
crumbled and soaked in oil. He then called thirty men to eat their lunch from this
33Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 135; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 204; Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 2, p. 310.
34Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 434; vol. 7, pp. 40, 202; Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, pt. 2, p. 3; Shaybani,
Sharh Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir, vol. 1, p. 139; al-'AE, Tanzimai, p. 140. Technically this was called
taja'ul(sing. ju'l). Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 11, pp. 110-1.
35Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 202. Sharon ("Reform", p. 124) underlines this fact by commenting, "The
end result was that, although theoretically all the Arab warriors were at the disposal of the Head of the
Islamic State, in practice there was no real standing army existing in such numbers that could even
approach the list of the diwan"
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food. The men ate from it until they were sated. For dinner he did the same thing
and indeed the food was sufficient for those thirty men. Seeing the result, 'Umar then
decided to designate two jaribs of food to be the allotted portion of each person on a
<17 # t t
monthly basis." During Umayyad times the warriors continued to receive this
subsidy and it seems that, because of the richness of the conquered territories in basic
agricultural products such as wheat and barley, the central government did not have
any problem in providing and distributing supplies among the troops on a regular
basis.38
2.2 The Dsvan Al-Jund Under the Early'Abbasids
There is no doubt that the accession of the 'Abbasids to power marked a turning
point with regard to many of the organizational procedures and concepts relating to
the military institution, whether regarding the methods of registering the warriors in
the Diwan or regarding the concept and principles of the 'ata' and arzaq as a whole.
In order to identify the dimension of some of these changes, one has first to realize
that the 'Abbasid dynasty in its early years had at its disposal two types of military
forces:
36The jarib is the quantity of crops harvested from a certain size of land. According to Mawardi
(Ahkam, p. 146), the size is around 60 x 60 cubits. For more information on measures of capacity in
mediaeval Islam, see Hinz, fslamische Masse und Gewichte: umgerechnet ins metrische System,
Leiden, 1955; Ehrenkreutz, "The Kurr System in Mediaeval Iraq", JESHO, V (1962), pp. 309-14; al-
Rayyis, al-Kharaj iva al-Nuzum al-Maliyah li al-Dawlah al-lslamtyah Cairo, 1985).
37
Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 564; Ya'qubl, Tarkh, vol. 2, p. 171; Ibn Sallam, AmwM, p. 260.
38A1-'A1i, Tanzmat, p. 147. The type of food distributed among the people varied according to the
products of each province. For instance, while the Syrians had wheat, oil, and vinegar, the Egyptians
had wheat, oil, vinegar, and honey each month.
95Rakan al-Mutairi 1 PhD Thesis } Chapter 2 | 'Abbisid Faros within the Frameuvrk of the. Dfuan AUhmd
1. The central army in Baghdad, which represented the standing army of the state.
Its members entered the military service as a profession and thus received their pay
on a monthly basis (mushaharah).
2. The Arab tribal forces in the various provinces which the 'Abbasids inherited
from the Umayyads and continued to be used in case of need whether to suppress
internal rebellions or to secure the frontiers of the state.
2.2.1 The Diwan al-Jund and the Methods of Enlisting the Central Armed
Forces and Distributing Their Pay
2.2.1.1 The Methods ofEnlisting the Soldiers into the Dlwan Al-Jund
By all military standards, the Khurasan! army which brought the 'Abbasids to power
must be considered the first body reflecting the emergence of professionalism in the
history of the Islamic armies. This is first and foremost because its warriors entered
the military establishment as individuals and not as tribes or groups, as had been the
case with the Islamic armies up until the end of the Umayyad Caliphate. One of the
most important factors that played a vital role in the emergence of this phenomenon
was the decision of Abu Muslim, from the beginning of the outbreak of the 'Abbasid
revolt in 129/747, to adopt a new system for registering the revolutionary forces in
the Diwan. Unlike the traditional system, under which the warriors were registered
in the Diwan according to their tribal affiliation (nasab), the Khurasanls were
enlisted in the new Diwan according to their names, their fathers' names, and the
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villages they came from.39 By this tactical move, Abu Muslim was able to abolish
the significance of the nasab as an important factor in the Muslim military
institution, a factor which had previously done much to heighten the sense of tribal
awareness and tribal loyalties in the army as well as to distinguish the Arab
tribesmen socially and fiscally over non-Arab Muslims. According to the new
system of registration, all Khurasan! forces, regardless of their ethnic affiliations or
nasab, entered the army on an equal basis and thus received equal rights, especially
~ 4Q
in matters of pay.
After establishing their rule in 132/750, the early 'Abbasid Caliphs continued to
apply the same rule in enlisting their central forces in the Drwan, that is to say on a
geographical basis rather than according to tribal affiliation. Nonetheless, starting
from the time of al-Mu'tasim (218-227/833-842), with the introduction of Central
Asian troops on a large scale, many of whom had no link with any specific place
either because of their enslavement or their previous nomadic mode of life, the
'Abbasid authority seems to have adopted a new method of registration in addition to
the one already in use. The new method stood on a racial basis (ajnas, sing. jins).
Therefore, while the troops who had clear geographical origins' such as the
Khurasanls, the Faraghlnah, the Magharibah, and the Ushrusanlyah, were registered
j9The account in Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 358, 366) runs as follows: "Abu Muslim ordered Kamil b.
Muzaffar to review the people in the fortress [of Makhuwan], to enlist them according to their names
and their fathers' names, to designate (yansubunahum) them according to their villages, and to record
all that in the register (daftar)."
40Sharon, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 99, 102. At most times the mawali in the Umayyad army received
less 'cita' than the Arabs. For some notes on the mawall in the Umayyad army, see Pipes, Slave
Soldiers, pp. 170-4.
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according to their places of origin, the Central Asian troops, who had no place of
origin, were most likely registered in the Drwan according to their race, as they were
simply and indiscriminately identified as Turks (Atrak).
2.2.1.2 The Organization ofthe Soldiers in the Drwan al-Jund
Historical accounts covering the KhurasanI military forces' formation during the
'Abbasid revolt and, later, their settlement in Baghdad indicate that they were
organized from the start according to military contingents. Each of these contingents
consisted of warriors who belonged to a group of villages within a close range or
who came from the same town or district in Khurasan and other eastern provinces.42
In most cases, these contingents were commanded by leaders of the local community
from which each contingent was raised, many of whom had been pro-'Abbasid
activists during the propaganda period. Among these large and most noticeable
contingents and their leaders were the Marwarrudhiyyah,43 the Jurjaniyyah,44 the
4lYa'qubi, Buidan, pp. 29, 30, 32. While speaking of the registration of the non-Arab troops in the
Dhvan, al-Mawardi (AMam, p. 242) says, "If they were foreigners ('Ajam), they were not grouped
according to nasab. Instead, they were grouped by one of two things: either race or place. Those
distinguished by their race were such as the Turks and the Indians, who were further subdivided into
smaller racial groups. Those distinguished by their places [of origin] were people like the Daylamls
and the Jabalis, who were further subdivided by geographical region."
j.n ~i y £jL»l i '' 2^" ^ iOtj
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42See e.g. Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 7, pp. 355, 357, 366, 386.
43They were ascribed to Marw al-Rudh. Among the leaders of the Marwarrudhiyyah were Khazim b.
Khuzaymah al-Tamiml, al-Akhyam b. 'Abd al-'AzIz (naqib), al-Aghlab b. Salim (da'i), 'Abdallah b.
Shu'bah, Abu Khalid al-Marwarrudhi, Nadalah b. Nu'aym al-Nahshall, Hurnayd al-Warthakani,
Muslim al-Arghandl, al-Ajtham al-Marwarrudhl, al-Mujashir b. Muzahim, 'Abdallah b. Shu'bah, and
Shablb b. Waj al-Marwarrudhl. Akhbar, pp. 219, 221, 229, 297, 335; Tabari, TarMi, vol. 7, pp. 436,
462, 509; vol. 8, pp. 29, 113, 142; Azdl, TarMi, p. 242.
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Kirmaniyyah,45 the Khwarazmiyyah,46 the Bukhariyyah,47 the Farghaniyyah,48 and
the Baghiyyun.49 For better control as well as to facilitate the organization of the
troops during peacetime and in war, each contingent was divided from the very
beginning of the 'Abbasid revolution into smaller contingents, each consisting of
about a thousand men.50 Each of these smaller contingents was entrusted for all time
to the direct command of an army officer (qa'id), who most often had a close
attachment to his men, who usually consisted of his relatives, mcrwalT, and fellow
citizens of the same village or town back in Khurasan.51
Registering the warriors in the military register (Dfwan al-Jund) must have involved
a great deal of precision and verification in 'Abbasid times. Unfortunately, however,
not many details survive about the technique used in the early 'Abbasid period for
enlisting the troops in the Dfwan. Nevertheless, by comparing the available
^They were ascribed to Jurjan. Among the leaders of the Jurjaniyya were 'Abd al-Malik b. Yaztd al-
'Atkl (known as Abu 'Awn), Marwan al-Jurjanl, Abu al-Mutawakkil al-Jurjanl, Khufaf b. Mansur al-
Jurjanl, al-Hasan b. Ziyarah, and Abu Nusayr al-Jurjani. Akhbar, p. 330; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp.
445, 475; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 21.
45They were ascribed to Kirman. Among their leaders was Buzan b. Khalid al-Kirmanl. Ya'qubl,
Buldan, p. 20.
J6They were ascribed to Khwarazm. Among their leaders were al-Harith b. Ruqad al-Khwarazml and
Salim Abu Muhammad al-Khwarazml. Tabarl, Tarikh. vol. 8, p. 67; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 18.
47They were ascribed to Bukhara. Among their leaders was Salamah b. Sam'an al-Bukhari. Ya'qubl,
Buldan, p. 17.
48Among their leaders was 'Abbad al-Farghanl. Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 18.
49They were ascribed to one of Marw al-Rudh's villages called Baghshur. Among their leaders were
Hafs b. 'Uthman and Ibrahim b. Jibril, who is mentioned as one of al-Rashid's military commanders.
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 258-9, 313; Khatib, Tarikh, vol. 1, pp. 85, 410; Jahshiyarl, Wuzara', p. 192.
For further indications that the KhurasanI forces were divided into units and that each one was under
the command of a leader who was in complete control of his troops, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 412.
50Akhbar, pp. 337, 351; Khatib, Tarikh, vol. 1, p. 77; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 527; vol. 8, pp. 410-2.
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fragmentary information related to the first century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate with
that concerning Umayyad times as well as that relating to a later period of 'Abbasid
rale (the fourth and fifth centuries A.H.), we may build up a picture of the processes
involved.
One of the common organizational procedures for enlisting the troops in the Dtwan
al-Jund, employed from the first century of 'Abbasid rale and onward, was for each
commander along with the troops under his command to be specified with a single
register (daftar or jaridah) within the main military register.52 Abu 'Abdallah al-
Khwarazml (d. 387/997) in his encyclopaedia of the sciences (Mafatih al-'Ulum),
while speaking of the Drwan al-Jund and the registers (dafatir) used within it,
identifies this sort of register by saying:
One of the registers (dafatir) of the Diwan al-Jaysh is the black
register (al-Jarkia al-Sawda). This register is divided into
dossiers (tukassaru) according to the various military leaders, as
they stand each year, and it lists the names of the soldiers, their
genealogies (ansabihim), their ethnic affiliations (ajnasihim), their
distinguished physical characteristics (hilahim), the amount of
their pay (arzaqihim), the due date to receive it, and any other
issue concerning those soldiers. This register is the master-register
(asi) of the Diwan al-Jaysh.33
It may further be deduced from this passage that each military division was further
divided into smaller registers in which each soldier had his own military record,
51Ya'qubi, Buldan, pp. 16-22; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 462; vol. 8, p. 30.
52Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 422; Hllal al-Sabl', Wuzara', pp. 17-8.
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containing his physical description, identification, and the amount of his pay.
Writers in military practice in a later 'Abbasid period, such as Qudamah b. Ja'far (d.
328/932), Abu al-Husayn Ishaq b. Sulayman b. Wahb (d. c. 330/934), and al-
Mawardl (d. 458/1058), indicate the manner of organizing the soldier's army record
while speaking of the distinguishing features of men (tahliyah or hula al-rijal).54
Ibn Wahb, for example, points out that the process of tahliyah involved, first, the
registering of the man's name, followed by his home town (balad) or the military
unit he belonged to, the amount of his pay, and his age in terms of whether he was
young, an adolescent, or old.55 Moreover, the soldier's record would also contian the
smallest details of his physical description, including information on his height,
complexion, eyes, nose, teeth, hands, arms, forehead, eyebrows, ears, and any
distinctive facial features.56 Nevertheless, if the soldier was a well-known person,
being perhaps a qa'id or amir, then the common practice was to omit a full
description and simply to note his name and pay.57 The purpose in noting the finest
details of the soldier's physical features in these military records was to ensure that
no possible confusion could occur between one soldier and another of the same
y ^J y ijlyj 1j .y&l—ilj JU-J>\ .5-*^ 4.— y iityi—JiLyi j—!>_* y,j f j—!l aJuyM jiyi ylii yy ^
".-y- y $ u> j jJi jiii y-j Khwarazml, Mafatih, p. 53; Bosworth, "Abu 'Abdallah
al-Khawarazml", p. 125.
54According to Jahshiyari (Wuzcira', p. 72), the last Umayyad Caliph, Marwan b. Muhammad was the
first Caliph to order the listing of the distinguishing features of the troops (lahliyat al-jund) in the
army register. This procedure continued to be practised during the first century of 'Abbasid rule and
onward. For evidence relating to the first century of 'Abbasid rule, see Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, pt. 2,
p. 191; Ibn Abi al-RabT, Suluk al-Mamalik, p. 100.
15Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 298.
56Jbid., p. 299; Qudamah, al-Kharaj, pp. 24-6; MawardI, Ahkam, p. 214.
57Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 300; MawardI, Ahkam, p. 214.
Uakan al-Mutam j PhD Thesis j Chapter 2 | 'Abbasid Forces nithin the Framruxtrk ofthe Dfu&n Al->Jund 101
name.58 Moreover, it helped to identify any intruder (dakhil), substitute (badil), or
even spy from the enemy camp and to prevent such persons from insinuating
themselves into the ranks. In addition, it facilitated identification of the troops in
battle and their deployment in the field.59
2.2.1.3 The Administrators ofthe Diwan al-Jund
The responsibility for administering the Diwan al-Jund was placed in the hands of
highly qualified secretaries usually referred to as Kuttab al-Jund (sing. Katib al-
Jund).60 Because the main duty of the Katib al-Jund was to organize the
administrative affairs of the warriors rather than lead them in the battlefield, there
were certain qualifications that he had to obtain so that he could perform his work
efficiently. Ibn Abi al-Rabl', who is said to have written his book Suluk al-Mamalik
ft Tadbir al-Mamalik in the time of al-Mu'tasim and dedicated it to him, lists some of
these qualifications. They included knowledge in hula al-rijal (the distinguishing
features of the men), nu'utuhum (their characteristics), and shiyat al-dawab (lit. "the
distinguishing marks of animals", i.e. the ability to distinguish good from poor
animals). Moreover, the Katib al-Jund must also have expertise in the different types
of weapons and their condition, conversance with the different languages used by the
58lbn Qutaybah, Imamah, pt 2, p. 190; MawardI, Ahkam, p. 241; lbn Wahb, Burhan, p. 300.
"'Bosworth, "Recruitment", 71; Hoenerbach, "Zur Heeresverwaltung", p. 271; Tantum, "Muslim
Warfare", p. 195.
^Their immediate superior was also a Katib, sometimes referred to as Sahib al-Jund or Sahib Diwan
al-Jaysh.
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troops, and, finally, knowledge of military hierarchy, so that he could allocate
ranks.61
Since one of the prime functions of the Diwan al-Jund was the registration of troops
and the issuing of their salaries, the financial side was very important and one aspect
of the Kuttab's work was to act as paymasters. It is, therefore, not surprising to find
that knowledge of arithmetic (hisab al-taqdlr) was a very important requirement for
the Katib al-Jund, as it was essential in his work.62
A Listing ofthe Kuttab in Charge ofthe Dm-an al-Jund in Baghdad




Abu Salih Karnil b.
al-Muzaffar. He was
succeeded by Abu
Nasr Malik b. al-
Haytham.
First, Abu Salih was in charge of all
administrative affairs during the time of the
revolt. Later, for the sake ofbetter organization
and efficiency, the administrative duties
became divided. Then Abu Nasr took charge of
enlisting the soldiers, managing the booty,
distributing payments, and eliminating all







Khalid b. Barmak He was in charge ofcollecting the kharaj,






Abu Jahm was appointed by Abu Salamah al-
Khallal in Kufah in 132/750.65
61ibn Abi al-Rabt', Suluk, p. 100. The Katib al-Juntfs need of these qualifications is indicated in the
report of an interesting conversion between 'Amr b. Mas'adah, al-Rashld's vizier, and a traveller who
was later put in charge of the Diwan al-Kharaj. For the full story, see Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, pt. 2,
pp. 188-91. For the terms used to describe the features of people and animals, see Qudamah, al-
Kharaj, pp. 24-9; Bosworth, "Abu 'Abdallah al-KhawarazmF', pp. 8-164.
62Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, pt. 2, p. 189. In his Risalah about the kiittab, Jahiz (Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 2, p.
204) mentions that Ibrahim al-Hasib, one of the army's secretaries in the time of al-Ma'mun, was
tutored in all sorts of belles-lettres, but learnt only arithmetic amongst the sciences.
aAkhbar, p. 279; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 366.
64Akhbar, pp. 333, 349.
65Ibid, p. 376.
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Khalid b. Barmak66 He was given responsibility for both the Diwan





Given responsibility for both the Diwan al-
Jund and the Divan al-Kharaj.6S
Ishaq b. Salih b.
Mujalid
















with Isma'H b. Subvh
to assist him





They were in charge of the Divan al-Jund at
the time al-Rashld's death.74
Al-Amln,
193-198/809-814
Al-Fadl b. Abl al-
Rabl'







al-Hasan b. 'Abl al-
Musharraf
In charge of both the Divan al-Jund and the
Divan al-Kharaj16
66According to Jahshiyari (Wuzara', p.89), Khalid was the first to use the record (daftar) in the
dawawm instead of the separate sheet, "yUj j iU J_,! juu. jtsd j o! ^yj-Oi j u j_„ ois"/
67Jahshiyari, Wuzara', p. 89.
6Slbn Khayyat:, Tarikh, p. 354. In the same account Ibn Khayyat indicates that 'Abd al-Malik used to
be in charge ofRasallal-Futuh.
6>Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 354. Ibn Khayyat indicates that Ishaq's uncle, Sulayman, was in charge of
the State Treasury and that after his death, Ishaq's brother, Ibrahim, took his place and continued until
the death of al-Mansur.
7tkTabari, Tan-Mi, vol. 8, p. 183; K. al-'Uyun, p. 281. Muhammad b. Humayd al-Katib is mentioned
again as one al-Hadl's Kuttab but without further details of the post he held, in Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 6,
p. 184.
71lbn Khayyat, TarMi, p. 360.
72Jahshiyari, fVuzara,,p. 167; Tabarl, Tarlkh, vol. 8, p. 189.
7ilbn Khayyat, Tarlkh, p. 382. According to Jahshiyari (Wuzara', pp. 177-8), al-Rashld first entrusted
all the dawawm (bureaus) except the Djwan al-Khatam (the Bureau of the Seal) to Yahya b. Khalid,
who in turn placed Abu Salih in charge of the Diwau al-Jund.
74Jahshiyari, Wuzara', p. 277.
151bid., p. 289; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 369.
76Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 204.





Humayd b. 'Abd al-
Karim
The Dm an al-Jund in Baghdad.77
Klialid b. Zayd The Diwan al-Jund. Khalid was also a very
well-known poet.78
Table 2.1: A Listing ofthe Kihtab in Charge ofthe Dhvan al-Jund in Baghdad
2.2.1.4 The Methods ofDistributing the Soldier's Pay
The processes of distributing the pay allowances among the warriors would start
when their pay fell due. At this point, the secretaries of the army started to take out
and review the registers of the various military units, after the names and details of
the soldiers had been organized in each register according to the method previously
mentioned and with an indication at the end of each register of the number of
recipients and the total of their pay.79 Next, the secretaries would start to draw up a
document of authorization (sakk, pi. sikak) containing the number of the recipients,
along with the total amoimt of cash needed for their payments. This legal document
was then presented to the Caliph or his vizier, who, if satisfied with its contents,
would then place his official seal (khatm) at the end of it and forward it to the
Paymaster General of the Treasury (Sahib Bayt al-Mal)m After establishing the
11
Ibid., pp. 206-8. Among the Kuttab who worked in the Dm-an al-Jund at that time and who are
mentioned by al-Jahiz were Mahmud b. 'Abd al-Karim (who was discharged from his position
because he prejudiced the Khurasan! troops by reducing their payments and unjustly eliminating
many from the Dm-an), Zayd b. Ayyub al-Katib (who worked for forty years in the Dhvan al-Jund),
and al-Ma'la b. Ayyub (who was highly praised by al-Jahiz for his honesty and uprightness).
78Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 11, p. 52.
79Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 299.
80Ibid., p. 300; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 36. Evidence that this sort of Sakk was used in paying the
warriors during the century of the 'Abbasid rule is found in al-Isfahani (AghanI, vol. 18, p. 43). He
reports that Di'bil al-Khuza'I read a poem to the troops who mutinied in the days of Ibrahim b. al-
Mahdl over the delay of their pay, a line of which reads:
(footnote continued)
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authenticity of the official mark, the Paymaster General issued the amount indicated
in the document to the Majlis al-I'ta' (Awards Office), located within the department
of the army. One of the main functions of the Majlis al-I'ta', as is obvious from its
name, was its responsibility to distribute the pay among the troops. The actual
distribution of pay would be carried out by officials known as munfiqh82 or mu'tm83
(paymasters), who were assisted by other officials known as 'urrad (sing. 'ard).M
Within this context, Ahmad b. Naqid, a mawla of Banu Aghlab, narrates that under
Caliph al-Rashld the troops in Qayrawan mutinied after their pay fell into arrears.
They continued to do so until "the 'urrad and the mu 'tm came carrying with them
money that had been collected from the land tax {kharaj) in Egypt. So, when the
troops received their pay, they dispersed."85
"Your pay document (sukk) has been sealed; / the resolve is right, so there is no cause for wrath".
AJ |Jb .» j1—""*■? ibl jcJliu ('!203-202)cJ-^*^ jjJ AlAr 1 Jj-i jl j*
eJUii
It is not difficult to infer from this verse that the meaning of Sukk here is different from the fiscal
meaning of "personal written order for payment which had been used on a few occasions during
Umayyad times to pay the stipends and the food subsidies of the warriors and resulted in many
problems (Ibn Manzur, Lisan, s.v. Sakiq Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 4, pp. 208-9; al-'AlI, Tartzonal,
p. 168). Instead, the meaning of Sakk here is, as Khwarazmi (Mafaiih, p. 53) identifies it, "an
inventory Carnal) prepared for every issue of pay. It contained the names and total number of all those
entitled to receive something, together with the amount of cash needed for this, and the ruler set his
official seal at the end of it, thereby authorizing the payment of their salaries."
Jjaj OUaL-Ji v < ,-AL. j *,*
81 Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 300; Hilal, Wuzara', p. 27.
82Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 300.
S3HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 38; Khwarazmi, Mafatih, p. 38.
^Harthaml, Mukhtasar, p. 38.
^Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 276. "
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In addition to their role in inspecting the troops by reviewing them with their mounts
and weapons and testing their military skills, the 'urradwere also responsible, before
distributing the pay, to examine the warriors' physical descriptions to see if they
corresponded with the descriptions in the register.86 Those men whose physical
features agreed with what was written in the register would be given their pay, but if
they did not, such men would be considered as intruders or substitutes (dukhala' or
budala').87
When the processes of distributing the pay among the troops came to an end, the
mu'tln or munfiqm started preparing a financial report to be sent to the Diwan al-
Jund. In this report they indicated the amount that had been distributed and the
amount that had been saved from the payments of dead soldiers, absentees, and those
whose descriptions did not match those in the register.88
The currency used in paying the allowance of the early 'Abbasid troops varied from
one province to another, owing to the 'Abbasids' continuing use of bimetallism in
their monetary policy. Thus, in Iraq and eastern provinces, which once were Persian
territory and where silver was widely used, the troops were paid in silver dirhams,
86Hilal, Wuzara\ p. 18.
87Ibid.; Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 300. Administratively the 'mad belonged to a bureau known as the
Diwan al-'Ard\ which was closely linked to the Diwan al-Jund. The sources disagree on the date
when the bureau was first established. While Ya'qubl (Mushakalat al-Nas, p. 31) indicates that Caliph
al-Ma'mun established the Diwan al-'Ard, Jahshiyari, (Wuzara', p. 289) mentions that al-Fadl b. al-
Rabl' b. Yunus was in charge of the Diwan al- 'Ardunder Caliph al-Amin. For an exhaustive study of
the role of the Diwan al-'Ard in a later 'Abbasid period, see Bosworth, "Recruitment", pp. 70-7;
Tantum, "Muslim Warfare", pp. 195-6.
8SIbn Wahb, Burhan, p. 300.
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whereas in the western Roman provinces such as Syria and Egypt, along with Arabia,
where the taxes continued to be collected in gold, the troops were paid in gold
dinars.*9 As under the Umayyads, the rate of exchange between the two currencies
was also subject to fluctuation during the first century of the 'Abbasid rule. We are
told that the gold dinar was worth 22 silver dirhams in the time of Caliph al-Rashld
(170-193/787-808).90 However, in 204/819, under al-Ma'mun, the gold dinar was
equivalent to only 15 dirhams91
2.2.1.5 The Timetable for Distributing the Soldier's Pay
The timetable for distributing the troops' pay seems to have varied from one Caliph
to another, depending primarily on the financial situation of the central government.
During the reign of the first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, all historical
indications seem to agree that the Khurasan! forces were paid on a monthly basis.
The writer ofAkhbar, for example, notes that when Abu Salamah al-Khallal, the first
'Abbasid vizier, addressed the revolutionary forces in Kufah, one of the promises he
made to them was that he would make the salary (rizq) of each man 80 dirhams per
month.92 This monthly system of remuneration is confirmed by Ibn Qutaybah, who
notes that when Abu Muslim came from Khurasan to Kufah at the request of the
Caliph, he was accompanied by 10,000 of Khurasanls, who received their pay at the
S9Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 197, 201, 223, 226, 288.
'wJahshiyari, Wuzara', p. 223.
91Qudamah, Kharaj, pp. 162-7.
92Akhbar, p. 276.
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outset (ghurrah) of each month.93 Payment of the Khurasani troops on a monthly
basis seems to have continued throughout the early years of the second 'Abbasid
Caliph, al-Mansur.94 Nevertheless, there is evidence that the arrangement became
greatly disrupted at a later stage in his rule, as is indicated by certain remarks found
in Ibn al-Muqaffa''s Risalah fi al-Sahabah. In this Risalah, the author advises the
Caliph of the great need to establish a fixed timetable for the troops to receive their
allowance, so that the long waiting and complaining amongst the troops might come
to an end. As for the period, Ibn al-Muqaffa' suggests that "it could be every three
months, four months, or as the Caliph sees proper to do."95 Although sources do not
mention whether the Caliph accepted or rejected the suggestion of Ibn al-Muqaffa', it
seems only reasonable that the 'Abbasid authority must have had to specify a certain
due date for the troops to receive their pay. This fact may be deduced from what al-
Shaybani (132-189/750-807) indicates while explaining the adjudication of
accidental homicide committed by one of the recipients of the regular pay (ah! al-
diwan) and process of paying the blood-money (diyah) to the family of the person
killed. Thus, he writes, "If he [the killer] receives his salary on a monthly basis, he
would be liable to pay one third of the blood-money every year, i.e. one sixth every
six months. As for him who receives his pay every six months, he would pay one
sixth of the blood-money every six months."96 hi understanding this passage and the
Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, p. 152.
94Isfahan!, Aghani, vol. 10, p. 106.
9,Ibn al-Muqaffa', Risalah, p. 123.
%Shaybani, al-Jam' al-Kabir, p. 208. y ^ y _^4 y j jjj j*i iyur / i y y)
si— yy y ^*-■" y 3 yjj otj (Sjoii yA si- y 3
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fact that there is no indication whatsoever that the Khurasan! forces in Baghdad were
paid according to two timetables, only one of two conclusions is possible. The first
possibility is that when the author mentions the two due dates, he may be comparing
the timetable in Baghdad with that in other provinces. The second possibility, which
is more convincing, is that the due date for distributing the warriors' allowances in
Baghdad during the period between the reigns of al-Mahd! and al-Rashld (during
which the author lived most of his life) was subject to fluctuation and the common
timetable was either each month or every six months.
After the death of al-Rashld and the outbreak of the civil war (194-198/813-817), the
timetable for distributing the warriors' pay fell into complete chaos. This confusion
was mainly the result of the circumstances prevailing during the civil war and the
awareness of both rivals of the importance of utilizing the wealth that was in their
hands to both enhance the support of their men and also attract the manpower they
badly needed. The direct effects of these factors were not only incessant increases in
the pay of their men, but also payments were granted to them whenever they asked
for "advance payments", for periods of service ranging between four months and
eighteen months.97 However, after the end of the war and the return of al-Ma'mun to
Baghdad, the timetable seems to have settled to a basis of six months.98
97For four months, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 412, 496-7; six months, vol. 8, p. 543; twelve
months, vol. 8, p. 370; eighteen months, vol. 8, p. 370.
,sIbn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 10; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 544, 553.
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2.2.1.6 The Soldier's Reactions to Their Pay Fallins Into Arrears
One of the characteristics of the 'Abbasid standing army was that the allegiance and
discipline of the troops were always very closely connected to the ability of their
sovereigns to pay their salaries in a constant manner and on due dates. Therefore,
their pay was the first charge on the State Treasury as, if for any reason they were not
paid on time, they rioted dangerously." However, as with their predecessors the
Umayyads, paying the troops' allowances regularly and on due dates was not always
an easy matter for the 'Abbasids. The first indication of this problem comes from as
early as the time of the first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu 'Abbas. Thus, referring to such a
crisis al-Abl (d. 421/1030), for example, points out that the Khurasan! troops
stationed in Anbar mutinied after their payments fell into arrears, which led Caliph
Abu 'Abbas to send a message to those soldiers on which he reprimanded them and
i ru"\
at the same time promised them to pay their pay soon. The same problem recurred
during the reign of al-Mansur when al-Tabarl records, "The governor of Armenia
wrote to al-Mansur that his troops had mutinied against him, had broken the locks of
the Treasury, and taken what was in it."101 Under al-Rashld also, we are told that
immediately upon his accession to the throne, his vizier, Yahya b. Barmak, wrote a
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 178, 412, 419; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 418.
Abi, Nathr oTDurar, vol. 3, p. 80. ■ya^ c..2 *4;
. 4&1 tLi 0} -cij rf- frUxal)J (,^£jL»l JJJ
10lTabarI, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 97.
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letter to be circulated all over the empire. One of the promises included in the letter
was that the new Caliph would be punctual in distributing their pay on its due date.102
The problem of the troops' payments felling into arrears grew much worse after the
reign of al-Rashid and the direct result was always the mutiny of the army to the
degree that this action became one of the trademarks of the 'Abbasid military
institution. Because of its seriousness and deep impact on the stability of the state's
political and economic life, this problem could not pass without being noticed by the
chronicles of that time. For Ibn al-Muqaffa', the delay of pay only created
dissatisfaction among the troops and reduced their readiness to face the enemies. In
the view of Ibn Abl al-Rabl', the undesirable consequences were three: the army
extorted money from civilians by force, they deserted to whomever would pay them,
and they became involved in commerce, so that they would become of no use in time
of need.103
2.2.1.7 Reasons Behind the Troops' Pan,' Falling into Arrears and Solutions Applied
Although the reasons that caused the troops' payments to fall into arrears and thus
led to their mutiny were various and differed in nature from one Caliph to another, it
seems that there were two principal reasons that prevailed under almost all 'Abbasid
Caliphs. The first was that in spite of the immense revenue flowing into the central
Treasury, the 'Abbasids, with the exception of Caliph al-Mansur, did not seek to
]02Ibid., p. 231. jSi S^^ r~Y>"• For more examples from the beginning of al-Rashld's
reign, see Ya'qubl, Tarkikh. vol. 2, p. 411.
103Ibn Muqaffa', Risalah, p. 123; Ibn Abl al-RabF, Masaiik, p. 105.
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reserve a part of these funds for emergencies.104 To the contrary, the central
Treasury suffered on many occasions from deficiencies, which came as a natural
result of mismanagement, either because of weak financial surveillance over
governors and high officials or through the excessive use of funds as a means to
satisfying and gaining the allegiance of their courtiers.105
The second reason for delay in payments to the troops, which was purely
administrative, was that for much of the period of the first century of their rule, the
'Abbasids maintained the practice of paying all of their central forces at the same
time. Thus, besides the financial strain that fell on the Treasury every pay-session,
any delay in paying the troops led eventually to collective mutiny at the same time.
This problem was, however, resolved during the reign of al-Mu'tadid (279-289/892-
902) when his vizier, Abu al-Qasim 'Ubaydallah b. Sulayman, differentiated
between the pay dates of the various troops. Consequently, any delay would only
! 114For example, al-Mas'udl (Muruj, vol. 2, p. 175) records, "Al-Mahdi laid his hand on the allotments
until he wasted all the funds that had been left to him by al-Mansur along with what was collected
during his own days. So when there was no money left in the Treasury, Abu Harithah al-Hindl, the
Paymaster General in the State Treasury, came and threw the keys of the Treasury down in al-Mahdi's
presence saying to him, 'What is the meaning of keys for an empty Treasury?' Al-Mahdi then detailed
twenty of his servants to collect the taxes. Within a period of a few days, funds flowed in and then al-
Mahdl said to his Treasury chief, 'Did you think that the funds would not flow for use when we
needed them?' So Abu al-Harithah replied, 'If an emergency arose, it would not wait until you sent
someone to collect funds and bring them to you.'
10SFor some examples, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 384, 652-3.
lead to the mutiny of the concerned unit or group of soldiers, rather than to mutiny by
the all of troops.106
To cope with the financial difficulties and in order to be able to pay the salaries of
their troops, the 'Abbasids resorted to several solutions, among them the following:
1. The most convenient method for the 'Abbasid Caliphs was to exact loans from
the wealthy people, a practice which started as early as the first 'Abbasid Caliph and
became more commonly used from the time of al-Ma'mun.107
2. Alternatively, they might postpone the paying of the troops to the time when the
central Treasury received the taxes due to it, especially the land tax (kharaj), which
started to be levied in midsummer with the harvesting of the crops.108 An example of
this practice relates to the events of 200/815. In that year, as al-Tabarl reports, when
'All b. Hisham entered Baghdad on behalf of al-Hasan b. Sahl, he "promised the
Harblyyah troops that he would pay their six months' salaries as soon as the tax
!06Ibn Wahb, Burhan, p. 301: ^ j cjsy tSju-tj JijA' a jlJ,i oir/
iiyd dttU 1 "• -1' . - OLe—I—■ iUl-C_P y\ J-L1J IJU .c_.,» All -jA jllo J <■ .IUll |« •> 15" ^ j
■ ^*1" 1 /jvj
107For some examples relating to Abu al-'Abbas, see Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, d\-lqd, vol. 5, p. 62; relating
to al-Ma'mtin, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 496-7; Ya'qubi, Mushakalat al-Nas, pp. 29-31; relating
to Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi, see Isfahan!, AghanI, vol. 8, p. 43; relating to al-Mu'tasim, see Tanukhl,
Nishwar al-Muhadarah, vol. 8, p. 48.
108The financial calendar for land tax (kharaj) was a solar one. Ibn Wahb (Burhan, p. 360) explains
the use of the solar system by saying: "Because it always relates to one state of circumstances, it does
not rotate so that the winter months come in the summer and the summer months come in winter.
This is because it runs according to the sun." wtu. } < qj ^ jyj y ivi u'y"
"•j—i-Ji J* ^ ■ For more on this subject, see Levy, Social Structure, p. 312.
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revenue (ghallah, lit. "yield of crops") was gathered."'09 Moreover, in 201/816, 'isa
b. Abl Muhammad b. Abl Khalid, the leader of the Baghdadi troops, asked al-Hasan
b. Sahl to grant him, his family, and his fellows guarantee of safety as well as the
payment of six months' salaries to his fellows, his troops, and the remainder of the
Baghdad troops as soon as the tax revenue was collected.110
3. The Caliph might substitute foodstuffs such as wheat and barley as part of the
troops' payments. This sort of solution was used more than once after the end of the
civil war. The first indication comes in 202/817, when, it is reported that, after
receiving the pledge of allegiance from the people of Baghdad, Ibrahim b. al-Mahdl
promised the army that he would pay them salaries (arzaq) for six months.
Nevertheless, he later reneged on his promise. So, when the troops realized this, they
mutinied against him, which led Ibrahim to give each man 200 dirhams. He also
wrote to the Sawad on behalf of some amongst them for the equivalent of the amount
of pay owing to them in the fonn ofwheat and barley.111
4. Another device was to make the army commander bear all the expenses of the
campaign that he led, including the salaries of his troops, out of his own money. We
are told, for example, that after his return to Baghdad, al-Ma'mun summoned 'isa b.
Muhammad b. Abl Khalid to assemble an army from amongst the abna' of
109Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 544.
n0Ibid., p. 553.
111 Ibid., p. 557. For another example, under al-Ma'mun, see Ibn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 10.
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Harblyyah to face the rebellion of Babak al-Khurrami, and to pay the salaries of
those troops from his own funds.112
2.2.2 The Tribal Armies and Developments in the Traditional System of 'A fa'
and Arzaq
One of the significant developments that came with the establishment of the
'Abbasid dynasty was the change that occurred within the whole concept of 'ata'
and arzaq, clearly reflecting not only changes in the pay system but, more
importantly, in the idea and structure of the whole Islamic army. This is most
obvious in the indiscriminate use of both terms in the historical sources when
speaking about the social life of the people or the payment of the troops, whether in
Baghdad or in the various provinces.113 In Baghdad the term most commonly used
when dealing with the payments of the troops was the term rizq.1H However, the
concept of rizq was no longer applied to the foodstuffs that used to be given to the
warriors and their families since the time of Caliph 'Umar. Rather, it indicated a
cash allowance received only by those who were registered in the Diwan and
"2Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 462. The same practice was repeated when Caliph al-Ma'mun appointed
the general Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Hamld to lead an expedition against Babak in 213/828.
Muhammad is reported to have assembled and armed men using his own funds. Azdl, Tarikh, p. 379.
"3As far as we can tell, the terms 'ata' and rizq are mentioned simultaneously three times by the
historical sources during the advance of the 'Abbasid army toward Iraq. Nevertheless, all these
accounts actually concerned the Syrian troops in the time of the Umayyads (Akhhar, pp. 229, 320,
344). In reporting events in 'Abbasid times, both terms tend to be used together except in one place in
which al-Tabarl mentions that when al-Amln came to power, "He wrote to Salih b. 'AIT to treat the
soldiers well and to distribute their arzaq and 'ata' among them." Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p.770.
iUAkhbar, p. 376; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 365, 370, 384, 419, 443, 496.
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engaged in active service in the army all the year around.115 That the warriors in
Baghdad did not receive any foodstuffs is clearly indicated by Ibn al-Muqaffa', who
points out that the pay of the troops was inadequate owing to the high prices of
cereals and fodder in Iraq. Thus, to prevent more financial upheaval for the Treasury
and to satisfy the troops, Ibn al-Muqaffa' suggests that part of their salaries (arzaq)
be deducted and given instead in the form of cereals and fodder.116
However, the term 'ata' did not disappear completely from the 'Abbasid state fiscal
dictionary, but it remained in use with two connotations. First, within a civil context,
the 'ata' simply meant the grants or donations that the 'Abbasid Caliphs would give
in a selective manner and more of an honorary than a concrete nature to some of the
descendants of the Prophet's family (both 'Alid and 'Abbasid branches), their
courtiers, religious personnel, and some of the Arab aristocratic families such as
those in Makkah and Madlnah. Within this framework, the 'ata' or the civil pension
was no longer a right that could be claimed or inherited from father to son as it used
to be during former times. Instead, as often happened, it could be discontinued either
through the death of recipients or simply on account of the displeasure of the Caliph
or his officials with its beneficiaries. Within this context, al-Isfahanl, for example,
1I5This new condition was one of the foundations for the transformation of the Islamic army from a
tribal army, standing on the concept of "a nation in arms", into a professional one made up of salaried
fighters (artizaq), who might be Arabs, Iranians, or people of any other race. The recipients were
called murtazaqah (sing, murtazaq) and they seem to have formed the nucleus of the 'Abbasid
standing armies. See Tabari, TarMi, vol. 8, pp. 142, 320.
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narrates that one day Caliph al-Mahdl gave al-Mughlrah b. Hablb, a close intimate of
the Caliph, 10,000 pensions (faridah) and asked him to distributed them to whom he
wished among the people of Madinah. A poet by the name of'Abdallah b. Salim al-
Khayyat came to al-Mughlrah asking him for one. In response, al-Mughlrah offered
'Abdallah either to include himself or his son. On reflection, therefore, as he was an
old man and the number of his days in this world was running out, 'Abdallah asked
for it to be given to his son Yunus, who thus received 50 dinars,}11 The fact that the
'ata' was no longer a vested right is also supported by reports that al-Mansur
stopped altogether the 'ata' of the people of Makkah and Madinah, seemingly after
the revolt of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah in 145/762, which continued to be
denied them until 160/776 when al-Mahdl resumed their payment.118 Nevertheless,
this resumption of the 'ata' for the people of Hijaz seems most unlikely to have
involved any admission of their natural right to such privileges, but rather to have
been made for political considerations. In addition, to prevent them from joining any
future revolt, the 'Abbasids always endeavoured to present themselves as the
defenders of the Sunnah and restorers of orthodoxy, from which the Umayyads had
deviated. So, cultivating the favour of religious figures, contracting marriages of
il6Ibn al-Muqaffa', Risalah, pp. 123-4. There is no indication that the troops in Baghdad received
foodstuffs except on two occasions, once under al-Ma'mun and the second time during the short reign
of Ibrahim b. al-Mahdl. However, as previously noted, both cases occurred in unusual circumstances,
when the government did not have enough money for the troops' salaries. Moreover, there is no
indication in the topography of Baghdad of any food warehouses such as there used to be in many of
the garrison cities during Umayyad times.
U7Isfahani, AghanI, vol. 19, p. 282. fj—«i> *Jj, aisy ^ cs- l*'"
iliV jf <j t)l ftjoUl 5 *4 <1)1 "U* l,Vr* L» aH-UP JtW 43j tfrCi ^ 1j , jjl eUaplj
".IjL,z jws- ^Jp_>! Ui- jl fjJl 1>U ,;S £-1 lii : Jui I .
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political expedience with influential tribes, and paying their 'ata' were some of the
methods the 'Abbasids followed with the people of Hijaz to achieve their ends.119
Second, the 'ata' within a military context was a term used to denote the pay of the
tribal forces. Although eliminating the Arabs from the Dhvan and cutting off their
'ata' are closely associated in the historical sources with Caliph al-Mu'tasim, a close
examination proves that the roots of such action had been laid as early as the time of
the second 'Abbasid Caliph, al-Mansur. Thus, what happened in the time of al-
Mu'tasim was in fact just the completion of a process that had begun much earlier.
Although historical sources do not evidence any significant use of the tribal forces
during the reign of the first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, nonetheless, there are
many indications that a large proportion of these forces, whether in Iraq, Syria, or
Egypt, continued to receive their traditional 'ata'. In Iraq, Abu al-'Abbas not only
promised the Iraqi warriors that he would be punctual in distributing their 'ata' at
due times,120 but he also increased their basic 'ata' by 100 dirhams.i2i Regarding the
Syrian forces, historians like al-Baladhuri and al-DInawari point out that
immediately after the accession of the 'Abbasids, the new authority requested the
Syrian forces stationed in Iraq to return immediately to their homes in Syria and
ll8Tabari, TarAh, vol. 8, p. 133.
1 '''Omar,'Abhasiyyat, p. 41.
120Abl, Nathr al-Durar, vol. 3, p. 80; Ibn Abl al-Hadld, SharhNahj al-Balaghah, vol.7, p. 157.
mTabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 426; Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 143; K. al-'Uyvn, p. 200.
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promised that they would receive their 'ata' according to the Syrian Diwan. "" The
same policy was repeated with regard to the Arab forces in Egypt. Al-Kindl, for
example, points out that in 133/751 Caliph Abu al-'Abbas ordered the 'ata' to be
allotted to the muqaiilah as well as to their families.123
The reign of the second 'Abbasid Caliph, al-Mansur, was clearly a turning point with
regard to the 'ata' of the tribal forces, as we find no further indication of any 'ata'
being given to Arab forces whether in Iraq or Syria. For Iraq the phenomenon can be
explained by the fact that al-Mansur sought to evacuate Iraq of much of its
manpower by transferring men to the frontiers such as those with Armenia,
Adharbayjan, and Sind.124 Nevertheless, in these difficult frontier regions these Iraqi
forces continued to preserve their tribal structure. So, when historians refer to them
in the time of Caliph al-Rashid, they continue to be described as Rabi'ah, Yaman,
and Nizar.125 In view this, it seems safe to assume that these Iraqi forces must have
continued to use the old method of registration based on tribal affiliation and that
they were still paid according to the traditional system of 'ata'. As for those who
remained in Iraq, it is most likely that they were denied the right to the 'ata' in the
'"Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 147; Dinawan, Akhbar, p. 375. \3H-\ «uji j*i l <s>y ^ u./
1 .-ti
123
Kind!, Wulat, p. 122. ".Jul'j ^ J
l24Ya'qubi, Tatikh, vol. 2, p. 371; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 246; Tabari, Teh-jkh, vol. 7, p. 517; vol. 8, p.
116.
125See e.g. Ya'qubl, Tarkh, vol. 2, pp. 371, 381, 426.
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aftermath of Ibrahim b. 'All's rebellion in 145/762.126 As for the Syrian troops, it is
evident from the Risalah of lbn al-Muqaffa' that they were demobilized, apparently
after the rebellion of 'Abdallah b. 'All in 136/754, and that they were not only denied
the right to the 'ata' but also all sorts of political and economic privileges that they
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had previously enjoyed. " But breaking up the Syrian army and abolishing its
Dman did not mean that the new authority had no more need of its services. To the
contrary, the 'Abbasids continued to use Syrian troops in considerable numbers
whether on the Syrian frontiers or in other, turbulent Arab provinces such as Egypt
and Ifrlqiya. Now, however, their recruitment was not on the basis of their tribes, but
according to their cities and districts and, most important, according to the irtizaq
system. We are told, for example, that in 169/786 when al-Mahdt appointed al-Fadl
b. Salih as governor of Egypt, the latter left for Egypt accompanied by a large army
recruited from among the ah I al-Sham. The Syrian units in this army are said to have
• 178
been from Qinnasnn, Hims, Damascus, Jordan, and Palestine.
As for the Arabs in Egypt, we know for certain that they continued to receive their
traditional 'ata'until the time of al-Mu'tasim, who, immediately after his succession
to power, ordered the removal of the Arabs from the Diwan and the cessation of their
l26It should be noted, however, that the cessation of 'ata' payments to the Iraqi people does not mean
that the old Umayyad registers (dawawm) in cities such as Basrah and Kufah were destroyed. To the
contrary, they continued to be preserved but without any more names being added or being used to
distribute the 'ata'. Instead, they served as genealogical records to trace the tribal descent of
individuals. For examples, see Tabari, TarSch, vol. 8, pp. 129-32; Baladhiiri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 95.
I27lbn al-Muqaffa', Risalah, pp. 126-7; Sharon, "Reform", p. 127.
128Kindi, Wulat, p. 152. See also Tabari, TarSch, vol. 8, p. 631.
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'a/a'.129 Unlike in Iraq and Syria, the 'Abbasids were able to establish their
authority in Egypt without any sort of resistance on the part of the Arabs there. In
fact, the different factions of the Arab tribes in the region seem to have played a vital
role in frustrating the escape of the last Umayyad Caliph by withdrawing their
support, leaving him to his fate.130 Until the end of the reign of al-Mansur, except
for the 'Alid rebellion in Fustat in 145/763, which did not find any real support
among the Arabs there, the political atmosphere between the central government and
the Arabs in Egypt was characterized by tranquillity. Thus, it is no surprise to find
that the 'Abbasid authority in the province increased their 'apa' by ten dinars in
137/755.131
However, this good relationship did not last long, as the Arabs, especially those in
the Hawf region, started to emerge as a disruptive element from 167/784, during the
reign of al-Mahdl and the governorship of Musa b. Mus'ab. This change of attitude
on the part of the Arabs can be attributed mainly to the change in the taxation policy
of the central government at this time. From the time of al-Mahdl, the 'Abbasids
sought to extract more taxes from the region either by imposing new taxes on the
urban population, as for example on markets (aswaq) and animals (dawab), or by
l2lKindT, Wulat, p. 217, Maqrizi, Khitat, vol. 1, p. 94. The text in al-Kindl runs as follows "Al-
Ma'mun died...and the people (al-nas) formally swore allegiance to Abu Ishaq al-Mu'tasim [as
Caliph]. Al-Mu'tasim sent a latter to Kaydar (Nasr b. 'Abdal, the governor of Egypt) informing him
of his accession to power and ordering him to drop what Arabs were on the Dman and to discontinue
their 'ata'."
^'ftindl, Wulat, p. 117.
mIbid., p. 124.
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unjustly increasing the land taxes imposed on the Arab cultivators of the Hawf.132
What deepened the rift between the two sides was the fact that, besides the serious
uprising of the Arab cultivators, who did not hesitate to join forces with political
rivals of the 'Abbasids such as Dihyah b. Mus'ab, the tribal militias, who were
raised locally and led by members of the local elite (wujuh or wujahaj, and who
were responsible for keeping order in the province, were not always a tractable
element in the hands of the 'Abbasid governor.133 While they rioted dangerously
whenever their pay fell into arrears, they were less impressive when they were asked
to face the rebellions of their brothers among the Arabs of the Hawf, who had with
them many common links and interests.134 Moreover, at most times the influence
and power of the local militias and their commanders seem to have exceeded those of
the 'Abbasid governor and sometimes even of the 'Abbasid Caliphs, especially when
u~Ibid., p. 148; Basawi, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 1, p. 157. The settlement of the Arabs in the delta banks
goes back to Umayyad times, when, as historical sources indicate, Arab tribes such as Lakhm and
Jadham of Yemen settled in the western side. Meanwhile, with regard to the Qaysls tribes, who
played a vital role in resisting the 'Abbasid authority in the province, historians such as al-Kindi
(Wulat, pp. 98-9) and al-Maqrizi, (Khitat, vol. 1, p. 80) indicate that in 109/728 'Abdallah b. Habab,
the governor of Egypt during the reign of Caliph Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik, transferred 400 Qaysl
families from Syria to the eastern side of the delta, especially in the rural district of Bulbays, where he
asked them to cultivate the land. However, it seems that the transformation of these Qaysl tribes from
the bedouin mode of life to an agricultural one was not completed until the early years of 'Abbasid
rule. This may explain why, after transferring them to Egypt, the Umayyad authority continued to pay
their 'ata' according to the Egyptian DM>an. Also, until the end of the Umayyad rule, there is no
indication that the Umayyads taxed the Arabs of the Hawf.
U3Until the death of Caliph Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik in 125/743, the Umayyads relied mainly on the
Syrian forces stationed in Egypt to maintain order. After the death of Hisham, however, the new
Caliph, al-Walld b. Yazld, instructed Hafs b. al-Walld, the governor of Egypt, to send all the Syrians
in the region back to their original districts (ajnad) in Syria. From that time the duty of maintaining
order in the province fell upon the local Arabs who had settled there since the time of its conquest.
While this led to the rise in power of the local wujuh in the province, it led on the other hand to the
decline of the Umayyads' authority, to the degree that they were no longer were able to affirm their
political control except by sending their Syrian troops from time to time. Kind!, Wulat, pp. 105-12.
' "Kennedy, "Central Government", pp. 34-5. For examples, see Kindi, Wulat, pp. 149, 166.
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it came to appointing officials in the province, including the governor himself.135 In
addition, during the period between the outset of the civil war in 194/810 and the
appointment of 'Abdallah b. Tahir in 211/826 as governor of Egypt, the central
government effectively lost control over the province. It was then that these tribal
militias and their wujuh entered the political struggle to establish their own authority
far away from Baghdad.136 Consequentially, all the problems that the Arab militias
created helped persuade the 'Abbasids finally to decide to put an end to the role of
the Arabs in the military affairs of the province. As for the reasons why the
'Abbasids proved unable to achieve this aim before the time of al-Mu'tasim, they
may be summarized under two main heads. First, after the reign of al-Mahdl, the
central government seems to have lacked sufficient manpower to carry out the duties
both of defending the frontiers of the state and, at the same time, of suppressing the
serious uprising of the Arabs in Egypt, which required their permanent presence
there.137 We may add to this the fact that for many years after the civil war, the
'Abbasids effectively lost control over their standing army in Baghdad and al-
Ma'mun did not have either the money or the confidence to use the Syrian tribal
forces against the Arabs of Egypt. The second reason was that Egypt was the next
most important source of revenue for the central government after Iraq.138 Therefore,
the 'Abbasid Caliphs were cautious not to irritate the leaders of the local militias,
which eventually would lead to the complete separation of the province, as had
1JSKindi, Wulat, pp. 180, 186; Kennedy, "Central Government," pp. 33-8.
'"'Kennedy, "Central Government," p. 37.
'"ibid.
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already happened with other areas in Ifiiqiya, and consequent loss of this important
source of revenue. Circumstances, however, changed with the coming of al-
Mu'tasim to power. With a large Turkish fighting force whose loyalty was in no
doubt, al-Mu'tasim was in a better position to remove the tribal forces and substitute
his new forces, through whom he could enforce his will in the region.139
As in Umayyad times, the traditional 'ata' of the Arab tribal forces in provinces such
as Egypt continued to be paid annually during the first century of 'Abbasid rale.140
Yet, it seems that its due payment date was no longer in the month of Muharram
according to the Arab calendar, but mainly connected to the time when the land taxes
could be levied. Furthermore, there is no indication that the provincial forces
received in addition to their cash allowance any payment in foodstuffs during
'Abbasid times, except in unusual circumstances. The most common of these
circumstances was when the troops demanded the whole of their salaries to be issued
before they were actually due. Thus, the provincial authority found itself unable to
pay their full salaries in cash. An example of this occurred in 193/809 when the
Arab tribal militia in Egypt exploited the news of the death of Caliph al-Rashld and
the accession of al-Amln to power by mutinying and demanding their pay in
advance.141 Faced with this situation, the governor of Egypt, al-Hasan b. al-
138 r,.jIbid.
' wBosworth, "Master", p. 62.
140Ya'qubI, TarMi, vol. 2, p. 439.
l4lCaliph Harun al-Rashid died on Saturday the 3rd Jumada II, AH 193 (= 24th March, AD 809).
From this date there were still at least three months before the harvesting of the crops began, so that
the land tax could be levied, and so on the distribution of the pay of the troops.
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Takhtakh, found himself compelled to pay their 'ata' in full: one third in cash, one
third in linen (bazz), and one third in wheat.142
2.2.3 The Conditions of Enlistment in the Dhvan
Muslim jurists, such as the Abu Yusuf (d. 182/ 798) and Chief QadI MawardI (d.
458/1058), drew up five qualifying conditions needing to be fulfilled before one
could become eligible for enrolment in the Diwan al-Jund and receive a regular
allowance from the Treasury. These conditions were Freedom from disability and
illness, being a Muslim, freedom, courage, and, finally, maturity.143 Although it is
difficult to determine to what extent the early 'Abbasid military institution was
committed to all these principles as conditions of entry to its service, there are some
scattered signs which do indeed seem to indicate that certain restrictions were in
force to safeguard entrance to military service. 'Akhbar al-'Abbas, for example,
notes a very interesting directive (wasiyyah) issued by the 'Abbasid Imam, Ibrahim
b. Muhammad, to his propagandists (du 'ah) in Khurasan. The account relates that
the Imam instructed his du 'ah not to invite into the ranks of the movement ten types
of people: anyone extremely tall, anyone dwarfish, anyone with short curly hair
(most probably meaning black slaves), anyone, albinotic, anyone defective in the
right eye, anyone with unnatural bodily superfluities, anyone with unnatural bodily
deficiencies, anyone effeminate, any woman with masculine characteristics, or
"Kind!, Wulat, p. 172: jUs cOj^ >as a*
frlizxJl
143 MawardI, Ahkam, pp. 204, 302; Farra', Ahkam, pp. 224-5; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 175.
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anyone with a yellowish complexion for no obvious reason.144 From this wasiyyah
one may conclude that those sorts of people were not amongst those who joined the
revolution and were later eligible to be enlisted in the Khurasanis' Dlwan.
However, in later times the 'Abbasids seem to have paid less regard to these physical
defects that formerly rendered some unsuitable for military service, especially when
concerning themselves with the commanders of the army. Thus, we find, for
example, that Tahir b. al-Husayn, al-Mu'mun's commander-in-chief during the civil
war, was actually a one-eyed person with a repugnant face.145
Regarding the condition of being a Muslim, it seems that this condition remained a
vital condition for enlisting men in the Dlwan. According to Islamic law (Shari'ah),
non-Muslims cannot serve in Muslim armies.146 Nevertheless, in extreme
emergencies they might be employed, but still they had no right to be enlisted in the
Dlwan or to receive regular pay from the Treasury.147 Evidence that the 'Abbasids
stuck to this condition is found in Baladhurfs comment that, besides accepting the
authority of the Caliph, embracing Islam was the next condition that Caliph al-
144 l * • n
^Ar'« tJaiaU! taa^il j&*a* taJuJ.! Jj y t_3Uaai aUia-Ua !y-si V C Jl— Iy J.I . i a - j aJV-aJ y\ J ISJ
.aifi. jS. j. Aj j j.—all, tJlapJ\A c'l—AA j at ■. .lb Jlar S* y A _r'p . caaU-l J ^asLJl . y\^ t
Akhbar, p. 387. Without Islamic juristic foundation, the only reasoning which might possibly lie
behind this wasiyah is that the 'Abbasids did not wish their movement to be associated with
"unworthy people", inviting their enemy to describe the followers of the movement as nothing but the
dregs of society. For some insight into the propaganda war between the 'Abbasid propagandists and
the Umayyad supporters, see Omar, The 'Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 98-9.
145Jahshiyari, WuzariT, p. 291; 'Uyun, p. 342. ".i^_ jy't oir} " . Also, Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 7,
pp. 492, 577) indicates that Ja'far b. Hanzalah al-Bahranl, a very well-known military commander in
the time of Marwan and later one of the 'Abbasids' commanders, suffered from a skin disease (Barss)
146 Qur'an, 3: 28; 4: 139; 5: 51-59; 58:14; 60:1-3; MawardI, AMain, p. 204.
147Abu Yusuf, Awza'i; pp. 39-40; Farra', Ahkam, p. 151.
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Ma'mun set before the people of Ma wara' al-Nahr (Transoxania) for them to be
eligible to enter the Diwan and thus receive stipends.148
Regarding the freedom principle in personal status, although slaves participated as
fighters in the Muslim armies as early as the battle of Badr in 2/624 and continued
occasionally to do so throughout the Umayyad rule, their rights never amounted to
those of free-bom men or mcrwali Instead, they entered the war on the capacity of
their masters and, therefore, they were not entitled to be enrolled in the Diwan or to
receive the 'a/a!149 Nevertheless, it seems that this qualifying principle lost its value
with the introduction of so-called Turkish slaves into the military institution in the
time of Caliph al-Ma'mun and afterward. One of the clearest indications proving that
many of al-Mu'tasim's Turkish troops entered the army while still under
enslavement was their inability to divorce the slave women who had been assigned to
marry them,150 which blatantly contravenes the basic right of a free person in
14SBaladhun, Futuh, pp. 528-9. Although there is no mention of the process of Turkish troops'
conversion to Islam in the time of al-Mu'tasim, sources clearly imply that they were Muslims. It is
reported, for instance, that Ashnas and other Turkish commanders were assigned the task of building
mosques in Samarra'. Ya'qubT, Btildan, p. 29. Referring to the Mamluks' experience, Ayalon points
out that "young children from nomad tribes were brought as slaves from non-Muslim areas into the
Muslim world; they were converted to Islam, given a fanatical orthodox education and trained in the
finest methods of combat." Ayalon, "The Muslim City", p. 311.
I49lbn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 255-6. For some examples of the participation of slaves in warfare in the
time of the Prophet, the Orthodox Caliphs, and the Umayyads, see Pipes, Slave, pp. 108-120.
However, one should be careful to distinguish between the slave who was still under enslavement and
the one who was manumitted and became a mawla as the latter, legally, had the same rights in the
army as the pure freeman (salib). Thus, the slaves who fought with the Prophet and later were
manumitted were entitled to be enrolled in the Divan and receive the 'ata' in the time of Caliph
'Umar I. Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 255. For more details on this subject, see, Forand, 'The Relation of
the Slave and the Client to the Master or Patron in Medieval Islam", IJMES, vol. 2, (1971), pp. 59-66.
IS0Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 29.
Islam.151 Commenting on this condition, Khwarazmi points out that freedom was a
fundamental demand when the Arabs were the dominant element in the army, yet it
lost its significance and value with the introduction of non-Arabs on a large scale.152
The courage condition seems to have been a fair demand for those who wished to
engage in military service in the time of the 'Abbasids, since service in the army in
'Abbasid times was an optional choice and not an obligatory duty (fard 'ayri), as it
had been in the time of the Prophet and the Orthodox Caliphs or for those who
received pensions during the Umayyad Caliphate.153 Thus, it could be expected that
under the 'Abbasids those who possessed less than average courage or simply
disliked military life for any reason would certainly turn to the civil services instead.
Finally, it is worth remembering that courage is one of those traits that can hardly be
tested in a fighter outside the battlefield and that its degree can easily vary from one
battle to another according the circumstances of each one. In fact, the 'Abbasid
army was not always crowned with victories. To the contrary, on many occasions
the 'Abbasid standing forces suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of rebel
forces, who were often less numerous and prepared. In fact, the extent of humiliation
on some occasions reached the point where prominent leaders such as Humayd b.
Qahtabah offered the Kharijite rebel forces immense monetary tributes to stop the
15'Abu Yusuf, Awza'T, p. 68.
l52KhwarazmI, Mqfaiih, p. 64.
153Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 107, 111, 478; vol. 4, pp. 245, 261; vol. 5, pp. 193, 222; vol. 6, pp. 204,
207; Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 2, p. 310.
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fighting and allow him and his forces to return home safely.154 Moreover, in a
campaign against the Byzantines in 164/781, the 'Abbasid commander, 'Abd al-
Kablr b. 'Abd al-Humayd, is reported to have lost heart before he even met the
enemy forces and to have returned home without engaging with them. This so
enraged Caliph al-Mahdl that he wanted at first to execute him.155
Concerning maturity, there is no information about the minimum age at which the
early 'Abbasids enlisted people in the Diwan. However, it seems that the age of
fifteen, which was approved by the Prophet and applied by the Orthodox Caliphs and
the Umayyads,156 was the same age limit also applied by the 'Abbasids. This age,
besides being the age of assuming religious responsibility according to the Islamic
SharPah, is also the age when it is expected that the mental capability of young
recruits would have ripened, enabling them quickly to grasp the arts of war and
making them readily amenable to taking orders from their superiors without much
questioning.
''4Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 114; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 496; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 79.
1:>5After intercession was made for the commander, al-Mahdl agreed only to confiscate all his fortune
and imprison him in the Mutbaq. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 150; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 246;
Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 356; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 146; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 245. Seemingly,
the 'Abbasid leaders recognized the adverse psychological effects and fear that used to affect the
soldiers as a result of being defeated in the battlefield. Therefore, some of the 'Abbasid commanders
were very cautious not to use in the main formation of their armies those soldiers who had been
defeated by the same enemy now being faced. Instead, those soldiers would be left at the rear of the
army as supernumerary reinforcements as well as to increase the size of the army in the eyes of the
enemy. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 30; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 190; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10,
p. 113.
l56Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 175; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 5, p. 351.
Raktw til-Muiairi | PhD Thesis | Chapter 2 \ '/tbbOsid Forces within the Framework ofthe Dtii-ati Al-^hmd BHEH
2.2.4 Rates of Pay of the 'Abbasid Troops
Neither the standards promulgated by Caliph 'Umar nor the conditions applied by the
Umayyads to determine the rate of warriors' allowances were the same as those used
in 'Abbasid times. Instead, the 'Abbasids seem to have referred to two main factors-
military division and location- in assessing pay rates. With regard to military
division, soldiers belonged either to the cavalry or to the infantry. Besides being the
most effective force in the army upon whom rested the final result of battle, the
cavalry were also fully responsible for taking care of their own horses, so that their
pay had to include allowances to cover all the expenses needed for such care.157 For
that reason, the 'Abbasid cavalrymen, for most of the time, received double the
amount that the infantrymen used to receive.158 Salary levels were also affected by
the place in which the soldiers were stationed, so that the troops who were stationed
in the frontier towns, where they were in constant danger, received higher allowances
and more privileges than their colleagues in the central armies did.
2.2.4.1 The Pay ofthe Standing Army in Baghdad
It seems that the rate of payments made to the regular troops, whose names were
formally enrolled in the Dfwan and who were assigned regular allowances (arzaq)
was subject to considerable fluctuation throughout the first century of 'Abbasid rule.
The first reference to troops' pay relates to Dhu al-Qa'dah 129/747, when Kamil b.
!:>7Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 47. Indication that the cavalry were responsible for paying the expenses
incurred by caring for their horses, including the provision of fodder, is found in Ibn al-Muqaffa'
(.Risalah, p. 124), who suggests that part of the rizq should be given as food and some as a fodder.
158TabarI, TarJkh, vol. 8, pp. 534, 550.
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Muzaffar drew up the first register in Makhuwan village. In it he listed 7,000 men,
mostly infantry and non-professionals, and "he paid them three dirhams each and
later four dirhams."159 However, by attracting the Arab professional forces to their
side, the revolutionary leaders seem to have been compelled to offer these forces
who joined them and who were previously listed in the Umayyads' Diwan, the same
amount of money that they used to receive while they were on the Umayyads'
side.160 Thus, we find that some of the warriors who were in the revolutionary army
advancing westward under Qahtabah received 60, 80, and others 100 dirhams.161
According to Akhbar, the first rizq to be paid to the 'Abbasid forces from the
Treasury of the 'Abbasid dynasty came on the 11 Muharram 132/ 30 Dec 749 in
Kufah.162 With a Treasury full of money, the victors were determined to show their
supporters as well as others that they were better than their predecessors and there
was no better way to express this than to reward them fiscally.163 Thus, in his first
speech to the army commanders and their soldiers in Kufah, Abu Salamah al-Khallal
announced, "The people of the cursed house [the Umayyads] used to allot 300
dirhams a year for each warrior. I therefore shall make the rizq 80 dirhams a month
for each."164 This rate of rizq, however, seems at first not to have included all the
159Ibid., vol. 7, p. 367.
160Akhbar, p. 344.
l61Baladhuri, Ansah, vol. 3, p. 135; Sharon, Revolt, p. 102.
162Akhbar, pp. 374-7.
163 "iikr j-u-Ji j-uit J/. Akhbar, p. 377.
164Akhbar, p. 376.
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warriors, since, a few months later, the first Caliph granted to those who had
witnessed the battle of Zab (on the 11 Jumada II 132/26 February 750) 500 dirhams
as a premium and raised their rizq to 80 dirhams.165 However, it was not long before
the first Caliph found himself unable to continue paying his troops at this high rate.
This was on account of the steep decline of the tax yield coming from the provinces
to the central Treasury, either because some provinces, like Khurasan under Abu
Muslim, stopped sending the taxes, or because of the undesirable consequences of
the Caliph's own taxation policy.166 To cope with this problem the Caliph resorted
to two solutions: first, reducing the number of soldiers listed in the Dlwan, and,
second, reducing the payments of the troops from 80 to be 60 dirhams in 135/753.167
Although the reign of the second Caliph, al-Mansur, started with an initial increase
in soldiers' pay of 80 dirhams per month,168 the pay level soon dropped dramatically
to as little as 20 dirhams for each infantryman.169 There were two principal causes
for this reduction. First, there was improvement in the economic position of the
16STabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 435. The chroniclers also narrate that at the outset of his reign Abu al-
' Abbas promised the Kufans that he would raise their 'afa' by 100 dirhams each. However, it seems
that this increase was a once only gesture of appreciation limited to the Kufans. Tabarl, Tarikh, vol.
7, p. 426; Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 143.
166It seems that one of the causes of the government's economic decline was the decreasing amount
coming from the poll tax (jizyah). In this regard Severus b. al-Muqaffa' points out that the first
'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, declared that everyone who became of his (i.e. the Caliph's) faith
and prayed as he prayed would be exempted from paying the jizyah. Therefore, because of the heavy
taxation imposed upon them, many of the wealthy and poor denied the faith of Christ. Severus b. al-
Muqaffa', History ofthe Patriarch, pp. 189-90 ( cited from Shakir, Banu al-'Abbas, vol. 2. p.579).
167Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 107.
. A c™- a auA' j>i jis*". Baladhurt, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 107.
I69lsfahanl (Aghani, vol. 10, p. 106) gives an oral report of one of al-Mansur's soldiers saying, "I
swear by Allah that I am a foot soldier and my rizq from Caliph al-Mansur is 20 dirhams a month."
(footnote continued)
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central government, which came as a consequence of the wide and deep
administrative reforms, especially in the mechanism of tax collection and in
monetary policy.170 This economic boom led to a reduction in the price of goods in
the markets, which in turn was reflected in the lowering of people's wages in all
avenues of employment including the army.171 The second reason for the reduction
in army pay may be attributed to the practical ideology of the Caliph himself. Al-
Mansur seems to have realized that giving the troops more than they actually needed
was the shortest way of corrupting the warriors and weakening their martial strength.
Therefore, the best way to control the soldiers and ensure their loyalty was to attach
them fiscally to their provider and make them always dependent on him. This was
pithily expressed by al-Mansur when he said one day to a group of his commanders,
"The bedou (a'rabi) was right when he said, 'Starve your dog and it will follow you
about.'"172 However, in an attempt to prevent any sort of complaint by the people as
well as the army, Caliph al-Mansur sought to cast a religious halo over his fiscal
J ^3J3^ J*** a' cy </-"-> 'lHj Atj lit .... "
170Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 576. For more information on al-Mansur's economics reform, see Shakir,
Bandal-'Abbas, vol. 1, pp. 574-90.
171JahshiyarI (fVuzara', p. 117) states plainly that prices fell in the time of Caliph al-Mansur. For
further references to prices and wages in the time of al-Mansur, see Khatib, Tarikh, vol. 1, pp. 43, 70;
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 655; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 104.
Rakan al-Mtdam | Phi) Thesis ( Chapter 2 | 'Abbitoid Forces uithm tfu: Framezuark ofthe Dtu&n Af^lund
policy. This is well illustrated in his address to the people on the day of 'Arafahm in
158/775, saying:
I am only the authority of God in his earth, and I govern you
through His guidance and His direction to what is right. I am His
treasurer in charge of the fay', and I work according to His will
and divide it according to His wish and give it with His
permission. God has appointed me over it as a lock; if He wants
to open me for your salaries and divide your fay' and allowances,
He will do so and if He wants to close me up, He will close me
Although the troops' salaries witnessed some increase throughout the reigns of al-
MahdT and al-Rashld,175 they returned again to the rate of the 80 dirhams during the
period of the civil war between the two brothers. Al-Tabari recounts that when the
war started, al-Amln assigned 'Isa b. Mahan to command 50,000 soldiers from
among the people of Baghdad, that he handed over to him the army registers, and
that he asked him "to choose those who pleased him and raise the salaries of
172"aU^. eur Ibn al-Azraq, Bada ivol. 1, p. 199. With a strong economy and a Treasury full of
money, we cannot find any other reason than this to explain the delay in the troops' pay which
happened in the time of Caliph al-Mansur, as noted by Ibn al-Muqaffa' (Risalah, p. 124). Al-Mansur
also recognized that the strength of the dynasty and the loyalty of the army were closely connected to
the availability of money in the central Treasury. Therefore, in his wasiyah to his son al-Mahdl, he is
able to declare, "For you I have gathered in it such wealth that, if the kharaj (taxes) were to be
interrupted for ten years, you would have enough for the salaries of the army, the expenses and
allowances of the children, and the needs of the frontiers. So keep it and you will not cease to be
powerful as long as your Treasury remains full." Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 103 (English tr. quoted
from Kennedy, The History ofal-Tahari, vol. 29, p. 150). Further, Jahshiyari (Wuzara', p. 158), Azdl
{Tarikh, p. 230), and Khatlb (Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 393) all state that al-Mansur left after his death more
than 960 million dirhams in the central Treasury.
173The 9 Dhu al-Hijjah (the tenth month of the Islamic calendar).
174TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 8. p. 89; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 130 (English tr. quoted from Kennedy,
The History ofal- Tabari, vol. 29, p. 131).
"'Although chronicles indicate that there was a rise in the troops' pay during the reigns of al-Mahdl
and al-Rashid, they do not specify the actual rate of this increase. For example, Jahshiyari (Wuzara',
p. 191) narrates that in the reign of al-Rashld, al-Fadl b. Yahya increased the pay of the troops and
their commanders in Khurasan.".jiyiij .ma jijj , luui ym jj*-\} ...."
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whomever he wished to 80 [dirhams]"176 This rate of pay is reconfirmed by al-
Tabari when he mentions that after the death of'Isa and the defeat of his army at the
hands of Tahir b. al-Husayn, the soldiers in Baghdad exploited the dire need of al-
Amln for manpower and mutinied, demanding that the Caliph increase their salaries.
Thus, when the news reached al-Amln, he "ordered four months of their salaries to
be paid in advance and raised the salaries of those who received less to 80
dirhams."m This raise of pay for al-Amln's troops played an effective role in
inducing 5,000 men of Tahir's warriors to withdraw and join the other side, where
they were enlisted in the Diwan and offered 80 dirhams as well.178 To stem the
ebbing tide of troops in his army as well as to induce those who felt dissatisfied with
al-Amln to come and join him, Tahir b. al-Husayn found himself with no other
choice but to raise the salaries of his troops to 80 dirhams m
With the end of the civil war, the troops' salaries started to decline gradually until
they reached, in 201/816, 40 dirhams for the cavalry and 20 for the infantry.180
Nevertheless, between the years 202/818 and 203/819, under unusual circumstances
the pay of the Baghdadi troops in particular witnessed some increase. This was
owing to al-Ma'mun's sudden and peculiar decision, in 201/817, to designate 'All b.
176Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 405; see also Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 396; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 372.
177Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 412.
178According to al-Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 442), 5,000 men joined al-Anrin.
l79Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 443.
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Musa b. Ja'far as his heir to the throne. This decision led to wide spread outrage and
dissatisfaction among the commanders of the army in Baghdad, who decided to
overthrow al-Ma'mun and proclaim Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi as the new Caliph in his
place. As a gesture of appreciation and to secure their support, Ibrahim promised the
troops in Baghdad a salary of 50 dirhams. Nevertheless, his failure to fulfil his
promise led the people of Baghdad, especially after they received a promise from
Humayd, one of al-Ma'mun's commanders, that he would pay them 50 dirhams, to
throw off their allegiance to Ibrahim and recall al-Ma'mun as the Caliph. It is said,
however, that when Humayd went to review the army of Baghdadi troops and pay
out the 50 dirhams that he had promised them, the troops asked him to reduce the
sum by ten dirhams and instead to pay them 40 dirhams each. This gesture had its
origin in their previous disappointment with 'All b. Hisham, who, having offered
them 50 dirhams, tricked them by paying nothing. Humayd, however, answered
them munificently by saying, "No, but instead I shall increase your pay and give you
each 60 dirhams."m
The decline of the troops' pay after the end of the civil war could well be attributed
to two important factors. First, there was the sharp decline of the revenue flowing
into the central Treasuiy, so that there was a shortfall of funds to the tune of 100
l80These rates of pay are said to have been paid by 'Isa b. Muhammad b. Abi Khalid to the 125,000
men who were under his command and represented most of the troops in Baghdad (Ahl Baghdad).
Tabari, TarSch, vol. 8, p. 550; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 430.
181Tabari, TarMi, vol. 8, p. 571; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 449.
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million dirhams in 204/820.1X2 This was due, first, to the devastating economic
impact of the long years of civil war and the temporary separation of many key
provinces, like Syria, Egypt, Sind, and Ifriqiya, from the direct control of the central
government, which meant that no taxes at all could be collected from them, and,
second, to al-Ma'mun's own taxation policy as he reduced the amount of tax due
from other areas such as the Sawad and al-Rayy.183 It can also to be related to the
increased reliance on non-Arab recruits, especially from Transoxania and inner Asia,
who seem to have been more content with lower salaries than were the people of
Baghdad.184
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Early days of the 'Abbasid revolt From 3-4 dirhams
130/748 The revolutionary troops marching toward
Iraq (Qahtabah's army)
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132/750 'Abu al-'Abbas 80 dirhams
135/753
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After 136/754 Al-Mansur 20 dirhams to infantry / 40
dirhams to cavalry
194/810 Al-Aniln (during the civil war) 80 dirhams
182This figure can be calculated by comparing the kharaj list of Qudamah (Kharaj, p. 167), relating to
the year 204/820, with that of al-Jahshiyari (Wuzara', p. 288), which goes back to the reign of al-
Rashld (170-193/786-809).
183lt is reported that al-Ma'mun reduced the share of the harvest payable as tax by the cultivators in
the Sawad lfom one half to two fifths. He also reduced the sum of tax payable by al-Rayy by the
amount of two million dirhams. Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 8, pp. 568, 576; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 393; Ibn al-
Tiqtaqa, al-Fakhri, p. 260; Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'i', vol. 2, p. 70. On some aspects of al-Ma'mun's
taxation policy, see M. Shamsuddin, "Some Aspects of Revenue Administration under the Early
'Abbasids with Reference to al-Mutawakkil", Journal of the Pakistan Historical Soc. vol. 14 (1966),
pp. 172-9.
184Sharon, "Reform", p. 138; Ayalon, "Remarks", p. 48.
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198/814 Al-Ma'mun 80 dirhams,
201/817 Al-Ma'mun 20 dirhams infantry/ 40
dirhams cavalry
202/818 Al-Ma'mun 60 dirhams
223/838 Al-Mu'tasim 2 dinars185
Table 2.2: Summary ofthe Rates ofthe Troops' Pay During the First Century ofthe 'Abbasid Caliphate
2.2.4.2 The Pay ofiheTlroops in the Frontier Regions
In order to ensure enough manpower in the frontier towns, which constituted the first
defensive lines of the state, the 'Abbasids gave special privileges to the troops
stationed there. In addition to grants of lands and subsidies, the warriors received
higher salaries than their partners in the central army. After rebuilding Malatyah on
the Byzantine frontiers, Caliph al-Mansur settled there 4,000 warriors from the
Jazlrah province and increased the pay of each one by ten dinars over and above his
normal salary.186 It is also reported that al-Mahdi awarded ten dinars to each of the
500 soldiers who were stationed in Masslsah.187 In 169/786, after building the
fortress of Hadath, Caliph al-Had! awarded salaries of 40 dinars to each of the 6,000
warriors who were brought from Syria, Jazlrah, Khurasan, and other frontier cities
and settled there.188 Caliph al-Rashld supplemented by ten dinars the salaries of each
of the 5,000 troops who were settled in the frontier town of Tarsus in 172/789.189 in
218/833, Caliph al-Ma'mun is said to have awarded allocations of 100 dirhams for
185Ya'qubi, Tarikh, p. 476.
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each cavalryman and 40 dirhams for each infantryman who were dispatched from
Damascus, Hims, Jordan, Filastxn, Jazirah, and Egypt to encamp in the frontier city
of Tuwanah.190
Although we have little evidence of the actual salaries that the army commanders
(quwwad) used to receive, it seems only fair to assume that they received more than
their soldiers did. Moreover, we know for sure that in the early days of the
'Abbasids' rale certain aspects were taken into consideration while assessing their
salaries. Among these were seniority and service to the 'Abbasid da'wah. Akhbar
indicates that when Abu Salamah al-Khallal distributed the first payments among the
Khurasan! warriors in Kufah in 132/750, he "allotted the distinguished people (al-
khawass), the prominent commanders (kubara' al-quwwad), and the prominent
nuqaba' [leaders of the 'Abbasid partisans in Khurasan] along with others, between
1,000 and 2,000 [dirhams], while he gave those of lower status between 100 and
1,000 [dirhams\rm
2.2.4.3 Additional Fiscal Sources for the 'Abbasid Troops
Besides their regular pay allowance, the 'Abbasid forces used also to receive
sometimes a special fiscal subsidy best known as ma'unah. In the frontier town of
190Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 631; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 412.
(31 **'^* v o ^a>-j .jail 31 al cv. sUijt . Akhbar, p. 376.
Another indication relates to the time of Caliph al-Ma'mun, when, as sources report, the salary of al-
Rayyan b. ahSilt, one of al-Ma'mun's commanders, was 10,000 dirhams, per month. Jahshiyari,
Aqsam Da'i'ah, p. 34; Tanukhl, al-Faraj, vol. 2, p. 204.
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Malatyah, after he quartered 4,000 men there, Caliph al-Mansur is said to have given
each one of them 100 dinars as a ma'unah,192 This type of subsidy or extraordinary
allowance is also indicated amongst the 'Abbasid troops in Baghdad. In 162/779, al-
Mahdl gave 1,000 dirhams as a ma'unah to each of the 1,000 soldiers he had sent as
reinforcements to deal with the rebellion of 'Abd al-Sallam al-Yashkrf in Jazlrah
province.193 According to Ibn Abl Hadld, the ma'unah "is a small sum of money
given to the soldier in order to restore his arms and refresh his beast, and this sum of
money is not part of his regular allowance (rizq)."m
In addition to the regular payments, the plunder (ghana'im, sing, ghaninah) taken
from enemies represented another fiscal source for the warriors as well as for the
central Treasury. In contrast to the fay', the ghana'im consisted of all portable
objects that might be taken from non-Muslims on the battlefield, including arms,
money, merchandise, cattle, and prisoners.195 According to Muslim jurists, one fifth
(khums) of the ghana'im was to be divided into three parts. One part, which is God's
and the Prophet's portion, goes to the State Treasury and is to be spent for the
general welfare of the Muslim ummah according to the decision of the Caliph. A
second part goes to the near kinsmen of the Prophet and, theoretically, the Caliph has
192Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 223.
193Tabari, TarMi, vol. 8, p. 142.
194lbn Abl Hadld, Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah, vol. 10, p. 71.
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no authority over it. The last part also goes to the State Treasury, to be spent on
charitable purposes such as for orphans, the poor, and wayfarers. The remaining four
fifths of the khums should be divided amongst the men who took active part in the
battle.196
In reality, however, the application of these principles was somewhat different. It
seems that one of the problems that the early 'Abbasids inherited from their
predecessors was that of disagreement between the ruling authority and the army
over booty. Nonetheless, in 'Abbasid times the disagreement was much augmented
as it took two dimensions. First, with regard to the booty taken from non-Muslim
foes, in contrast to what used to happen in Umayyad times when the authority always
tried to obtain more than its legal share from the booty, in 'Abbasid times it was the
army who endeavoured to acquire all the booty including the one fifth which was
normally sent to the Caliph.197 The second area of dispute, which was much more
serious, concerned the booty acquired from an enemy who had previously been part
l95From the Muslim jurists' point of view, the booty was only the property taken from non-Muslims in
warfare. However, in cases of war between Muslims, the property of Muslims cannot be considered
as booty and must be returned to its rightful owners. Also, prisoners must not be kept after the end of
the war. However, in reality the case was somewhat different. On this issue, see, Farra', Ahkam, pp.
55-6; MawardI, Ahkam, pp. 58-60; M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore,
1955).
I96lbn Sallam, Amwal, p. 140; MawardI, Ahkam, pp. 139-41; Farra', Ahkam, pp. 141-52; Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 22-3, 29.
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of the regime. While the 'Abbasid authority viewed this as part of government
property, all of which should be returned to the central Treasury, the army
commanders resisted this and looked on it as pure ghanalm, in which case the
government should only take the one fifth.'98
The booty was divided among the soldiers according to a system of shares (ashum,
sing. sahm). Accordingly, the infantryman received one share while the cavalryman
received two: one for himself and the other for his horse.199 Soldiers who rode
camels, donkeys, mules, or elephants received the same share as the infantry and
000
were not treated like the cavalry."
Apart from the regular allowance and ghanalm, the commanders of the army as well
as their soldiers also used to receive grants (silal). These grants were usually
197The first indication comes in 134/752 when Abu Muslim, in Samarqand, held all the booty that had
been acquired after a successful campaign against the king of Kish in Central Asia and did not send
the khums to the Caliph. Tabari, Tarjkh, vol. 7, pp. 464-5, 497; K. al-'Uyun, pp. 224-5. The second
clear indication comes in 198/814 in the time of Caliph al-Amln. It is reported that before undertaking
a military campaign the soldiers made al-Amln promise that he would give them also the khums
belonging to him, a condition to which al-Amln yielded. As a result each man received after the end
of the campaign six dinars more than he should rightly have obtained. Tabari, Tarjkh, vol. 8, p. 524.
Likewise, when Minkajur, the 'Abbasid governor of Adharbayjan, came across a large treasure left by
Babak in one of his dwellings, he did not inform the Caliph about it, but instead seized it for himself.
Tabari, TarSch, vol. 9, p. 102.
198Confrontation of this kind occurred during the war with 'Abdallah b. 'All, the Caliph's uncle. The
Khurasan! officers who were on the side of the Caliph resented his decision to acquire the possessions
of 'Abdallah, claiming that 'Abdallah's property was ghanalm and therefore the Caliph was only
entitled to one fifth, adding, "The rest is ours." pj» «(4— J J! »w/
iJu> oo.jli jA 'M;l j u*. jt_, Tabari, Tarjkh, vol. 7, p. 482; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 164; K. al- 'Uyun,
p. 219; Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 201.
199Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 19; Isfahan!, Aghanf, vol. 14, p. 40; MawardI, Ahkam, p.141. For no
obvious reason some jurists, such as al-Farra' (Ahkam, p. 151), allot three shares to the cavalryman
instead of two.
200MawardI, Ahkam, p. 141; Farra', Ahkam, p. 151.
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distributed by the 'Abbasid Caliph to the members of the army either on happy
occasions such as his accession to the Caliphate, when changing the line of
succession, or in times of crisis as when facing an enemy. These grants took two
forms. First, there were material grants such as land, whether in the capitals of
Baghdad and Samarra' or in the frontier regions. The lands in Baghdad, for example,
known as qata'V (sing. qatTah)201, were in perpetual ownership and were both
heritable and transferable.202 Meanwhile, on the frontiers, as a means toward
creating a sense of attachment and thus ensuring the settlement of troops there, the
'Abbasid Caliphs granted in some areas both housing lands and agricultural lands to
the troops serving there.203 From the dimensions we have relating to some of the
housing lands, known as khipat (sing, khitpah), in these frontiers cities, such as those
distributed in the frontier town of Tarsus, one may deduce that they were only large
enough to accommodate a single house.204
The second form that Caliphal grants took was that of hard cash. This type of grant
was given occasionally and as the case required to the regular troops and their
commanders, either before or after a successful military campaign. It is worth
20,During the first centuries of Islam, the term qatTa donates a unit of land, often a sizeable estate,
granted to prominent individuals in the garrison cities. See Ef , s. v. "Katl'a".
202Ya'qubI, Buldan, pp. 21, 25; Kennedy, 'Abbasid Caliphate, p. 78; al-'AK, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 169.
According to al-Khatib (Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 75), the dimensions of many of these qata'i' were "fifty
by fifty cubits". This means that they were not so big that their sale could cause problems for their
inhabitants, which could happen if these people were other than the owner and his family living within
them.
20,Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 196-7, 200-3, 223.
204BaladhurI (Futuh, p. 201) notes that after the frontier town of Tarsus was built in the time of al-
Rashld, there were 4,000 khitut and that the dimension of each was 20 x 20 cubits.
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noting, however, that in addition to these irregular bonuses, the commanders of the
army used also to receive others on a regular basis, most likely annually. Their
names were enlisted, along with the names of members of the 'Abbasid family and
the intimates of the Caliph, in a special record where the names of each person was
linked with the amount of the grant bestowed by the Caliph on him. Although the
amounts of these seasonal grants were fixed, at least theoretically, for most of the
time they were subject to fluctuation for various reasons. For the commanders,
however, one of the main factors that determined the size of increases or decreases in
their annual grant was the outcome that each accomplished on the battlefield.205
The Caliphal grants might also include within their scope members of the
commanders' families. We know, for example, that after Caliph al-Amln handed to
'Ali b. 'Isa the governorship of al-Jabal in Khurasan, he gave him 200,000 dinars,
and 50,000 dinars for his son as well.206
205Tabari (TarJkh, vol. 8, p. 172) mentions that al-Mahdi sat down one day to give rewards, which
were distributed in his presence to his intimates (khassah) among his family and his army
commanders. The names would be read to him and he would order increases of their normal bonuses
by 10,000, 20,000, and similar amounts. There came before him one of the commanders and al-
Mahdl then said, "This man is reduced by 500." The officer then asked, "O Commander of the
faithful, why have you reduced my grant?" Al-Mahdi replied, "Because I sent you against an enemy
of ours and you fled."
Uj, i^jjytj els'_jtj,—as yiy
. ,tj >- I *iJU l_Li ; JiLfli olyij'i
206Taban, Tarikh. vol. 8, p. 390.
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Figures Mentioned by Al-TabarT as Hard Cash Grants (Silat) Given by
'Abbasid Caliphs to Their Troops2"
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For each soldier who was
with him in the campaign
against Tabaristan
To prevent their mutiny




'All b. Tsa b. Mahan After changing the line of
succession from al-
















army, who by now were
besieging Baghdad214
210/826 Al-Ma'mun 50 million
dirhams
Among his commanders His marriage to the
daughter of al-Hasan b.
Sahl215
207This table does not include reports ofunspecified gifts.
208Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 435. In addition to the cash, the commanders would also receive standard
gifts such as robes of honour, jewel-encrusted swords, horses, and gold collars.
209Ibid„ p. 497.
210lbid., vol. 8, p. 508. Ma'n was also awarded the governorship of Yemen.
21
Ibid., p. 187. The purpose in distributing these grants was to prevent any riot by the army, who
might exploit the death of al-Mahdl and demand that the new Caliph give them their arzaq three or
more years in advance. However, this grant did not abate the troops' demands and indeed they were
given two years of their arzaq in advance.
2nIbid., vol. 8, p. 390. In addition, Tsa also received 1,000 ornamented swords and 6,000 robes of
honour, w} i_ . JLe j-. jJl"
213 Ibid.
2141bid., p. 443. Mas'udi (Muruj, vol. 3, p. 409) indicates that the grants totalled 500,000 dirhams,
which means that the number of commanders who received die grants was 1,000 men.
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213/829 Al-Ma'mun Six million
dirhams
All the army After receiving 30 million
dirhams in taxes (kharaj)
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Table 2.3: Figures Mentioned byA I- -*Aban as Hard Cash Grants (Si/at) Given by 'Abbasid Caliphs to Their Troops
Besides legitimate fiscal sources of income, the soldiers would sometimes disregard
the law and take what were known as ghulul ('seized goods'). One of the Islamic
laws concerning booty strictly forbade warriors to seize for themselves anything
whatsoever, even the smallest and most insignificant object, from the booty before it
had been gathered and distributed justly amongst all.220 However, despite the
extreme threat of punishment on the Day of Judgement, this did not prevent some
cases of this transgression, first, in the time of the Prophet and, more increasingly, in
later periods including the early 'Abbasid era.221 Although there is no specific
provision in Islamic law regarding the sort of punishment that the ghal (the illegal
215Ibid., p. 608. Al-Tabari also notes that al-Ma'mun granted al-Hasan ten million dirhams, to be
taken from the revenue of Fars.
2l6Ibid„ pp. 652-3.
211Ibid., vol. 9, p. 10.
2iSIn addition to this, al-Mu'tasim also granted al-Afshln 10,000 dirhams for every day he rode forth
against the enemy and 5,000 dirhams for each day when he did not ride forth. Ibid., p. 54.
2l9Apart from this, the Caliph also presented al-Afshln with a crown (tawwajahu) and girded him with
two jewelled belts (wishahayn). Also, al-Mu'tasim used to send every day a horse and a robe of
honour to Afshln from the moment he captured Babak until he reached Samarra'. Ibid., pp. 52, 54.
220The only exception to this rule was objects taken for necessity, yet these should be returned
immediately with the ending of the emergency. Abu Yusuf, al-A wza'I, pp. 13-6.
221For such cases in 'Abbasid times, see Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, pp. 481-2.
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seizer of booty) should receive, it seems that the authority had freedom to impose on
such a person whatever punishment it thought suitable, which could be moral or
999
physical."
The practice of taja'ul (or ja'a'il) seems to have continued in 'Abbasid times and
more particularly in the areas where the Arab tribal forces served. We read, for
instance, that after rebuilding the frontier town of Malatyah, Caliph al-Mansur
allotted the garrison forces there ten dinars over their normal salary of 100 dinars as
a ma'unah, "in addition to the ju'l which the tribes practised among themselves."223
According to Ibn Manzur, the ju 7 was the sum of money which a soldier who was
obligated to go to war gave to another person in recognition of the latter's going to
the war on his behalf.224
Regarding the mutatawwi'ah (volunteers) who were not enrolled in the Diwan, they
usually joined the army at their own expense and sometimes they might even
contribute to the overall expense of the campaigns that they took part in.225 To assist
them in coping with their expenses while on active in service, the authority might
give the needy amongst them a sum of money from the voluntary alms (sadaqat), but
222Ibn al-Qayyim, Zad, vol. 2, p. 66; Ibn A'tham, Futuh, vol. 1, p. 350; Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'i', vol. 2,
pp. 55-6. To express his resentment at such behaviour, the Prophet is said to have refused to pray for
ghats after their death (Ibn Hishani, Sirah, vol. 3, p. 391; Bukharl, Sahih, vol. 3, p. 96). In Umayyad
times the punishment for this crime was of a physical character, so that, for example, it is reported that
Caliph 'Umar II ordered the cutting offof the hand of a ghat (Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 5, p. 192).
223 Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 223.
224Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 11, p. Ill, s. v. ju 'I. For an exhaustive discussion of the concept ofju 7 in
early Islam, see Bonner, "Ja'a'il and the Holy War", pp. 45-64.
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not from the State Treasury. Nevertheless, when it came to the distribution of the
m ( T)ft
plunder, the mutapawwi 'ah enjoyed the same rights as the regular troops."
The People of the Book (Christians and Jews, otherwise known as dhimmh, or
protected people) were not required to serve in the army as the state was fully
responsible for their protection in return for their payment of the jizyah. Even if they
did participate, they were still legally not entitled to receive a regular allowance
(rizq) nor had they any right to shares in the booty. Instead, in return for their
service, they would be allotted an amount from the khums of the booty and this was
called radkh (a paltry gift).227 However, on occasion the People of the Book might
reach an agreement with the Muslim authority under which they committed
themselves to support the Muslims whether by participating with them in actual
fighting, defending the frontiers near to them, or keeping an eye on the Muslims'
enemies. In return for such services they would be exempted from paying the jizyah
and become entitled to a sharing in any captured plunder if they practically
participated with the Muslims in combat.228
225Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 116.
226Farra\ Ahkam, pp. 39, 152; Mawardi, Ahkam, p. 141; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 19.
227Jurisprudentially, women and children fell also within the same category. Nevertheless, there is no
indication in 'Abbasid times of any participation by women, except for the one instance of the sisters
of Salih b. 'All al-'AbbasI, who vowed that if the Umayyad rule came to an end, they would fight for
the sake of Allah. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 500. On the radkh, see Farra', Ahkam, p. 151; Mawardi,
Ahkam, pp. 129-30; Abu Yusuf, al-Awza'i, pp. 37-40.
228Such an agreement took place between the Muslims in the time of 'Umar b. al-Khattab and the
Christian Jarajimah (the Mardaites) who lived near the frontier town of Antakiyah. The agreement
lasted right down to the time of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil (232-247/847-861), who imposed
the jizyah upon them and instead gave a regular allowance (rizq) to those whose military service was
needed. Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 189-91.
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For slaves (mamalik or ghilman) military service was not compulsory. Nevertheless,
for those who did choose to fight alongside their masters, they had no legal right to
an allowance, although on some occasions they might receive a sum from their
masters, who usually received more than their normal allowance on account of their
using their slaves. Although slaves had no right to a share of the booty, those who
participated in fighting and performed well in battle might be given some
insignificant wares from the booty such as household goods (known as kharthi al-
ghanimah) and these were also classified as radkhr29
2.2.5 The Size of the 'Abbasid Army
It is not an easy task to discover the exact number of men serving in the early
'Abbasid army. This is mainly because primary sources not only provide us with
very little information of this kind, but also because of exaggeration in the few
accounts that they provide and contain such information. Nevertheless, with the
exercise of caution and close examination of the numbers that can be found in these
sources, one may get some idea of the size of'Abbasids' army at certain periods.
The earliest evidence of the size of the 'Abbasid army relates to 23 Rajab 131/18
March 749 and the battle of Jabalq near Isfahan. To match the Syrian army under
'Amir b. Dubarah, which is said to have numbered between 100,000 and 150,000
men,230 Qahtabah b. Shablb had to assemble most of the available revolutionary
229Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 254-7, 354-5.
r,0Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, pp. 405-6.
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troops, who were widely spread across Khurasan. Qahtabah, along with eleven
military commanders, were able to put 20,000 men in the battlefield.231 In addition
to this force, we know that there were other forces, most probably numbering
between 5,000 and 10,000 men, divided between Abu Muslim in Nlshapur and al-
Hasan b. Qahtabah, who now lay siege against the Syrian forces in Nahawand under
the leadership of Malik b. Adham.232 This would give a total force of some 25,000
to 30,000 men.233
The second note relating to the size of the 'Abbasid army concerns the years 131/749
and 132/750. After the surrender of the Syrian army in Nahawand, Qahtabah
dispatched 4,000 men under Abu 'Awn b. Yazld al-Khurasaru and Malik b. Tarif to
face 'Uthman b. Sufyan and his Syrian forces in Shahrazur in the territory of
Mawsil.234 With the defeat of the latter, Caliph Marwan b. Muhammad found that
he had no other option but to lead personally a large army and march from Harran
toward the region of Mawsil to try to halt the advance of Abu 'Awn. To be able to
face Marwan's army, Abu Salamah al-Khallal, the first 'Abbasid vizier, sent
mIbid., p. 406.
n2Ibid„ pp. 404-5.
~33The element of exaggeration clearly appears in the account given by Ibn al-'Umranl (al-Anba\ p.
59), who estimates the number of those who joined Abu Muslim in the early stage of the 'Abbasid
revolution at 70,000 cavalry and 70,000 infantry.
234Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 409; al-Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 137.
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reinforcements to Abu 'Awn, whose army thereby increased to 19,000 men.235 This
number represents almost half of the 'Abbasid forces at that time and by this force
'Abdallah b. 'All, who was sent by the new Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, to take over the
army command, entered the decisive battle with Marwan in Zab on 11 Jumada 11
132/26 February 750.236 In addition to this force, there were 20,000 men under al-
Hasan b. Qahtabah, who now lay siege around the 30,000 Syrian troops under Ibn
Hubayrah inside Wasit.237 Moreover, there must have been other forces, probably
numbering over 10,000, who were left with Abu Muslim in Khurasan.238 Therefore,
the overall total of men in the 'Abbasid army at the outset of 'Abbasid rule was
about 50,000.239
H5Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 432) reports that Abu Salamah sent 'Uyaynah b. Musa, al-Manhal b.
Fatan, and Ishaq b. Talhah al-Ta'I with 3,000 men. Also, 'Abu al-Abbas, who had just been
proclaimed Caliph in Kufah, sent to Abu 'Awn 2,000 men under Salamah b. Muhammad, 1,500 under
'Abdallah al-Ta'I, 2,000 under 'Abd al-Hanud b. Rub'I, and 500 under Waddas b. Nadlah. Almost
the same figures are given by the author of Akhbar (p. 378) when he mentions that Abu 'Awn had
18,000 men before 'Abdallah b. 'All came, probably along with 1,000 men, and took over the
command.
b6Two figures are given by al-Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 439) for the number of men in the 'Abbasid
army at Zab. The first is 20,000, which seems close to the truth, and the second is 10,000 men. The
20,000 figure is also mentioned by al-Azdl (Tarikh, p. 126).
237DInawari, al-Akhbar, p. 369.
238Our estimate of the number of troops left with Abu Muslim is based on an account by Ibn Qutaybah
(Imamah, pt. 2, p. 158), who mentions that when Abu Muslim came from Khurasan to Kufah at the
request of Caliph Abu al-'Abbas, "he had with him 10,000 troops from the people of Khurasan."
"wThe increase in numbers should be attributed mainly to the Iraqis, especially from among the
Yemenite tribesmen, who joined the revolutionary army. For example, Akhbai- (p. 367) indicates that
Muhammad b. Khalid al-Qasri, along with 1,000 men from his tribe, mawall, and neighbours in
Kufah, joined the 'Abbasid forces. Meanwhile, al-Baladhurl (Ansab, vol. 3, p. 138), with an element
an of exaggeration, indicates that Muhammad b. Khalid al-Qasri, along with 11,000 Ktifans, joined
the revolutionary forces. See also DInawari, Akhbar, p. 368.
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The next evidence of the size of the 'Abbasid army relates to the time of the second
Caliph, al-Mansur. Facing the rebellion of Ibrahim b. 'Abdallah b. al-Hasan in
Basrah in 145/762-763, which broke out two months after the rebellion of his brother
Muhammad in Madlnah, al-Mansur realized that the 'Abbasid capital (al-
Hashimiyyah) was almost defenceless. His armies were widely scattered as 4,000
men had been sent with his nephew Tsa b. Musa to face Muhammad's movement in
Madlnah, 30,000 men were with his son al-Mahdl in al-Rayy, 40,000 were on a
campaign in North Africa under the leadership of Muhammad b. Ash'ath, and 1,000
men were with him in Kufah. 240 According to this account, the total number came
to 75,000 men. However, there must have been other forces that the Caliph did not
mention. These forces, which were relatively small, consisted of bands of men
(rawabit) stationed in garrisons that were scattered across the various provinces. For
example, 2,000 troops under Harb b. 'Abdallah al-Rawandl were stationed in
Mawsil to defend it against any attack by the Kharijites.241 Also, there were 4,000
troops stationed in al-Ahwaz under its governor, Muhammad b. al-Husayn.242 In the
Jazlrah province, although sources do not mention the size of its garrisons in the time
of Ibrahim's rebellion in 145/763, yet there are earlier indications of such garrisons.
Al-Tabari, for example, indicates that during the rebellion of Abu al-Ward in
240Frastrated by the rebellion of Ibrahim, al-Mansur swore that if he overcame this dilemma, he would
not so divide his army again and he would always keep 30,000 men close beside him. Tabari, Tarikh,
vol. 7, pp. 638-9; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 207; Ibn AthTr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 171; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah,
vol. 10, p. 99.
~41
Azdl, Tarikh, p. 195; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 632; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 98.
242Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 636.
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132/750 there were 3,000 men posted in Harran under Musa b. Ka'b.243 Yet this
number of garrison soldiers seems to drop later. Al-Tabari points out that during the
rebellion of al-Mallabad b. Harmalah al-Shaybanl in 137/755, there were only 1,000
'Abbasid forces in all the Jazirah garrisons, a number which most probably
continued to hold at that level.244 In addition, a large number of troops must also
have been stationed on the frontiers. On the Byzantine frontiers their number may
have exceeded 25,000.245 Similar figures probably also apply to the frontiers with
Armenia, Adharbayjan, and Sind.246 This would give us an overall total of about
130,000 'Abbasid troops in the reign of al-Mansur. However, the number seems to
have increased over the years, as we learn from participants who were involved in




244lbid., p. 495. It is worth noting that not all the provinces had garrisons. Basrah, Fars, and Madlnah,
for example, seem to have had none. When Ibrahim b. al-Husayn rebelled in Basrah, there were only
600 government troops to oppose him. Ibid., p. 635. Also, when Husayn b. 'All b. al-Hasan revolted
in Madlnah in 169/786, there were only 200 local troops to face him. Kennedy, 'Abbasid, Caliphate
p. 78; Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 194.
245Kcnncdy, Abbasid Caliphate, p. 77.
246With regard to Sind, for example, al-Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 464) mentions that in 134/752 Caliph
Abu al-'Abbas al-Saffah sent 4,000 Arab troops from Basrah under Musa b. Ka'b to face the
rebellion of Mansur b. Jumhur in Sind. As regards Armenia and Adharbayjan, although the sources
clearly indicate that the 'Abbasids had transferred many of the Iraqi troops who were recipients from
the Diwan, especially men from Basrah and Kufah, to these frontiers, yet no clue is given as to how
many they were. See e.g. Ya'qubl, Tarikh, pp. 371-2, 426; Baladhurl, Futuh, pp. 246-7, 405.
It is worth noting that not all the participants in these campaigns were regular soldiers, but rather
many of them would have been mutafowwi'ah (volunteers) or levied forces (furud) recruited for a
short period of military service.
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List ofFigures Citedfor the Number of'Abbasid Troops Tubing Part in Military
Campaigns
Year Caliph Number of
Troops






Armenia, as reinforcements for
al-Hasan b. Qahtabah in his
O40









150/767 Al-Mansur 34,000 Khazim b.
Khuzaymah
Khurasan, to deal with the
rebellion ofUstadhsis251
154/771 Al-Mansur 50,000 Yazid b. Hatim Ifriqiya, to deal with the
Kharijite rebellion* "
























176/793 Harun 50,000 Yahya b. al-Hasan and his
rebels257
248Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 372.
249In another narration the number is said to have been 20,000. However, the first number seems
closer to the truth. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 638.
250Ibid.
251 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 30.
252Ibid., p. 44.
2532,000 (farad) men were from Basrah 1,500 mutatmvwi'ah were from the frontiers, 700 were
Syrians, 1,000 were mulatawwi 'ah from Basrah, and 4,000 were Aswariyyins and Sayabijah. Tabari,
























The Byzantines, on a summer
759
campaign
192/808 Harun 10,000 'Abdallah b.
Malik
Adharbayjan, to deal with the
Khurramiyyah 260
195/811 Al-Amin 40,000261 'Ali b. 'isa b.
Mahan
Khurasan, to face al-
Ma'mun's forces led by Tahir
b. al-Husayn262
195/811 Al-Amln 20,000 'Abd al-Rahman
al-Abnawi
Khurasan, to halt the advance
of Tahir s army toward
Baghdad263












Against the Byzantine city of
Amorium267




261Two figures appear in al-Tabari: 40,000 and 50,000 (ibid., pp. 391, 405).
262The people in Baghdad said that this was the biggest army they had ever seen. Ibid., p. 406.
26}Ibid., p. 412.
26420,000 of these troops were A 'rab and 20,000 were abna'.
265
Jabari, TarAh, vol. 8, p. 423.
Many of these were mutatuwwi'ah and, according to Ya'qubl (TarAh, vol. 2, p. 476), the number
of the regular troops (murtazaqcih) who were with al-Mu'tasim in this campaign was 80,000 men.
267Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 60.
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Summary
After tracing the history of the Dhvan al-Jund from its inception to the end of the
Umayyad dynasty, in this chapter we have also examined in detail the DJwan under
the early 'Abbasid Caliphate, when fresh initiatives were introduced regarding many
of its organizational procedures. Among many other practicalities, these new
initiatives affected the way the early 'Abbasids' soldiers were registered, the
methods of distributing their pay, and, indeed, the very concepts of 'ata' and arzaq.
which underwent some serious modification.
The most obvious feature of the Drwan al-Jund under the 'Abbasids was the move
from the system of enlistment by nasab to a system of enlistment according to
personal names, fathers' names, and regions of soldiers' origin. For Central Asian
troops with no clear geographical origins, registration was according to race, as they
were all generally denoted as Atrak (Turks).
The early 'Abbasid soldiers were organized in the Diwan according to military
contingents from particular geographical areas. Each commander, along with the
troops under his command, was allocated a separate register within the main military
register. In turn, each of these separate registers contained discrete records for each
soldier, which would include details of his physical appearance and his rate of pay,
thereby eliminating any confusion over soldiers with the same name and facilitating
also the detection of infiltrators.
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Running the affairs of the Dhvan al-Jund was entrusted to very qualified secretaries
best known as Kuttab al-Jund. Among the qualifications required in them were
knowledge of the distinguishing features of men, their characteristics, the
distinguishing marks of beasts, and knowledge of arithmetic.
The distribution of soldiers' pay under the early 'Abbasids was earned out through
the issuing of the 'document of authorization' (sakk), which would contain the
number of recipients and the total amount of their pay. After being verified and
sealed by the Caliph or his vizier, the sakk would then be forwarded to the Paymaster
General of the Treasury, who would thereupon release the necessary funds to the
Award Office (Majlis al-I'ta). The actual distribution of the soldiers' pay was
carried out by appointed officials best known as munfiqin or mu'pn, who were
assisted by other officials called 'urrad (sing. 'arid). After the pay had been
distributed among the soldiers, a report would be drawn up stating the actual mount
distributed and any savings that had been made.
The timetable for distributing the soldiers' pay during the first century of 'Abbasid
rule tended to vary from one Caliph to another, depending very much on the financial
situation under each one. The normal reaction of the soldiers to their pay falling into
arrears was for them to mutiny. This, in fact, became the set form, growing worse
from the time of Caliph al-Rashld onwards. The reasons for the payments' falling
into arrears in early 'Abbasid times centralized mainly on the failure of most of the
'Abbasid Caliphs to reserve funds for emergencies and the ill-conceived practice of
paying all their troops at the same time. Efforts were made to overcome these
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financial difficulties by taking loans from the wealthy people, postponing the pay¬
day until taxes (particularly the kharaj) had been received, substituting part of the
pay in foodstuffs, or simply making the army commanders responsible for covering
campaign expenses, including the pay of their troops, out of their own pockets.
One of the significant developments that came with the rise of the 'Abbasids to
power was a change in the meaning and concept of both the terms 'ata' and arzaq.
The term arzaq under the early 'Abbasids no longer applied to the foodstuffs given
by the state since the time of 'Umar up to the downfall of the Umayyads to the
recipients of the Diwan and their families, but simply denoted a cash allowance
received only by those who were registered in the central Diwan in Baghdad and
engaged in active service in the army all the year around. Also, The term 'ata',
within its civil context as a civil pension, was no longer a right that could be claimed
or inherited from father to son. Instead, it meant a grant that the 'Abbasid Caliphs
gave in a selective manner and which could be terminated by the death of the
recipient or by the displeasure of the Caliph or his officials with its beneficiary.
Meanwhile, within its military context, the term 'ata' became basically a cash
allowance paid to the Arab tribal forces as long as they were on active military duty.
Unlike the Umayyads, the 'Abbasids took into account two main factors in assessing
the rate of pay for their soldiers: military division and location. Commonly, the
cavalrymen received double the amount that the infantrymen would receive. Further,
the troops serving in the frontier regions received higher pay than that received by
their counterparts in Baghdad. The soldiers' rates of pay during the century of
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'Abbasid rule fluctuated widely, depending to a great extent on the economic and
political circumstances under each Caliph. In addition to their normal pay, the
'Abbasids' soldiers also had access to other sources of funding, most importantly
booty, which was an area of serious dispute between the army and the 'Abbasid
Caliphs concerning the proper manner of its classification and distribution. As the
claim of the Riling authority tended to decline, the soldiers used the strength of their
position to assert their personal claim.
Volunteers, People of the Book (Dhimmis), and slaves were all free from obligation
to serve in the army, but when they did choose to serve, each class was rewarded
differently from the others.
The size of the 'Abbasid army varied widely under the different Caliphs, beginning
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Introduction
A common basis for organization of Muslim armies on the battlefield was the
division of the participants into units according to the functions that the men in each
unit would perform. At the most general level, these units could be classified, for
convenience, into two types: the military units, consisting of those men directly
involved in the actual fighting, and the supportive units, a relatively small group by
comparison, whose functions were mostly of a non-combative nature. This chapter
attempts to describe these units during the early 'Abbasid period, explaining their
characteristics, their special roles, and their equipment.
3.1 The Military Units
3.1.1 The Cavalry
The cavalry (fursan or khayyalah) played a major role in the history of Muslim
armies. The Qur'an (VIE, 60) and the Prophet both encouraged the Muslims to have
horses and to train them for battle.1 Moreover, the share of the booty distributed to
the cavalryman (faris) was twice the share received by the infantryman (rajil), one
share being for himself and the other for his horse.2 All this was a great incentive
therefore for the Muslims to acquire horses and take good care of them, and it was
not surprising that the cavalry became a significant element in the military success of
the Muslims. During the 'Abbasid period, an extensive and varied literature
'Abu 'Ubaydah, Khayl, p. 109; WaqidI, MaghazI, vol. 3, p. 1019.
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flourished, describing in detail, among other matters, the colour, breeding,
temperament, accoutrements, and names of horses. Some more specialist literature
dealt with equine diseases and how to treat them, while the concern of other writers
was with mounted combat.
As in earlier revolutions, the number ofhorses available to the 'Abbasids in the early
days of their revolution was relatively small. Most of their fighting forces at that
early stage came from among the early Arab settlers and Iranians, most of whom
were infantrymen and not very well armed.4 Nevertheless, the number of horsemen
seems to have been rapidly augmented. This was in consequence, first, of enlistment
by Arab tribal forces from Yemen and Rabi'ah who had previously served in the
Umayyad military institution as cavalry, and, second, of the sizeable number of
horses seized by the revolutionary forces from the defeated Syrian army, which was
predominantly composed of cavalry. Evidence of this is found in reports of the battle
that took place at Jabalq, near Isfahan, on the 23 Rajab 131/18 March 749. It is
2Ibn Sallam, Amwal, p. 309; Abu Yusuf, Siyar al-Awza'i, p. 17.
3See, e.g., Abu 'Ubaydah (d. 210/826), Kitab al-Khayl; Hisham al-Kalbl (d. 207/823), Kitab al-Khayl;
Asma'I (d. 213/829), Kitab al-Khayl and Kitab al-Sarj wa' l-Lijam; al-Mada'ini (d. 215/830), Kitab
al-Khayl wa 'l-Rihan; Ahmad b. Hatim (d. 231/846), Kitab al-Khayl; al-'Utbl (d. 228/843), Kitab al-
Khayl; Muhammad b. Ziyad al-A'rabl (d. 231/836), Kitab al-Khayl and Kitab Nasab al-Khayl;
Ahmad al-Khazzaz (d. 258/872), Kitab al-Hala'il wa' l-Rihan. For further information on writing in
the early 'Abbasid period on horses and related matters, see Gorguis 'Awwad, Masadir al-Turath al-
'Askarl 'inda al-'Arab, vol. 1, pp. 294-305 ( 3 vols., Baghdad, 1982); Ahsan, Social life, p. 244, n. 1;
EI', s. v. "Furusiyya".
163Rakan al-Siutairi | PhD Thesis { Chapters ( The Military Units ami Support Services
reported that the consolidated 'Abbasid forces, under the leadership of Qahtabah,
entered the battle with 20,000 men, including both cavalry and infantry.5
Meanwhile, the Syrian anny, under the leadership of 'Amir b. Dubarah, numbered
between 100,000 and 150,000, all of whom were horsemen and very well equipped,
to a degree that earned them the title 'the army of all armies' ('askar al-'asakir).6
The outcome of the battle was a very swift and decisive victory for the revolutionary
forces, as a result of which they captured a large number of horses, weapons, and
slaves.7 We find indications that, not long after this battle, the number of horsemen
in the revolutionary forces almost equalled, if not in fact exceeded, that of the foot-
soldiers. The first of these appears in accounts of the battle between Qahtabah and
Ziyad b. Hubayrah on 8 Muharram 132/27 August 749 in the region called Upper
Fallujah in Iraq. In this battle, as various chronicles indicate, Qahtabah was able to
order each of his horsemen to cany a foot-soldier with him across the River
Euphrates from the west to the east bank in order to face the Umayyad army.*
Another example comes four months later in reports of the decisive battle at Zab,
which took place on 11 Jumada II 132/26 January/ 750 between 'Abdallah b. 'All
'Thus, Dmavvari (Akhbar, p. 361), who gives a description of those who joined Abu Muslim during
the early days of the open revolt in Ramadan 129/June 747, says, 'People came over to Abu Muslim
from Herat, Bushanj, Marw al-Rudh, Taliqan, Nasa, Ablward, Tus, Nishapur, Sarakhs, Balkh,
Saghaniyan, Tukharistan, Khuttalan, Kasaf, and Nasaf. They all came clad in black garments as well
as having blacked half of the wooden clubs that they had, which they called "clubs for hitting
unbelievers" (kafir kubat). They came on foot and riding on donkeys and horses.' Also, Tabari
(Tai-Jkh, vol. 7, p. 357) indicates that of the first 2,200 who joined the revolt, there were only 20
horsemen among them.
sTabari, TarMi, vol. 7, p. 406.
6Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 5, vol. p. 56; Tabari, TarMi, vol. 7, p. 405.
7Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, p. 406; Akhbar, p. 346; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 57.
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and the Syrian forces under the leadership of Caliph Marwan. In order to be able to
hold back the massive assault of the Syrian cavalry forces and most likely also to
compensate for the shortage of foot-soldiers in his army, 'Abdallah b. 'All ordered
his horsemen to carry out the role normally played by the foot-soldiers, that is, to
dismount from their steeds and kneel down in close formation with their lances held
out in front of them with the intention ofwounding and startling the Syrian horses.9
After the end of the revolutionary era, the cavalry troops continued to form the
backbone of the 'Abbasid armies and they were often responsible for the final
outcome of a battle.10 The ever-increasing reliance on the cavalry reached its zenith
with the introduction of the Turks into the 'Abbasid military institution. Al-Jahiz, in
his Risalah fi Manaqib al-Atrak, discusses at length their martial skills as first-class
horsemen. He says:
If the Turk's daily life were to be reckoned up in detail, he would
be found to spend more time in the saddle than on the
ground...The Turk is at one and the same time herdsman, groom,
trainer, horse-dealer, farrier, rider: in short, a one-man team.
When the Turk travels with horsemen of other races, he covers
twenty miles to their ten, leaving them and circling around to the
right and left, up and down to the bottom of the gullies, and
shouting all the while at anything that runs, crawls, flies or stands
still. The Turks never travel like the rest of the band, and never
ride straight ahead. On a long, hard ride, when it is noon and the
halting-place is still afar off, all are silent, oppressed with fatigue
and overwhelmed with weariness. Their misery leaves no room
*Akhbar, p. 370; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 416.
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 433-4; Azdi, Tarikh, p. 129; K. al-'Uyun, p. 202.
"The importance of the horsemen in the army is indicated by al-Jahiz, who writes, "Horses and their
riders are the pivot of the armies. They it is who withdraw and return to charge, who fold the
battalions around themselves as a letter is folded, and then scatter them like hairs." Jahiz, Rasail,
vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 53 (English translation quoted from Peilat, Life, p. 95).
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for conversation. Everything round them crackles in the intense
heat, or perhaps is frozen hard. As the journey drags on, even the
toughest and most resolute begin to wish that the ground would
open under their feet. At the sight of a mirage or a marker post on
a ridge they are transported with joy, supposing it to be the
halting-place. When at last they reach it, the horsemen all drop
from the saddle and stagger about bandy-legged like children who
have been given an enema, groaning like sick men, yawning to
refresh themselves and stretching luxuriously to overcome their
stiffness. But your Turk, though he has covered twice the distance
and dislocated his shoulders with shooting, has only to catch sight
of a gazelle or an onager near the halting-place, or put up a fox or
a hare, and he is off again at a gallop as though he had only just
mounted. It might have been someone else who had done that
long ride and endured all that weariness.11
Enhancing their forces with horsemen must have obligated the 'Abbasid Caliphs to
provide the ever-increase number of their forces with a sufficient number of riding
beasts. Riding beasts in early 'Abbasid times were usually obtained through three
main sources, first, through what the army could capture from their enemies after the
end of the fight. As examples, first, during the expedition against the Byzantines in
165/782, the 'Abbasid army is reported to have taken as booty 20,000 riding beasts
with all their equipment.12 Again, in another campaign against the Byzantines, in
188/804, the 'Abbasid forces seized 4,000 riding beasts.13 The second source was
through the peace treaties that the 'Abbasid forces would sign with their enemies, by
which the former stipulated that the latter must provide the central government in
"jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 49-50 (English translation quoted from Pellat, Life, pp. 94-5).
12Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 153; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 248.
uIbn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 157; Tabarl, TarSch, vol. 8, p. 313.
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Baghdad with a specified number of riding beasts.14 The third prime source of beasts
was through what some Islamic provinces, especially these known for their
thoroughbred horses such as Egypt and Khurasan, would send to Baghdad whether
as a gifts or as part of the taxes imposed on them.15
The great enthusiasm of the 'Abbasid Caliphs for horses and the activities associated
with them was undoubtedly reflected in the establishment of hippodromes (mayadln,
sing, maydari) in their cities, such as were found in the suburb of al-Shammasiyyah
(east of Baghdad), Rusafah, Samarra', or in the city of Raqqah in Jazlrah.16 The
'Abbasid Caliph would arrive at the hippodrome accompanied by his high officials
and intimate associates to watch with interest racing competitions between their own
horses17 or to pass the time by playing games on horseback such as polo
(,scrwlajan).18 At these hippodromes, which also served as training grounds for the
army, the 'Abbasid Caliphs would also come and watch their horsemen being trained
"One example of this comes in 214/829 during the reign of al-Ma'mun. It is reported that the peace
treaty between the 'Abbasid forces and the Sanarriyah of Armenia stipulated that the latter must
provide the 'Abbasids with 3,000 brood mares (ramakal, sing, ramkah). Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 1, p.
464.
"jahshiyari, Wuzara', p. 283; Tha'alibi, Lata'if pp. 166-7; lbn Iyas, Kitab Tarikh Misr, vol. 1, pp. 3,
7; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 314.
"'Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 373; Ya'qubT, Buldan, pp. 24, 34; Jahshiyari, Wuzara', p. 207.
!7Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 373; Jahshiyari, Wuzara', p. 207. The first maydan founded in Baghdad
for horse-racing is reported to have been built by Caliph al-Mahdl. For more details on the
establishment of hippodromes in the different 'Abbasid capitals, see Rogers, "Samarra'," pp. 151-5;
Ahsan, Social Life, pp. 262-3; al-'Ali, "Foundation", pp. 93,101.
18Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 372; vol. 9, p. 121; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 410; K. al-Uyim, p. 321.
Ibn Tiqtaqa (Fakhri, p. 163) notes that Caliph al-Rashid was the first Muslim Caliph to play polo. For
more details of the various games played on horseback in the time of the 'Abbasids, see Ahsan, Social
Life, pp. 252-8.
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in combat skills (furusiyyah). Al-Mu'tasim, for example, is said to have supervised
the training of his horsemen, who would be clothed in white for the classes and have
the heads of their lances steeped in saffron, so that if one hit another, the strike would
be visible.19 The training of the 'Abbasid horsemen, which the Khurasanis prided
themselves in, would also include learning the skills and tactics of evasion
(mujawalah); jousting (mushawalah); hit and am (karr wa-farr); leaping over
horseback (nazw); and using the bow or lance to shoot a couching animal
(mujthamah), a flying bird (ta'ir khataf), or a target placed over the head of a lance
or similar object (burjass). Moreover, the training would also include learning the
skilful manoeuvring involved in polo.20
The selection of the optimum breeds of horses for use by their cavalrymen was given
great attention by the 'Abbasids, especially in wartime. During the campaign of
'Ammuriyyah, for example, Caliph al-Mu'tasim commanded the use of piebald
horses (bulq) by his cavalry and, when he set out, there were 4,000 piebald horses in
2J __ %the vanguard of his army alone. The emphasis that was placed on the fitness of the
cavalry horses before they entered combat is also indicated in another account of the
same military campaign. As a way of testing the adequacy of the horses of his
cavalry, Ashnas, one of the chief commanders, rode with 500 of his horsemen and, at
"Al-Ahdab, Kilab al-Furusiyyah, p. 58.
20Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 20-1.
"'Qalqashandl, Subh, vol. 3, p. 287; ibid., Mo'athir al-Anafah, vol. 1, p. 221; Ansari, Tafrg al-Kurub,
p. 48. Literally the word bulq means 'piebald' or 'spotted'. When it was a matter of horses'
characters, the Arabs seem to have considered this sort as the best breed of racehorse. See Ibn
Manzur, Lisan al- 'Arab, s.v. "Ablaq"; Ibn SIdah, al-Mukhassas, pt. 6, vol. 2, p. 152.
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a distance of about one mile from their camp, Ashnas whipped his mount and
galloped furiously for about two miles. He then stopped to look at his cavalry who
were ranged behind and those who had not kept up with the main body because of
the inadequacy of their horses were sent back to the camp.22
The cavalry squadrons were generally classified into two categories according to the
horses that they rode. First were those who rode horses that were armoured with
cuirasses, made either from leather or steel. These cuirasses were known as tajaflf
and therefore horses armoured in this way were known as al-mujaffafah." The
second group consisted of those horses that had no cuirasses, referred to as
miijarradah (bare)24 and the cavalry squadrons made up of this type of horse were
usually sent in pursuit of fleeing enemy troops since these horses carried nothing
inessential that might load them down.25
It is worth noting, however, that besides horses, 'Abbasid horsemen might
sometimes ride baradhm (sing, birdhawn = hinny) or bighal (sing, baghl = mule).
The birdhawn was the product of the union of a female-donkey and a stallion, while
the baghl came from the union of a donkey and a mare.26 The tiro horseman would
start his training on a birdhawn or a baghl as they were more tractable. On the
battlefield, to prove his bravery in that he could not successfully ran back, the
22Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 60.
nIbid.} vol. 7, p. 586; Azdl, Tarikh, pp.129, 392.
24Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 477.
25Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 47.
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horseman might ride a baghl rather than a horse. 7 With the same bravado in view, if
he rode a horse, he might hamstring Caqr) his horse and fight as an infantryman."
In some cases, we also find that the commander of the anny would wander about the
camp and command the fighting mounted on a birdhawn.29 The baghl, however,
proved its value during the long march. Apart from being used to transport supplies,
these beasts were sometimes ridden, while the horses were led along unridden.30 In
his campaign against Ibn al-Sari in Egypt in 210/825, 'Abdallah b. Tahir is reported
to have mounted his soldiers on mules, two men on each mule, with all their arms
and equipment, while their horses were led along beside them.31
The arms of the 'Abbasid horsemen included either a straight, short sword or a long,
curved one, the latter being the special pride of the Khurasanis.32 As for lances, it
seems that long, heavy lances were most common among the cavalry at the
beginning of the 'Abbasid rule when the Arab elements were dominant in the army.33
However, with an increasing reliance on non-Arabs, such as the Iranians and the
Turks, the use of short, hollow lances came to dominate among the 'Abbasid
horsemen. This type of lance was described as "the lance of the Turkish horsemen
26 Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 296-8.
21Ibid., p. 376.
^abari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 434; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 387.
"'Mas'udI, Miiruj, vol. 3, p. 389; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 393.
"jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 42.
''Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 610.
i2Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 20, 26.
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and the abna' if they were cavalry."34 The advantage of these lances over the long,
heavy lance type was their greater penetrating power and lightness to horsemen to
carry.35
The introduction of non-Arab elements, especially Turks, led to the appearance of
new weapons that were previously unknown to either the Arab or Iranian cavalry.
One of these was the lasso (wahaq).36 Explaining the efficiency of this weapon
when used by the Turkish horsemen, al-Jahiz says, "The Turk is especially
formidable in his trick of using his lasso to throw a horse and unseat its rider, all at
full gallop."37 Moreover, the 'Abbasid horsemen, many of whom were clad in mail
with iron helmets, would also arm themselves with shields and maces. The mace
(dabbus), made of iron or steel with a cubical head, was normally secured under the
stirrup leather and was used to smash the skulls of foes.38
The horseman had to have some knowledge of horses, their equipment, veterinary
medicine, and farriery.39 When 'Abbasid cavalry were used in combat, their position
in the order of battle was almost always behind the infantry and in the two flanks.
This sort of formation seemed to have provided the cavalry squadrons with a high
33The long, heavy lances of the Khurasanis in the battle of Zab were described by Marwan, the last
Umayyad Caliph, as being 'as thick as palm trees'ulr). Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 266.
"Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 27, 53.
i5Ibid„ p. 53.
'''Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 3, p. 49; Isfahan!, Aghani, vol. 18, p. 253.
rJahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 46.
™Ibid., Bayan, vol. 3, p. 58.
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degree of manoeuvrability on the battlefield. Normally, when the charge
commenced, the cavalry squadrons (karadis) would burst forth fiercely and attack
the flanks of the enemy's forces in an attempt to break their ranks, which, if
successfully accomplished, would eventually cause the collapse of the whole
formation of the enemy troops. Best example of such battle formation could be seen
in the war between Abu Muslim and 'Abdallah b. 'All in 137/755, as both armies are
said to have posted the striking force of their cavalry squadrons on the wings. Six
months of sporadic fighting passed and neither army was able to penetrate the flanks
of the other side. On 7 Jumada 11/29 February, however, the battle reached a turning
point. The armies clashed and fought fiercely. Abu Muslim, who was nearby
watching what was happening, tricked 'Abdallah by instructing al-Hasan b.
Qahtabah, the commander of the right flank, to strip the right flank and use those
troops to reinforce those in the left flank, leaving with him only the bravest fighters.
When 'Abdallah saw this manoeuvre, he stripped most of the left flank of his own
army and reinforced the right flank. At this point, Abu Muslim instructed al-Hasan
to take those who remained with him in the right flank together with the centre of the
formation and attack the left flank of 'Abdallah's army. Al-Hasan did so and was
able to break 'Abdallah's left flank, causing the centre and right flank of 'Abdallah's
army to collapse.40
WTabari, Tat-Jkh, vol. 7, p. 476; Ansari, Tafrg, p. 42.
"Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 477-8; K. al-'Uyun, p. 218.
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In addition to their main role in the heart of the battlefield, the 'Abbasid cavalrymen
were also charged with many other military duties, among which were those
described in the following subsections.
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance missions were usually undertaken by small groups of cavalry,
known as the tala'i' (sing. talTah) or nafadah (sing, nafidah) if they carried out
their duties at night.41 Each scouting party was usually composed of some three to
ten men, who were chosen from among the most courageous and wise in their
experience of the affairs of war.42 Their duty was to go ahead of the marching army
to try to obtain information about the enemy's size and the weapons or tactics that it
might use, and to give the first alarm of battle.43 They themselves were not required
to involve themselves in any confrontation with the enemy's forces except in case of
extreme necessity. Among the considerations to which the scouting party paid close
attention in performing their task were swiftness, mobility, and secrecy. Therefore,
we find that writers on military practice at that time such as al-Harthaml (d. first half
of 3rd century AH) emphasize that there were certain regulations and instructions that
had to be adhered to by the tala'i' while carrying out their task 44 First, to ensure the
41
Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 3, p. 17; HarthamI, Mukhtasar, pp. 26, 39. For references to the tala'i' by al-
Tabari during the period of our study, see Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 412, 417, 463; vol. 8, pp. 38, 136, 432,
531.
42
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 417, 441; vol. 9, p. 26; Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'T, vol. 1, p. 63; Harthami,
Mukhtasar, p. 49, 'Abd al-Hamld al-Katib, "Risalah", p. 196; Ansarl, Tafrij, p. 51.
4iTabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 161; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami], vol. 5, p. 240.
44Harthami, Mukhtasar, pp. 48-50.
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swift dispatch of news and their own fleet movement, the horses of the scouting party
needed to be race-horses, sound of back, and securely shod, with not a stubborn or
recalcitrant one among them. None of the scouts should wear a coat of mail or carry
a shield or anything else that might encumber him. Their arms would be limited to
bows, each supplied with between ten and twenty arrows, which had to be deposited
in a quiver (ja'bah) made of pure leather (adam).45 Their bags had to be securely
fastened (samata)46 to the rear of their pack-saddles. As far as was possible, they
should make their advance over level, hard ground where there was no dust, as rising
dust would catch the attention of the enemy. Further, to avoid all members of the
scouting party being seized by the enemy, they should not march close to each other.
Instead, enough distance, perhaps as much as a mile, was to be kept between one and
another. During their expedition the scouting party should not stray too far into the
enemy's vicinity; rather, their advance should not exceed more than two thirds of the
distance between their own army and the enemy.
Safeguarding the Army While Encamping
A precautionary procedure that was carefully put in place if it was feared the enemy
might launch a sudden attack while the army was in camp was to charge the cavalry
corps to station themselves as a band of protection around the camp. During daylight
hours this mission would be entrusted to cavalry groups best known as rabaya (sing.
4The insistence that the quiver, with its straps and ties, had to be made of leather seems to have been
so that it might not occasion any noise during movement, as it would, for example, if it were made of
hard felt, metal, or wood. For further notes on the types and characters of quivers used by Muslims,
see Arab Archery: a Book on the Excellence of the Bow and the Arrow, tr. and ed. Faris & Elmer,
(Princeton, 1945) pp. 145-5.
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rabFah), who would be stationed beyond the army camp in the narrow passes that
formed the entranceway to the army. At sunset, however, these groups would be
withdrawn and replaced by other groups of patrolling cavalry known as the darrajah,
who would usually be posted around the camp, in front of the foot guards, in the
form of small squadrons (karadis) with a distance of a mile or bowshot between each
of them.47
Safeguarding the Army Purine Combat
In addition to the scouting parties' reconnaissance work, they were also charged
before the beginning of the combat to control the strategic points surrounding the
battlefield such as mountains, pasture lands, and water sources to prevent the enemy
from utilizing them as well as to protect the army from any ambush.48 In addition,
another group of light cavalry (mani 'ah) would be stationed at the end of the army's
right and left flanks. Their duty was to restrain any attempt that the enemy forces
might make to turn around toward the army's rear or to penetrate its ranks from the
sides.49 Also, the army commander always seems to have avoided sending all the
cavalry forces into the battlefield at once and to have kept a company of horsemen,
known as al-madad (reinforcement) or al-rid' (support), out of the main formation of
'''Samata is a verb derived from the noun sum ut (sing, simt), which are leather thongs attached to the
saddle, used to secure the rider's personal belongings. Ibn Sidah, al-Mukhassas, pt. 6, vol. 2, p. 187.
47Tabari, Tarlkh. vol. 9, pp. 31, 33; HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 32; Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 3, p. 17.
Harthaml, Mukhtasar, p. 39. An example of how the enemy was prevented from utilizing natural
resources occurred during the war between Abu Muslim and 'Abdallah b. 'All in 137/755. After the
two armies exchanged encampment sites, Abu Muslim was careful not to let his enemy take
advantage of the water sources that were near the camp and so he spoiled them fawwara) by
throwing decaying carcasses into them. Tabari, TarMi, vol. 7, p. 477; K. al-'TJyun, p. 218.
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the army. Their main duty was to fill any gap that might appear within the formation
of the army's body in combat time or to reinforce any division that might need more
manpower.50 Moreover, another group of cavalry would be placed near the rear of
the right flank of the army. Their main duty was to attack the camp of the defeated
army, making an opportunity for the rest of the cavalry forces to exert full aggression
against the enemy by making it impossible for the enemy to reorganize their forces.51
Ambuscades52
Usually the number of cavalrymen participating in ambuscades was large. They
would organize themselves into small, separate squadron formations, not far distant
from each another, in order to facilitate the reassembling of their forces at the end of
the operation.53 Normally, the ambush parties (kama'in, sing, kamm) would be used
to carry out a sudden and swift assault. This could be directed to the rear of the
enemy's forces in the battlefield54 or to their encampment, the aim being to spread
49HarthamI, Mukhtasar, pp. 34, 39.
50Ibid., p. 39; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 415-6.
"HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 39.
52Jahiz (Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 53) emphasizes that there was "no ambush, advance-guard or
rearguard duty but is always entrusted to the mounted troops."
svTabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 58; HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 51; Ibn al-Azraq, al-Bada'i', vol. 1, p. 164;
Tantum, "Muslim Warfare", p. 198.
''Tabari, Tarikh. vol. 7, p. 453.
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disarray and panic as well as to capture some of their men who would reveal
information about their army.55
3.1.2 The Infantry
Although cavalry corps constituted both the backbone and the bulk of the 'Abbasid
fighting forces, the infantry troops (rajilun or rajjalah) remained throughout the first
century of 'Abbasid rule the next most indispensable element within the structure of
the army. Their fundamental role is not only reflected in the fact that the 'Abbasids
hardly ever entered a war without them, but, most important, by the fact that at most
times it was upon them that the burden of the initial and direct blow with the enemy
forces rested. This helps to explain one of the common fighting tactics of the
'Abbasids. That is to say, since the early days of their revolution, in most of the
battles that they fought with their enemies, the 'Abbasid forces were not the side who
launched the first assault. Instead, they generally choose to wait and incite their
enemies in one way or another to make the initial charge. Their aim in this seems not
only to have been to test the strength of their enemy but, more important, to drain as
much of the enemy's energy as possible before the 'Abbasid cavalry commenced
their charge.56 This tactic always seems to have required the placing of the foot-
soldiers, armed with long lances and shields, in the front line of the army formation,
"As an example, we may cite the military campaign at 'Ammuriyyah in 223/837. On that occasion, at
the request of Caliph al-Mu'tasim, Ashnas, the 'Abbasid commander, sent one of his field
commanders with 200 cavalry as an ambush party to seek out a man from the Byzantines who could
supply them with information regarding the Byzantine Emperor and his army. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9,
pp. 58-60.
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mostly in straight lines free of any gap between one foot-soldier and another. Just
behind them stood the archers, whilst at the back and in the flanks were posted the
cavalry.57 When the enemy started their attack, the infantry would crouch on one
knee, keeping the heads of their long lances close to the ground. As soon as the
enemy's cavalry came within range of the archers' arrows, the latter would deliver a
tremendous volley of arrows to inflict as much injury as possible upon the enemy
forces. Before the enemy's cavalry could approach the army lines, the infantry
would at this point plant their lances in front of them with their points tilted upward
toward the enemy, aiming by this to neutralize the effectiveness of the enemy's
cavalry whether by injuring or by startling away their horses. As soon as the
enemy's attacking thrust had been repulsed by the infantry, the cavalry squadrons
would then burst forth either through breaks in the lines or through the flanks of the
army, and charge at the advancing enemy, who, by this point, would have expended
a considerable amount of their energy.59
The importance and the effective role played by the foot-soldiers in the early
'Abbasid armies again came to the fore when the 'Abbasid forces were faced by
enemies whose forces were composed of infantry. In fact, on many occasions, as for
instance in the 'Alid rebellion in Madinah in 145/763, it was with infantry foes that
the 'Abbasids had to deal. In these circumstances the 'Abbasid commanders seem to
5hOne example of provoking the enemy to start the initial charge is well illustrated during the Zab
battle. See Azdi, Tarikh, p. 129; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 433.
5
Azdl, Tarikh, p. 129; Nicolle & McBride, Annies, p. 12; Parry, "Warfare", p. 848.
58TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 7, p 435; vol. 8, p. 416; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 129; K. al-'Uyun, p. 326; HarthamI,
Mukhtasar, pp. 45-6; Ansari, Tafrij, p. 43.
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have fully realized the disadvantage of deploying their horsemen. Thus, their foot-
soldiers had to carry out the main fighting, leaving the cavalry troops with the
primary mission of pursuing the retreating enemy.60 Likewise, the key role of the
infantry became obvious when the 'Abbasids had to face their enemy on very
difficult terrain where it was at many points unsuitable to use mounted forces. Such
cases occurred with the Zutt rebellion in the marshland of southern Iraq and when
opposing the Khurramiyyah forces in the ragged mountains and valleys of Armenia
and Adharbayjan.61
Besides the long lance, sword, bow, and shield, the 'Abbasid infantrymen armed
themselves with other weapons, many of which were of Persian origin. Among those
were the mace (jurzah),62 the iron club ('amfit/),63 the battle-axe (tabarazh),64 the
dagger (khanjar),65 and the wooden club (kafir kubat).66 These were used in hand-
to-hand fighting, especially among the Khurasan! troops.67 'Abbasid infantrymen
also used, for the first time in Muslim armies, the sling (miql3~or mikhlah), which
S9Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'T, vol. 1, p. 159; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 416.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 583-4.
61Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 8, 25, 30, 32-3; Dlnawari, Akhbar, p. 403; K. al-'Uyun, p. 387.
"DhahabI, Siyar, vol. 7, p. 128; Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 19; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 526- 7.
' 'Mas'udl, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 224; al-Khatlb, TarMi, vol. 2, p. 299; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 20; Jahiz,
Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 26; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 467; vol. 8, p. 194.
'vtJahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 20; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 467.
'"Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 20, 26.
"'Mas'udl, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 276; Dlnawari, Akhbar, p. 361; Azdi, Tarikh, pp. 132, 139; Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 308-10; Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 20.
''
Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 19-20; idem., Boyan, vol. 3, p. 115; DhahabI, Siyar, vol. 7, p. 128;
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 467.
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was used to hurl stones against the enemy.68 This implement proved, when used in
battle, that it could kill, or at least knock an enemy horseman offhis horse.69
Besides their fighting role on the battlefield, foot-soldiers also had to share other
common responsibilities with the cavalry. The chief of these was guarding the army
encampment and controlling the strategic high points surrounding it.'0 It seems
possible to classify 'Abbasid foot-soldiers carrying out such duties into two
categories according to the names that they were known by and their positions.
Those who performed guard duty within the army encampment or outside it within a
close circuit were simply called hurras or 'askar. The circle of their guard duty was
understandably smaller than that of the mounted guards.71 Meanwhile, those posted
on mountain tops as watchmen were known as kuhbaniyyah72 or dayadibah,73
6!tTabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 587.
'"ibid., vol. 8, p. 458; K. al-'Uyiin, p. 334; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 414. For more information on
the sling as a weapon, see Rehatsek, "Notes", p. 219.
70Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 32-3.
71HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 32; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 31.
72Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 593; vol. 9, pp. 24, 29-30, 34, 46-47; Ibn Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, pp. 29-30.
According to Bosworth (Tabari, vol. 33, p. 38, n. 138, referring to Herzfeld, Samarra', p. 141, n. 4),
'The term stems from Middle Persian kohbin < Old Persian kaufa-pana "mountain guard, watcher'.
While Shaban (A New Interpretation, vol. 2, pp. 66-7) believes that the kuhbaniyyah, mentioned in
connection with the war with Babak in 220/836, were from al-Afshin's native homeland of
Ushrusanah, Bosworth (Tabari, vol. 33, p. 38) suggests that they might have been recruited on the
spot in Adharbayjan. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the kuhbaniyyah are mentioned as one of
the 'Abbasid infantry corps as early as 145/763 during the war with the 'Alids in Madinah, during
which their duty was also associated with controlling the mountain. See Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 593.
73Jahiz, Bayart, vol. 3, p. 189; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 52; Yaqiit, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 521; Ibn
Manzur, Lisan, p. 303, s.v. " 'ayynal-Razi, Mukhtar, p. 195, s.v. " 'ayyn According to Bosworth
(Tabari, vol. 33, p. 85), dayadibah is an Arabicization of the Persian plural word dHa-ban. Ibn al-
'Amri (d. 757/1556) devotes a long section in his book Kitab al-Hiyal fi al-Hurub (manuscript,
Ahmad III, Topkap Saray: Istanbul, pp. 223-6), to a discussion of the physical characteristics and the
different skills that the dayadibah had to have to be able to carry out such an important task.
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One of the common military practices related to the infantry forces was for their
officers to be provided with mounts at the battlefield.74 Most likely, this was to
facilitate their movement between the divisions of their men in the battlefield both to
deliver instructions as well as to maintain full control over them.
When a long distance was to be travelled, 'Abbasid foot-soldiers were usually
provided with horses, camels, or mules.75 However, if passage was made by water,
perhaps a river, the foot-soldiers would be loaded into boats while the horsemen
would march alongside on the bank.76
3.1.3 Archers
Al-rumah and al-nashibah were the most common Arabic terms that were applied to
those soldiers whose principal arms were bows and arrows. Their role in combat was
essential, as the fighting would usually start with a heavy salvo of arrows between
the two armies with the purpose of inflicting as many injuries as possible on the
opposing side before the main troops clashed with each other.77
Though we know little about the archers in pre-Islamic times, or indeed the types of
bows that they used, still there are certain deductions that can be drawn from the
74Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 54; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 65.
"Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 432; Ali, Short History, p. 440.
7bTabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 846.
77Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 406; Azdi, Tarikh, p. 129; Basawl, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 3, p. 452.
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sparse information available, which is largely to be found in poetic literature.78
Among these is the conclusion that although the Arabs in pre-Islamic times knew the
importance of the bow as an implement of war and considered an accomplished
person to be one who had mastered the skills of swimming, writing, and archery,79
there is evidence that the bow was not widely used in comparison with the sword and
lance. Instead, its use as a weapon of war had been limited to certain tribal groups,
oft
amongst whom was that of Tamim.
With the rise of Islam, however, emphasis on using the bow and mastering its skills
reached their zenith. This was because it had a strong basis in the new faith, which
connected military strength in fighting against the unbelievers with two important
implements of war: the horse and the bow. Repeating the statement three times, the
Prophet interprets the word quwwah within the Quranic verse "Make ready against
them whatsoever force you are able to gather"81 as "the force of archery (ramy)".82
Furthermore, it is narrated that the Prophet preferred the Muslims to be archers rather
than cavalrymen.83 It is also narrated that the bow was never mentioned before the
78For some of the poets who describe the use of bows in pre-Islamic times, see Dinawan, Kitab al-
Ma'anial-Kabirft Abyat al-Ma'anl, vol. 2, pp. 1039-70.
"ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 604.
"Al-Hasan b. 'Abdallah, Athar al-Uwal fi trtib al-Duwal, p. 167-68; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 540;
Ef,s.v. "Raws".
81
"jy ja u jaJ/ . Qur an, 8: 60.
82
jJi ijili j! Ml i^jii ji Mi c^-jJi oi Mi" Abu Dawud , Sunan, vol. 3, p. 13; Tabari, Jami' al-Bctyan,
vol. 10, p. 30.
81Shaybani, Kitab al-Siyar, vol. 1, p. 112; Ibn al-Qayyim, Furusiyyah, p. 9.
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Prophet without his saying, "There is no weapon excelling it in goodness.' All
these hadrths, and many others, strongly urge Muslims to master the use of the bow.
In reality, however, it seems that mastering this type of weapon as a prime
implement of war took a while before Muslims really reached the proficient stage. In
all the battles that Muslims fought during the time of the Prophet, there was only one
battle in which archers really had to play a vital role in spite of their scanty
numbers.85
With the Muslims' expansion of their conquests beyond the confines of Jazirah, they
became increasingly aware of the importance of the role of the bow in combat. This
awareness took root when they came face to face with the well-drilled troops of the
Byzantines and, more importantly, with the Persians, who were renowned for their
archery and were considered masters of this art.86 In addition, Muslims were
required to face new methods of combat, for example, in the realm of siege warfare,
in troop formation, and in the battlefield the use of unfamiliar tools of war such as
elephants.87 In spite ofwhat is narrated about the role of Muslim archers during the
siege of Anbar (12/633), in which 1,000 of the defenders' eyes were lost, the truth of
the matter is that neither the number of Muslim archers nor their skills at that time
84 "
jA1 J! -ki ShaybanT, Kitab al-Siyar , vol. 1, p. 112; Nuwayri, Nihayat al-Arab, vol. 6,
p. 22.
SvThis was in the battle of Uhad in 3/625, in which, as it is reported, out of the 700 Muslims who took
part, there were only 50 who were familiar with the use of the bow. The most famous amongst them
was Sa'd b. Abl Waqqas, who effectively used his great skill in archery in defence of the Prophet. Ibn
Kathir, Tafsir, vol. 1, p. 416; al-Nasa'I, Fada'il al-Sahabah, pt. 2, p. 34; TirmidhI, al-Jam' al-Sahlh,
vol. 5, p. 650; Tabarl, TarJkh, vol. 2, p. 516.
8fTabarI, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 537; Nicolle, "Introduction", p. 163.
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were comparable with those of their foes in open combat. This was obvious, for
example, in the battle of Qadisiyyah in 14/635 and against the Nubians, who used the
pupils of the Muslims' eyes as targets for their arrows.89
The first real indications of the emergence of the archers as a distinct regiment within
the Islamic armies are linked with the defection of some of the non-Arab auxiliary
forces to the Muslim side. Among the auxiliary forces that entered into a
confederacy with the Arabs was the Asawirah, who were known for their great skill
in the use of the bow. 0 Another group that was also known for their skill in the bow
were the Bukhariyyah, who were brought by 'Ubaydallah b. Ziyad from Bukhara in
54/674 and later settled in Basrah, where they came to be known as Bukhariyyat Ibn
Ziyad.91 Their archery skills were put into use when they were sent to Yamamah in
Q7
order to suppress various dissident groups in the region.
It is worth noting, however, that although these non-Arab groups had formed the core
of the archers in the Syrian army operating in central provinces, neither their small
number nor the type of warfare practised by the Arab rebel forces, including the
87Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 537, 540; Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'i', vol. 2, p. 160.
88It is reported, for example, that Hisham b. 'Utbah, one of the sub-commanders at the battle of
Qadisiyyah, wanted to shoot at the enemy while he was sitting on his horseback. Unfortunately,
instead of doing so, he mistakenly shot his horse's ear. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 552-3.
"'Baladhurl, Fuluh, pp. 260, 283; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 525; vol. 4, p. Ill; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol.
1, p. 352; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 31.
<XlTabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 89; vol. 5, p. 519; Baladhuri, Fuluh, pp. 366-7. For details of the
Asawirah, see al-'AlI, Tanzimat, p. 69; Ayalon, "Remarks", p. 45.
"Baladhurl, Fuiuh, p. 507; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 298.
,2Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd, vol. 1, p. 195; Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhba>\ vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 132.
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Kharijites among others, enabled the Syrian army to use them in all its campaigns.
Instead, their use seemed to have been mostly confined to those military operations
that took place on a restricted battlefield, such as inside a city and only when the
army's position was desperate. During the rebellion of 'All b. Zayd in Kufah in
122/739, the rebel force is said to have inflicted heavy casualties among the Syrian
forces at the beginning of the hostilities. It was only at this critical point that the
Syrian commander asked for reinforcement by archery divisions. The Bukhariyyah
and Qlqaniyyah93 were sent to the battlefield and it was owing to their skill in
archery that the battle was turned around and the rebel forces were defeated.94
With the 'Abbasids, however, the archery divisions became clearly recognizable
units within the main formations of the their armies. While facing the army of Ibn
Dubarah in 131/749, the commander-in-chief, Qahtabah, is said to have instructed
his archers to target the enemy's horses. This onslaught was apparently sufficient to
cause the Syrian army to lose their nerve and retreat in a disorganized manner,
leaving the heart of the army open to attack by 'Abbasid forces, which offensive was
soon concluded with the death of the Syrian commander-in-chief.95 In the battle of
Zab, the archers were lined up in the second row just behind the infantry troops.96
Their presence was also apparent amongst the forces facing the 'Alid rebellions in
"A renowned regiment of archers from Qiqan province in Sind at the edge of the boundary with
Khurasan. Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 531; Hillenbrand, The History of Tabarl, vol. 26, p. 41.
'"'All b. Zayd is said to have died the next day in consequence of an arrow wound in his forehead.
Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 186; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami/, vol. 3, p. 424.
95Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 406.
Rakan al-MiUairi | PhD Thesis ) Chapters [ The. Military Units and Supfwrt Sennas 185ISuZsH
Madlnah and Basrah (145/763), in which, tellingly, both of the 'Alid brothers are
said to have been killed by arrows.97 In 138/756, the archers among the
Marwaziyyah troops, the followers of Khazim b. Khuzaymah, must take the credit
for having saved their forces from certain defeat by turning the battle around. They
showered the rebel forces with arrows, inflicting heavy casualties upon them, which
was crowned by the death of their leader, al-Mulabbad b. Harmalah al-Shaybanl, and
the defeat of his supporters.98 In like manner, in 160/777, it was only by use of the
Turkish archers that the 'Abbasids were able to put an end to the Kharijite rebellion
in Jazlrah under the leadership of 'Abd al-Sallam al-Yashkuri, who had defeated
many 'Abbasid armies prior to this battle.99 In the war with the Khurramiyyah, al-
Afshln used his archery divisions to clear the mountain tops of the enemy.100
4
The defensive character that distinguished the warfare of the 'Abbasid army made
the role of the archery divisions essential. However, another factor contributing to
the centrality of the archery divisions in the 'Abbasid army was the traditions
prevailing in Khurasan, the homeland of many of the 'Abbasid troops. In Iran and,
more precisely, in Khurasan, archery was not only a long-standing tradition among
the Persians but also amongst the Arabs who had been serving in those regions since
"'Azdl, Tarlkh, p. 129; Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, p. 433.
qiK. al-'Uyun, pp. 243, 353; Tabari, Tai-lkh, vol. 7, pp., 587, 635.
<)8Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, pp. 498-9.
"ibn Khayyat, Tarlkh, p. 361. Tabari (Tarlkh, vol. 8, p. 142), however, dates the defeat of al-
Yashkiri in 162/779.
1 ""Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 9, pp. 34, 37, 40, 42-3.
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the time of Qutaybah b. Muslim.101 The archery divisions within the 'Abbasid
armies were later enhanced by the introduction of Turks, who were also well
renowned for their archery skills. But, in contrast to the Arabs, amongst whom the
bow was essentially an infantry weapon, the Turks were accustomed to use of the
bow on horseback. Their astonishing skills as mounted archers is well documented
by al-Jahiz, who says:
Neither the Kharijites nor the Bedouins [A'rab] are famous for
their prowess as mounted bowmen. But the Turk will hit from his
saddle an animal, a bird, a target, a man, a couching animal, a
marker post or a bird of prey stooping on its quarry... The Turk
does not wheel around like the KhurasanI, indeed if he turns his
horse's head it is deadly poison and certain death, for he aims his
• • • in?
arrow as accurately behind him as he does in front of him.
3.1.4 Siege-Engineers
For making open and direct attacks on fortresses and stronghold cities, the 'Abbasid
armies carried with them many varieties of siege-machinery. The most effective
amongst those were the mangonel (manjaniq, pi. manajiq) and the catapult
('arradah, pi. 'arradat), which was the smaller and lighter of the two types of
ballista machine. These hurling machines were constructed and operated by a select
staff of engineers possibly known as the manjcmlqiyyun (sing, manjanlqi). The Arabs
were acquainted with the use of mangonels as siege-machines since pre-Islamic
times. According to al-Jahiz, Judhaymah b. Malik, the king of Hirah, was the first
mIbid„ vol. 6, p. 472.
102Jahiz, Rasall, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 45-6 (English translation quoted from Pellat, Life, p. 93). Regarding
the techniques used to shoot from horseback, see Latham & Paterson, "Archery in the Land of Eastern
Islam", In Islamic Arms and Armour, ed. Elgood (London, 1979), pp. 78-88.
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Arab to employ them.103 In Islamic times, the Muslims used them in their military
campaigns as early as the time of the Prophet. Nonetheless, their use in this early
period was on a very limited scale and is, in fact, only mentioned during the Muslim
siege of the Thaqif tribe in Ta'if in 8/630.104 With the expansion of the Islamic
operations beyond the confines of the Arabian Peninsula, tire Muslim armies
increasingly employed mangonels in their warfare as they were faced with the
Persians' and Byzantines' stubborn defence in Iraq and Syria. Thus, they used them
in the siege of Damascus (13/634) and against the city of Buhr-slr105 (16/637), where
the Muslims are said to have employed more than twenty mangonels.106
By the time of the Umayyads, the use of hurling engines not only became common in
attacks made against fortifications, but they were now refined and brought to a new
peak of perfection. At the siege of Daybul in Sind in 92/712, Muhammad b. Qasim
used a gigantic mangonel which was called al- 'Arus (the Bride). It was operated by
no less than five hundred persons and was under the control of a very skilled
operator, who took charge of the aiming and shooting.107 In one of his military
campaigns in Khurasan in 91/710, Qutaybah b. Muslim is also reported to have
employed a huge mangonel, which he called al-Fahja' (the Wide-Legged).108 The
,03Jahiz, Bayart, vol. 1, p. 362.
"l4Ibn Hisham, Sirah, vol. 5, p. 155; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 2, p. 158; Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 1, pp.
366-7; ibid., Futuh, p. 66.
"'sOne of the towns of the Sawad near al-Mada'in. Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 515.
106
Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 6.
""Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 535; Ibn al-Athlr, Karnil, vol. 4, p. 537.
10STabarf, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 463; EI1, s.v. "Hisar".
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last occasion on which the Umayyads are reported to have used mangonels was in
the siege laid against Sa 'Id b. Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik in Hims in 127/744, when
Marwan b. Muhammad set up more than eighty mangonels and bombarded the city
• 1OQ
by day and night.
The 'Abbasids also used hurling engines as early as the revolutionary period. Thus,
Qahtabah is said to have used mangonels during his siege of Nahawand, as did also
his son, al-Hasan, against the Syrian forces besieged inside Wasit in 132/749.110
Later, the 'Abbasid forces commanded by al-'Abbas b. Muhammad are reported to
have used mangonels in their conquest of the city of Kamakh in 149/766.1'1
It is worth noting, however, that the 'Abbasids were innovative in their use of the
mangonel in that they employed a more complex type of projectile, which caused
much greater devastation than was achieved with the use of stones; that is to say,
they used flaming naphtha.112 The first occasion when such projectiles were used by
the 'Abbasids was during the siege of Heraclea in 190/806, when Harun al-Rashld,
who was in command, instructed his men to place sulphur and naphtha with the
stones. The whole was wrapped up with tow and placed into the holder, where it was
then ignited and hurled against the wall, to which it clung, so that the wall would
109Tabari, Tib-jkh, vol. 7. p. 326.
mIbid„ pp. 407, 451.
1'1
Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 220.
"2Bosworth, "Armies", p. 207; EI2, s.v. "Hisar".
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crack with the heat.113 To compose and use naphtha missiles against the enemy and
also to deal with them when used against Muslims, a special corps known as the
naffatun (naphtha-hurlers) was employed.114 During the campaign against Heraclea,
the 'Abbasid forces found their way barred by the Byzantine Emperor, Nicephorus,
who instructed his forces to cut down trees across the road and set them on fire. The
naffatun, who wore special fire-proofclothing and were led by Muhammad b. Yazid
b. Mazyad al-Shaybanl, burst through the burning timber and succeeded in making a
safe passage for the rest of the army.115 The naffatun are also mentioned as having
been employed by al-Mu'tasim's commander, al-Afshln, against the Khurramiyyah,
especially in the siege of Babak's stronghold of al-Badhdh.116 At the siege of
Baghdad, during the civil war, both rivals used all types of mangonels extensively
and indiscriminately.117 They were used from land positions as well as from ships in
'"is fahani, Aghanly vol. 18, p. 253.
'l4TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 40,41, 44; K. al-'Uyun, p. 386; Levy, Social Structure, p. 439; Bosworth,
"Armies", p. 207; Samadi, "Some Aspects", p. 131.
"5lsfahanl, AghanI, vol. 18, p. 274.
"'Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 40-1, 44; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 32; K. al-'Uyun, p. 386.
"7Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 445-7, 451-2, 455, 457, 464, 474, 478, 490, 497; Dlnawari, Akhhar, p.
399; Mas'udI, Murig, vol. 3, p. 411; K. al-'Uyun, p. 332.
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the middle of the Tigris, and their rocks and fire brought the city into complete
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devastation, which was described by contemporary poets.
Against the enemy, mangonels were also used successfully in the siege of
'Ammuriyyah in 223/837. Al-Mu'tasim, who was in command, instructed his
engineers to build strong, powerful mangonels. Each one was manned by four
people and was moved about by being placed on a platform resting on a wheeled
cart. When the siege started, al-Mu'tasim ordered his men to gather all the
mangonels in his camp into one place and thus concentrate their bombardment
against a particular spot in the city's wall perceived to be the weakest point. Despite
the persistent attempts of the defenders to protect the wall by placing over it a great
barrier of timber planks, each lapped over another and covered with pack-saddles
(baradhi*), their efforts came to an end as the wall split open under the heavy
bombardment of the 'Abbasids' mangonels.119
n8Tabari, TarAh, vol. 8, pp. 445-7, 454, 457, 463-4, 477, 500-6; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, pp. 412-4.
The most renowned hurler with the mangonel at the siege of Baghdad was a man called al-
Samarqandi. He fought on the side of al-Amln and, on account of his skill in shooting, he is described
as 'a marksman whose stone did not miss'. As to his fate after the end of the war, it is reported that
the people of Baghdad, who had suffered from his stones, avenged themselves upon him by crucifying
him alive before showering him with arrows and stones and continuing to do so even after his death.
Finally, his body was set on fire and what remained of him was eaten of by dogs. Tabari, TarAh, vol.
8, pp. 447, 497-8.
"Tabari, TarAh, vol. 9, pp. 63-5; K. al-'Uyun, p. 392; Miskawayh, Tajarib, p. 490; Ibn al-Athir,
Kamil, vol. 6, p. 43; lbn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 315. A great variety of hurling machines came to
be used by the Muslims in later periods. For more information on the different types of hurling
engines and projectiles, see Arnbagha al-Zardhkash (d. 867/1462), al-Anjq JTal-Manajiq, ed. Ahsan
Hindi (Damascus, 1985). Also, see Cahen's "Un traite d'armurerie" on a work on the art of war by
the Ayyubid author MardI al-TarsusI, including important illustrations.
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Another engine of siege, which the 'Abbasid forces used for direct assault on city
walls, was the dabbabah.]20 This was a movable wooden tower of several stories, on
each of which was stationed a number of men. After the dabbabah had been pushed
to the foot of the wall, the miners (naqqabun), stationed on the lower storeys and
armed with picks and drills, would commence their work of boring into the wall or
scaling it. Meanwhile, the men on the upper levels, armed with bows and arrows,
would both protect their own men and inflict as many casualties as possible upon the
defenders on the walls.121 At the siege of 'Ammuriyyah, al-Mu'tasim is said to have
instructed his engineers to erect a number of large dababbat, each one capable of
holding ten men inside it. To be able to roll them over the defensive trench
surrounding the city, sheepskins stuffed with earth were used to fill in part of the
trench.122
3.1.5 Pioneer and Labour Corps
During the early days of the Islamic army, soldiers would engage ancillary workers
in duties of a non-military nature before, after, and during the breaks in the actual
fighting, as for example in the Battle of the Ditch in 6/628, when they alternated their
primary battle duties with the digging of the ditch.123 With the spread of the
120Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 220.
12lIbn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 309; Levy, Social Structure, p. 440; Bosworth, "Armies", p. 207;
Zaky, "al-Silah", p. 24.
l22Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 65; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, pp. 43-4; K. al-'Uyun, p. 392; Miskawayh,
Tajarib, p. 491; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 315.
l23Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 568; Ibn Hisham, Sirah, vol. 4, p. 168; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 50; Ibn
Sa'd, Tcibaqat, vol. 2, p. 66.
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conquests and the abundance of Muslim converts, especially skilful craftsmen from
among the people of the conquered lands, groups of laborers (fa'alah)124 started to
join the Islamic armies.125 Those builders, carpenters, blacksmiths, and other
artisans would support the army by engaging in activities such as making and paving
roads, building and repairing bridges, searching for and digging wells, and digging or
filling in ditches. One of the campaigns that illustrates the vital role of the fa'alah
occurred during the war with Babak. In a very harsh and hostile terrain, the fa'alah
were required at all stages to provide defensive measures for the anny. They would
transport rocks to fortify mountain roads used by the troops, erect defence posts on
mountain tops for guards, dig trenches around camps and roads to prevent easy entry
by the enemy, and fill in pits dug by their foes to hinder the movement of 'Abbasid
cavalry.126
Another of the duties committed to thefa'alah was that of building, or at other times
demolishing, fortresses. When Caliph al-Mansur wanted to build the frontier
strongholds of Malatyah and Kamkh, fa'alah were dispatched from all over the
n,Other names were also attached to these workmen. While they were known in Egypt as qadiiiyyah,
kilghariyyah seems to have been the common name for them in Adharbayjan and Armenia. Al-Kindl,
Wulah, p. 157; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 9, p. 32.
125DInawari, Akhbar, p. 116; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 32; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 2, p. 337.
'''Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 32, 43; Ibn al-Athlr, KamiI, vol. 6, p. 29.
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Islamic territories to take part in the construction.127 The same procedure was
repeated during the construction of Tuwanah in 218/834.128
3.1.6 The Army Police Force
There was always a small elite body of troops attached to the army in all its military
operations. These were known as Shurtat al- 'Askar or Jund al-Shuratand their main
duty was to maintain order within the ranks of the army by, for example, restraining
crime, investigating offences said to have been committed, and tracking down spies
or infiltrators, who might make their way among the ranks of the army.129
Besides being known as Sahib al-Shurat (or Shurtah), the officer of the army in
charge of this police force was also known as al-Hashir.130 He acquired this title as
he and his men were responsible during marches to follow up the army and urge
forwards (hashara) any lingering soldiers to catch up with the rest of the army.
Likewise, in combat, they would be stationed at the rear of the army to prevent any
desertion attempts that might occur within the ranks of the soldiers or their retreating
without clear orders from the army commander.131 Sometimes, they would have
very strict instructions to put to death any deserter, reluctant soldier, or trouble-
127Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 223; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 372.
12hBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 223; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 631.
mAkhbar, p. 279; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 366.
130Harthanu, Mukhtasar, p. 29; ShaybanI, Siyar, vol. 1, p. 214.
l uTabarI, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 415.
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maker so that they would be examples for others.132 Executing punishments on
guilty soldiers was also one of the functions of the police force. When 'Abdallah b.
'All decided to get rid of the Khurasanls in his army, fearing that they might desert
to the side of Abu Muslim when the warfare started, he charged his chief of police,
Hayyash b. Hablb, with the mission of putting them to death.133 In addition, as
members of the police force were always chosen from amongst the most courageous
and loyal members of the army, the commander sometimes, especially when the
troops' morality was low, might charge them with the mission of launching the initial
attack on the enemy.134
3.2 The Support Services
In addition to the main units of the army, there were certain functions that were
carried out by specially appointed individuals or small groups. Miscellaneous texts
contain the terms used to describe some of these functions and officers.
In most of its military campaigns, the 'Abbasid army was accompanied by guides
(adilla', sing, dalil), whose main duty was to guide the army along its route. For this
reason, they had to have knowledge of the physical geography of the land, the
location of wells, and the route that the army needed to take to reach its intended
n2lbid., vol. 8, p. 368; Dtnawari, Akhbar, p. 396. It was al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf who was the first to
impose such harsh punishment on deserters and reluctant fighters. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 207;
Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 136.
, uBasawx, Ma'rifcth, vol. 1, p. 119; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 481; Ibn Kathlr, Bidaycih, vol. 7, p. 67.
'"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 414.
Rakan al-Mutairi \ PhD Thesis } Chapters { The Military Units and Support Services 195
destination.135 We know, for example, that when the 'Abbasid army was dispatched
in a campaign against the Isbabhadh in Tabaristan in 141/759, it was accompanied
by 'Umar b. al-'Ala', who is said to have been the person most knowledgeable of the
land of Tabaristan.136 Likewise, before sending his army to face the 'Alid rebellion
in Madlnah in 145/763, al-Mansur appointed Ibn al-Asamm to guide the army during
its march as well as to choose the best sites for the army encampments.137 To obtain
the most reliable local knowledge of the land, the commanders would exchange one
dalil for another as they travelled from one stage to the next.138 When the army was
divided into separate divisions, each division was headed by a single dalil or
sometimes more than one.139 When the army had to fight outside or on the edge of
Muslim territory, non-Muslims were generally employed as adilla' in return for
money, exemption from tribute, or to gain their freedom if they were captives.140 In
fact, in recognition of the dalil's importance, the commander would sometimes
award him a portion from the booty before it was divided into fifths.141 Some of the
truce agreements with non-Muslim foes also stipulated that the latter provide the
Muslim forces with guides. For example, one of the conditions of the peace treaty
made between Hamn al-Rashld and the Byzantine Empress Irene in 165/782 was
'""Ibid., vol. 9, p. 59.
™ibid., vol. 7, p. 510; K. al-'Uyim, p. 229.
137Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 7, p. 583.
m/bid., pp. 412-3.
139Ibid., vol. 9, p. 58; K. al-'Uyun, p. 486.
""Tabari, Taiikh, vol. 9, p. 60; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 42; Miskawayh, Tajarib, p. 487.
I+Ilbn Sallam, Amwal, p. 333.
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that the latter should pay the tribute (jizyah) for three years and provide the 'Abbasid
forces with guides on their return journey home.142
During operations in the field, the 'Abbasid army was accompanied by a staff of
physicians (atibbasing, tabib). These people were not just responsible for treating
soldiers for the wounds they received in the battlefield, but also for dealing with
illnesses and injuries that the troops might succumb to during marches, as there were
usually many sore feet after marching in very rugged highlands.143 In addition to the
physicians, the army was also accompanied by a considerable number of private
chemists (sayadilah, sing, saydali), who would find in these military expeditions a
very flourishing and profitable market to sell their shop-made medicines, many of
which were derived from Indian and Greek medicines.144 However, because of the
fear of fraud amongst these chemists and the need for genuine and effective
medicines, army commanders took care from time to time to examine the sincerity
and competence of these chemists accompanying the army. Abu Zakariya al-
Tayfuri, a famous physician of that time, reports that while he accompanied the army
during the war with Babak, the 'Abbasid commander-in-chief, al-Afshln, wanted to
examine the chemists in his army. He therefore arbitrarily chose twenty terms with
l42TabarI, Tai-ikh, vol. 8, p. 152; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 248; Ibn al-'Ibrl, Tarikh, p. 218.
143Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 39; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 32.
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no connection to medicine and asked one of his men to take these terms with a sum
of money around the chemists asking if such medicines were available. The account
concludes by stating that those who denied their knowledge of such medicines were
allowed to stay, while those who took the money and assured the agent of their
possession of these medicines were ordered to leave the camp immediately, under
threat that the next day any of them who remained would be put to death.145
The field hospital (al-bimaristan al-sayyar) was well supplied and to it were attached
ambulances for the wounded in the shape of litters (mahamil, sing, mahmil) that
were carried by camels in the flat lands and by mules in the nigged mountains.146
In the course of the long time spent in marching, camping, and fighting, it was
natural that problems would arise between members of the army. In view of this, a
number of judges (qudah, sing. qadi) would accompany the armies to determine the
proper solution of these problems according to Islamic law (Sharpah)}47 Another
function of the Qadi al-Jund was to supervise the booty and ensure its fair
,44Most of the chemists and physicians who served in Baghdad in that period were non-Arabs, the
majority being Persian Christians or Indians. In fact, the people of Baghdad preferred non-Muslim
chemists and physicians over Muslim practitioners. In this regard al-Jahiz tells an interesting story of
a starving Muslim physician in Baghdad who had no clients because, as al-Jahiz explains, 'the
physician had a non-Christian name, he wore a white cotton cloak instead of a black silk one, and he
did not speak the language of Jundl-Shapur' (Dols, "Origin", p. 383; Jahiz, Kitab al-Bukhala', p. 160
[Arabic original]).
145Ibn Abl Usaybi'ah, Tabaqat, p. 255; Ibn al-'Ibrl, Mukhtasar, p. 244.
l46Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 9, pp. 39, 41; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 32; Miskawayh, Tajarib, pp. 482- 3.
u~'Akhbar, p. 280; Taban, TarJkh, vol. 7, p. 366; vol. 8, p. 143; Khatib, Tarikh Baghdad, vol. 9, p.
123.
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distribution.148 In some cases, some qadh, especially those who possessed martial
skills, might also be given purely military tasks such as commanding the troops.
Among those mentioned in this connection was the renowned 'Abbasid qadl, Yahya
b. Aktham, who led several summer expeditions against the Byzantines during the
reign of al-Ma'mun.149
The troops were not allowed to take any booty directly for themselves. Instead, the
booty had to be collected and handed to an officer commonly referred to as the Sahib
al-Aqbad (or al-Qabid), who, after the fighting, would hand it in turn to the Sahib
al-Maqasim. This last person would divide the booty into fifths (akhmas). He then
gave four fifths to agents (umana', sing, amln) to be distributed amongst the troops,
while the remaining fifth would be handed to the commander so that he could send it
to the Caliph, who would put it into the Treasury (Bayt al-Mal).150
The muyyar (sing, ma'ir) were the people who carried the food, prepared it, and
served it to the troops,151 while the saqayun (sing, saqi) or ashab al-sharab were
responsible for supplying the fighters with water (siqaycth).152 Sometimes the
saqayun would be summoned to take up a position in the midst of the fray so that the
149
4STabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 143; vol. 9, p. 69; K. al-Uyun, p. 395.
AzdT, Tarikh, p. 405; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 625; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimcih, p. 222; Ibn al-
Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 496.
'^Dlnawari, Akhbar, pp. 135, 379, 381; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 114, 390, 416, 478; vol. 9, p. 69;
Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 115; Abu al-Tayyib, 'Awn al-Ma'bud, vol. 7, p. 333; Ibn Hanbal,
Musnad, vol. 5, p. 412.
1MTabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 374.
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soldiers would not became thirsty and thus need to leave there position for
refreshment.153
When facing non-Muslim enemies, the 'Abbasid armies were accompanied by
translators (tarajimah, sing, turjuman), whose main duty was to interpret between
themselves and the enemy.154
Whenever the army set out on a long military expedition, especially against a non-
Muslim foe, it was usually accompanied by many merchants, who would rash from
different parts of the Islamic territories to join the army and take advantage of this
event.155 During the campaign against Ammuriyyah in 223/838, the 'Abbasid army
under the command of Caliph al-Mu'tasim is reported to have been accompanied by
30,000 merchants and provisioned.156 Throughout the campaign period these traders
would open mobile markets (aswaq) where soldiers could purchase whatever goods
they might need. More important, however, was the fact that these wholesale
merchants would benefit richly by buying the booty won by the army. The booty
would usually include all sorts of goods including slaves (considered the most
valuable assets), beasts, military equipment, and personal possessions, which most
often were all sold at truly bargain prices. On some occasions a birdhawn (hinny)
!:>2 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 637; vol. 9, p. 40.
'}/bid., vol. 9, p. 40.
li4/bid., p. 69.
Ibn Abl Usaybi'ah, Tabaqat; p. 244; Tabari, TarMi, vol. 8, pp. 153, 406; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 357.
11,1Vasiliev, Byzance, vol. 1, p. 146; Bury, Eastern Roman Empire, p. 263.
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would be sold for only a single dirham and a mule for less than ten dirhams, a coat of
mail for less than one dirham, and twenty swords again for just a dirham.157
The last significant element of the 'Abbasid armies' supportive services were the
spies ('uyun, sing, 'ayn), who were responsible for gathering information about the
enemies. The 'Abbasids realized the importance of espionage and the dimensions of
its techniques since the clandestine phase of their movement in Khurasan. During
that period, as travellers and merchants, the 'Abbasid propagandists would wander in
the triangle that stretches between Humaymah, Kufah, and Khurasan, spreading the
ideology of the 'Abbasid cause while seeking information about weaknesses on the
Umayyad side. This information was then delivered to the chief da'iyah in Kufah,
who, in turn, was the only person entitled to pass it to the 'Abbasid Imam in
Humaymah. In the light of this information the Imam would then set the agenda to
♦ 1SX
be followed by his propagandists in the coming stage of the campaign.
Meanwhile, these 'Abbasid intelligence activities were faced at most times by a
weak surveillance system that was operated by the central government. It was
especially flimsy in Khurasan, where the Umayyad governors were completely
immersed in the dilemma of the tribal strife in the province and thus were unaware
that the 'Abbasids' propagandists were very actively promoting their cause. Indeed,
even when the 'Abbasids' covert activities started to reach the surface, news of them
iy7Tabari, TarAh, vol. 8, p. 153; vol. 9, p. 69; lbn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 45; K. al-'Uyun, p. 279,
395; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 157.
'^Akhbar, pp. 194-5.
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still did not reach the central government in Damascus, this on account of the
continuing political straggle between the Umayyads' governors in Iraq and the
governor of Khurasan.159 Thus, after the end of the Umayyads' rule, when one of
the elderly members of Banu Umayyah was asked for the reason that led to their
demise, he answered with the following definitive statement: "Concealing of
information and mutual envy among the most competent of our officials were the
most apparent reasons for the vanishing of our rale."160
Learning from the mistakes of their predecessors, the 'Abbasids gave close attention
to the establishment of a wide intelligence network which not only informed them of
events in the far reaches of their empire, but also of the conduct of the slaves in the
corridors of their palaces.161
This intelligence system operated in two modes. The first was a formal and overt
one, which was conducted by the postmasters (ashab al-barld), who were scattered
all over the provinces of the state.162 In addition to their duty of transmitting official
correspondence, they were also responsible for writing secret reports about every
event and circumstance in their areas of operation, starting from the conduct and
activities of the governor and other high officials in the province to the state of the
L''lt is reported that the governor of Iraq, 'Umar b. Hubayrah, would deliberately fail to deliver the
reports sent to him by Nasr b. Sayyar, the governor of Khurasan, about the ' Abbasid activities and the
critical situation in the province to Caliph Marwan b. Muhammad. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd, vol. 4, p.
493; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 241; Ibn Qutaybah,'Uyun, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 128.
"'"Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 241 ("uso, jijj _>r^ 3 our jjH").
1Jahiz, al-Taj, pp. 169-71; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 316.
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people and the food prices in the markets.163 The most distinctive aspect of this sort
of intelligence agent was that they enjoyed a wide-ranging power and freedom in
being able to report everything they heard or saw, even if that information would be
damaging to the governor's interests.164 This power was based on a dual foundation.
First, the fact that these agents were appointed directly by the Caliph himself meant
that they were not under the authority of the local governors. More important,
however, was the fact that the vast majority of them were chosen from among the
'Abbasids' mawalT, who were the most trusted of the 'Abbasid Caliphs' personnel.
This being so, they derived their power and immunity directly from their close bond
with the Caliph himself.165 It was in the nature of the task of the postmasters, which
we have seen involved close surveillance of state officials, that at times a great deal
of tension would arise between the two, including also the chief of police, who
shared many common aims and interests with the postmasters. Nevertheless, the
intelligence agents always seem to have had the upper hand and the support of the
'Abbasid Caliph.166
The second mode of espionage used during the 'Abbasid era relied on secrecy and
concealment through the covert work of spies. This type of agent was recruited from
both sexes and was used to penetrate various social circles in the guise of merchants,
l62See Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 67 for an account reflecting the importance and character of the
postmaster's office in the time of Caliph al-Mansur.
163Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 96; Sarnadi, "Some Aspects", p. 149.
IMSee e.g. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 68, 594-5; vol. 9, p. 102; Ya'qubl, Tarlkh, vol. 2, p. 457; Ibn al-
Jawzl, Muntazam, vol. 10, p. 167.
1<l5See e.g. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 80.
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travellers, physicians, money-changers, or slaves.'67 Spies of this sort played a vital
role in peacetime as well as during times of crisis. In peacetime, the 'Abbasids'
espionage contributed effectively to the exposure of many of the rebel movements
while still in their early stages, thus enabling the 'Abbasid authorities to move fast
and nip them while still in the bud. The efficiency and effectiveness of 'Abbasid
espionage is well illustrated by the events of the 'Alid rebellion in 145/ 763.
Historical sources indicate that when it came to al-Mansur's attention that the
political ambitions of the 'Alid family had begun to take a serious course and to pose
a threat to 'Abbasid rule, he decided to place them under constant surveillance. He
sent an agent by the name of 'Uqbah b. Salm to Madlnah with the purpose of
gathering intelligence regarding Muhammad b. 'Abdallah. 'Uqbah thus entered
Madlnah as a perfume merchant and dispatched his slaves to gather information
under the cover of wishing to sell scent, which enabled them to eavesdrop on the
inhabitants. He then sent the intelligence he had gathered, in report form, to the
Caliph.168 Sources conclude that 'Abbasid espionage succeeded later to penetrate the
'Alids' ranks and ascertain the location of their headquarters on Mount Juhaynah.169
166For evidence of this, see Ibn Tayfur, Baghdad, pp. 43-4.
""Slaves, and slave-girls in particular, seem to have been widely used, especially in the surveillance of
high officials. It is reported, for example, that Caliph al-Mahdl employed a slave-girl to spy on the
activities of the vizier Ya'qub b. Dawud, whose career came to an end following the intelligence
report of the slave-girl. Tabarl, Tarlkh, vol. 8, pp. 158-9; vol. 7, p. 631; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, al-Fakhri, p.
220; 'Abdul Jabbar Bag, "The 'Serfs' ", p. 114.
16S£. al-'Uyun, p. 234.
'"'Tabart, Tarlkh, vol. 7, p. 527; K. al-'Uyun, p. 234. Mount Juhaynah is located on the north-west
coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Its name was derived from the Juhaynah tribe, one of the tribes of
Quda'ah, who were the main settlers in that area. EI2, s.v. "Diuhaina". EI2, s.v "Kuda'a"; Jane, "The
History ofal-TabarF, vol. 28, p. 103, n. 494.
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Moreover, Caliph al-Mansur was able, through the supply of misinformation to the
'Alid leadership about the political situation and the extent of their supporter, to limit
their chances of achieving victory. It was reported that al-Mansur would write to
Muhammad b. 'Abdallah in the guise of one his commanders, Humayd b. Qahtabah,
encouraging Muhammad to move fast and declare his revolt, and assuring him that
they would support him in the event of this happening. Consequently, Muhammad,
who started to lay his plans according to this false information, used to tell his
courtiers, "Were we to meet, all of the army commanders would side with me."170
It is worth noting, however, that the role of the Abbasids' spies sometimes went
beyond the gathering of intelligence or supplying the enemy with false information,
but more importantly carrying out assassination operations against the Caliph's
enemies. When 'Abdallah b. 'All rebelled against Caliph al-Mansur, the latter sent
Muhammad b. al-Sawal to try to penetrate the ranks of 'Abdallah with the aim not
only of learning their news and plans but also of seizing any chance to assassinate
him.171 The case of Idrls b. 'Abdallah b. al-Hasan, the founder of the Idrisid dynasty
in the Maghrib, provides another example of this double-dealing.172
It was natural that the activities of the 'Abbasids' spies stretched beyond the
boundaries of the Islamic territory into the neighbouring states, especially against the
l70Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 559; K. al-'Uyun, pp. 342-3; Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 224.
' 'Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, pp. 106-7.
1,2Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 192-204; Ibn Khaldun, Tarlkh, vol. 4, pp. 15-23; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol.
2, p. 405; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, pp. 336, 353.
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Byzantines, the traditional foe of dar al-Islam. Thus, for instance, under al-Rashld, a
man by the name of 'Abdallah al-SIdi served for twenty years as a spy inside the
Byzantine Empire.173 Moreover, for this purpose, the 'Abbasids also continued the
practice of using non-Muslims, particularly those inhabiting the frontier region with
the Byzantines, such as the Christian Jarajimah (Mardai'te) community, who
inhabited the area between Jabal Lukkam (Mount Amanus) and the frontier city of
Antakiyah in northern Syria.174
Among the common practices employed in the recruitment of intelligence agents
was care taken to ensure that spies remained unknown to one another and to the army
at large. This was to prevent conspiracy, to ensure that a captured agent could not
disclose the identity or whereabouts of others, and to prevent the identity of the spies
from spreading amongst the soldiers, which would effectively destroy their
secrecy.175 For this purpose, the commander of the army used to detail each one of
the spies to one of his personal retinue or officers who would be the only one in
charge of conducting the spy.176 To ensure the reliability and genuineness of
information received, especially when the report was vital, the commander of the
17Von Kremer, The Orient, p. 354.
mBaladhuri, Futuh, pp. 189-91. On the Jarajimah, see further Hitti, Lebanon, pp. 244-6.
17TlarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 24; Ansari, Tafry, p. 19,'Abd al-Hamld, "Risalah", p. 192.
17"llarthami, Mukhtasar, p. 25; Ansari, Taffy, p. 19, 'Abd al-Hamld, "Risalah", p. 193. We learn that
during the war with Babak, Abu Sa'Id al-Marwazi (also known as al-Thaghri), one of al-Afshln's
commanders, was responsible for connecting with one of the 'Abbasids' agents whose name was
Salih. Tabarl, Tarich, vol. 9, p. 14.
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army would dispatch another agent to confirm the veracity of the first report.177 On
occasions, the commander of the army might intentionally allow the enemy to gather
intelligence about his army. The intention behind this was either to trick him by
allowing him to gather false information that was concocted for his benefit, or to
demonstrate the extent of their readiness and capabilities, and thus deliver a
psychological blow.178 Finally, on occasion the situation might also require the
commander of the army to attempt to turn the captured spy's loyalty. This was
usually done by offering a better salary than he obtained from his previous
employers.179
Summary
This chapter provides details about the most distinctive features of the early
'Abbasid military units, including the cavalry, infantry, and the non-combatant
groups which supported the army from the outset of the march to the end of fighting
and the dividing of booty. The most salient features to be studies in this chapter may
be summarized as follows.
177This procedure is mentioned as being in use during the civil war as well as in the war with Babak.
See Tabari, Tirikh, vol. 8, p. 386; vol. 9, p. 14.
178Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 25. This occurred, for example, during the war with Babak, when al-
Afshln allowed Babak's spy to take a close look at his army and the strength of his defences. Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 33.
1
HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 24. It is mentioned that during the war with Babak, al-Afshln used not to
kill or beat Babak's spies. To the contrary, he would give them money and gifts and question them
about the sum of money Babak was accustomed to give them, so that he could offer to double it for
them in return for their becoming spies in his service. Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 9, p. 13; K. al-'Uyvn, p.
383.
As with many prior revolutions, the number of horses available to the 'Abbasids in
the early days of their revolution was relatively small. Nonetheless, the number soon
increased as a result of the affiliation of the Arab tribal forces in Khurasan to the
'Abbasid side and through the large number of horses seized from the defeated
Syrian armies. After the revolutionary period, the cavalry formed the backbone of
the 'Abbasid armies, often determining the outcome of battles. An apogee in the
cavalry's development was reached with the introduction of Turks into the 'Abbasid
military institution.
In early 'Abbasid times, riding beasts were generally obtained from three principle
sources: horses captured in battle, horses received under peace treaties signed with
enemies, and horses received as gifts or in payment of taxes.
The training of the 'Abbasid cavalry included learning the skills of evasion, jousting,
hit and run, using the bow and lance from horseback, and learning the skilful
manoeuvres practised in polo.
Although the 'Abbasid cavalry continued to use conventional arms such as the sword
and lance, their shapes and characters varied during the first century of 'Abbasid rule
according to the fighting elements that dominated the 'Abbasid army during that
period. In addition, the introduction of the Turks into the 'Abbasid military
institution brought new types of weapons that were previously unknown to both the
Arabs and the Iranians. Among these was the lasso (wahaq).
Rakan al-Mttfairi j PhD Thrsis | Chapters | The Military Units and Support Serrrnvx 208
In battle formation the 'Abbasid cavalry were generally positioned in the two flanks
and behind the infantry. Apart from their duty in the midst of the battlefield,
'Abbasid cavalry bore other duties including reconnaissance, safeguarding the army
while in camp and during combat, and setting ambuscades.
The next most indispensable military unit after the cavalry in the early 'Abbasid
armies was the infantry, who oftentimes assumed the initial, direct clash with the
enemy's forces. Their potential role was also demonstrated when facing unmounted
foes and in difficult terrain like the marshlands of southern Iraq. Besides swords,
long lances, bows, and shields, the 'Abbasid infantiy employed many other hand-to-
hand implements of war of Persian origin as such the mace, the iron club, the battle-
axe, and the wooden club. Moreover, for the first time in the history of Muslim
armies, the 'Abbasid infantry also used the sling, which proved to be astonishingly
effective in combat.
The archers usually led off the battle with a heavy salvo of arrows. The use of the
bow had not been widespread among the Arabs in pre-Islamic times and, although
Islamic teachings and the affiliation of some non-Arab auxiliary forces such as the
Asawirah to the Arab side, had enhanced the presence of archers within the Muslim
armies, yet the archery division only reached its zenith under the 'Abbasids. This
was not only because of the type of warfare favoured by the 'Abbasid forces, but
also because of the long-standing tradition of archery in Khurasan, the homeland of
many of the 'Abbasid troops. This leading in archery was further enhanced with the
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introduction of Turkish fighters, who were famed for their great skills in
bowmanship on horseback.
Early 'Abbasid armies continued the tradition of employing hurling machines in
their military operations, especially against their enemies' fortresses and stronghold
cities. Nevertheless, early 'Abbasids were innovative in their use of such machines
as they employed for the first time in Muslim history flaming naphtha, which caused
much more devastation than stone projectiles. To protect the naphtha-hurlers
(naffatun) from the effects of the fire, either while composing and using the naphtha
against the enemy or when it was used against the Muslims themselves, these corps
wore special fire-proof suits.
In almost all their military campaigns the 'Abbasid forces were joined by pioneer
and labour corps (fa'alah) whose duty included road-making and mending, bridge
construction, digging work, and fortress-building and demolishing.
Maintaining order within the ranks of the troops, preventing desertion attempts,
tracking down spies or infiltrators, and executing punishments, which might include
executions, were all part of the responsibilities of the army police (Shurtat al- 'Askar
or Junci al-Shurat).
In addition to tasks of the main units of the army, there were non-combatant
functions, which were carried out by specially appointed individuals. Among these
were the guides, physicians, chemists, judges, provisioners, translators, and spies, the
last of which were not only involved in 'Abbasid times in gathering information or
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spreading misinformation, but also in carrying out assassinations of prominent
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Introduction
This chapter of the study is divided into five separate topics, each of which deals
with one administrative aspect of the early 'Abbasid army. These aspects are: means
of military communication, army supplies and provisioning, levies and volunteers,
exchange of captives, and finally army command and ranks.
4.1 Means ofMilitary Communication
4.1.1 Mounted Post-Riders
During the early Muslim conquests, military communication between the central
government in Madlnah and its commanders in the battlefields was mainly by means
of camel-riders.1 However, after the succession of the Umayyads to power in
41/602, owing to the expansion of the Islamic state, a regular postal service (barid)
was needed to ensure confidentiality and swiftness in transmitting official
communications from Damascus to the outlying state provinces and vice versa. It is
reported that Caliph Mu'awiyah b. Abi Sufyan (41-60/661-680) was the first to
establish the postal system in Islam, although it was developed in imitation of the
systems that had been used in the Byzantine and Sasanid Empires.2 The barld,
which was used for military and civil purposes, had reached a high level of efficiency
by the time of the 'Abbasids, during whose rule a government bureau was
'Hill, "Role", pp. 33-4; Ahmad and Hill, Islamic Technology, p. 104; EI2, s. v. "Badw".
2EI 2, s.v. "Barld ". For the latest study on the Muslim Baril system , see Adam Silverstein's
Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 2002.
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established in Baghdad which was responsible for supervising all the issues related to
the provision of this service.3 In order to ensure the swift delivery of the post, postal
stages (sikak, sing, sikkah) were established all along the main routes of the empire,
ranged at a distance of two to six farsakhs4 apart.5 So, when a postal courier reached
one of these stages and his mount was exhausted, he would quickly exchange it for a
fresh one and then go at full gallop to the next postal stage, where the same
procedure was repeated, and so on until he reached the place intended.6
Although, in terms of speed, the barici was highly efficient in peacetime, it reached
its optimum performance in times of crisis. In such times, the central government in
Baghdad sought to supply the postal stages with more mounts and, in addition,
shortened the distance between the stages, in some cases to as little as one farsakh.7
The efficiency of the barld in wartime is well illustrated by the war with Babak in
222/837. In order to stay in touch with his army, Caliph al-Mu'tasim set up a very
advanced postal service that facilitated communication between himself, based in
Samarra', and his chief commander, al-Afshln, in Adharbayjan. It is interesting to
read al-TabarFs detailed description of this military communication network. Thus,
he observes that:
'Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 77.
4
The farsakh was equivalent to 5.985 km. EI2, s.v. "Farsakh".
sThe distance between one postal stage and the next varied from one region to another. MaqdisI
(A hsctn, p. 66) indicates that in Iraq the distance was four farsakhs, in Syria six, and two farsakhs in
Khurasan.
6Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, Fakhrj, p. 106; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 52.
7TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 52.
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Al-Mu'tasim stationed sleek, swift horses (khayl mudammarah)
along the road from Samarra to the pass leading to Hulwan. At
the start of each farsakh was specially stationed a horse with a
rapid rider (Mujri), who would gallop with the news, so that he
might relay it personally to another man [similarly stationed],
placing it in the latter's hand directly from his own. In the stretch
from beyond Hulwan to Adharbayjan they had stationed mounts
from al-Maij; these were ridden for one day or two days and then
would be exchanged for new mounts that were then dispatched
onward, and slaves from the personnel at al-Maij would travel on
their back, each mount being stationed at the beginning of each
[new] farsakh. He [al-Mu'tasim] posted for them watchmen
(dayadibali) on the mountaintops by night and day and ordered
them to cry out when news came to them (i.e., of the approach of
one of the relays). When the person who was near the shouting
heard the noise, he got himself ready, but his opposite number
who had shouted was not to go to him until the other was waiting
for him on the road; then he would take the dispatch bag
(Kharitah). hi this way, the mail bag used to reach Samarra' from
— X
al-Afshln's army camp in four days or less.
Another example of the efficiency of the postal service in wartime is found in
accounts of the civil war. It is stated that in 195/811 the news of the victory ofTahir
b. al-Husayn over 'isa b. Mahan travelled from al-Rayy to al-Ma'mun in Marw in
three days, passing over more than 250 farsakhs on its way.9
The remarkable speed of the barii service enabled the central government to utilize
it in time of war, not just for the transmission of information, but also for the delivery
of military reinforcements to the battlefield as speedily as possible. In 145/763,
Caliph al-Mansur wrote to his governor in Syria instructing him to send ten men
:<Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 9, p. 52 (English translation quoted from Bosworth, The History of al- TatarI,
vol. 33, p. 85).
'jahshiyari, Wuzari', p. 293; Tabari, Tarjkh, vol. 9, p. 394; K. al-'Uyun, p. 325; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil,
vol. 5, p. 375.
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every day by means of post mounts, in order to face the unexpected rebellion of
Ibrahim al-'Alawi in Basrah.10
The mounts used by the postal service, which were distinguished by their docked
tails and the rattle coming from the cowbell around their necks, differed from one
region to another according to the climate and relief found in each. Horses, however,
seem to have been used in most of the provinces of the state. Their role in wartime
postal service was well illustrated in 219/834 when al-Mu'tasim sent 'Ujayf b.
'Anbasah to put down the rebellion of the Zutt11 in the marshland of southern Iraq.
In order to stay informed of events on the battlefield, al-Mu'tasim stationed a relay of
sleek, swift, docked horses at every one of the staging posts (sikak al-burud) that
stretched between Baghdad and Basrah for the purpose of delivering news to him.
By this means, news used to come out from 'Ujayf and reach al-Mu'tasim on the
17
same day.
In addition to horses, mules were also widely used for transmission of the post,
especially in cold and mountainous areas, as for instance in Iran, where the nigged
,0Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, p. 629.
"Zutt is an Arabicization of the Indian ethnic term Jhai. In pre-Islamic times the Sasanids had used
members of this group in some areas of the Gulf region. Their number seems to have increased in
Umayyad times, when it is reported that during his conquest of Sind, Muhammad b. al-Qasim al-
Thaqafl sent back to al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf in Iraq a group of them along with other ethnic groups from
Sind. In Iraq they were settled in the Bata'ih, south of Kaskar in lower Iraq. Baladhuri, Futub, pp.
462, 536; Bosworth, The History ofal-Tabari, vol. 33, p. 7.
!2Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 9, p. 8; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 462.
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terrain is not suited to horses or camels.13
The 'Abbasids also continued to rely on camels in the postal service, especially in
desert areas. The superiority of the camel to any other means of transport lay in the
animal's ability to go more than two weeks without water in very hot conditions.
Therefore, it is reported that in 166/783 Caliph al-Mahdl erected postal stages all
along the main route that stretched between Makkah, Madlnah, and Yaman and, for
this service, it is reported that camels were employed along the route.14 It is most
likely that for this type of service certain breeds of camel would be used, specifically
those known for their speed and endurance such as the Najfyah, Mahriyah, and the
Bakhtfyah,1S
4.1.2 Carrier-Pigeons
The use of pigeons for the transmission of information was well known to the
Greeks, who employed them, for example, to spread the news of their Olympic
games to all parts of the Empire. The Romans also used this mode of
1JAhmad and Hill, Islamic Technology, p. 105. It seems that the use of mules in the postal service
during the early decades of the 'Abbasid rule remained limited to Iran and other eastern provinces.
This continued until the reign of al-Rashld, during which they started to be used in other parts of the
Islamic Empire. This can be concluded from an account by al-Qalqashandl (Suhh al-A 'sha, vol. 14, p.
141) which indicates that at the request of al-Rashld, Yahya b. Khalid al-Barmakl stationed mules in
the postal stages (marakiz) and gave his instruction that they were not to be used except by the Caliph
or the postmaster. Likewise, when al-Jahiz speaks of the mules in the postal service in 'Abbasid
times, he only indicates their use from the time of al-Rashld and onward. For more information on the
breeds, characters, and use of mules in the postal service and other related issues, see Jahiz, Rasa'il,
vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 215-378.
14Qalqashandi, Subh al-A 'sha, vol. 1, p. 390, Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 162; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol.
10, p. 158.
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communication, for the first time for military purposes in 34 BC when Hirtius and
Brutus were able to exchange messages by means of pigeons during the siege of
Modena.16
However, it seems that it took the Muslim authorities more than a century and a half
before they employed this method of communication. Nonetheless, contrary to the
common assumption that the earliest recorded use of carrier-pigeons by the Muslims
relates to the reign of al-Mu'tasim,17 it is now certain that pigeons were in use as
early as the time of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Rashld (170-193/786-809). According to
Ibn Qutaybah, al-Rashld employed carrier-pigeons extensively for the transportation
of urgent messages between himself and his state officials in the various provinces of
the empire.18 The efficiency of this method of communication was remarkable.
Thus, an inquiry addressed by al-Rashld to one of his officials, the answer to which
would have taken more than a month to arrive by land, would reach al-Rashld within
a day by pigeon.19 It is also stated that the great concern of al-Rashld for carrier-
pigeons caused him firmly to instruct those who were entrusted to look after them
''Dumayri, Hayat al-Hayawan al-Kuhra, vol. 1, p. 28. It is said that a riding camel in good condition
could traverse between 70 and 100 miles a day. Hill, "Role", p. 34.
"'Mikha'il b. Naqtila, "Musabaqat al-Barq", p. 142; Ameer, Short History, p. 418.
l7Ameer, Short History, p. 418.
,sIbn Qutaybah, al-Jmamah, pt. 2, p. 193.
"Ibid.
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not to involve themselves in any kind of task other than that to which they had been
primarily assigned.20
In support of the view that pigeons were widely used by the early 'Abbasid Caliphs
for the transmission of all kinds of information is another account which commences
its narration in the time of al-Ma'mun. Al-Jahiz (d. 255/868) reports that one day al-
Ma'mun asked Sukar, a bondmaid belonging to Umm Ja'far (i.e. Zubaydah, the wife
of Caliph al-Rashld and the daughter of Ja'far b. al-Mansur) whether she was a free
woman or a slave. She replied, "I do not know because whenever Umm Ja'far is
angry with me she tells me that I am a slave and whenever she is satisfied with me
she tells me that I am free." Al-Ma'mun then said to her, "Write her a letter this
minute and ask her about this matter." She is reported to have written the letter
• 7i .
recommended and attached it to the wing of a carrier- pigeon." Moreover, it is
stated that in 222/837, during the reign of al-Mu'tasim, carrier-pigeons were sent
from Adharbayjan and Armenia to Samarra', carrying the news of victory and the
capture of Babak al-Khurraml.22
Literary works of the early 'Abbasid era overflow with information regarding the
various breeds of carrier-pigeons, their description, and the methods of their training.
Al-Jahiz indicates the degree of refinement that the Arabs had reached in the art of
xIbid.
2lJahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 157.
"Mas'udl, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 56.
training pigeons for the purpose of carrying correspondence.23 He also clearly
indicates that this method of communication was widely employed, not only by the
government and its officials, but by civilians as well, especially in Iraq and the
frontier cities of northern Syria.24 As for the prices charged for carrier-pigeons, they
exceeded that of any other bird known to the Arabs. In Baghdad, the price of a well-
known pigeon could reach more than 500 dinars, while a chick could fetch more than
20 and a single egg five dinars or more.25
In conveying messages by carrier-pigeon, the most common practice was to place
the letter under the wing for security. The strength of the wing also made it well able
to carry this additional load." Moreover, to ensure the delivery of the message to its
intended recipient, the letter would be duplicated and sent via two pigeons, the
second being released two hours after the first, so that if one of them lost its bearings,
or was seized or killed by predators, then the second bird could still be relied on for
safe transmission of the message.27 To make it easy for the pigeon to carry the
dispatch, the information was written on a very delicate silky paper using a very fine
2iJahiz, al-Hayawan, vol. 3, pp. 274-5.
24
Ibid., p. 213. In this regard, al-JahiZ (ibid., vol. 1, pp. 96-7), says, "Ifpigeons were not used in the
transmission of news, the people of Raqqah, Mawsil, and Baghdad would not be able to know what
had occurred in Basrah and Kufah on the same day. Meanwhile, the news of any event that has taken
place in Kufah is circulated among the people of Basrah on the afternoon of that day."
2iIbid„ vol. 3, p. 212.
2l,SuyutI, Husn, vol. 3, p. 186.
'
Qalqashandl, Subh, vol. 1, p. 154.
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pen known as al-ghubar (powder), reflecting its fineness.28 In addition, the contents
of the dispatch would be as brief as possible. Thus, the writers would spare
mentioning the basmalcP and avoid long introductions and appellations. Instead, the
letter would be limited to a mention of the date, time, and information in brief, and it
would be sealed with the Qur'anic sentence "Allah is Sufficient for us, and He is the
Best Disposer of affairs (for us)."30
4.1.3 Fire and Smoke Signals
Since ancient times and until recent years, Arab tribesmen used fire and smoke as
means of communication. Al-Jahiz devotes a whole section ofhis book al-Hayawan
to fire. In this section, entitled "Fire and its varieties", he gives the full range of
knowledge regarding fire and its varieties, the role of each kind, and those associated
with the Arabs and others ascribed to non-Arabs. Among those mentioned as being
used by the Arabs as a means of military communication is nar al-qira (the fire of
hospitality). Since pre-Islamic times hospitable Arab individuals used to light fires
in front of their homes to declare their hospitality and to guide travellers to come
over and find a warm haven and nourishing food. The higher the place in which the
fire was and the larger it was built, the greater was the credit accorded to the host.31
Fire was also employed by the Arabs as a means of communication and in this case it
ziIbid., vol. 3, p. 52. To protect the letter from the effects of the weather, it would be deposited in a
very small container made of a sheet of pure beaten gold. Mikha'il b. Naqula, "Musabaqat al-Barq",
p. 143.
^Declaration of the name of God using the formula "In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most
Merciful".
^'Suyutl, Husn, vol. 3, pp. 186-7.
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was known as nar al-harb (the fire of war), nar al-indhar (the fire of warning), or
nar al-uhbah (the fire of preparation for war). Typically, when an attack was
imminent, the chief of the tribe would order a large fire to be kindled at night, while
during the day smoke would be used, to warn members of the tribe who were far
away and to summon them to an urgent muster.32
After the coming of Islam and the expansion of Muslim territories to include vast
areas, it seems that the Arabs did not utilize fire signals as a means of transmitting
information over a long distance until the time of the second orthodox Caliph. Al-
Baladhuri points out that Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab wrote to Mu'awiyah b. Abi
Sufyan instructing him to restore the fortresses located all along the Syrian coastline
and to adopt the use of cressets (mawaqid) on them.33 This mode of military
communication was used by Muslims probably until the 7th century AH/13lh century
AD,34 but only in areas that had previously been Byzantine territory, such as Syria,
Asia Minor, and North Africa.35
The transmitting of information by means of fire was achieved by placing large
beacons on the summits of high mountains, when available, or on lofty watchtowers
31Jahiz, al-Hayctwan, vol. 5, pp. 134-6; idem, al-Bukha\a\ pp. 163-4.
32Jahiz, al-Boyan, vol. 3, p. 22; idem, ai-Hayawan, vol. 5, pp. 133-5; a/-Nuwayri, Nihayat al-Arab,
vol. l,p. 111.
uBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 152.
i4AI-AnsarI, writing in the 9th century AH/15th century AD, indicates that this type of military
communication was in use at the beginning of the Mamluk rule in Egypt and that it was employed in
relation to the Tartar threat. Later, the peace agreement between the Tartars and the Mamluks led to
the disuse of this mode of communication and the falling into desuetude of the infrastructure on which
it rested (TafrJj al-Kuriib pp. 12-3).
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built specially for this purpose inside fortresses. Then, when danger threatened at
night, a fire would be lit on the summit of a high mountain or watchtower, while by
daylight smoke signals would be used. The signal would be passed from the top of
one mountain or watchtower to the following in a chain, until the signal reached its
intended destination.36
The efficiency and speed of this type of military communication in 'Abbasid times is
evidenced by an account in al-MaqrizI, who points out that during the governorship
of Ibrahim b. Ahmad b. Muhammad b. al-Aghlab over Ifriqiya in 261/875, fires used
to be kindled on the castles and watchtowers that stretched along the coast between
the cities of Sabta (Ceuta) and Alexandria. By this means, he says, the message
would take one night to travel between the two cities, while it would take a month by
land.37
4.1.4 Drums, Trumpets and Banners
These instruments of communication were normally used for sending signals or
dispatch massages between the commander of the army and his troops during
marches, especially when the numbers of men in the army were large and their
bMcz, Renaissance, pp. 502-3.
v'Ansari, Taf'rjj at-Kurub, p. 17. An actual description of the way information was transmitted by
means of fire and smoke is preserved for us in an account given by al-MaqdisI (Ahsan, p. 177).
37
MaqrizI, Khitat, vol. 1, p. 174. It is reported that this mode of military communication continued to
be used in North Africa until 440/1049, when al-Mu'izz b. Badls's revolt against the Fatimids, who
were no longer able to protect the coastal fortresses from Bedouin attacks. Hasan, al-Nuznm, p. 230;
idem, TarMi al-Islam al-SiyasI, vol. 3, p. 276.
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different companies were separated by long distances.38 During the war with the
Khurramiyyah in the difficult terrain of Adharbayjan in 222/ 837, the 'Abbasid army
is said to have carried with it 21 large drums, which the 'Abbasid commander al-
Afsliin used as a means of communicating with his troops, who were separated over
a vast area. The signal for marching foiward was given with the beating of the
drums, but if al-Afshin wanted the army to stop he would silence the drums and then
the troops would stop in whatever part of the mountain, valley, or other place they
might be.39 In the same campaign, al-Afshin would also instruct the Kuhbaniyyah to
climb up to the summit of the mountains to watch the roads, so that if they noticed
any suspicious movement by the enemy, they could inform the army by waving the
banners that they were carrying.40
4.1.5 Arrows
This means of military communication was employed in difficult circumstances
when it became almost impossible to transmit information by other means, as, for
instance, in time of siege. The manner adopted to place the letter in an arrow and
shoot it to those in or outside the besieged city.41 This means of military
communication is reported to have been used by the 'Abbasid forces during their
siege of the fortress of Isbahbadh in Tabaristan in 142/760. It is recorded that when
38Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 261; vol. 4, p. 43; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 20, 26, 30; Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 407; vol. 9, pp. 25, 32, 34; K. al-'Uyun, p. 332.
wTabari, Tarlkh, vol. 9, p. 34; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 30
40Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 9, pp. 30, 43. It is mentioned that in this campaign the 'Abbasid army used to
carry 12 large black banners and 500 small banners (ibid., p. 34).
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the stand-off of the 'Abbasid forces became too prolonged, Marzuq Abu al-KhasIb,
a mawla of Caliph al-Mansur and one of the army commanders, proposed a rase to
enable their forces to conquer the city. Marzuq suggested that, under pretence, he
should desert to the side of Isbahbadh's defenders, claiming that he had been ill-
treated and promising in revenge to point out the weak points in the Muslims'
encampment. Marzuq's trickery worked so well with the defenders of Isbahbadh
that he became one of those who were assigned to take turns in opening and closing
the city gates. At this point, Marzuq wrote a letter, placed it in an arrow, and shot it
to his confederates, informing them of the success of his rase and designating a night
on which he would open the gates for them. This he did on the appointed night and
the 'Abbasid forces were able to capture the city.42
4.2 Army Supplies and Provisioning
During the early days of Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate, the responsibility of
supplying the soldiers with arms and food in time of war fell upon the soldiers
themselves rather than the state. Each man who was in receipt of a stipend Cats')
from the Dtwan was obligated, when called upon, to join the campaign, providing
himself with food, arms, and anything else he might need, deducting that from the
food subsidies (arzaq) and stipend that he received from the state annually. The
application of this system seems, however, to have led in time to a serious dilemma
as many campaign draftees became reluctant to provision themselves properly for
4lHartharru, Mukhtasar, p. 64.
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war and were especially deficient in the supply of weaponry. This caused the
government to take a firm stand in emphasizing the necessity for soldiers to equip
themselves adequately in accordance with the amount of stipend that each individual
received. Kathlr b. Shihab, governor of Rayy and Qazwin in the time of Caliph
Mu'awiyah (41-60/661-680), is reported to have stipulated, whenever he led a
military campaign, that each man under his command equip himself with a full kit.
This would typically include a shield (turs), a coat of mail (clir1), a helmet (baydah),
a pack needle (misallah), needles (ibar), linen threads (khuyut), an awl (makhsaj), a
pair of scissors (miqrad), a horse's nose-bag (mikhlah), and a feed-basket made of
palm leaves (tillJsah).43 Al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf is also said to have stipulated that every
solider who was in receipt of a stipend of 300 dirhams or more had to equip himself
with a horse, a sword, and a bow with 60 arrows.44 Similarly, Caliph 'Umar II is
reported to have instructed his governors to make sure that any man who was in
receipt of a stipend of 100 dinars had to equip himself with an Arabian horse, a
shield, a sword, a lance, and a bow 45
Besides the soldiers' own self-provision, generous contributions from wealthy
Muslims were a very important source of provision of food and military equipment
for the early Muslim armies. On many occasions the Prophet Muhammad urged
those who had money, spears, riding beasts, or food to take part in the provisioning
4?TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 512-3; Basawl, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 1, p. 125; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 415.
4,Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 390.
44AI-'A1i, Tanzmat, p. 138.
4'Ibn Sa'd, Tbbaqat, vol. 5, p. 351.
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of those Muslims who lacked these things. In this context, the Prophet also declared
that anyone who provisioned a fighter for battle would have the same reward from
God as the fighter.46 Accordingly, rich Muslims used to donate military equipment,
food, and riding beasts to those who needed them. At the battle of Hunayn in 8/630,
the Companion Nawfal b. al-Harith is reported to have provided the Muslim army
with 300 lances.47 Again, in preparation for the expedition of Tabuk in 9/631,
'Uthman b. 'Affan donated 70,000 dirhams, which were spent in providing one third
of the 30,000 men with food, equipment, and mounts.48 Muslim women are also
reported to have made contributions toward war expenses by donating their jewelry
to be sold in order to raise funds.49
Individual contributions continued to be a source of funding for the Islamic armies in
Umayyad times, but on occasions it seems that contributions were taken on a
compulsory basis. Al-RabI' b. Ziyad al-Harithl, the governor of Khurasan appointed
by Ziyad b. Abi Sufyan, is reported to have been the first to have ordered the
wealthy people among his troops to contribute towards campaign expenses. Such
contributions were known as tanahud.50
""Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 4, p. 28; Muslim, Sahih, vol. 3, pp. 1506-7; Ibn Hisham, Srah, vol. 3, p. 157;
Tabari, TarSkh, vol. 3, p. 102.
4Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 4, p. 47.
+8WaqidI, Maghazi, vol. 3, p. 339; Baladhurl, Ansab, vol. 1, p. 368; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 6, p. 78.
wWaqidi, Maghazi, vol. 3, p. 991.
^'Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 507; Levy, Social, p. 415.
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Under the 'Abbasid Caliphate, however, changes in the provision and supply system
necessarily occurred with the fundamental changes that took place within the fiscal
and administrative system of the Islamic military institution. While the 'Abbasid
authority worked to abolish the traditional system of stipends ('ata) within its
central forces, it replaced it with the artizaq system, under which soldiers would
enlist in the army as a full-time profession. In return, the state would take upon its
shoulders the responsibility of training and allotting them a fixed monthly salary as
long as they continued to serve in the army. Another significant change was the
large increase in the pay of the 'Abbasid soldiers, compared with that received by the
Umayyad troops, the expense of which was met by depriving the former of the food
subsidies that the latter used to receive lfom the state. By this reform, the 'Abbasid
soldiers became themselves totally responsible for buying the cereal crops that they
needed during peacetime.51 Nevertheless, in wartime the supply of their daily rations
would become a duty of the state. Moreover, the rate of pay was no longer the
primary criterion deciding the military division that the solider would belong to,
whether cavalry or infantry, and consequently the type of equipment that he would
equip himself with. Instead, personal martial skills became the key issue in deciding
51 In this regard al-'Ali (Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 187) indicates that stopping the distribution of food
subsidies to the soldiers in the 'Abbasid period led to an increase in the economic activities of the
urban and rural markets. This was because soldiers had to buy the cereals they needed from local
markets, which in turn depended on what was imported from the countiyside. So, peasants were able
to sell their products to the urban dwellers for hard cash, which enabled them to pay their taxes to the
state. By contrast, the peasants in Umayyad times would pay both hard cash as well as their products,
which were freely distributed among the recipients of the DJwan. In consequence, most of the time
the peasants suffered from a lack of ready cash, which affected their ability to pay the tax due to the
state and thus caused them a lot of trouble with the authority.
,2Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 152; vol. 9, pp. 16-7, 32, 40; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 32.
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the amount of pay one would receive, as the cavalryman received double that paid to
the infantryman.
53
In contrast to prevailing policy under the Umayyads, the responsibility for
provisioning soldiers with military equipment during the 'Abbasid period fell upon
the state rather than the soldiers themselves. This is demonstrated by the fact that
while there is a lack of evidence to indicate the existence of food storehouses in
Baghdad, on the other hand there is strong evidence of the existence of arms
warehouses (khazain al-silah), even including the names of their administrators
(ashab khizanat al-silah).54 Sources also give indications of the amount of military
equipment stored in them. It is mentioned, for example, that the arms warehouses in
the time of the first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, contained 50,000 coats of mail
{durut), 50,000 swords, 30,000jawshans55, and 200,000 lances.56 Moreover, al-Fadl
b. al-Rabl' states that, after the accession of al-Amln to the Caliphal throne, he was
ordered by the latter to make an inventory of the contents of these warehouses.
Hence, on al-Fadl's instructions, the secretaries and the warehouse foremen spent
four months counting and sorting their contents. The inventory listed, among other
items, the following: 10,000 golden swords, 50,000 lances, 100,000 bows, 100,000
special coats of mail, 50,000 ordinary coats of mail, 10,000 helmets (baydat, sing.
boydah), 20,000 jawshans, 150,000 shields, 40,000 special saddles, 30,000 ordinary
53Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 8, pp. 534, 550.
"Ya'qubl, Buldan, pp. 13, 17, 23.
5The jawshan was a coat of mail made to protect only the front part of the fighter's body.
v'Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Dhakha'ir wa'l-Tuhaf p. 213.
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saddles, 4,000 tents (qibab, sing, qubbah) with their accessories, and 150 pavilions
(saradlq, sing, sardaq).57
There can be no doubt that the amount of expenditure (nafaqat) by the central
government in Baghdad on its armed forces in peacetime was subject to huge
increase in time of war to cover the necessary extra costs incurred by the army on
campaign. The amount that the 'Abbasids had to spend on their military campaigns
varied from one to another according to their size, their destination, and, most
importantly, the length of time that their forces took to accomplish their military
objectives. In the war against his uncle 'Abdallah b. 'All in 137/755, Caliph al-
Mansur is estimated to have spent between 12 and 18 million dirhams on the army
that he sent under the command of Abu Muslim.58 So also, in the war against the
Kharijites in Ifriqiya in 154/770, al-Mansur had to dispatch his commander Yazid b.
Hatim with an army of 50,000 soldiers and to spend 36 million dirhams, to maintain
this army.59 Moreover, during the campaign against the Byzantines in 165/782,
Harun al-Rashid, who was in command, is reported to have had armed forces of
more than 95,793 men. In addition to the 100,000 head of cattle and sheep that had
to be slaughtered to feed this army, al-Rashid also took with him 194,450 dinars in
"ibid., p. 214.
"ssBatadhurI, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 107.
S9Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 118; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 44. In al-AzdFs account (Tarikh, p.
218), the amount is stated to have been only three million dirhams, a figure which seems far too small
for such a large army.
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gold and 21,414,800 dirhams in silver to cover the expenses of his troops.60
Likewise, to bring an end to the rebellion of Rafi' b. al-Layth in Khurasan, Caliph
al-Rashid admitted with regret that he had spent more than million dirhams and still
had not achieved what he had hoped to.61 Last but not least, during the military
operations against Babak in Adharbayjan, al-Mu'tasim is reported to have sent with
his commander Aytakh in 222/837 one instalment of 30 million dirhams to cover the
expenses of the soldiers who were fighting there under the leadership of al-AfshTn.62
All these figures gives a clear indication of the huge amount of spending that the
'Abbasid Caliphs had to outlay in their military operations. While part of this money
was spent on such provisions as food, arms, medical attention, as well as fodder for
army beasts, the remainder was expended in pay and bonuses for those soldiers who
would carry out duties over and above their normal military tasks in the battlefield.63
In addition to the supplies and provisions that the army would take with it when it set
out from Baghdad, it would also gather provisions from the Islamic towns and
villages that lay along its route as well as from those located near to the battlefront.
In the war with Babak, for example, the 'Abbasid forces are reported to have
received large quantities of provisions and food supplies from the towns of
h"Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 152-3; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 248; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, pp.
156-7.
' 'jahshiyarT, Wuzara', p. 228.
fi2Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 23, 29; K, al- 'Uyun, p. 385; lbn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 28; Ibn Kathir,
Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 311; DhahabI, Siyar, vol. 10, p. 294; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 425.
"Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 15, 40, 59.
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Maraghah and Sirwan in Adharbayjan.64 'Abbasid forces would also sometimes
take food supplies from their enemies either directly or indirectly. Indirectly, they
could first obtain food supplies by plundering the cities and villages of their enemies,
especially those located along their way to the battlefield, and, secondly, through
what they could take at the conclusion of the battle.65 Directly, food supplies might
be obtained under the terms of peace treaties signed with their enemies, such as the
one signed by Harun al-Rashld with Augusta, the Byzantine ruler, in 165/782.
Accordingly, Augusta agreed to pay tribute of 70 or 80 thousand dmars as well as to
provide the 'Abbasid army with guides and to facilitate its provisioning on its way
back home.66
The diet of the soldiers during the campaign would vary according to the phases of
the campaign itself. During long encampments the armed forces would be fed well,
being served with freshly cooked meat, of sheep, goats, cows, or camels. Meanwhile,
during marches, as well as during breaks in fighting, the soldiers would survive
mainly on dried food such as hard dates (qasab), barley-mush (scrwlq), and dry
biscuit (ka'k).61 With the exception of dates, fruit such as oranges, apples, bananas,
and melons was most probably not included in the soldiers' food menu as such
MIbid., pp. 16-7.
'"Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 153, 313; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 42.
06K. al-'Uyun, pp. 279, 392; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 152; vol. 9, pp. 60-2; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol.
10, pp. 156-7; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 42.
6'Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 153; vol. 9, pp. 32-3, 39, 40, 65, Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhbar, vol. 2, pt.
1, p. 206; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, pp. 29,32.
comestibles seem in those days to have been luxurious food items that at least would
not be served to lower-ranking soldiers.68
The supplies and provisions of the army would also include large quantities of
fodder, especially barley, for the army beasts. But with the availability of natural
pastures during the march and encampment, the army beasts would be left to graze
under the supervision of a large number of foraging parties ('allafah).69
As long as the 'Abbasid army kept to the designated route for its march, the army
would seem to face no difficulties concerning water supplies, as water troughs made
of skin (hiyadmin al-adam) would be set down along the army's route.70
When the 'Abbasid forces had to cany out campaigns within the Iraqi territories or
in proximal provinces such as the Hijaz, Baghdad always seems to have been taken
as the provision centre of the forces.71 But when they were involved in military
operations far away from Baghdad, the army commanders took into their
consideration the necessity of adopting advance provision bases in which to deposit
supplies for all the army's needs. During the conquest campaign against Kamakh
(Kamachon) in 149/766, Malatyah, in south-eastern Anatolia, is mentioned as having
<,sTabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 33; Ibn al-Athir, KamiI, vol. 6, p. 29; Ashtor, "Diet", p. 14; Ahsan, Social
Life, pp. 108-10.
6<JTabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 23, 32, 60, 63; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 62.
70TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 70.
77W4„ vol. 7, pp. 517, 579.
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been the provision base for the 'Abbasid forces.72 Throughout the final two years of
the campaign against the Khurramiyyah forces in Adharbayjan, from AH 220 to 222,
'Abbasid commanders took up the town of Ardabll, in eastern Adharbayjan, as the
main provision and supply base for their forces.73 Tarsus, a frontier fortresses in
Cilicia, is another example of this arrangement. Besides its being a main ransom
(fida) centre for the exchange of prisoners between Muslims and Byzantines, it also
acted on many occasions as a main provision base for the 'Abbasid forces in their
land and naval operations against the Byzantine territories.74
Protecting the supply and provision caravans was one of those issues to which the
'Abbasid commanders gave much attention during their military operations. This
task usually rested upon a body of troops best known as the badhraqah (escort
party).75 The system used by the escorting party in early 'Abbasid times is well
described in al-Tabarfs account of the war with Babak al-Khurraml. To protect the
caravans of supplies, provisions, as well as Muslims travellers from Khurramiyyah
raids, al-Afshm stationed a rally of cavalry escorts at the fortresses that stretched
7~Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 220.
73Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 11^4; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 18. During the campaign of 213/829
against the Khurramiyyah, the 'Abbasid forces under the leadership of Muhammad b. Humayd are
reported to have taken the town of al-Hamdaniyyah in Adharbayjan as their base for provisions and
supplies. Azdi, Tarikh, p. 386.
74Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 323, 625; vol. 9, pp. 57, 70; Azdi, Tarikh, p. 399; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol.
5, p. 494; vol. 6, pp. 40, 45; Qudamah, Kharaj, pp. 186, 310.
7iHarthamI, Mukhtasur, p. 26; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 13, 15-6. Badhraqah is a word of Persian
origin, used to designate the guards who escort caravans. Al-Qurtubl, al-Jami' U-Ahkam al-Qur'an,
vol. 4, p. 158.
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between ArdabU76 and his field headquarters in Barzand.77 It is said that the
caravans would set off from Ardabfl accompanied by an escort until they reached the
fortress of Hisn al-Nahr.78 From there, the caravans would be accompanied by
'Alawayh al- A'war's men, the garrison force at the fortress of Hisn al-Nahr, up to a
designated place half-way between Hisn al-Nahr and the fortress of Arshaq.79 There
they would meet with al-Haytham al-GhanawFs men, the garrison force at the
fortress of Arshaq, where the two groups would exchange caravans. Thus, al-
Haytham's men would hand over the caravans they had brought from their own
district to 'Alawayh's men and the latter would hand over the caravans under their
protection to al-Haytham's men. Should one group arrive at the meeting place
before the other, they would not proceed further but rather wait until the other group
arrived. After exchanging caravans, 'Alawayh's men would escort the caravans back
to Ardabil. Meanwhile, al-Haytham's men would escort the Caravans under their
protection as far as Abu Sa'id's men, the garrison force at the fortress in Kushsh,80
who, along with the cravens under their protection, would also be waiting for al-
Haytham's men in a meeting place half-way between Kushsh and Arshaq. There the
two groups would also exchange caravans, so that al-Haytham's men would hand
over the caravans under their protection to Abu Sa'id's men and the latter would
76A town suited in eastern Adharbayjan. Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 145; Bosworth, The History ofal-
Tabarl, vol. 33, p. 15; Le Strange, Lands, p. 168.
17A town in Mughan district in Adharbayjan. Le Strange, Lands, pp. 175-6; EI2 ,s. v. "Barzan".
^Situated approximately two farsakhs north-west of Ardabil. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 14; Bosworth,
The History ofal- Tabari, vol. 33, p. 18.
7 Arshaq was a rural district (rustaq) in Mughan, between Ardabil and Bardand. Yaqut, Mujam, vol.
1, p. 152; Bosworth, The History ofal- Tabari, vol. 33, p. 17.
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under their protection to Abu Sa'id's men and the latter would hand over the
caravans accompanying them to al-Haytham's men. Then al-Haytham's men would
escort the caravans entrusted to them to Arshaq before handing them over next day to
'Alawayh's men. Likewise, Abu Sa'Id's men would accompany the caravans they
protected to Khushsh and then to al-Afshln's camp, where the leader of a caravan
from al-Afshln would meet them to receive the caravans and send what they brought
to the army headquarters, i.e. al-Afshxn's camp. From there the supplies and
provisions would be distributed to the rest of the army camps, which in this
campaign were fifteen in number. 81
Notwithstanding the intricate system of protection for supply caravans put in place
by the 'Abbasid commanders to ensure the safe flow of supplies to their men, this
could not altogether prevent the supply of provisions from sometimes being seriously
interrupted. This would be either because of natural causes, such as bad weather or
hard terrain, or because of the enemy's ambush attacks, as was the case during the
war with the Khurramiyyah.82 When this sort of problem occurred, it usually caused
serious exhaustion and hardship for the soldiers as they suffered from lack of water
and food.83 The situation would only get worse when the army was accompanied by
large numbers of captives, whose feeding not only became a great burden but also a
""A fortress located approximately half-way between Ardabll and Barzand. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p.
12; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 2, p. 373; Bosworth, The History of aI- Tabari, vol. 33, p. 17; Le Strange,
Lands, p. 317.
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 12-3, 45.B1
*2Ibid., pp. 12-3, 15-6; K. al-'Uyun, p. 385; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 6, pp. 20-1.
H1Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 16, 38, 60; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 6, pp. 21, 29, 42.
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real hazard as the captives might refuse to march or might even seize the opportunity
to attack and kill Muslim soldiers before escaping.84 Therefore, the most convenient
solution that the 'Abbasid commanders found for this problem was to get rid of the
captives by putting them to death, especially the combatants and those who had no
noble status. During the campaign of Harun al-Rashld in 165/782, the number of the
Byzantine prisoners who were reported to have been killed while captive was 2,090,
whereas in the campaign of al-Mu'tasim in 223/838, the number was as high as
6,000 captives.85 As for the booty, the 'Abbasid commanders would free themselves
from the burden of carrying it by selling what they could and setting fire to the rest
along with the heavy siege-engines that the they had brought with to the battle and
would restrain the hurried return of the army.86
Beasts used for transporting supplies and provisions differed according to the terrain
to be crossed. In desert and in level terrain, camels were primarily employed, but in
mountainous regions mules, asses, as well as oxen were commonly used.87 In some
campaigns the number of pack animals could reach thousands. According to Michel
the Syrian, during the campaign against Ammuriyyah in 223/838, the army of al-
Mu'tasim included 50,000 camels as well as 20,000 mules.88 These carrying beasts
84Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 60.
H,Ibid., vol. 8, p. 135; vol. 9, pp. 60, 70; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 10, p. 165; Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p.
393.
mK. al-'Uyun, pp. 165, 395; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 65, 69; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 45; Ibn
Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 316.
87Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 14, 16, 41,
88Vasiliev, Byzance, vol. 1, p. 146.
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used not only to transport food, fodder, litters, and heavy siege-engines, but also
thousands of tents which were used to shelter the troops during their campaign.89
Unlike the common soldiers, each of the 'Abbasid senior commanders would be
provided with his own private tent (madrab, or khaymah), where he would eat his
meals, sleep, interview prisoners, and carry out other duties.90
Sea and river vessels were also employed to transport army provisions whenever the
operation fronts were in close proximity to the seacoast or a navigable river. On
occasions, the army would march along the seacoast while the ships carrying their
provisions would sail alongside them.91
In areas where food sources were very limited, the forces garrisoned there would be
provided with food supplies from the nearer rich provinces. In the Hijaz, for
example, such food provision was usually brought by sea from Iraq and Egypt.92
43 Levies, Volunteers and other Supernumerary Fighters
Despite the fact that the Qur'an stipulates that holy war (jihad) is a collective duty,93
the Prophet did not compel the Muslims to serve in the army.94 Instead, he only
89Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 45.
XlTabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 66, 75; Levy, Social, p. 444.
JITabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 440; K. al-'Uyun, p. 204.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 603, 621; Waines, "Cereals", p. 264.
'"Qur'an, 2: 216.
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exhorted them to the duty of jihad and reminded them of the reward appointed for
willing participants both here and in the hereafter.95 The voluntary principle in army
service continued unchanged throughout the time of Abu Bakr and the early years of
the Caliph 'Umar.96 Nonetheless, the establishment of the Diwan in 20/640 played a
significant role in shifting service in the army from a voluntary to a compulsory
basis. Each person who was enlisted in the Diwan and thus received the annual
stipend was obligated to present himself for military service whenever his service
was required.97 In addition to the fact that stipends were an incentive for Muslims at
that time to join the army, both faith and courage also made jihad a necessity for
Muslims, so that they did not unreasonably fail to join the army. They were afraid to
t • • QO .
be denigrated as cowards and inferior believers. Nevertheless, starting from the
second half of 'Uthman's Caliphate, the outbreak of the political strife between
different factions of the Muslim community, the settlement of Muslims in the
conquered towns, and consequently their transformation from being warriors into
city dwellers all played a part in weakening the enthusiasm of Muslims to join the
army.
To deal with this problem and be able to raise the necessary number of warriors for
military campaigns, the Muslim authority during the time of the Umayyad Caliphate
,4Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 2, p. 106; Waqidi, MaghazI vol. 1, p. 13; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 114; vol.
3, p. 107.
AVaqidl, MaghazI, vol. 3, p. 990.
%Taban, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 322, 448.
Ibn Sallam, Amwal, pp. 240-4; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 142.
97,
W,Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 142.
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tried two sorts of solutions. First, they employed compulsion, most often by
threatening those reluctant to enlist that their names would be withdrawn from the
Diwan and that their annual stipends would cease. However, with the advent of
capable and ruthless governors such as Ziyad b. Ablhi and al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf the
threat would be much more serious, as it extended to the death penalty." The second
solution, which was much more convenient, was to subsidize some tribal chiefs and
agree terms with them for the provision of warriors when needed. The first four
Umayyad Caliphs received a standing draft of 2,000 men from the Qahtan tribe in
Syria. In return, each man was paid an annual stipend of 2,000 dirhams with the
condition that if he died, his son or cousin would be eligible to take his place with the
same privileges.100 Also, after the death of Caliph Yazid b. al-Walld in 126/744,
Marwan b. Muhammad allotted stipends for 20,000 men from the Qays tribe and
7,000 from Rabi'ah to join forces in his struggle against another member of the
Umayyad family.101
Under the 'Abbasids, the problem of raising the necessary number of fighters
remained, but with different characteristics and solutions from those that prevailed in
the time of the Umayyads. As the conquest operations came to a halt, the 'Abbasid
standing army in Baghdad, whose members were employed in military service as frill
professionals all the year round, was generally sufficient to carry any necessary
military operations within and without the state's borders under any circumstances
"Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 5, p. 222; vol. 6, pp. 204-7; Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 2, p. 310.
100Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 95; Levy, Social Structure, p. 414.
that might arise.102 Nonetheless, this did not prevent the 'Abbasid army, on certain
occasions, for one reason or another, searching for additional manpower. As a
means to repair the shortfall of combatants, the central government resorted to a
number of solutions, the first of which was to raise levied forces (furud\ sing. fard).
However, these levied forces were of more than one kind. First, there were
compulsory levies, but, unlike Umayyad times, they now touched only the wealthy
civilians in Muslim society. Such levied troops would virtually join the army at their
own expense and thus cost the central Treasury nothing in return for their service.
As an example of this procedure, it is reported that in 143/761, when Caliph al-
Mansur heard that the Daylamites were attacking Muslim territories and killing
Muslims on a large scale, he ordered the governor of Basrah to make a list of all
those who possessed 10,000 dirhams or more and to compel them to go forth
personally to wage jihad against Daylam. The same practice was also adopted with
the people of Kufah.103 The second form of levied forces stood on the base of
subsidizing men who were willing and capable of bearing arms. But, unlike the
Umayyads, the 'Abbasids subsidized these men on a regional rather than a tribal
basis. For example, in 159/776, Caliph al-Mahdl allotted stipends for 2,000 men
from Basrah in order to take part in the military expedition against the people of
""ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 296.
l02Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 9, p. 38.
""Basawl, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 1, p. 127; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 515; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p.
86.
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Barbad, in Hind.104 Similarly, Caliph al-Mansur allotted stipends for 400 men from
the Jazlrah province who were willing to serve as a garrison force in the frontier
town of Malatyah.105 In contrast to the regular troops, however, these levied troops
were recruited for certain military assignments and therefore they would receive pay
only as long as their services were needed. In 218/ 833, Caliph al-Ma'mun is said to
have raised a levied force from among the districts (ajnad, sing.jund) of Damascus,
Hims, Urdunn, Filastln, Egypt, Qinnasrin, Jazlrah, and the people of Baghdad to act
as a garrison force in the frontier city of Tuwanah. In return, they were allotted a
monthly stipend of 100 dirhams for each cavalryman and 40 for each member of the
infantry. Yet, a few months later, after the death of al-Ma'mun, the new Caliph, al-
Mu'tasim, ordered the demolition of Tuwanah and the dismissal of these levied
forces.106
Besides the regular troops (murtazaqah) and the levied forces (furud), the 'Abbasids
also made use of many other fighting elements, who are mentioned, along with their
supporting units, in accounts of many of the 'Abbasid military operations. Among
these were the purely voluntary troops (mutatawwi'ah). al-Sam'ani defines the term
mutatawwi 'ah within its military-religious context as
,0i,Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 116; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami/, vol. 5, p. 234; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p.
140; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 228.
1h
Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 191.
""Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 631; Azdl, Tai ikh, pp. 412, 415.
Rakaii al-MuUiiri | PhD Thesis | Chapter t | Administration 242
a group who devote themselves to ghazw and d[ihad, station themselves in ribats
along the frontiers (thughur) and who go beyond the call of duty (tatowwa'u) in
ghazw and undertake this last in the land of unbelief when it is not incumbent upon
them nor is an obvious institution in their land.107
Unlike the regular troops (murtazaqah) or the levied, the mutatawwi'ah were not
enrolled in the Drwan and, hence, were not in receipt of regular allowances (arzaq,
sing, rizq) even while in service. Instead, they would come at their own expense and
the only material advantage they received in return for their service would be their
1 OX
share from the captured plunder.
As far as the available historical sources indicate, only two occurrences of the term
mutatawwi'ah are found in connection with the active Umayyad forces. The first
comes in 79/698 during the campaign against the local ruler of Zabulistan, in eastern
Afghanistan, in connection with which a small group of volunteers is mentioned,109
",7Sam'anI, Ansab, vol. 12, p. 317, (English translation quoted from Bosworth, EI 2 s.v.
"Mutatawwi'a".
"Tarra', Afikam, pp. 39, 152; MawardI, Ahkam, p. 141; Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, p. 19; Ibn al-Athir, al-
Nihayah flgharib al-hadnh, vol. 5, p. 99.
1<|l)Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 6, p. 204; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 323; Bosworth, " 'Ubaidallah b.
Abl Bakra", p. 211.
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while the second is in 98/717, during the military expedition of Yazld b. al-Muhallab
against Tabaristan and Jurjan.110
With the 'Abbasids, however, the presence of the mutatawwi 'ah become much more
frequently perceived. In the military expedition against Barbad, in India, in 159/776,
the 'Abbasid forces are mentioned as including 1,500 volunteers who were settled in
the frontier garrisons (murabitat) as well as 1,000 volunteers from the people of
Basrah.111 After the Byzantines attacked al-Hadath and destroyed its wall in
162/779, the 'Abbasids retaliated by sending al-Hasan b. Qahtabah in a summer
expedition (sa'ifah) with 30,000 regular troops (murtaziqah), besides volunteers.112
During the summer expedition of 165/782, which was commanded by al-Rashld, the
son of Caliph Mahdl, the 'Abbasid army is said to have numbered more than
100,000, made up of regular troops, volunteers, and traders.113 In 190/806, al-
Rashld, having succeeded to the Caliphate, led a military expedition against the
Byzantine stronghold of Heraclea. His army was estimated to have consisted of
""Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 532; Levy, Social Structure, p. 410; EI2, s.v. "Mutatawwi'ah". It is worth
noting that although chronicles indicate that there were a great number of mawali fighting with the
Unimayads' central armies in Khurasan and that they were not in receipt of the 'ata\ they are never
described as mutatawwi'ah. Instead, they are simply portrayed as fighters (muqatilah) who were
unlawfully deprived of their rights. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 559; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 4, p. 321.
"'Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 116-7; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 236.
"2lbn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 242; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 142; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazom, vol. 8,
p. 256. Ibn Kathlr (Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 144) estimates the number of the 'Abbasid forces at 80,000,
besides volunteers.
""'Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 153.
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135,000 regular troops, in addition to camp-followers {atbaj, volunteers, and others
who were not registered in the ZXnvan.114
Unlike earlier times when the majority of volunteers were most likely from among
poor bedouin and mcrwali, the bulk of the volunteers during the early 'Abbasid
period were from among the Arab tribesmen of Iraq, Jazirah, and Syria. As many
found themselves dismissed from the military establishment with the accession of the
'Abbasids to power and consequently the cessation of their 'ata' and rizq, these
tribesmen seem to have had no other option but to enroll as volunteers. This was the
only means of access they had to booty, which was always a very important source
of income for them. Nevertheless, although the financial motive was a prime
concern for many who joined the troops as volunteers, this should not obscure the
fact that there were many others who served on religious grounds, as the desire to
fulfil the duty ofjihad was always a significant motive for many. While fighting the
rebel forces of Khurramiyyah, one of the mutatowwi'ah, known to be a pious person,
appealed to al-Afshxn saying, "O Amir, do not deprive us of [a chance of]
martyrdom, if an opportunity for it has now come to hand! We only intended and
sought God's reward and His favour. So leave us alone until we can advance, after
receiving your permission, and it may be that God will grant us victory."115
U4Ibid., p. 320; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 278; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 34].
"Tabart, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 39; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 31 (translation quoted from Bosworth,
The History ofal- Tabari\ vol. 33, p. 63).
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Besides taking part in raids into enemy territory or fighting against heretical
movements within the Islamic Empire, the role of the mutatawwi 'ah was especially
important in defending the Islamic frontiers in Syria, Jazlrah, and elsewhere against
any retaliatory attacks that enemies might attempt. Hence, we find, for example, that
many of the garrison points (murabitat) that stretch all along the Muslim-Byzantine
border, such as those at the frontier cities of Massisah and al-Haruniyyah, were
manned by a considerable number of mutatawwi 'ah along with salaried troops.116 In
fact, when the Byzantines carried out a sudden attack on one of the Muslim frontier
cities and the men of the rabipah there desperately needed more manpower, it was
not the 'Abbasid standing army but rather the mutatawwi'ah who lived within the
same province and those nearby who took quick action and rushed to lend their
assistance.117 In another example, when the Byzantines attacked the frontier town of
Zibatrah in 223/838, killing and taking captive many of its people, it was the local
inhabitants of the frontier zones of Syria and Jazirah who first rushed forth to counter
the Byzantine assault.'18
In spite of the great enthusiasm that some of the volunteers showed on the battlefield,
there were of course some disadvantages that the army commanders had to face as a
result of having to use volunteers. The most serious of these was that these
volunteers were not amenable to military discipline and, while they arrived by
"6Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 197, 202; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 116; Ibn al-Athir, Kami/, vol. 5, p. 234;
Ibn Kathir, B'tdayah, vol. 10, p. 140.
117Jabarf, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 320; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 343.
""Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 59.
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choice, they also departed of their own volition. Such being the case, their sustained
participation could not be relied upon in lengthy campaigning or strenuous fighting
in far-flung or inhospitable terrain. During the military campaign against the rebel
forces of Babak in Adharbayjan in 222/837, many of the volunteers from Basrah,
who were under the command of Abu Dulaf al-Qasim, decided to return home after
the final assault on the Khurramiyyah stronghold of al-Badhdh was perceived by
them to be overly delayed.119
Even though sources do not discuss the organization of the volunteers within the
army structure, it can be concluded that they were separated from the regular troops
in detachments of their own, so that their potential lack of discipline would not affect
the rest of the army.120 Their role on the battlefield seems to have varied between
making the initial assault on the enemy's defences, protecting the flanks of the army
in combat, and pursuing defeated enemy forces. It is worth noting, however, that it
was the volunteers in particular rather than the regular troops who were usually
assigned to certain military tasks of a sensitive nature. One of these was single
combat (mubarazah). In early times, battles would usually commence with
individual sword-fighting between the commanders and heroes of each side. By
'Abbasid times, however, such matches were stamped out as the 'Abbasid
commanders apprehended the serious psychological consequences for the spirit of
"9Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 32; Tabari, Tirikh, vol. 9, p. 39; K. al-'Uyun, p. 386.
'""Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 37-39; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, pp. 31-3.
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the whole army if the result was not in their favour.121 However, on rare occasions
when the 'Abbasid commanders were unwillingly pushed to accept such a challenge,
they preferred to give the task to the mutatawwi'ah. During the siege of Heraclea,
for example, one of the Byzantines' heroes is reported to have persistently requested
a match against twenty of the Muslim fighters at once. In view of the humiliating
nature of this offer, Harun al-Rashld, who was in command, decided to select one of
the volunteer warriors to meet the challenge. His reasoning was, as the account
reports, that if the Byzantine fighter succeeded in killing his Muslim opponent, it
would not have as serious an impact on the spirit of the Muslim regular forces as it
would have if a hero or commander of the regular forces met the challenge and was
slain. Of course, if the volunteer succeeded in killing his Byzantine rival, it would
severely shake the confidence of the Byzantines, realizing that their hero had been
177
killed by one out of the mass of their enemy.
In addition to the volunteers, the 'Abbasid army also made use of other elements
who were not in receipt of the regular allowance and who were classified while
joining the army on a campaign as camp-followers (atba").123 These camp-
followers, who usually took part in the actual fighting, would include slaves,
freemen, as well as fellow tribesmen of some of the Arab tribal commanders such as
Ma'n b. Za'idah al-Shaybani.124 Although these three elements fell within the same
mK. al-'Uyun, pp. 343-4; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 78; al-Dimashql, Shcidhurat, vol. 1, p. 190.
'"Isfahan!, Aghani, vol. 18, pp. 251-3.
1MTabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 320; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 278; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kami!, vol.
5, p. 249.
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al-Shaybani.124 Although these three elements fell within the same category as they
joined the campaign on behalf of their patron, they differed in regard to their
financial status. While slaves had no legal right to any financial privileges including
a share from the booty, the freeman and fellow-tribesmen might sometimes be given
their expenses (nafaqat) while on campaign, as well as their legal share in the
booty.125
The 'Abbasids' search for more manpower in time of crisis was not limited to their
employment of volunteers and camp-followers in their armies but went to the
extreme of recruiting convicted criminals (ahl al-mahabis).126 Of course, not all of
these prisoners were pickpockets and civil offenders, but, in fact, the vast majority
seem to have been highly skilled fighters and were probably highway robbers and
rebel forces who were ready at this point to do anything to obtain their freedom. By
this device the 'Abbasids were able to put more fighters on the battlefield without
bearing any additional financial charges and, at the same time, to rid themselves of
these trouble-makers.
The earliest reference to such action relates to the year 139/757 when by the order of
Caliph al-Mansur, al-'Abbas b. Salih transferred many released prisoners to the
I24Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 385; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 65.
,25Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 310.
Hakan al-Mutairi { PhD Thesis | Chapter 4 ( Administration 249
newly-restored frontier town of Massisah to act as a garrison against any Byzantine
attack.'27 In 147/764, Caliph al-Mansur is said to have ordered the release of
thousands of prisoners to support the army in stopping the advance of the Khazars of
Armenia, who had crossed the Islamic frontiers after a series of victories over
'Abbasid forces.128 Similarly, to assemble an army to face the rebel forces of
Muhammad b. 'Utab in Armenia, in 214/829, the 'Abbasid commander, Khalid b.
Yazld al-Shaybani, sought the release from Iraqi jails of all those prisoners from
amongst his tribe who later joined him in his campaign.129 During the final
campaign against the Zutt in the marshlands of southern Iraq in 219/834, 'Ujayf b.
'Anbasah is said to have employed to great effect the Egyptians who had been taken
captive from the Delta during the disturbances of 214/829. According to one source,
because of the close similarity between their homeland and that of the Zutt, the
Egyptians were able to swim swiftly like fish through the swamp and attack the
ambuscades of the Zutt.130
Defending the cities that lay within the territories that were under the direct control
of the central government from rebel forces was not always the task of the regular
' '''It should be noted that the use of convicts was not an 'Abbasid innovation, since it is reported that
this practice was also made use of by the Umayyads. Thus, it is reported that the 4,000 men who
formed Sa'id b. 'Uthman's army during his campaign in Khurasan in 56/676 were troublesome
elements from Basrah who had been jailed. Likewise, it is reported that Sa'id persuaded a group of
highway robbers from the tribe of Tamim to join him on his expedition. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, pp.
305-6; Isfahan!, AghanI, vol. 22, p. 298; Shaban, Revolution, p. 38.
,27Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 387; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 196-7; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 509;
Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 308; Bosworth, " Byzantium", p. 57.
128Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 371-2; Basawi, cil-Ma'rifah, vol. 1, p. 132; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 7.
raYa*qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 464.
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troops. Instead, the central government sought sometimes to recruit some of the
local inhabitants of certain areas, especially those within close proximity to rebel
bases, for this purpose. One such case was the city of Mawsil, in Jazlrah province.
During much of the rule of the first four 'Abbasid Caliphs, the garrison point
(rabitah) in Mawsil was manned mainly by a local militia. It was about 2,000 strong,
although the force is reported to have consisted of as many as 4,000 warriors during
the campaign against the Taghlib tribe in the province in 171/787.131 These troops'
prime duty was to defend the city against the aggression of the Kharijites, though
they were on occasion used in disciplinary tax-gathering campaigns among the local
tribes.132 Although no reference is made to any regular allowance being paid to these
local militias, nonetheless they most likely received a special grant while on active
service.133 With the exception of some isolated cases, these local militia were
commanded at most times by leading members of the local community whose names
are on record.134 in spite of the relative strength of their numbers, the local militias,
equally with the central forces, were subjected to a series of defeats at the hands of
the Kharijites.135
'"'Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, vol. 3, p. 84.
131Azdi, Tarikh, pp. 177, 194, 267; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 7, p. 632; vol. 8, p. 7.
l i2AzdI, Tarikh, pp. 177, 195, 268; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 7; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 98;
Kennedy, "Central Government", p. 30.
'"Kennedy, "Central Government", p. 30.
wIbid., pp. 31-2.
"5Ibn al-Athir, Krnil, vol. 5, p. 114; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 495; Azdi, Tarikh, p. 164.
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4.4 Exchange ofCaptives
One of the ultimate outcomes of the continuous military confrontations between the
Muslims and their Byzantine neighbours was the accumulation of captives by both
sides. Interestingly enough, despite the extensive marine and land operations
between the two rivals during the Umayyad Caliphate, Muslim sources make no
mention of any significant ransom operations between the two. In fact, when
speaking of the ransom operations between Muslims and the Byzantines, al-Mas'udl
explains this phenomenon by indicating that ransom operations and exchanges of
prisoners of war in Umayyad times did not acquire an official character in the eyes of
the central governments of either side. In other words, ransom operations were often
carried out between the two at the level of the army commanders shortly after the
conclusion of battles. Likewise, whenever a number of captives became available on
either side, even if it was insignificant, direct contact would be made between the
two local authorities across the border to coordinate the exchange operation without
any kind of intervention from the central government. Such procedure used to
deprive these ransom acts of the state's official stamp of approval and, consequently,
of the national ceremonial celebrations and publicity which eventually would attract
the attention of all the subjects of the state.136
However, from the beginning of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, and despite the dramatic
decline of military operations between the Muslims and the Byzantines, the era
witnessed the organization of ransom procedures between the two, which were
l ifiMas'udi, al-Tanbih, p. 189.
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referred to by Muslim historians as afdiyah (sing. fida').ni It is worth noting,
however, that one of the distinctive features of the ransoming operations during early
'Abbasid times was that most of the captives exchanged between the two sides were
not members of the standing anny. Besides the volunteers (mutatawwi 'ah), the vast
majority were in fact civilians, who included women and children, especially from
amongst those living in the frontier towns.138 The only explanation for the paucity of
members of the standing army amongst those ransomed is that Muslims and
Byzantines alike, on most occasions after any military confrontation, would put to
death those fighters who were captured.139 The motivation for this might have been
the mutual intention to deprive the other side of the future participation of such well-
trained troops. We may add to this the assumption that such well-drilled fighters
were not much sought for in the slave markets, as it was most likely difficult to
rehabilitate them for use in domestic services. Therefore, exchanging captives
between the two sides involved a considerable number of civilians, who are referred
to in Islamic sources as sabaya (sing. sabl). Whereas some were sold as slaves, the
137Ibid., pp. 189-95; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 315, 339; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 482, 490;
Ibn al-JawzT, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 22; vol. 9, p. 163; al-Dimashql, Shadharat, vol. 1, p. 321;
Yaqut, Mu jam, vol. 1, p. 55; vol. 5, p. 8; DhahabT, Siyar, vol. 9, p. 294; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 500;
vol. 8, p. 318; vol. 9, pp. 57, 143-5; Ibn Khayyat, Taiikh, pp. 365, 395; DhahabI, al-'Ibar, vol. 1, p.
302; Ibn Taghrlbirdi, al-Nujum, vol. 2, p. 259; El Suppl., s. v. "Fida".
138Tabari, Tai-Sch, vol. 9, pp. 55, 143; Mas'udI, Tanbih, pp. 190-4; Ibn Khayyat:, Tarikh, p. 395;
Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 482.
1 *For some examples, see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 152, 339; vol. 9, p. 70. While writing of the
ransom of 231/846, al-Tabari (Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 143) relates that one of the released Muslims, whose
name was Muhammad b. 'Abdallah al-Tarsusi, was taken captive by the Byzantines 30 years
previously while taking part in a Muslim raid against the Byzantines. Al-Tabari, however, notes that
the man was not, in fact a fighter but a member of one of the foraging parties ('allafah).
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remainder were kept as captives pending forthcoming ransom operations.140 With
regard to captives of noble status, they would be kept for future exchanges of
prisoners or, on occasion, they would be repatriated as a gesture of good intent on the
part of the releasing side. 41
It seems that the first exchange of captives between the 'Abbasids and the
Byzantines took place in 139/757, in the time of Caliph al-Mansur, when the Caliph
is reported to have ransomed (fada) the Muslims who had been taken captive by the
Byzantines after the latter's successful campaign at the frontier towns of Malatyah
and Qallqala in 133/751.142 Nevertheless, this first initiative between the two
opponents remained a unique incident until the second ransom occasion followed
during the reign of al-Mahdi, which was arranged by the 'Abbasid commander al-
Naqqash al-Antakl.143 The third ransom act took place in 181/797 during the reign
of Caliph al-Rashld, this time was under the supervision of 'Ayyad b. Sinan, the
governor of the Syrian frontiers.1 The fourth happened shortly thereafter, in
189/805, and was described by Muslim historians as the greatest in scale, to the
u"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 142.
ulIbn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 342; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 321, 628.
l+2Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 236; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 119; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 74;
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 500.
"'Mas'udI, Tanbih, p. 195. Al-Naqqash might be Tsa b. Kathlr al-Naqqash. See Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh,
p. 340.
l44Mas'udI, Tanbih, p. 195; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 315.
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extent that no single Muslim captive was left in the hands of the Byzantines.145 On
this occasion, al-Qasim b. al-Rashld and Abu Sallm al-Khadim are mentioned as
those responsible for arranging the exchange of captives on behalf of the Muslims.
The number of Muslim captives released under this agreement is estimated at over
3,700, while the number of government personnel, religious figures, and common
people who attended the act exceeded 500,000.146 The third ransom operation during
the Caliphate of al-Rashld took place in 192/ 808, when the Caliph entrusted Thabit
b. Nasr b. Malik, the governor of Syria, to supervise the operation on behalf of the
Muslims. The number of Muslims who were ransomed on this occasion was 2,500
including males and females.147 The last ransom act between the Muslims and the
Byzantines during the first century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate took place in 231/846
during the reign of al-Wathiq, when the number of Muslim captives involved is
estimated to have been 4,740.148
Al-Mas'udT counts up the recognized and famous ransom operations from the
beginning of the 'Abbasid Caliphate to the year of 335/948 as 18.149 It is, not
"5l)hahabi, al-'Ibar, vol. 1, p. 302; Dimashqi, Shadharat, vol. 1, p. 321; Mas'udi, Tanblh, p. 189; Ibn
al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 189; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 318.
U6Mas'udi, Tanbh, p. 189.
U7Ibid., p. 190; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 338.
148Mas'udI, Tanblh, p. 190; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 144; Ibn Khayyat, Taiikh, p. 395; Ibn
TaghribirdI, al-Nujum, vol. 2, p. 259; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 482.
"'Mas'udi, Tanbih, pp. 189-95.
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surprising, then, if the 'Abbasids established a certain pattern in dealing with and
releasing captives.150
The camp of the prisoners during the 'Abbasid Caliphate was usually divided into
two sections: one for high-ranking persons and the other for common people.151
Before any ransom act could take place between the Muslims and the Byzantines,
delegations from both sides would be dispatched. These delegations, normally
composed of renowned religious and court personages, would discuss every detail of
the ransom, including the number of captives to be exchanged, their ages, gender,
social status, and the exact date and place for the ransom to take place.152 During
the first century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the ransoming between the two sides was
usually conducted in Western Cilicia by the River Lamos, which was the boundary
between Muslim and Byzantine territory.153 The Muslims and their captives would
stand on the east bank and the Byzantines would be on the west bank, thus allowing
better control over the process of ransoming and avoiding any possible clash between
the two armies. The ransom act was carried out in a very organized manner. Before
commencing the exchange of captives, each party would erect his own bridge over
,5"Al-Mas'udi (Tanbih, p. 195) states that in his (lost) book al-lstidhkar limajarafiSalifal-A 'sar, he
has thoroughly explained each of the ransom acts that took place between the Muslims and the
Byzantines, the attendants from both sides, the detailed procedures, the mediators from each side, as
well as the conditions and the amount spent on each act. Since this book is no longer extant, we have
relied on the available fragmentary information to be found, especially the comments of al-Tabari
while discussing the ransom that took place in 231/846, in order to put together as much information
as possible relating to the organization and procedures followed in ransom operations.
t;,lTabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 69.
1l~Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 482; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 141-2.
,:l3Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 55; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 57; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 482, 490;
Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 315; Istakhri, Masalik, p. 69.
the river for the simultaneous reciprocation of captives, so that the Muslims would
send their captives over their bridge while the Byzantines would send their Muslim
prisoners over the bridge that they had built.154 Every time the Byzantines released a
Muslim captive, the Muslims in return would release a Byzantine captive equivalent
to him in age, status, and physical condition.155 Whenever a released Muslim
reached the bank on which the Muslim receivers stood, he would invoke the name of
Allah (i.e pronounce the takblr) and the Muslim receivers would do the same. The
Byzantines followed a similar practice, but according to their own beliefs and in their
own language.156 Although the number of prisoners exchanged between the two
sides was not considerable in most of the ransoming operations, the ransom process
would often take a long time, sometimes requiring several days to complete.157
Besides the great care taken by each side to ensure that each of the pairs of captives
exchanged were physical and social equivalents, each party would also take great
care to investigate the identity of the captives they received.158 This was probably to
ensure that no intruder or enemy spy would be able to penetrate their ranks by means
of the exchange.
Finally, it should be noted that not all the captives from the Muslim side were
Muslims. In fact, on many occasions a good number of the captives were non-
U4Ya'qubI, Tirikh, vol. 2, p. 482; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 142; Ibn al-'tbri, Mukhtasar, p. 245.
'"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 142.
bid., p. 144; rbn al-'Ibri, Mukhtasar, p. 245.
,:l7For example, the ransom of 189/805 took 12 days to complete the process of exchanging the 3,700
Muslim captives, while seven days were required to exchange around 2,500 Muslim captives during
the ransom of 192/808. For more details, see al-Mas'udl, Tanbih, pp. 190-4.
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Muslim protected 'People of the Book' (Dhimmls) who lived within the Muslim
territories. Although the vast majority of these Dhimmlcaptives were Christians, the
Byzantine authority considered them as part of the Muslim society and thus always
looked on them with suspicion.159 Hence, the responsibility of freeing the Dhimmi
prisoners rested upon the Muslim authority.160 It should be noted, however, that the
Muslims in their turn did not consider the ransom of those Christian citizens as part
of the "Islamic ransom".161 Instead, they perceived their release simply as an act of
barter, as Muslims were not obligated to exchange them for prisoners of war, but for
slaves who did not belong to the same race or religion as that of the enemy.162
In the event that the number of Muslim captives in the hands of the Byzantines
exceeded that of the Byzantine captives held by the Muslims, the 'Abbasid
government would resort to the solution of buying Byzantine slaves from the slave
market in Baghdad. If the number remained insufficient, then some of the 'Abbasid
courtiers, including the Caliph himself, would on occasion donate some of the aged
RumI females serving in their palaces to be included in the ransom. That is why
1:>8TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 144.
'''There is no doubt that this attitude sprang from the fact that some of the Christian communities,
such as the Jarajimah, used to carry out intelligence activities for the Muslims.
1wTabari, Tai-jkh, vol. 9, p. 143; Mas'udi, Tanbih, p. 191.
,6lMas'udI (Tanbih, p. 191) explains this by stating, "The Rumls had more than 100 Christian
captives who were taken from the Muslim territory. They were exchanged for non-Muslim (a la/), as
the ransom cannot be made nor concluded over a Christian."
.-klxj VJ^V ftl-kdil jlT Ij) \yUi "^[1 »J
",2Mas'udi, Tanbih, p. 191.
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most of the time the Byzantine delegation insisted on the exclusion of old men and
women and juveniles from being among their released captives.163
4.5 Command and Ranks
The overall command of the Islamic armies always belonged to the Caliph, if not
actually so, then at least in theory, by virtue of his being the supreme leader (amir) of
the Muslim community not only in prayer, but also in all mundane affairs, including
warfare. With the exception of Caliph 'All, who commanded in person his forces
during the civil war battles,164 none of the orthodox nor Umayyad Caliphs is reported
to have led in person the Muslim armies while occupying the seat of the Caliphate.
This practice, however, changed during the time of the early 'Abbasid Caliphs, who
seem to have been eager to gain religious prestige for their rule. Thus, from the time
of Caliph al-Mahdl until the reign of al-Mu'tasim, it became more common to see
'Abbasid Caliphs take personal command not only of the pilgrimage expeditions, but
also of their armies during military campaigns, particularly those directed at the
Byzantine front, which, for Muslims, retained a distinct religious tinge, as being the
earliest and most convenient front for jihad}65 Hence, for example, Caliph al-
Rashld, who led in person his armies more than once against the Byzantines, is said
to have adopted a cap (qalansuwah) inscribed with the words "Warrior for the Faith,
163Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 142.
IMD!nawari, Akhbar, pp. 146, 155, 205; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, pp. 182, 187; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 506,
563.
155Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 144, 321-2, 623-5; vol. 9, p. 57; DInawari, Akhbar, pp. 390, 401;
Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, pp. 396, 428, 465, 475.
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Pilgrim" (ghazi, hajj), which he used to wear when setting out to war against the
Byzantines.166
Besides taking personal command of their armies, the early 'Abbasid Caliphs also
initiated a custom in connection with the command of their annies, that of sending
their sons, particularly their heirs apparent, to lead the military expeditions. This
time, the objective of the 'Abbasids was not so much to put a religious stamp on their
rule as it was to stress the right of their heirs apparent to the throne, and also to create
ties of allegiance between the army with its commanders and the future Caliphs.167
Oftentimes, however, the Caliphs' sons who took command of military campaigns
lacked the necessary military experience, basically because of their youthfulness.
For instance, when Caliph al-Mahdl sent his son al-Rashld to lead a major campaign
against the Byzantines in 163/780, he was no more than 15 years old.168 Therefore,
to compensate for their lack of experience and in order to guarantee the greatest
chance of success, the 'Abbasid Caliphs would review their commanders and
advisers and choose the most trustworthy and experienced in warfare to accompany
their sons.169
'"Tabari, TarM, vol. 8, p. 321.
l67Ibid., pp. 14, 16, 286, 366.
mIbid., p. 230; Kennedy, 'Abbasid Caliphate, p. 107; Bosworth, The History ofal-Tabari, vol. 30, p.
92, n. 350.
",9Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 244; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 396; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 8, p. 145;
Ibn Kathlr, Bayan, vol. 10, p. 155.
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Next to the Caliph in the chain of command came the quwwad (sing, qa'id), a term
that could be translated as 'commanders' or 'generals'. With the exception of some
isolated cases, the command of the Muslim armies throughout the early period of
Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate was almost entirely in the hands of Arab
personnel. Under the 'Abbasids, however, the ethnicity of the commanders who
served in the armies during the first century of their rule was subject to variation as a
consequence of the changing elements that composed the army during that period.
During the first half century of 'Abbasid rule, when the Arabs where the dominant
component of the army, most of the high-ranking commanders were drawn from
families of Arab origin who had previously settled in Khurasan. The circle of
command in those days also comprised some members of the 'Abbasid family as
well as some Arab tribal chiefs, who would take with them some of their tribesmen
when they joined the standing army in a campaign or when the authority gave them
absolute charge to carry out a military task such as crushing an internal rebellion.170
The distinctive role of the Arabs in army command went into eclipse in the time of
Caliph al-Ma'mun, when command of the army fell into the hands of non-Arab
personnel drawn from Khurasan and Transoxania.171 Nevertheless, it was not long
before the army command shifted again, to concentrate finally in the hands of the
Turks, who by the time of al-Mu'tasim, constituted the bulk of the 'Abbasid troops.
l7l>Ya'qubI, TarMi, vol. 2, pp. 372-3, 385, 464; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 30, 65.
17lAyalon, "Reform", p. 5; Fukuzo, 'AbbasidAutocracy, pp. 130A.
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Until the entry of Turks into the 'Abbasid military establishment, the most distinctive
feature of the 'Abbasid military command was that it passed hereditarily from fathers
to sons.172 Throughout the first half century of 'Abbasid rule, the high-ranking
command of the 'Abbasid forces was concentrated in a handful of prominent military
families whose service to the 'Abbasids could be traced back to the days of the revolt
— — 1 T\ •
in Khurasan. " In general, senior appointments in the army command were based
most often on political considerations more than on the military qualifications of
particular persons. In his Risalah to Caliph al-Mansur concerning the Khurasan!
troops, Ibn al-Muqaffa', for example, points out that there were among the lower
ranks men whose qualities and military skills were better than those of their
commanders. Because of that, Ibn al-Muqaffa' advises the Caliph that he might
consider promoting those unknown troops in rank, which would not only be
extremely beneficial for the common soldiers, but also for the commanders over
them.174
One of the most serious problems related to military command under the early
'Abbasids was the extent of authority that the commander-in-chief really had over
his army during the military campaign. Such a problem did not actually crystallize
during small-scale military campaigns, in which the role of the 'Abbasid Caliph was
usually limited to appointing one of his trusted commanders to carry out a particular
military task such as routing small military revolts in various parts of the state. Most
172Jahshiyari, Wuzara\ p. 291.
17,For some biography of these families, see Kennedy,'Abbasid Caliphate, pp. 78-85.
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often, the chosen commander, for his part, did not find a ready-made army, but had
to assemble his army by his own means. In such cases, the participating troops
would usually be made up of the commander's own relatives, mawalT, members of
his own tribe, and citizens of the region or town to which the commander
belonged.175 From this motley company, the commander would appoint all the
military and administrative officers in his army. Thus, no command problems could
occur since the commander-in-chief had, in effect from the beginning, the overall
authority relating to all the administrative and military affairs of his troops during the
campaigns.
By contrast, however, the matter was not that simple with great military campaigns,
as the organization procedures were somewhat different. Besides appointing the
commander-in-chief, the 'Abbasid Caliph would also intervene personally in
appointing the army sub-division commanders, the administrators who would
supervise and direct the financial and administrative affairs of the campaign, and,
finally, the courtiers who would accompany the army. In the midst of this mixture
of influential personages who derived their power directly from the Caliph, the
commander-in-chief would usually find himself virtually without any real authority
over the army he commanded, starting from financial and administrative matters up
to the authority to appoint or dismiss the military officers under his command.176 It
is noted that in the military campaign against the Byzantines in 159/775, the
MIbn al-Muqaffa', Risalah, p. 123.
175Ibn al-Athlr, Kami/, vol. 5, pp. 93, 116; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 7, pp. 462, 498.
17'Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 29-30.
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'Abbasid commander-in-chief had no authority whatsoever over the army's vanguard
commander, who was appointed by Caliph al-Mahdi and came to be one of the
Caliph's personal servants.17
Initially, this intervention and undermining of the authority of the commander-in-
chief was enough reason for many of the leading 'Abbasid commanders to seek,
under one pretext or another, abstention when charged by the Caliph to command an
army that comprised other prominent commanders or influential courtiers.178 In
course of time, however, the dilemma started to assume a dangerous cast. This was
not only because of the strife and jealousy between the participating commanders,
but also because of the deep dissatisfaction which began to emerge among some
commanders with respect to the Caliph himself, who would give more authority
during a military campaign to certain favoured commanders rather than to others.
Historical sources indicate, for example, that one of the reasons why the 'Abbasid
commander 'Ujayf b. 'Anbasah conspired with other commanders to assassinate
Caliph Mu'tasim during the 'Ammuriyyah campaign in 223/838, was his
dissatisfaction with the Caliph, who did not give him a free hand regarding




17'lbn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 46; K. al-'Uynn, p. 396; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 71.
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Usually, the problem of authority for the commander-in-chief would come to a very
satisfactory point in times of crisis, when the Caliph was deeply committed to
gaining victory over his enemies. Then, in order to boost the morale of his
commander, he would hand over all the military and administrative authority related
to the campaign to his commander. On occasions, this authority would include the
power of choosing the army sub-division commanders, free access to the arsenals
and Treasury, as well as the authority to determine the rate of salary to be paid to the
troops participating in the campaign.
180
Frequently, the role of the 'Abbasid Caliph, if not personally in command of his
army, wrould not end with the appointment of the military commanders and
administrators participating in the campaign, but would extend to monitoring the
progress of the campaign in all its stages. Sometimes, the Caliph would ask his
commander to report to him daily, giving full details concerning everything that was
happening on the war front.181 This, in turn, enabled the Caliph to remain in constant
touch with his army, to the extent that he would sometimes direct the march of the
army and also draw up the military procedures to be taken by his commander such as
during encampment in a hostile area.182
One aspect of the changed basis of the Muslim army in the early days of Islam and
under the Umayyad Caliphate on the one hand, and under the 'Abbasids on the other,
1<snTaban, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 405.
mIbid.p. 422; vol. 9, p. 8.
ls2Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 29; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 31.
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is the change in the way the army was organized and commanded respectively in
peacetime and war. While, under the orthodox Caliphs and in Umayyad times, the
organization had been on a tribal basis, under the early 'Abbasid Caliphate the
manner of organizing and commanding the Muslim army was completely altered.
No longer were the Muslim armies recruited, organized, and commanded according
to a tribal basis, but rather according to a geographical arrangement. From the very
beginning of their armed revolt in 129/747, the 'Abbasids organized their Khurasan!
troops according to military contingents, each of which consisted of warriors from a
group of villages in close proximity to each other or from the same town or district in
which they resided in Khurasan and other eastern provinces.184 Usually, these
military contingents were commanded by leaders of the local community from which
each contingent was raised, many of whom were pro-'Abbasid activists during the
propaganda (da'wah) period. For better control as well as to facilitate the
organization of the troops in peacetime and war, each contingent seems to have been
divided from the very beginning of 'Abbasid rule into a number of smaller units,
each of which consisted of about 1,000 men.185 Each of these smaller units was in
turn entrusted for all time to the direct command of a military leader (qa'Id), who
"°See, e.g.. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 488-9; vol. 4, p. 48; Mas'udI, Muriij, vol. 2, p. 349.
184Ya'qubi, Buldan, pp. 16-22; Akhbar, pp. 277-8, 281, 293, 330, 335, 339; Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 361;
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 355, 357, 366, 386, 463, 498; vol. 8, p. 29.
185Akhbar, pp. 337, 351; Khatlb, Tarikh, vol. 1, p. 77; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 527; vol. 8, pp. 210,
410.
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most likely had a very close attachment with his men, and a second officer (ra 'is-),
who was in charge of affairs of a non-technical military nature.186
Organizing and commanding the 'Abbasid forces according to a geographical basis
continued to be the only technique until the introduction of Central Asian troops on a
large scale in the time of Caliph al-Mu'tasim (218-227/833-842). Because most of
the Central Asian troops who served at the end of the first century of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate lacked any homeland tie, either on account of their enslavement or because
of their nomadic mode of life, the 'Abbasid authority appears to have adopted a new
technique in addition to the one already in use. While the troops with homeland ties,
such as the Khurasanls, the Faraghinah, the Ushrusanlyah, and the Ishfikhajlyah,
were organized on a geographical basis, the Central Asian troops who had no
homeland tie were organized racially (by jins) as they were indiscriminately
identified as Turks (Atrak).187 Moreover, unlike the Khurasanls, Faraghinah,
Ishtlkhajlyah, and Ushrusunlyah, who were commanded by leaders of their local
communities,188 the unrooted troops were divided into groups, each of which was
186Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 20; Lassner, Shaping, p. 213; al-'Ali, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 160.
1S7Ya'qubI, Buldan, pp. 29, 30, 32; Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, p. 148.
ISKAmong these leaders were Khaqan 'Urtuj Abu al-Fath b. Khaqan and al-Afshln b. Haydar b.
Kawus. Ya'qubi, Buldan, pp. 28-30, 32.
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entrusted for all time to a Turkish military leader, who himself lacked any
geographical tie owing to his past life as a slave.189
Although we lack any direct information describing the chain of command in the
early 'Abbasid armies and the number of troops under each rank, such information
may still be deduced from notes relating to the chain of command of the armed
vagrants (layyarun, sing. 'ayyar)m who fought alongside Caliph al-Amln in
Baghdad during the civil war and whose military organization must have been
imitative of that used by the 'Abbasid central forces at that time. According to
different sources of information, the vagrant forces were organized on a base of ten:
over every ten men was an 'arjf(p\. 'urafar), over every ten 'urafa' of 100 men was
a naqib (pi. nuqaba'), over every ten nuqaba' of 1,000 men was a qa'id (pi.
quwwad), and over every ten quwwad of 10,000 men was an amir.m
Another indication of the changed basis of command in the Muslim army in early
'Abbasid times is the absence of a deputy (khalfah) to the commander-in-chief. One
of the common military procedures during the early days of Islam and under the
Umayyad Caliphate was that, whenever the army set out to war, it was headed by a
'wAmong the Turkish commanders who lacked any homeland attachment on account of their former
enslavement were Ashnas, Aytakh, Waslf, and Sirna al-Dimashqi. Ya'qubl, Buldan, pp. 27, 29, 30,
32.
l90For more discussion on the 'ayyarun, see Elr, s.v. " 'ayyar".
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commander-in-chief, under whom the Caliph or the commander-in-chief himself
would also name a deputy, who would take charge of the army in case the
commander was killed, wounded, or dismissed.192 Without specific rules, the number
of deputies usually varied from one battle to another, depending very much on how
much the army was determined to achieve victory over the enemy at any cost. In the
decisive battle of Nahawand in 21/642, for example, the Muslim army is mentioned
to have had seven deputies, who were to succeed the commander-in-chief one by
The importance of the deputy in the army became obvious to the 'Abbasids as early
as the time of their revolt. After the sudden death of Qahtabah, the commander-in-
chief of the 'Abbasid forces in the battle of upper Fallujah in 132/750, the 'Abbasid
forces almost fell into disarray. So, in order to maintain the morale of their forces
and set right the situation, the commanders of the army had to meet immediately to
discuss the matter, before finally deciding to appoint Humayd, the son of Qahtabah,
who, according to some sources, accepted the position unwillingly.194
l9lMas'udt, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 411. This military arrangement agrees, at least approximately, with what
al-Baladhuri (.Futuh, p. 186) mentions while describing the troop settlement in the frontier town of
Malatyah. He points out that each 'arafah was composed of between ten and 15 men. Moreover,
very many passages indicate that an 'Abbasid qa'id was commonly in command of 1,000 troops, see
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 390, 527; vol. 8, pp. 441, 581-2; Akhbar, pp. 337, 351; Khatib, Tarikh, vol.
l',p. 77.
i92Tabari, TarM, vol. 3, pp. 40-1, 489, 531; vol. 5, pp. 209, 550, 596.
1BDInawari, Akhbar, p. 135; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 119; Baladhuri, Fuluh, p. 371.
194Akhbar, p. 371; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 414.
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Although the 'Abbasids realized the importance of a deputy to the commander since
that incident, there is no proof that they sought to resolve this military dilemma. To
the contrary, all historical indications are to the effect that whenever an 'Abbasid
commander-in-chief was killed on the battlefield, the whole campaign would cease
until the Caliph sent against the same enemy another army under a new commander.
195 On occasions, however, the new commander might use some of the routed
soldiers at the rear of his army just as 'padding' to increase the number of his forces
in the eyes of his enemy.196
Summary
In this chapter, dealing with the administration of the early 'Abbasid army, we have
discussed in turn the means of military communication, army supplies and
provisioning, levies, volunteers and other supernumerary troops, exchange of
captives, and finally army command and ranks.
Under the first of these topics, we have considered the use of mounted post-riders;
carrier-pigeons; fire and smoke signals; the use of drums, trumpets, and banners; and
the shooting of arrows.
The speed of the barid by means of mounted riders in early 'Abbasid times was
highly efficient in peacetime and reached an optimum peak of perfonnance in
wartime, when the authority tended to shorten the distance between the postal stages
i95Tabari, TarMi, vol. 8, pp. 29, 30, 142, 412, 416; Azdi, TarM, pp. 373-4, 391.
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and supply these stages with more mounts. Apart from transmitting messages, the
mounted barld service was also used for delivering military reinforcements much
more swiftly to the battlefield. In addition to horses, camels and mules were also
employed in the postal service, usually in accordance with the terrain and climate in
each region of the state. Carrier-pigeons were also used in transmitting messages as
early as the time of Caliph al-Rashld. They are referred to frequently in 'Abbasid
literary works, where we find information on their breeds, the methods of their
training, and the manner of their use. To transmit messages between army
commanders and their troops during marches, drums, trumpets, or banners might also
be employed. Drums, for example, were used to keep order on the march, especially
when long distances and difficult terrain separated different companies of the army,
so that when the drums ceased beating the whole army would halt on the spot.
Finally, in emergencies, when no other means of communication was possible,
arrows might be shot containing messages, perhaps from a besieged city.
Turning to the topic of army supplies and the provisioning system, we have noted the
changes that occurred to the system under the early 'Abbasids. These were
principally on account of the changes that occurred to the system of 'ata' and,
consequently, the way warriors were recruited and how they served in the Muslim
army. Unlike the early days of Islam and under the Umayyads when recipients of the
'ata' were fully responsible for provisioning themselves with necessary food and
arms when called to service, under the artizaq system of the 'Abbasids it was the
state that was responsible for provisioning the troops in time of war.
'"Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 30.
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In addition to the supplies that the 'Abbasid army would take with it when it set out
to war, it would also obtain others through two different sources: as contributions
from fellow Muslim whose towns and villages lay near the battleffont or as direct or
indirect plunder from the enemy.
The diet of the 'Abbasid troops during campaigns varied according to the phase of
the campaign itself. Thus, while the soldiers enjoined freshly cooked meat during
encampment, they would survive mainly on dried food during the march and breaks
in fighting.
Despite the elaborate system that early 'Abbasid commanders adopted during their
long military campaigns to ensure the safe and constant flow of supplies to their
troops, sometimes these supplies could be seriously interrupted for different reasons,
which caused real exhaustion and hardship for their men. As a means of
economizing and relieving their troops of some of the hardship, 'Abbasid
commanders would sometimes rid themselves of the burden of captives by putting
them to death.
Turning to the topic of levies, volunteers, and other supernumerary fighters, we have
noted that although the 'Abbasid central forces were oftentimes sufficient to carry
out any necessary military tasks within and without the state's borders, on occasions
they might need additional manpower. As a means to repair the shortage of
combatants, the 'Abbasids turned to a number of solutions, the first of which was to
raise forces by levy, which could be either compulsory in the case of wealthy people
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or voluntary when subsidizing men who were willing and capable of bearing arms.
The latter were subsidized on a regional rather than a tribal basis. Besides, the levied
forces, the 'Abbasids also employed purely voluntary troops (mutatawwi'ah), most
of whom were Arab tribesmen from the regions of Iraq, Jazlrah, and Syria, who
joined the army for religious and financial motives. Besides taking part in raids, the
military contribution of the mutatawwi'ah was most clearly seen in defending the
Islamic frontiers, especially those situated north of Jazirah and Syria. Because they
were not as amenable to discipline as the regular troops, the mutatawwi'ah were
usually kept in separate detachments in battle formation.
Among other supernumeraries mentioned in early 'Abbasid armies were camp-
followers (including slaves, freemen, and fellow tribesmen), locally recruited
militias, and even released prisoners.
Turning to the topic of exchanging captives, we have noted that exchanging captives
became much more definitely and organized under the 'Abbasids than it had been
under the Umayyads. The vast majority of persons ransomed during early 'Abbasid
times were volunteers and civilians rather than members of the standing army, most
probably because captured fighters were executed immediately after the conclusion
of battles. Generally, the ransom operations between the 'Abbasids and the
Byzantines would occur after delicate negotiations between the two sides regarding
the number, the age, the gender, and the social status of the captives to be exchanged.
Frequently these ransom operations took place across the River Lamos in Western
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Cilicia and were carried out in a very organised manner according to rules agreed
beforehand between the two parties.
Turning to army command and ranks, we have noted that unlike their predecessors,
the early 'Abbasid Caliphs on many occasions took command of their armies during
military campaigns and sometimes they would also place their sons, especially their
heirs apparent, at the head of military expeditions. Next to the Caliph in the chain of
command came the commanders (quwwad), whose racial origins during the first
century of 'Abbasid rule were as diverse as the changing elements that composed the
army during that period. Most times, senior appointments in the early 'Abbasid
armies were based on political considerations more than on military qualifications.
The actual authority of the early 'Abbasid commanders over their men during
military campaigns was often overshadowed by that of the Caliph, who would
interfere personally in appointing the army sub-commanders, the administrators, and
the courtiers who would join the campaign. Under the 'Abbasids, the Muslim armies
were no longer organized and commanded on a tribal basis, but rather according to
geographical considerations. This continued to be the prevailing method until the
large-scale introduction of Central Asian troops, who, owing to their lack of any
homeland ties, were organized racially as they were indiscriminately identified as
Turks (Atrak). The chain of command in the early 'Abbasid armies and the number
of troops under each rank most probably extended from an 'artfover ten men, naqib
over ten 'arafaqa'id over ten nuqaba', and an amir over ten quwwad of 10,000
men.
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Finally, in contrast to the early days of Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate, the
military chain of command under the 'Abbasids was marked by the absence of the
rank of the deputy (khalifah) of the commander-in-chief, who would take charge of
the army in case the commander-in-chief was killed, wounded, or dismissed. As a
consequence, it became a familiar scenario under the early 'Abbasids that whenever
the commander-in-chief was killed on the battlefield, the whole campaign would
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Introduction
The word 'mobilization' within a military context could perhaps be best translated
into Arabic as ta'biyah, which means the art of arranging the troops in the best
possible military manner, whether on parade, on the march, in camp, or on the
battlefield, to achieve the best intended results. This chapter attempts to trace the
overall characteristics of the military mobilization and fighting tactics under the early
'Abbasids. For convenience, it is divided into three sections: march and camp, field
warfare, and summer and winter raids.
5.1 March and Camp
Before the founding of Samarra' in 220/ 835, Baghdad was the main base in which
the 'Abbasid standing troops were concentrated and from which the 'Abbasid armies
launched most of their military campaigns to all parts of the state. The first procedure
in organizing military expeditions in the time of the 'Abbasids was for the Caliph to
choose the commanders who would lead the expedition. As part of the insignia of
command, each commander would be presented ('aqada) with a banner.1 As a
significant part of the mobilization of the army for a military operation, the
commander-in-chief would take care to provide his troops with all the necessary war
equipment and supplies before the day of dispatch. The time needed to complete this
task would vary from one campaign to another according to the number of the
participating troops and the destination of the army. In small-scale campaigns, the
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preparation might only take a few days before the army could set out on the march
directly from Baghdad itself. Nevertheless, in large-scale operations, which were
usually led by the Caliph or his heir apparent, the matter might take a long time,
perhaps up to two months2 and sometimes even more than seven months, as in
preparation for the campaign against the Byzantine stronghold city of 'Ammuriyyah
in 223/ 838.3 In these large expeditions, the army's mobilization ground and its point
of departure was most frequently outside the walls of Baghdad. During the early
years of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, this would take place on the site of al-Rusafah or
what used to be called 'Askar al-Mahdl, on the east bank of the Tigris at Baghdad.4
However, after the founding of al-Rusafah in 151/768, the 'Abbasids seem to have
adopted two new sites north of Baghdad on the east bank of the Tigris to be the bases
where the armies would encamp, prepare, and set out from on their way to war.
While the Bardan area, about seven parasangs north of Baghdad, was the base in
which 'Abbasid armies encamped before their departure on expeditions into the
Byzantine lands,5 the nearby area of Nahrawan, about four parasangs from Baghdad,
'jaban, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 441, 581; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 534;K. al-'Uyun, pp. 328, 332.
"Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 244; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 148; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 398.
3
For detailed discussion of the timing of the 'Ammuriyyah campaign, see Shakir, Banial- 'Abbas, vol.
2, pp. 562-3.
4Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 361; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 37; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 198; Ya'qubi,
Buldan, p. 22.
3Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 116, 148, 623; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 398; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 379. On
the location of Bardan, see Yaqut, Mu Jam, vol. 1, pp. 375-6; Ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 93;
Istakhri, Masalik, p. 87.
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was the base from which expeditions set out against eastern provinces.6
Nevertheless, after the removal of the 'Abbasid capital from Baghdad to Samarra',
the area of 'Uyun, on the western bank of the Tigris, became the new site in which
'Abbasid armies would concentrate before marching out to war.7 On many
occasions, especially important military expeditions, the 'Abbasid Caliphs would
seek the advice of astrologers on the best time for the army to depart, although the
enthusiasm of the former might sometimes lead them to simply ignore such advice.8
Before the commencement of the march, the 'Abbasid Caliph or his commander-in-
chief would review the troops.9 This was probably to check that each unit was
present in its correct strength and with its proper complement of weapons and
equipment.10 Finally, the commander-in-chief or the Caliph, if he personally led the
expedition, would order the distribution of the pay to the troops as well as hard-cash
gifts to the commanders of the army and notable people and, just at this point, the
army would be ready to march.11
6
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 315, 338, 391, 406. On the location ofNahrawan, see Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol.
5, pp. 324-7.
7
Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 475; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 56; Ibn al-Athir, KamiI, vol. 6, p. 40.
8SuyutI, Tarikh, p. 336; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 146, 407, 564; DhahabI, Siyar, vol. 10, p. 303; Ibn
al-'Ibrl, Mukhtasar, pp. 235-6.
'Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 148, 391, 407.
Tantum, "Muslim Warfare", p. 190.
Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 475; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 379.
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Sometimes, however, especially in great military expeditions and as a way to rise the
morale of their troops, the 'Abbasid Caliphs along with members of the royal family
and the high officials of the 'Abbasid court might escort (shaya'a) the army for a
distance, perhaps as far as the gate of the capital or sometimes over most of the very
long distance to the battle site. On one occasion, Caliph al-Mansur is reported to
have escorted his army, that was heading from Baghdad to Ifriqiya (in 154/771), as
far as Jerusalem.12
Because the march (masir) was a preparatory stage to actual warfare, to avoid being
surprised by the enemy, a mobilization plan (ta'biyah) would be drawn up for the
army to follow at this stage. The most common plan was to divide the army into five
main divisions: the vanguard (muqadditnah); the right flank (maymanah); the left
flank (maysarah); the centre (qalb), the commanding hub of the whole army; and,
finally, the rear (mu'akhkharah or saqah), which would contain the baggage
(athqal), provisions, siege engines, etc.13 On occasions, however, each of these main
divisions could be divided during the march into a number of smaller divisions
similar in formation to that of the general army, as happened in the attack on
'Ammuriyyah under al-Mu'tasim. In that campaign there was a distance of two
12
Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 386. For more examples, see Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 8, p. 147.
13Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 60; Tabari, Tai-jkh, vol. 7, pp. 391, 498; vol. 8, pp. 29-30; vol. 9, pp. 58,
60; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 40; Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'i', p. 158.
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parasangs between the centre and the two flanks, and each of these divisions was
itself divided in turn into right and left flanks.14
During the masir, the army would be headed by a scouting party (tall'ah). Its duty
as confined to exploring the land ahead of the army to find the best route, discover
any ambushes laid by the adversary, find out the enemy's position, size, and what
kinds of weapons or tactics it might use, and to give the first alarm of battle.15
To facilitate the march of the army along the road and ensure its arrival at the
intended destination on time, the army was also headed by groups of workmen
(fa'lah), whose function was to repair the roads, cut down trees, build bridges and
barrages over rivers, and attend to other necessary activities relating to the route to be
taken.16
Besides using drums as a means of communication between the squadrons of the
army during the march, the 'Abbasids would also use them in the course of the
^Tabari, TarHkh, vol. 9, p. 63; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 314.
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 412, 417, 463; vol. 8, pp. 38, 136, 531; HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 29.
There were two occasions when 'Abbasid commanders did not take care to send a scouting party
ahead of their armies. On both occasions the consequences were absolute defeat. Mas'udI, Muruj,
vol. 3, p. 399; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 136, 408.
lf>Tabart, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 590; vol. 8, p. 406; vol. 9, pp. 32, 43; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 29; K..
ctl-'Uyun, p. 385.
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march as a means of keeping order, as regal insignia, and as a psychological weapon,
boosting the morale of their men and, hopefully, terrifying the enemy.17
During the mas3-, should the army come upon a river, mountain slope, or defile, the
commander would by all means possible ensure that his army passed safely and in a
very organized manner to avoid any surprise attack by the enemy or confusion
among the troops. The common procedure in such situations was to avoid all the
army passing at once. Instead, a single squadron with all its cavalry and its foot-
soldiers would pass through the defile, while the next squadron following behind
would not go near the defile until it was clear that all the men in the squadron in front
had passed through and the road was clear for it to move forward. The rest of the
army would follow the same procedure.18
When the 'Abbasid army had to march through a hostile area over difficult terrain,
the commander would instruct his army to advance very slowly and cautiously.
During some stages of the war with the Khurramiyyah, the 'Abbasid army could
only creep along at a rate of four miles a day.19
The march would end with the choosing of a spot of land for the final encampment
(mu'askar). The commander would bear in mind that as far as circumstances
17
K. al- 'Uyvn, p. 332; Mas'tidi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 261; vol. 4, p. 43; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 407; vol.
9, pp. 25, 32, 34; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, pp. 20, 26, 30.
18
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 30; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 36, 38.
19
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 31, 34.
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permitted, the encampment had to be in a terrain rich in natural resources like pasture
and water.20 Physical barriers, such as valleys, rivers, and mountains, would also be
an important consideration in the selection of the camping ground. The commander
would seek to place the encampment with a mountain to the rear to act as a barrier
against any enemy attack.21 After pitching the camp, the next task would be to build
a defensive belt around it. If the encampment was only for a night (bayat) or a
couple of days, the commander would be satisfied with simply striking a protective
belt of caltrops (hasak) around the camp.22 So, should the enemy attempt an attack,
the sharp points on the caltrops would enter the hooves of the horses and the feet of
the infantry, impeding their movement.23 If the encampment was final or for an
anticipated longer period of time, the commander would order the fa 'lah to dig a
trench all around the camp.24 Sometimes, with the availability of rocks, the trench
might also be enhanced by the constructing of a wall on its outside.25 To facilitate
the movement of forces in and out of the encampment, the trench might have two or
four 'gates' (abwab, sing, bab) depending on the size of the camp and the number of
20
Ibid., vol. 7, p. 477; vol. 9, p. 63; Miskawayh, Tajarib, p. 489; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 31.
21
Taban, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 27; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, p. 26; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 31.
22
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 31; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 32.
23
Ansari, Tafrij, p. 60.
24
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, pp. 25, 28, 29; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 498; vol. 9, pp. 32-3; K. al-
'Uyun, p. 386; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 32.
"^Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 403; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 590; vol., 8, p. 464; vol. 9, p. 23; Ibn al-Athir,
Kamil, vol. 6, p. 25.
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forces.26 On one of its military campaigns, the 'Abbasid encampment was as large
as one parasang in size.27 Sometimes, because of the nature of the terrain, the army
might be divided among several camps. In this case each camp would be entrusted
to one of the sub-commanders and each would be protected by its own trench.
After digging the trench, the next task would be to guard the encampment by day and
night. During daylight hours, groups of cavalry forces (rabaya, sing, rabl'ah) would
be distributed beyond the army camp on hills and the routes that led to the camp. At
sunset, the rabaya would be withdrawn and replaced by another raiding patrol
known as a darrajah. They would be deployed all around the camp in the form of
small squadrons (karadis, sing, kardus) with a distance of a mile or a bowshot
(ramyat sahm) between one squadron and another.29 Controlling high points around
the camp as well as sounding the first alarm in case of threat was the duty of groups
of unmounted sentries best known as kuhbaniyyah30 or dayadibah,31 In addition,
other groups of unmounted guards (haras or 'asakir) would also be distributed
within the encampment as well as outside it just behind the darrajah?2 Sometimes,
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 336; vol. 8, pp. 29-30.
27
Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 406.
28
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 33.
29
Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 31, 33; Harthanu, Mukhtasar, p. 32.
30
Ibn al-Athir, Kami/, vol. 6, pp. 29, 30; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 24, 29, 46-7.
31
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 52; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 26.
32
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 31; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 32.
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in situations of high alert, the instructions would be so strict to the point that none of
the raiding patrol would be allowed to dismount from their steeds during their duty.
Moreover, they and the foot-guards behind them were not even permitted to turn and
look to another group even if they heard a loud noise. Instead, each group had to
devote its absolute attention only to what was near to it. To frighten the enemy
from afar and to expose them to the patrol if they drew near the camp, fires would be
lit at night on every side of the camp.34
5.2 Field Warfare
While the early days of Islam witnessed a rapid development in the military tactics
and formation of Muslim armies, this development seems to have reached a point of
settled equilibrium by the end of the first century A.H. Hence, a close look at the
military tactics and troop formations employed by the early 'Abbasid forces shows
that they did not very much come out of the tactical doctrine that already in use in the
time of the Umayyad Caliphate. The main reason for this was probably that the types
of enemies and weapons that the 'Abbasids dealt with were almost the same as those
the Umayyads had had to deal with before them.35 Nonetheless, the difference
between the 'Abbasids' army and that of their predecessors lay in the prime role and
33
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 33.
34
Mas'tidl, Mnruj, vol. 4, p. 45; Harthami, Mukhtasar, p. 52; Ansari, Tafrij, p. 61.
35
With the exception of the use of naphtha especially in siege warfare, the military tactics used by the
land forces remained without significant change up until the discovery of gunpowder around the sixth
century A.H. For information on the use of gunpowder, see Ahmad & Donald, Islamic Technology,
pp. 109-120;Ms.v. "Barud".
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task of the central army within each society and, consequently, the kind of military
tactics that were adopted by each side to fit that particular role.
One of the military tactics known and used by Muslims in early 'Abbasid times was
the practice of 'hit and run' (al-karr wa al-farr). This fashion of warfare dated from
the pre-Islamic period and basical ly consisted of carrying out a sudden attack against
the enemy using the full strength of the army, followed by a quick retreat. This
would be repeated until the enemy collapsed or that the attackers lost any hope of
36 « • . • .
victory. In connection with this military tactic, Arabs in the pre-Islamic period
would sometimes place their camels and goods (called al-majbudhah) behind the
army. In addition to its being used as a shelter in the retreat, the majbudhah would
also inspire the fighters to fight ferociously knowing that if they lost, their
belongings behind them would eventually fall into the hands of the enemy.37
Because of the lack of horses at the beginning and the nature of the conquest
operations later, Muslim central forces starting from the time of the Prophet up until
the end of the Umayyad Caliphate did not use this kind of fighting tactic.
Nonetheless, this method of fighting did not disappear as it continued to be used
chiefly by the Arab rebel forces as it very well suited their small numbers in face of
the large and heavy forces of the central government. In a battle with the rebel forces
36
Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 271; Ibn al-Azraq, Bada'i\ vol. 1, p. 157.
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in 77/697, the Umayyad army had to endure more than thirty hit and run attacks by
TO
the enemy.
With the accession of the 'Abbasids to power, the operations of military conquest
came to an end. The prime role of the central forces in Baghdad was to deal with and
suppress rebel movements and their forces. This led the 'Abbasids to adopt the hit
and run tactic as one of the recognized methods of combat used in mobilizing their
troops in battle, especially against stubborn, swift-moving enemies. Khurasan!
commanders of Arab origin such as Khazim b. Khuzaymah were renowned for their
expertise in the hit and run tactic. Khazim employed this tactic in his war with the
rebel forces of al-Mulabbid in 138/756 and again in 141/759 against the
*5 Q
Rawandiyyah. Moreover, in a martial comparison between the Khurasanis and the
Kharijites, Humayd b. 'Abd al-Hamld,40 a prominent commander in the time of al-
Ma'mun, stated:
One of the criticisms of the Kharijites concerns their way of
disengaging (mustadbar) from combat, and of the Khurasanis
their method of engaging (mustaqbal). The weakness of the
Khurasanis is that as soon as they come up with the enemy they
wheel round: if pursued they then take flight, and return again and
again to charge. These are reckless tactics, which may encourage
the enemy to keep on their heels. When the Kharijites break off
38
Tabari, Tarjkh, vol. 6, p. 280.
39
Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 117, 130; Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, pp. 498, 506.
40
A kinsman of Qahtabah b. Shablb. For further information about him, see Ahmad, Nasif, "Humayd
al-Ta'I," In Majalcit al-Majma' al-Vlmi al-'Iraql (31: 1980), pp. 221-5; Kennedy, 'Abbasid
Caliphate, pp. 159-60.
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an engagement; it is broken off for good: once they withdraw they
do not return to charge, unless by chance.41
Another method of combat used by Muslim armies of that time was the tactic of rows
or sufuf (sing. saff). The first use of this tactic by Muslims is associated with the
first battle fought in Islam, the battle of Badr in 2/624, during which the Prophet,
according to the Qur'anic verse (LXI, 24), introduced the tactic of dividing the army
into rows, on that occasion into three rows, one behind the other.42 This method of
fighting required that the soldiers should conduct their advance (zahf) in straight
unbroken rows as if they were in the prayer position.43 In the battle of Uhud in
3/625, however, the Prophet modified the tactic by dividing the army's rows in the
battlefield into three theoretical sections: the centre, the right flank, and the left
flank.44 Since then, this formation became the main pivot in the mobilization of the
Muslim armies in the battlefields. These three divisions of the combat formation
might be near each other or at a distance from one another, as circumstances
demanded. Each division would consist of straight rows. The number of rows
would differ from one battle to another according to the number of fighters, weapons,
Jahiz, Manaqib, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 46. (English translation quoted from Charles, The Life and Work of
Jahiz, p. 93).
42
WaqidI, Maghazi, vol. 1, pp. 67, 223; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 446.
43
Qur'an, XV, 8; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 271.
44
Ibn Hisham, Sirah, vol. 3, p. 29; Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 2, p. 39; Waqidi, Maghazi, vol. 1, p. 219.
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and the commander's plan. The number of rows could be two, three, five, or even
seven, as happened in some cases.45
The manner of organizing the fighters in these rows would also differ from one battle
to another depending on the commander's plan, the weapons available, and the
enemy's strength. In the defensive position, the first row would almost always
consist of infantrymen armed with long spears and shields, followed in the next row
by the archers, and behind them the cavalry.46 However, if the army was in the
assault position, then cavalrymen would be positioned in the first row, followed by
archers, and infantrymen in the third row.47
In addition to straight rows, Muslims later used other forms of rows. There was the
crescent row (hilali), where ranks would be curved out from the wings and in toward
the centre, thus strengthening the centre of the rankings and weakening the flanks.
To strengthening the flanks, the commander of the army would delegate for each of
the flanks a detachment of heavy cavalry as compensation for the bending in toward
the centre. 8
45
Dinawan, Akhbar, p. 173; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 12.
46
As an example of the adoption this sort of formation, we may cite the battle of Qadisiyah in 14/636.
Azdl, Futuh, p. 221; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 559; Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 122. The formation was
again used in 'Abbasid times in the battle of Zab in 132/750. Azdl, Tarikh, p. 128.
47
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 86; Dinawari, Akhbar, p. 210.
48
This sort of row was used in the battle of Yarmuk in 13/ 635. tbn al-A'tham, Futuh, vol. 1, p. 254;
WaqidI, Futuhal-Sham, vol. 1, p. 175; HarthamI, Mukhtcisar, p. 34; Ansari, Tafrg, p. 76.
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There was also the curved or the 'moustache-shaped' {qass al-sharib) row,49 where
the ranks would be curving out from the centre and in toward the wings, weakening
the centre and strengthening the wings. To enhance the centre, the commander
would position two cavalry forces in the front near the two flanks of the centre, or
put more rows in the centre rather than the flanks.50
One of the main advantages of mobilizing the army in the form of unbroken rows
(sufuf) was that this made the rankings of the army steadier and very hard for the
enemy forces to penetrate.51 On the other hand, the main criticism against it was that
if one section of the line was routed, the rest of the line would collapse and
consequently the whole formation of the army would fall into disarray.52 Because of
these practical considerations, the tactic of using unbroken rows was used primarily
when the men of the army were totally committed and ready to die before thinking to
flee the battlefield under any circumstances.53
At the battle of Yarmuk in 13/635, a fundamental change occurred in Muslim battle
array with the introduction of the Byzantine formation of squadrons (karadls, sing.
49
Ibn Sa'd, Tdbaqat, vol. 4, p. 255.
5<
Ibid.; DInawari, Akhbar, p. 173; HarthamI, Mukhtasar, p. 34.
51
Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 271.
52'
"Tabarl, Tarkh, vol. 7, p. 644; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 173.
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kardus). According to this type of formation, the whole army would be divided into
thousands. Thus, each tactical main division would be divided into karadis, each
thousand forming a kardus and acting as a separate unit within the main divisions.
Each kardus, positioned a bowshot's distance from the next, would consist of groups
of lancers, archers, and cavalrymen, led by a commander (amir kardus), himself
under the commander of the main division, who, in his turn, would be under the
authority of the commander-in-chief.54
In contrast to unbroken rows, the squadrons formation was more flexible as, if one
squadron was put to flight, it did not have much effect on the whole line, as other
squadrons would stand unaffected.55 In fact, with this type of formation it was
possible for one part of the army to be defeated while another part was victorious.56
Both tactics, unbroken rows and squadrons, continued to be used by Muslim forces
until 128/746, when Marwan b. Muhammad, the last Umayyad Caliph, abolished the
tactic of unbroken rows and adopted squadrons as the sole recognized formation for
To increase commitment in the early days of Islam and during part of the Umayyad era, the Muslim
fighters would take their families into battle, where they would place them in the rear (saqah) of the
army. Besides encouraging and rising the morale of their men, the families were also used as a strong
motive for the men not to flee from the battle, which eventually would lead their families' being
captured by the enemy. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 247.
54
Ibn al-A'tham, Fuiuh, vol. 1, p. 166; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 396-7; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 2, p.
259; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 6, p. 8.
3_TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 644.
56TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 3, pp. 400, 538; EI', s.v. "Harb".
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the central forces in battle.57 Marwan's decision, however, did not apply to his
opponents, who continued to use both tactics. During their revolt the 'Abbasid
commanders used both and, in the final decisive battle of Zab in 132/750, 'Abdallah
b. 'All, the 'Abbasid commander, is reported to have adopted the unbroken straight-
lines formation, while Marwan organized his forces according to squadrons
(,karadis).58
With the accession of the 'Abbasids to power and the evaporation of the first
enthusiasm of the revolution among their men, the 'Abbasids were compelled to
abandoned the use of rows, while their enemies did not. In 145/762, when Caliph al-
Mansur sent Tsa b. Musa to fight the 'Alid Ibrahim b. 'Abdallah, the latter was
advised to meet the enemy with his men arranged in squadron formation rather than
in unbroken rows. However, his men refused this formation, proclaiming that the
change was an unlawful innovation in Islam and that they should adhere to the same
method of fighting as that used by the Prophet.59
The actual tactics used in the battlefield would vary from one battle to another
according to circumstances. However, among the general rules for mobilizing the
army in the battlefield was the principle that each of the main divisions and smaller
57AzdI, Tarikh, p. 73; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 85; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 349; Ibn Khaldun,
Muqaddimah, p. 273.
58
Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 260; Azdl, Tarikh, pp. 127-8.
59
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 644; Ibn al-Athir, KamiI, vol. 5, p. 345; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol. 10, p.
100.
Rakav al-Midairi | PhD Thesis | Chapters | M(thilizatirm & Tactics 292
units in the army formation enjoyed a degree of independence, though the
commander-in-chief might give orders concerning the tactics of one section for the
benefit of another, or take from one section reinforcements for another.60 Each
section of the army would fight the similar section in the opposing army based on
locality. Almost always the full burden of the fighting, whether in defence or
offence, would rest upon the flanks of the army. Meanwhile, the centre of the army
would stand unmoved and its main role was to enhance the flanks by reinforcing any
side needing more manpower.61 Nevertheless, on very rare occasions, when the
army found itself in critical straits, the commander might shift the attack from the
flanks toward the centre of the enemy's formation. For example, in the battle
between the two 'Abbasid armies, those respectively of al-Ma'mun and al-Amln, in
Khurasan in 195/811, their military commanders Tahir and 'All b. 'Isa mobilized
their armies in similar fashion but according to different plans. 'All, whose troops
were too many, arranged his men into a centre and two wings, each of which
contained ten squadrons, a thousand men in each. The squadrons in each division
were arranged in a successive manner, one after another, putting a bowshot between
each. 'All instructed the commander of each squadron that when the first squadron
had fought, held out, and the battle had become too protracted for it, the next
squadron was to be moved forward, while the one that had fought was to be moved
back until its men regained their spirit, rested, and had the energy to fight again.
Meanwhile, Tahir also mobilized his army into a centre and two wings, each in the
61
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 104; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 7, p. 478; K. al-'Uyun, p. 218.
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form of squadrons. But, because his men were too few, he decided to adopt the
Kharijites' battle tactic (naj'aluha kharijiyah), which consisted basically of a single-
round fight during which either victory was achieved or a rapid retreat was made if
the enemy gained the upper hand. Seeing the two flanks of his army being pressed
very hard by the forces of 'All, Tahir decided to take the risk and concentrate his
attack upon the centre of the enemy's army rather than the flanks, knowing that if the
centre collapsed, the whole of the enemy's army would eventually follow. Tahir did
so and victory was achieved by the end of the day.62
The fighting would commence with a signal being given by the general commander.
This signal could be given by waving the banner (liwa'), beating the drums, or
exclaiming the takblr ('Allah is Great).63 On some occasions, before the fighting
commenced, the commander-in-chief would choose the highest point near the
battlefield to observe the course of the fighting. If the battle continued long on the
same ground, an arbour parish) would be erected to protect the commander-in-chief
from the heat of the sun. However, if the battle was short or in the form of raids that
each time happens in a different place, it would be sufficient to spread for him a
leather mat (nat') and position a seat (kursi) from which he could view each raid.64
To deliver his instructions to his commanders in the middle of the fighting, the
^Harthaml, Mukhtasar, p. 41; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 415-6, 433-4, 477-8, 645-6.
62
Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 399; K. al-'Uyun, p. 324; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 392, 409-11; Ibn al-
Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 373-4; Ibn al-JawzI, Muntazam, vol. 10, p. 7.
63Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 261.
commander-in-chief might sometimes employ runners (rusul, sing, rasul) who
would go back and forth between the two sides.65 Sometimes, in the middle of the
fighting, the commanders would instruct their men by using brief military call signs
(inida'at, sing, nidi') whose meanings were conventionally known to soldiers of that
time. These nida'at would include 'arms' (al-silah), meaning to get ready to fight;
'ground' (al-ard), meaning to dismount from their horses and fight on foot; and
'attack' (al-hamlah or al-nafir), meaning to launch the attack in the battlefield.66
Although the 'Abbasid standing army would fight for any cause as long as they were
paid,67 the commander might sometimes need to raise the spirit of his men and excite
their zeal to fight bravely, especially when the balance of the fighting in the
battlefield was not in his favour. Usually, this would be done by proclaiming a series
of enthusiastic slogans, which would include reminding the soldiers of their noble
history and their heroes.68 The commander-in-chief would send gifts and rewards to
his commanders to be distributed among those soldiers who fought valiantly. The
64
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 478; vol. 9, pp. 35, 40; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 104; vol. 6, p. 33.
65Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 478; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 104; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 67.
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 433, 499; vol. 8, p. 426; vol. 9, p. 24; K. al-'Uyun, p. 328.
67
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 187, 412, 419, 442; Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 418; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil,
vol. 5, p. 366.
/o
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 391-2, 434, 477; vol. 8, pp. 411, 414; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 49,
70, 374.
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soldiers who excelled might be given a purse containing money, a golden neck chain
(siwar), a golden bracelet (towq), or an increase in their pay allowance.69
During marching, camping, and fighting, the fighters would identify themselves by
standing with their leaders (<quwad, sing, qa'id) under their banners (alwiyah, sing.
liwa') and standards (rayat, sing, rayah).10 The use of these alwiyah and rayat dated
from pre-Islamic times, when each tribe and clan had its own identifying liwa' and
rayah.11 The same method of organization continued throughout the early days of
Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate, as each tribe would fight under its own distinctive
banner.72
Under the 'Abbasids the liwa' and the rayah continued to be used, but this time they
were arranged according to military contingents and not on a tribal basis.73 One of
the differences between the liwa' and the rayah was that the former would be larger
than the latter. Each commander within the 'Abbasid army's main formation would
be assigned a liwa', while each unit or regiment under his command would also have
69
Taban, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 41.
Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 410, 441.
71
Waqidi, MaghazI, vol. 3, p. 896;El2, s.v. " 'Alain".
7~lbn Sa'd, Tabaqat, vol. 4, p. 166; Waqidi, MaghazI, vol. 3, p. 1002; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 3, p. 560;
Baladhuri, Ansab, vol. 3, p. 220; idem., Futuh, p. 535.
7\abari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 441; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 390; K. al-'Uyun, p. 332; Ya'qubl,
Ttb-ikh, vol. 2, p. 440.
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its own rayah to fight under.74 Hence, the number of alwiyah and rayat would vary
in number from one battle to another depending on the number of commanders and
their soldiers. In the campaign against Babak, the 'Abbasid army was so big that it
had with it twelve large black banners in addition to around five hundred small
banners.75 While the alwiyah of the 'Abbasid army were similar, as they were black
in colour and embroidered in gold letters with slogans and phrases,76 it appears that
the rayat varied in shape and probably also in colour to facilitate the identification of
each unit on the battleground. To distinguish them from the other alwiyah and rayat,
the liwa' of the commander-in-chief and the rayah of the unit under which he stood
were the largest of all those in the army.77 In the war with the Umayyad forces, the
liwa' of the 'Abbasid general commander was so big that it needed to be fastened on
a lance 14 cubits high, while his rayah was flown on a lance 13 cubits high.7 The
vicissitudes of the liwa' had a veiy significant psychological effect on the spirit of
the soldiers. Thus, during the march or when camping, should the liwa' be seen
unfurled, rumpled, or caught up on by anything, this would be taken as boding ill and
74Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 30-1,410, 440; vol. 9, p. 66.
75
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 34.
76
Ibn Tayfur, Baghdad, p. 25; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 581-2.
77
Usually the liwa' and the rayah of the general commander would be called al-liwa' al-a'zam (the
great banner) and al-rayah al-'uzma (the great standard). Waqidi, Maghazi, vol. 1, p. 58; vol. 3, p.
996; Ibn Sa'd, Tahac/at, vol. 2, p. 14.
78'
lbn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 28; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 356; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Munlazam, vol. 7,
p. 271.
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as a sign of pending defeat.79 Therefore, every effort was made to maintain the
banners and standards in their correct horizontal and vertical positioning. It is
reported, for example, that after appointing 'Abdallah b. Tahir to lead the army
against the rebel forces of Nasr b. Shabath, Caliph al-Ma'mun ordered that all the
drying lines of the flillers along with the sunshades lying along 'Abdallah's way be
removed from the streets of Baghdad so that there should be nothing that would
impede 'Abdallah's liwa' as he went along.80 Likewise, in the war with Babak, the
'Abbasid commander, al-Afshin, used mules instead of horses to carry the army's
banners simply to prevent their tottering (taza'za') during the march.81
On the battlefield, the fall of the liwa' was considered a clear signal of defeat. The
hamil al-Iiwa' (banner-bearer) or hamil al-rayah (standard-bearer, or ensign) should
therefore be characterized by both courage and patience. In 'Abbasid times, the
mawall of the commander seem to have sought out persons of such character as those
most often entrusted with this vital and honourable task.
By the time of the 'Abbasids, battle no longer necessarily commenced with single-
handed fighting (mubarazah) between the commanders and heroes from each side.
But, on rare occasions when this did occur, the fighters from each side had to belong
79
Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 49; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 393.
80
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 581.
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to the same kind of fighting division; for example, they must both be either
cavalrymen or infantrymen.83 Usually, the first stage of the fighting would start with
intermittent bouts of attacks by one or more companies of cavalrymen from each
side.84 This would be followed by archery attacks from a distance and then the
lancers would start to make thrusts at the enemy when they came within close range.
The general melee (mujaladah) would start when the armies came very close and
would fight using axes, swords, and shields.85 On the battleground, pitfalls were
sometimes dug, sealed, and covered to act as traps. In the war with the
Khurramiyyah, 'Abbasid horsemen fell off the backs of their mounts as the forelegs
of their horses stumbled in the pitfalls.86
During the actual fighting the 'Abbasid soldiers wore items of defensive armour,
most of which were known to Muslims before this time. The main piece of armour
was the coat of mail (dir\ pi. durit), which was constructed of chain mail (zarad)
tightly twisted together and attached, front and back, to round metal plates to protect
the upper part of the fighter's body. 7 The dir' was worn by both the infantry and
82
Ibid., vol. 7, p. 414; vol. 8, p. 30.
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Isfahan!, Aghani, vol. 18, p. 251; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 590.
S4Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 433; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 69.
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Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 7, p. 589.
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DInawari, Akhbar, p. 403; Ibn al-Ath!r, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 33; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 43.
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cavalry as well as common soldiers and commanders. In association with the dir\
soldiers might wear a wide belt (mintaqah) made of leather (adam) to protect the
waist and hold the dagger or the club.89 The infantryman who wore a did, i.e the
armour-clad soldier known as a dari\ was placed in the front line, while the
infantryman without such cladding, the hasir, was placed behind.90 Offering greater
freedom in battle, some fighters might wear ajawshan, which was a light dir made to
protect only the front of the fighter's body. It seems that only skilled soldiers and
commanders would use this fonn of dir\9i To protect the skin from the metal,
soldiers would wear an undergarment (ghilalah, or shall) made of a material such as
Q-)
linen. ~ One of the common items of the armour at that time was the helmet. The
baydah, khudhah, and lamah (all meaning 'helmet') were used to cover the top of
the head.93 The mighfar9 , however, was a helmet that covered the head and all of
Dmawari, Akhbar, p. 398.
89
Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 53; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 186, 194; Jahiz, Rasa'il, vol. 1, pt. 1, p.
20; idem.. Bayan, vol. 3, p. 18.
90
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 410,
91
Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, 'Iqd, vol. 1, p. 199; Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhbar, vol. 1, pt .1, p. 131; Ibn al-
Athlr, Kami!, vol. 5, p. 374; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 465.
92
Dinawari, Ma 'anl, vol. 2, p. 1033; Ibn Sidah, Mukhassas, vol. 6, pt. 2, p. 72.
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Mas'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 411; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 590; vol. 8, p. 52.
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Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 458.
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the face except the eyes.95 To protect the head from the helmet, a short head-
covering (qalansuwah), probably made of fiir or fabric, was worn beneath it.96
Some fighters might also wear metal vambraces (sa'idan, sing, sa'id) and greaves
(.saqan, sing, saq) to add extra bodily protection to the forearms and legs.97
The military expedition would come to its final conclusion with an enemy's either
achieving victory or succumbing to defeat. In the latter case, the victorious army
would return to Baghdad, where its would be warmly received by the Caliph,
• QX •
members of the 'Abbasid household, nobles of the court, and poets. Starting form
the reign of Caliph al-Mu'tasim, a novel practice emerged in the customary
rewarding of those commanders who distinguished themselves on the battlefield. In
addition to the cash reward, the Caliph would present his victorious commanders
with a robe of honour (khal'ah)," a golden crown (ta/), double broad belts
95
Nuwayn, Nihayah, vol. 6, p. 240; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 618; vol. 7, p. 589.
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Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 52; Ahsan, Social Life, p. 30.
97
Mus'udi, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 411; Jahiz, Bayan, vol. 3, p. 18; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 291.
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Mas'udI, Muriij, vol. 4, pp. 56-8; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 55; Ibn al-Athlr, KamiI, vol. 6, p. 38; K.
al- 'Uytin, p. 388; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 474.
99
According to Hilal al-Sabl (Rusum, pp. 93-4), the khal'ah consisted of the following articles: "a
black turban of one colour ('imama musmata sawda); a robe (sawad) of a single colour having a
collar and lining; a similar robe without the collar; red khazz silk of Sus, gold-figured silk (washi
mudhahhab) and mulham stuff or single-coloured stuff of khazz\ DabTqi qaba' and a sword with a red
sheath studded with silver; a mount and a saddles" (English translation quoted from Ahsan, Social
Life, p. 60).
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(wishahiri) adorned with jewels, and a garland (ikliJ) with rubies and emeralds
within gold-filigree work.100
Meanwhile, the sort of punishment imposed on those commanders who failed in their
mission would vary according to the degree of the humiliation of their defeat and,
most important, the status of the commander within the 'Abbasid court and the
family he belonged too. The punishment could range between scolding, reducing his
annual grant, divesting him of the official 'Abbasid insignia of black, along with
confiscating his wealth and imprisonment, and finally threat of death.101
Finally, the ceremony of executing the unlucky rebel leaders who were captured in
the battlefield and brought alive to Baghdad also varied according to the degree of
the threat they had constituted to the central government. As a form of humiliation,
petty leaders of rebellions were usually brought to the streets of Baghdad to be
paraded before the public dressed in a coarse woollen coat (mudar'a'ah suf) and
mounted on camels or mules, with their faces turned to the tail.102 Meanwhile, to
show the great efforts and accomplishment of the army, really threatening rebel
100
Mas'udi, Murig, vol. 4, p. 56; Tabari, TarMi, vol. 9, p. 52; lbn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 38;
DInawari, Akhbar, p. 405; K. al-'Uyun, p. 388; Azdl, TarJkh, p. 426.
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leaders, such as Babak,'03 were presented to the public eyes dressed elegantly in a
short coat (qaba) of satin brocade and a round cap {qalansuwah) of sable fur.
Moreover, for a great display, they would also be mounted on a magnificent camel or
elephant that had been specially painted and adorned with dyestuff for this
occasion.104 However, the execution of both classes of rebel leaders followed the
same process as it would start by cutting of their hands followed by their legs and
then their heads, after which their bodies would be crucified in one of the public
places in Baghdad.105
5.3 Summer and Winter Raids (al-Sawalfwa al-Shawalfj
Among those issues that the 'Abbasids inherited from the Umayyads was the
continuation of the idea of carrying out the duty of jihad against the Byzantine
Empire. Nevertheless, the manner of the ' Abbasids' struggle with the Byzantines
was somewhat different in regard to its objective and fighting tactics from that of the
Umayyads. While the Umayyads were always ambitious to expand within Asia
Minor, to conquer Constantinople, and, if possible, to terminate the Byzantine
Empire, the 'Abbasid Caliphs followed a purely defensive policy in their dealings
103
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with the Byzantines. This is evident in the fact that the 'Abbasids' military policy
towards the Byzantines stood on two primary principles. First, they endeavoured to
strengthen the boundaries of their state with the Byzantines by constructing a series
of fortresses and fortified towns to protect their territories from the Byzantine
military raids. Second, they adopted a permanent tactical system in their fight with
the Byzantines, consisting of the launching of regular seasonal raids on the important
settlement centres located in the frontier regions of the Byzantine Empire. These
seasonal raids were of two types: summer raids (sawa'if, sing, sa'ifah) and winter
raids (shawati, sing, shatiyah).106
Of these two, the summer raids were by far the more common to be conducted by
'Abbasid forces, as we find only two examples of winter raids throughout the first
century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the first raid in 178/795 and the second in
231/846.107 Not only did the harsh climate, which characterizes Asia Minor, make
winter raids difficult,108 but, most important, they were also hampered by difficulties
in providing the beasts used by the soldiers with the necessary fodder during the raid.
This meant that whenever the Muslims had to launch a raid during the winter, they
would have to carry with them enough provisions for themselves and their beasts.109
With regard to the timing and the length of these two types of raids, Qudamah points
10&For a lull list of these seasonal raids during the first century of 'Abbasid rule, see Brooks,
"Byzantines", pp. 728-47.
107
fbn Khayyat, TarMi, p. 368; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 260; vol. 9, p. 144; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol.
5, p. 304; vol. 6, p. 88.
108
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 144; Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 368.
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out that the summer raid would usually start from the middle of July and last for 60
days. Meanwhile, the winter raid would be launched only under conditions of the
maximum necessity. During such raids Muslims would be cautious not to penetrate
deep inside the territory of the enemy and take pains to ensure that their raid would
not last more than 20 days, during which the soldiers would carry with them
sufficient provisions for themselves and their beasts. With regard to timing, the
winter raid would usually take place between the end of February and the first half of
March, in consideration of the fact that the Byzantines and their animals would be
extremely weak at this time of year.110
During the first century of their rule, the 'Abbasids showed sufficient enthusiasm to
launch these summer raids every year. Nonetheless, internal disturbances sometimes
kept them from engaging in this military practice.111
These small-scale raids were launched from the Islamic frontiers via the Taurus
Mountains into the Byzantine territories. During the early days of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate, the Pass of al-Hadath (Darb al-Hadath), located to the north of the
109
Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 193.
110
Ibid., pp. 192-3. Qudamah also notes another type of raid, called al-rabPiyyah (spring raids).
Without any reference to such military raids during the first century of 'Abbasid rule, Qudamah
explains that these raids would start in the middle of May when the horses were strong and well fed on
the spring pastures. The raid would last for 30 days, i.e. till the end of June, during which the
Muslims' horses would find sufficient fodder on the pastures of Byzantine territory, which in turn
would represent another spring season for the Muslims' horses. Following the raid, Muslims would
take rest with their horses from the middle of June till the middle of July, as the summer raiding would
then resume.
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frontier town of Mar'ash, was the pass most used by 'Abbasid forces in their raids.112
Nevertheless, with the development of the Islamic frontier strongholds in the Cilicia
region, especially that of Tarsus, the Gates of Cilicia became the pass preferred by
the 'Abbasids in launching their raids.113 This did not, however, stop the Muslims
from using other passes, such as Malatyah114 and the Qaliqala pass in the extreme
part ofAnatolia.115
Besides the small-scale summer raids, whose operations were mainly confined to the
Byzantine frontier region adjacent to that of Muslim lands, there were also large-
scale summer raids. For example, the period from 159/776 till the end of the rule of
Caliph al-Rashld in 193/809 witnessed huge summer raids that were able to penetrate
the hinterland of Asia Minor. In 159/776, the 'Abbasid forces led by al- 'Abbas b.
Muhammad managed to launch a summer raid which stormed the Byzantine territory
as far inland as Ancyra (modem Ankara).116 In 162/779, al-Hasan b. Qahtabah
launched a summer raid by which he was able to reach as far as Dorylaion
For example, the period between 140/758 and 146/764 witnessed a cessation of such raids as
Caliph al-Mansur was occupied with the affairs of the sons of'Abdallah b. al-Hasan. The same thing
happened between 191/807 and 215/830 because of the civil war and its consequences. Tabari, Tarkh,
vol. 7, p. 500; vol. 8, p. 337.
2Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 500; vol. 8, pp. 57, 150, 324; vol. 9, p. 57.
^
Ibid., vol. 8, p. 623; vol. 9, p. 58; Le Strange, Lands, pp. 133-4.
114
Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 337; Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 7, p. 500.
115
Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 8, p. 143.
116
Ibid., p. 116; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 231.
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{Adhruliyyah, modern Eski§ehir).117 Again, during the summer raid of 165/782, the
'Abbasid forces under the command of Harun the son of Caliph al-Mahdl, managed
to penetrate deep into Byzantine territory as far as the sea of Marmara in the far
west.118
Despite the cessation of the large-scale summer raids after that year, they were
resumed in 181/798 when 'Abd al-Malik b. Salih succeeded in launching a summer
raid during which he reached Ancyra."9 In the following year, 182/799, the
'Abbasid troops carried out a summer raid which succeeded in reaching Ephesus
(Afsus, modern Efes) in the west of Asia Minor.120
Although historical sources do not provide sufficient information about the number
of soldiers who took part in these summer and winter raids, it seems that the figure
did not exceed 10,000 soldiers in a single raid.121 Nevertheless, this number was
liable to great increase if the raid was led by a prominent figure like the Caliph or
one of his representatives from among the senior commanders of the army. During
the summer raid under the command of al-Hasan b. Qahtabah in 162/779, the
117
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 142; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 242.
'^Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 396; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 248; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 152-
3.
119
Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 286; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 314.
120
Azdl, Tarikh, p. 294; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 269; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 317.
121
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 323; vol. 9, p. 145.
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participants numbered 30,000 regular soldiers, besides volunteers.122 In the summer
expedition of 165/782, the 'Abbasid forces, under the command of al-Rashld,
numbered more than 95,000 men.123 In 191/807, Harthamah b. A'yan led the
summer raid with 30,000 men from among the Khurasan! troops.124
As to the objectives of these summer and winter raids, it is evident that they were not
intended to expand the territory of the Islamic State at the expense of the Byzantine
front, which very much remained without any significant change since the 'Abbasids
had inherited the Islamic State from the Umayyads.125
It seems, though, that these raids successfully accomplished other objectives. The
most important of these was their defensive effect, as they helped to protect the
Islamic territories by destroying the Byzantine frontier bases and consequently
establishing a neutral land (no man's land) that would separate the Byzantine lands
from those of the Muslims.126 Moreover, the 'Abbasid Caliphs sought by launching
these seasonal attacks to enhance their political prestige in the eyes of their subjects.
One of the means of doing this was to affirm the religious character of the 'Abbasid
122
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 152. Meanwhile, with exaggeration Ibn al-Athir (KamiI, vol. 5, p. 242)
gives the number as 80,000 regular troops, besides volunteers.
123
Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 248; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 152.
124
Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 323; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 348.
125
It is obvious that the 'Abbasids did not try to establish any bases beyond the Taurus Mountains in
Asia Minor. Even though fortress towns such as Heraclea, Lulu'ah, and 'Ammuriyyah would fall into
the hands of the 'Abbasids, they did not seek to settle and permanently establish a foothold there.
Instead, the only thing they would do was to raze them before their retreat homewards. Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 320-2, 628; vol. 9, pp. 65-70.
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Caliphate and to assert that its Caliphs would be committed, like the earlier Muslim
rulers, to pursuing the jihad against the Byzantines, the traditional enemy of the
Muslims. Because of the importance attached to these campaigns, we find that
historians, such as al-Tabarf, list the names of the leaders who carried out these
summer raids side by side with the names of the leaders of the pilgrimage
campaigns.127
Finally, in addition to the fact that the summer and winter raids did not cost the
central government's Treasury very much, they represented a good opportunity for
the soldiers to gain military experience and to win some plunder. Moreover, these
raids also presented a good opportunity for the central government to keep the
soldiers busy and so restrain them from committing any disturbances or indulging in
acts of violence if they had nothing else to do.
Summary
hi this chapter we have discussed in turn the mobilization and tactics employed by
the early 'Abbasid armies in marching, camping, field fighting, as well as in summer
and winter raiding. The main findings of this chapter may be outlined as follows.
The first step in the preparation for a military campaign in the time of the 'Abbasids
was for the Caliph to select the commanders who would lead the troops and, as part
126
Shakir, Bcinial-'Abbas, vol. 2, p. 300.
127
Tabari, TarM, vol. 7, p. 460; vol. 8, pp. 27-8, 41,44, 50, 53, 153, 165, 234-6, 313, 322, 624.
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of the insignia of command, each commander would be presented with a banner.
One of the main responsibilities of the commander-in-chief before setting out to war
was to make the necessary arrangements in providing his army with all the fighting
equipment and supplies that would be needed. The time required to accomplish this
would vary from one campaign to another depending on the number of troops and
the destination of the army.
The site of the assembly ground where the 'Abbasid army would encamp and
prepare, and from which it would set out to war changed during the first century of
the 'Abbasid rule as a consequence of the development of the 'Abbasids' capitals.
After the founding of al-Rusafah in 151/768, the 'Abbasids adopted two new
assembly grounds- al-Bardan and Nahrawan- both on the east bank of the Tigris near
Baghdad. Nevertheless, with the shift of the capital to Samarra', the area of 'Uyun,
on the west bank of the Tigris, became the new assembly site for the 'Abbasid
armies before setting out to war.
As a means of raising the morale of their troops heading out to war, the 'Abbasid
Caliphs would usually escort (shaya'a) the army some distance on the first leg of its
journey.
The most common military formation of the army on the march was for it to be
divided into five main divisions, each of which could sometimes in turn be divided
into a number of smaller divisions similar in formation to that of the general army.
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During the march (masir) the army would be headed by a scouting party (palPah),
part of whose duty was to explore the land ahead of the army and give the first alarm
of battle. The army would also be headed by groups of workmen (fa'lah), who
facilitated the march of the army by carrying out any necessary road repairs ahead of
its progress. When faced in a hostile area by a river, mountain slope, defile, or other
natural obstacles, 'Abbasid commanders took extreme caution to ensure the safe
passage of the army by allowing only a single squadron to pass through the natural
barrier entirely and safely before the next squadron could follow.
The site of the army's camp was usually chosen with a view to sustenance and
defence, thus taking into account, on the one hand, the availability of water resources
and pasture lands, and, on the other hand, natural barriers such as rivers and
mountains. As additional defence measures, man-made defences, such as belts of
caltrops, trenches, and walls, might also be put in place depending on the length of
time to be spent in the camp. Guards would also be stationed around the army camp
by day and night and sometimes, in situations of high alert, strict measures were
taken to ensure the guard was effective at all times.
In the realm of field warfare, fighting methods employed by the early 'Abbasid
armies were the same as those known to Muslims before that time. Among these
tactics were 'hit and run', the 'row' (saff), and the old Byzantine formation of
'squadrons' (karadls).
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Fighting usually commenced on a signal from the commander given by waving a
banner, beating the drums, or exclaiming the takblr. Thereafter, the commander
would take up a position from which to view the battle and issue further commands.
During marching, camping, and fighting, the fighters would identify themselves by
standing with their leaders under their banners (alwiyah) and standards (rayat). In
contrast to the early days of Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate, the banners and
standards in 'Abbasid armies were arranged according to military contingents and
not on a tribal basis.
With the 'Abbasids, battle no longer commenced with single-handed combat
between heroes from each side, but most often with intermittent bouts of attacks by
one or more companies of cavalrymen from each side. This would be followed by
archery attacks from a distance and then the lancers would start to make thrusts at the
enemy when they came within close range. The armour of the 'Abbasid soldiers
included the coat of mail (dir') or lighter jawshan, the wide belt to protect the waist
and hold weapons, the helmet, vambraces, and greaves.
While the Caliph would bestow rich rewards on his victorious commanders,
commanders who failed in their missions were punished according to the degree of
military humiliation suffered. Unlucky rebel leaders suffered worse humiliation and
public execution.
In pursuing the jihad against the Byzantine Empire, the 'Abbasids not only sought to
defend Muslim territory by constructing fortified positions along the northern
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frontiers of their state, but also engaged in regular summer raids into Byzantine
territory and also, on occasions, winter raids. The purpose of these seasonal raids,
the extent of which ranged from border skirmishes to raids deep within Byzantine
territory, was not to expand Muslim territory. Instead, they aimed to protect Muslim
lands, to enhance the Caliph's prestige in the eyes of his subjects, and to keep the
soldiers busy and so restrain them from committing any disturbances or indulging in
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Introduction
This chapter provides details about Muslim sea warfare under the early 'Abbasids. It
is divided into two parts. The first, which in aim is divided into two sections, deals
with the 'Abbasids' naval power, first, in the Mediterranean and, second, in the
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, reviewing the procedures that early 'Abbasid
Caliphs adopted to encounter the naval challenges of their enemies in these two
maritime regions. The second part provides a description of the 'Abbasids' naval
organization. For convenience, this part is divided into three sections, dealing
respectively with dockyard and naval bases, warships and naval tactics, and, finally,
the crew of the warship and the responsibilities of the commander of the fleet.
6.1 'Abbasid Naval Power
6.1.1 'Abbasid Naval Power in the Mediterranean
The period of the Umayyad Caliphate had been an era during which the Muslims had
mastered the art of maritime warfare and learnt how to navigate the seas. It was
under Mu'awiyah, first as governor of Syria and then as Caliph, that the Muslims
captured some of the most important islands of the eastern Mediterranean, including
Cyprus in 28/648, Aradus (Arwad) in 54/674, and Rhodes in 58/678.' Also during
the Umayyad Caliphate, Muslim fleets had frequently raided Sicily, Crete, and the
1Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 4, p. 260; vol. 5, p. 293; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 180, 279; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol.
2, p. 489; vol. 3, p. 344.
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Straits of Bosphorus {Madiq al-Qustantmiyyah)? This supremacy in the
Mediterranean ended, however, with the coming of the 'Abbasids to power.
Unlike the Umayyads, the 'Abbasid Caliphs looked to the sea, particularly all along
the Mediterranean seacoast, as the border at which they should stand to protect their
territories and not as an expanse into which the Muslim state could penetrate and
Muslim international commerce could extend. Evidences of the reduction of Muslim
naval power in the Mediterranean in early 'Abbasid times are numerous. The first
clear indication was the spread of fortified coastal towns not only in Syria but also all
along the Ifrfqiya seaboard as a means of defending Muslim territory against the
persisting Byzantine naval attacks.3 Furthermore, the serious threat that the
Byzantine fleet constituted toward the Islamic shores reached such a pitch that
Caliph al-Rashld abandoned the idea of connecting the Red Sea with the
Mediterranean by means of a canal. As Ja'far b. Yahya al-Barmakl pointed out, such
a canal would only facilitate the access of the Byzantine fleet to that part of the Red
Sea coast adjacent to the Hijaz and thus the inhabitants of the holy places of Makkah
and Madlnah would become vulnerable to attack.4 This story reflects the historic
fact that while the 'Abbasid naval power was waning, the Byzantines' power at sea
was increasing to such strength that they were able to impose their full domination
Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, pp.123, 226; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 293, 304; vol. 6, p. 530 ; Ya'qubl,
Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 195; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 279; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 3, p. 344; vol. 4, p. 304.
Tbn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 300; Ibn Khaldun, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 417; Muhammad "Nash'at al-
Arbitah", p. 41; Salim, at-Bahr'tyyah al-Islamiyyah, p. 40.
'Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. p. 264; SuyutI, Tarikh al-Khulafa', p. 286.
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over all the Mediterranean basin. Islamic sources note, for example, that the
Byzantine fleet based in Sicily and Sardinia used to sail along the coast of Tunisia
waiting to plunder Muslim trading vessels.5
It should, however, be noted that despite the 'Abbasids' general disinterest toward
the Mediterranean and the further development of Muslim naval power, this did not
mean that there was no 'Abbasid fleet based in Syria and Egypt, neither did it mean
that there were no serious naval confrontations between these 'Abbasid fleets and
those of the Byzantines. Yet, the most noticeable thing about these 'Abbasid naval
operations is that their standard and the victories they achieved did not rank as high
as those achieved by the land forces. Furthermore, most of these naval operations
were actually imposed on the 'Abbasids and were the result of necessity rather than
their own initiative. In 136/754, the first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, had no
means other than a military solution to regain power over the Maghrib, which had
announced its separation under the leadership of 'Abd al-Rahman b. Habib al-Fahri,
who had gained power over most of that region between 127/745 and 131/749.6 The
military expedition was supposed to be of terrestrial and naval components. The
leadership of the terrestrial army was given to Abu 'Awn 'Abd al-Malik b. Yazid
and 'Amir b. Isma'il, whereas the naval one was handed to al-Muthanna b. Ziyad al-
Khath'ami. The latter reached Alexandria in the month of Shawwal in 136/754 to
5Ibn al-Athir, Kami/, vol. 5, p. 97.
(>He was finally killed in 138/756. Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 328.
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prepare to sail towards Tarabulus al-Gharb, but at the last moment the plan was
cancelled because of the sudden death of Abu al-'Abbas.7
The second Caliph, al-Mansur, who internally, had to face many serious political,
economic, and administrative challenges during the early years of his rule, did not
show any enthusiasm for completing the above-mentioned plan. Nevertheless, he did
exert some effort to fortify the Syrian coast, which was vulnerable to the raids of
Byzantine fleets. In 140/758, the Byzantine fleet based in Cyprus managed to launch
an attack on the Syrian shores, destroying and burning the towns of Ladhiqiyah and
Tarabulus al-Sham.s Although details of this raid are not covered by the historical
sources, it seems that this incident was the reason for Caliph al-Mansur's
undertaking a tour of Syria and Jerusalem to take a close look at the fortification
situation of the Syrian coastal cities. During this tour he took some measures to
enhance and protect the coastal cities. The first of these was the decision to depose
Yunus b. al-Layth al-'Abs! from his post as admiral of the Syrian coastal region
(Amir Bahr al-Sham) and to appoint al-'Abbas b. Sufyan al-Khath'aml in his place.9
Al-Mansur is also reported to have transferred some groups of Banu Tanukh from
their homelands in northern Syria to Lebanon. The aim of this was to use them to
protect the coastal highway, which for some time had been subject to disturbance and
7KindI, Wulat, pp. 123-4; Ibn Taghribirdl, al-Nujum al-Zahirah, vol. 1, p. 331.
Tbn 'Asakir, Tai-ikh, vol. 34, pp. 402-3.
"ibid., vol. 48, p. 85.
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attacks by rebels from among the Nabataeans10 of Mount Lebanon, as well as against
the Byzantines coming by sea.11 In his journey from Jerusalem to al-Raqqah in al-
Jazlrah, al-Mansur is also said to have inspected the Syrian coastal towns and
fortresses, where he gave orders for fortification and of any necessary restoration
works to be carried out in these places.12 The same fortification policy also included
the frontier cities, so that, for example, al-Mansur ordered the building of the town of
al-MassIsah in 140/758.13
The defensive system maintained on the eastern coastline of the Islamic State during
the early period of the 'Abbasid Caliphate continued to apply the same practices used
by the Umayyads. This meant that servicemen (ajnad) from inland towns and
regions would come and station themselves in the coastal towns during the
summertime and in the winter would return to their inland areas, leaving behind a
small number of garrisoned troops (murabituri).H The adoption and continual use of
this form of defensive system made the Islamic coastland vulnerable to the sudden
attacks of the Byzantine fleets. The petition presented to Caliph al-Mansur by the
"'"NabatI (originally referring to the Aramaic-speaking indigenous populations of Syria and Iraq) was
a term of opprobrium in early Islam." Bosworth, The History ofal- TabcnT, vol. 32, p. 100, n. 318.
1 'Shidyaq, Kitab al-Akhbar, vol. 1, p. 217; vol. 2, pp. 495-6; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 192; Hitti, History
ofSyria, p. 545.
l3Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 193.
' Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 7, p. 509; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami], vol. 5, p. 500; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 195. Al-
Masslsah is situated on the west bank of the Jayhan, about 20 km. north of the Mediterranean coast.
Yaqtit, Mu'jam, vol. 5, pp. 144-5; El2, s.v. "Masslsa".
"Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 196-7.
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great Imam al-Awza'i (d. 159/775),15 who is reported to have been among those
enlisted in the Diwan of the Syrian coast and who devoted himself to ghazw and
ribat there, explains the critical circumstances of these Syrian coastal towns. In his
petition, al-Awza'I first stresses the vital role that these murabitun played in these
coastal areas and the harsh conditions under which they performed their guard duties
whether in the heat of summer or the long, chilly nights of the winter. By contrast,
their colleagues living in the inland towns enjoyed a more comfortable and peaceful
life. In his petition al-Awza'i further stressed the need for the Caliph to raise the
annual salary of these murabitun from ten dinars to 15, so that they could cope with
the high cost of living. The petition also contained a request to the Caliph to speed
up the payment of their overdue salaries, since the year had ended without their
receiving anything. According to al-Awza'i, the delay of their salaries had a very
deep impact in causing the deterioration of their living standard as well as that their
families.16
Whether these demands were fulfilled or not is still unclear. However, it seems that
the letter had a pronounced impact on the policy of al-Mansur, especially towards the
seacoast areas. As mentioned earlier, he commenced a tribal rehabilitation
programme in Syria, following in this the example of Mu'awiyah, who had
'
tic is 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Umar al-Awza'i, one of the renowned religious scholars in Syria of that
time. Among the books he composed were: Kilab al-Sunanfial-Fiqh and Kitah al-Mcisa'i!fial-Fiqh.
Ibn al-Nadlm, Fihrist, p. 318; Basawl, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 2, p. 408.
"'This important letter seems only to be found in Ibn AbT Hatim al-Razi, Kilab al-Jarh, vol. 1, pp.
193-5.
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transplanted Persian colonists from Baiabakk, Hims, and Antakiya to the Syrian
seacoast towns, of Sur and 'Akka a century before.17
The years 142-164/760-764 witnessed disturbances in the Syrian coastland and
particularly the part neighbouring Lebanon. This was the result of a widespread
rebellion led by the Nabat and other groups inhabiting Mount Lebanon against the
'Abbasid authority and its harsh taxation policy in the region.18 During this period,
the rebels, led by a youthful mountaineer called Bandar, an inhabitant of the town of
al-Munaytlrah, were able to impose their control over a wide sector in Mount
Lebanon and to seriously threaten the stability of the coastal areas. It was not long,
however, before Salih b. 'All, the 'Abbasid governor of Syria and Egypt, was able to
suppress the rebel forces and, having achieved this, he decided to drive out the
Nabataeans from their villages in the mountains and to disperse them all over the
Levantine lands.19
Following their success in suppressing the rebel movement in Lebanon, the
'Abbasids had to turn toward the people of Cyprus, who supported the Byzantines in
their naval raids against the Syrian coastal towns of Ladhiqiyah and Tarabulus in
140/758. This seems to have been the reason why the Syrian fleet, under the
command of al-'Abbas b. Sufyan al-Khath'aml, launched a raid against the island of
17Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 140; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 88.
lsIbn 'Asakir, TarJkh, vol. 18, p. 267; Manbaji, al-'Unwan al-Mukallal, vol. 2, pp. 377-8; Baladhurl,
Futuh, p. 192; Hitti, Lebanon, p. 268.
r'lbn 'Asakir, Tarikh, vol. 18, pp. 267-8; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 193.
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Cyprus in 146/763. According to the Syrian historian Ibn 'Asakir, this was the first
Muslim naval expedition against the island since the establishment of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate.20
The raid on Cyprus was followed by a decade of silence, during which the Islamic
sources do not mention any activities by the 'Abbasid naval forces in the
Mediterranean until 175/773. In that year, the Syrian fleet is reported to have
launched an attack on the southern coast of Asia Minor. This attack seems to have
been part of a combined land and maritime military operation against the Byzantines
during the last days of Caliph al-Mansur. The military operation was under the
leadership of Thumamah b. al-Walld al-'Absx,21 who at first attempted to penetrate
deeply northwards into the Byzantine Cappadocia region. But it was not long before
the Byzantines' land forces, supported by their navy, were able to cut off the line of
retreat of Thumamah's army by capturing the town of Syce and consequently
circumscribing Thumamah's army and depriving it of any contact with the Syrian
fleet. Although Thumamah's army managed to escape the circumscription, the
terrestrial campaign ended in failure. Nevertheless, the Byzantine sources record the
news of the victory of the 'Abbasid Syrian fleet in its raid against Cyprus and the
capture of its Byzantine ruler.22
^'ibn 'Asakir, Tarikh, vol. 34, p. 340.
''He is known in the Byzantine sources as Thumamah b. al-Waqqas or pavatcou;. Brooks, "Byzantines
and Arabs", pp. 734-5.
22Archibald, Naval Power, p. 100; Brooks, "Relation", p. 384; idem., "Byzantines and Arabs", p. 735.
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The straggle between Caliph al-Mansur and Constantine V, the Byzantine Emperor,
ended with the decease of both leaders in the same year. However, the war between
the Caliphate and the Empire was not over. During the reign of Caliph al-Mahdi
(158-169/775-786), Muslims resumed their naval raids via the Syrian naval bases.
According to Islamic sources, there were two consecutive naval expeditions in
160/778 and 161/779, both under the command of the Syrian Admiral, al-Ghumar b.
'Abbas al-Khath'aml. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide any clue of either
the direction or the outcome of these two operations.23
The naval confrontation between the Byzantines and the 'Abbasids intensified in the
time of Caliph al-Rashid. According to al-Baladhuri, al-Rashld showed considerable
concern for naval affairs as well as for the fortification of Islamic coastal towns.24 It
seems though that the initiative in naval attacks in the time of al-Rashld was not
taken by the 'Abbasids but rather by the Byzantines, whose strategy at the time
consisted of closely monitoring the Islamic coasts and carrying out sudden attacks on
them. In 174/790, the Byzantine fleet succeeded in capturing some 'Abbasid ships
sailing from Egypt to Syria.25 This incident was an incentive for the 'Abbasid fleet
based in Syria to launch in the same year raids against both Crete and Cyprus. These
raids were apparently the reason prompting the Byzantine Empress, Irene I, to send a
2iTabarI, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 129, 140.
24Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 193.
2lBrooks, "Relation", p. 385.
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large salvation fleet to Cyprus, yet this fleet was defeated in a sea battle with the
• , , 26
Muslims in the bay of Attalia, in which also its admiral Was captured."
The Muslims had to maintain a keen watch on Cyprus and its people, whose
incessant alliance with the Byzantines constituted a persistent hazard for the security
of the Levantine coastlands. It was because of this that, after the last raid against the
island, 'Abd al-Malik b. Salih, the governor of the frontiers (al-thughur), considered
revoking the old agreement concluded between the Muslims and the people of
27
Cyprus in the time of the Umayyad Caliph Mu'awiyah." He also considered the
option of evacuating the island of its Christian Cypriots and transplanting there a
Muslim population instead. However, before proceeding with his plan, 'Abd al-
Malik wanted the backing of a juristic ruling (fatwa) to uphold the Tightness of his
measures under the excuse that the Cypriots never fulfilled their pledges toward
Muslims. Among the Muslim jurists consulted on this issue were Isma'Il b. 'Ayyash,
al-Layth b. Sa'd, Malik b. Anas, and Sufyan b. 'Uyaynah, but out of all those jurists
and more, not one of them approved the proposed measures of 'Abd al-Malik and the
2© .
idea of breaking off the agreement between the two sides." Despite this restraint of
the Muslims towards the people of Cyprus, the latter continued their collusion with
''
Archibald, Naval Power, p. 102.
"Since the days of Mu'awiyah, the people of Cyprus used to pay tributes to both the Muslims and the
Byzantines. In the time of Caliph 'Abd al-Malik, the Umayyad authority decided to raise the tribute
of Cyprus by 1,000 dinars above what originally was demanded. This increase was, however,
eliminated by the Umayyad Caliph, 'Umar. Nevertheless, Caliph Hisham reimposed the 1,000 dinars
increase, which continued to be paid by the people of Cyprus until 146/763, when Caliph al-Mansur
finally abolished the increase and decided to deal with the Cypriots according to Mu'awiyah's
agreement by which the people of the island would pay only 7,200 dinars. Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 183.
28Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 183-6; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 360; Tabari, TarMi, vol. 4, p. 262.
Rakan al-Mutairi ( PhD Thesis | Chapter 6 [ 'Abbasid Sea Warfare 324
the Byzantines, who used the island as a base for their raids against the Syrian coast.
During his great campaign against the Byzantines in 190/806, Caliph al-Rashld
became aware of the seriousness of this co-operation. According to al-Tabari, the
Caliph responded by giving charge of the Levantine coastlands as far as Egypt in the
south to Humayd b. Ma'yaf al-Hamadanl.29 Thus, while al-Rashld's land army was
advancing into the Byzantine lands as far as Heraclea, Humayd was conducting a
naval raid on Cyprus, where he razed buildings and enslaved 16,000 of its people,
whom he dispatched to Rafiqah. There, the judge Abu al-Bakhtari is reported to
have taken charge of selling the captives and it is stated that the bishop of Cyprus
was sold for 2,000 dinars,,30
Form Cyprus Humayd continued his naval expedition by attacking Crete and
conquering some parts of it.31 Meanwhile, land forces under the command of Caliph
al-Rashid were able to take over Heraclea and to force the Byzantine Emperor,
Nicephorus, to pay tribute (jizyah).32 In 191/807, the Syrian fleet also launched a
raid against the Byzantine territories in the Mediterranean, this time against Rhodes,
^Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 320; see also Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 342.
'^Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 320, 322; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 43; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p.
153; lbn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 342. According to al-Baladhuri (Futuh, p. 183), Caliph al-Rashid
ordered the return of the captives in 191/807.
"Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 279.
,2Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 279.
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from where, as Islamic sources record, the Muslim fleet returned safely laden with
booty and captives.33
A long period elapsed after this expedition without any naval actions being recorded
of the 'Abbasids, but the time of Caliph al-Ma'mun witnessed the first meaningful
victory of the Muslims over the Byzantines since the establishment of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate. Two of the three major Byzantine islands in the Mediterranean, namely
Crete and Sicily, became the property of the Muslims. The winning of these islands,
however, was neither through the effort of the central government in Baghdad nor
through that of its fleets. Instead, it was by the efforts of independent African and
Spanish (Andalusian) Muslim forces who were working outside the realm of the
'Abbasid authority and policies in Baghdad. It is worth noting, however, that if the
loss to the Byzantines of these islands meant the end of their supremacy in the
Mediterranean basin, which had lasted undeniably for three quarters of a century
following their naval victory over the Umayyads in Cyprus in 129/747, the 'Abbasid
Caliphs in Baghdad were clearly not the beneficiaries of this victory. Instead, it was
the new dynasties in north Africa such as the Tulunids in Egypt, the Aghlabids in
Tunisia, and the Idrlsids in Maghrib who were the sole beneficiaries.
"Baladhuri, Fuluh, p. 278; Archibald, Naval Power, p. 104.
6.1.2 'Abbasid Naval Power in the Persian Gulf (Bahr al-Basrah) and the
Indian Ocean
Information regarding 'Abbasid naval activities and the trading traffic throughout the
Persian Gulf as far as India, East Africa, and China during the early 'Abbasid
Caliphate is in general scarce. Nevertheless, the small fragments of infonnation that
some historic sources do contain, especially those found in the History ofKhalifah b.
al-Khayyat al-Basrl (d. 240/855) are of vital importance. The first fact that these
fragmentary reports reveal is the general weakness of the 'Abbasid fleet in the
Persian Gulf {Bahr al-Basrah) during the early years of the 'Abbasid Caliphate.
Most of the time it stood unable to repel the audacious piratic raids which were not
confined to attacking trading ships but also put in jeopardy major cities such as
Basrah and Jeddah on the Red Sea coast. Such events were of noticeable recurrence,
especially between the years 141/759 and 153/770, during the reign of al-Mansur.
Piracy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean at that time was closely connected to
a people known as the "Mayd".
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According to Islamic historical and geographical sources, the Mayd people were
from the region of Sind and their concentration was on the town of Sarrast.34 The
first indication of piratic activities in the Persian Gulf during the 'Abbasid era comes
from as early as 141/759. Ibn Khayyat reports that in that year Caliph al-Mansur
appointed Muhammad b. Ab! 'Uyaynah b. al-Muhallab as head of the admiralty
(Imarat al-Bahr) in the Persian Gulf. So, the latter chose the island of Qays35 as his
headquarters. It was not long, however, before his forces engaged with the Mayd in
a naval battle, which resulted in the death of his son and compulsion to evacuate the
island, which was then taken and laid waste by the Mayd.36 It seems that the absence
of any genuinely effective 'Abbasid naval forces at that time soon encouraged the
Mayd to carry their piratic raids even as far as the mouth of the Tigris. It is reported
"'Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 539, 544-5; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 320; Istakhn, Masalik, p. 176; Ibn Khayyat,
TarJkh, p. 395. Al-Mas'udT (al-Tanb]h, p. 49 and Muruj, vol. 2, p. 20) says about the Mayd: "Near
the river of Mahran [in Sind] is a race of people [/7/is] known as the Mayd. Their numbers are
abundant and they are at enmity with the people of Mansurah [the military and administrative capital
of the Muslims in Sind]. They have warships (bawarij) that they use to make piratic attacks on the
Muslims' ships sailing to the lands of India, China, Jeddah, and elsewhere. Their ships resemble the
galleys (shawani) used in the Mediterranean." In another place al-Mas'udl (Muruj, vol. 1, p. 168)
describes the Mayd as "a people of different races from amongst the people of Sind and elsewhere.
Their homeland is the area of Multan, located eight miles from al-Mansurah." Ibn Khurradadhbih
(Masalik, p. 62) simply describes the Mayd as "robbers" (lusus). Al-Istakhri (Masalik, p. 176) calls
the Mayd "Ahl al-Badh" and states that their homeland in Sind is the area located on the banks of the
River Mahran, between the Multan area and the sea. In addition to the Mayd, piratic activity in the
Persian Gulf and as far as the Indian Ocean as well as the Red Sea was closely associated with another
group from Sind known as the Kurk. Ibn Khurradadhbih (Masalik, p. 65) indicates that they were
from the Sind region. Yaqut (Mu 'jam, vol. 5, p. 227) comments that they belonged to the Multan area
in Sind. Like the Mayd, the Kurk also engaged in piracy, as we shall see later.
33 The island of Qays, or Kaysh, is most probably the island referred to as Qaytham in our days. It is
located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. For further information on the island of Qays, see Ibn
Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 62; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 344; vol. 5, p. 239.
"'Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, pp. 388-9.
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that in 148/765 the Mayd managed to enter the Shatt al-'Arab (Dijlat al-Basrah).37
A similar attack occurred in 149/766, but sources do not provide any further details
about it. Nevertheless, Ibn Khayyat alone records a very important account about
the events of that year. Most likely, the account was relevant to Caliph al-Mansur
and an inspection cruise that he made in the Persian Gulf. It says that the Mayd
encountered Abu Ja'far on the island of Kharak,3* where he and the crew of his boat
were injured." Assuming that the text had been understood properly and that it
relates to Caliph Abu Ja'far, it reflects the evident feebleness of the 'Abbasids' fleet
operating in the Persian Gulf as well as the notorious character of the piratic
operations that the Mayd pursued there.
The Mayd continued their attacks on the southern part of Iraq. In 151/768, their
ships were again able to sneak into the Shatt: al-'Arab, but this time it seems that they
failed to take the inhabitants by surprise. Instead, the Mayd faced vigorous resistance
from inhabitants of southern Iraq under the leadership of Abu 'Ubaydallah al-
Sa'dl.40 A year later, in 151/769, the Mayd raided Basrah again, but to avoid any
confrontation with the 'Abbasid forces or the armed inhabitants as happened last
"ibid., p. 343.
'"Kharak is a small island (most probably the island of Kharg) 300 miles from Bahrain and 240 miles
from Basrah. It is described as three miles square and it is stated that it normally took a day and a
night to reach it from 'Abbadan. Idrisi, Nuzhat al-Mushtaq, vol. 1, p. 381; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 2, p.
165; Ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 61.
39The text mentions the name "Abu Jayfar", which has no logical meaning or historical support. Thus,
it seems better to be read it as Abu Ja'far. " y Ait^ A* d W1 -vA' J jo** 44' J**
y Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 343.
"7bid., p. 344.
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time, they chose this time one of the minor branches of the Shaft al-'Arab as their
route, namely the River al-Amlr. Initially, the Mayd were able to kill and take
captive many of the people of the area, but very soon the 'Abbasid forces realized
the situation and managed to engage with them, to defeat them, and to obtain the
release of the captives.41 During the same period, the 'Abbasids also had to endure
piratic attacks against commercial ships and cities situated along the Red Sea coast.
There the threat came this time from the other Sindi pirate group, the Kurk. Al-
Tabari reports that in 151/769 the Kurk launched a sea raid on Jeddah. The same
was repeated in 153/770, which this time drove al-Mansur, who had just completed
the rites of pilgrimage (Hajj), to return without delay to Basrah, where he ordered the
preparation of a naval expedition to pursue the attackers.42
Surprisingly, after this naval expedition, news of further attacks by pirates against
Muslim coastal cities ceased throughout the reign of al-Mansur. This may indicate
the success of the decisive measures that were taken by al-Mansur to confront the
perpetrators of maritime piratic activities. Nonetheless, without doubt these measures
did not consist in building a capable fleet that could secure stability in the Gulf as
much as in his awareness of an important factor regarding this issue. This was the
fact that stability in the Gulf waters was closely connected to political stability and
the affirmation of 'Abbasid authority in Sind, which was the homeland of many of
the pirate groups, who for most of the time were supported by the Hindu
"ibid., p. 345.
l2Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 33, 42.
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principalities in the area. Al-Mansur succeeded in achieving his goal by appointing
competent governors in that part of the empire, such as Hisham b. 'Amr al-
Taghlawbi, who was appointed in 152/769. Unlike his predecessors, Hisham
followed an offensive policy towards those local Hindu principalities that had not yet
been subjugated to Muslim authority. During his governorship, which lasted six
years, he was able to stretch the 'Abbasid authority over the wide area of Multan and
to capture Qandahar in eastern Afghanistan, as well as the town of Narrand after a
successful naval expedition led by 'Umar b. Jamal.
After the death of al-Mansur, Caliph al-Mahdi tried to adhere to the policy of his
father but did not attain the same degree of success, at least at the beginning. The
reason was that Hisham's successors in Sind fell victim to the QaysTYamanI tribal
struggle amongst the Arab settlers in the area.44 While the 'Abbasid governors in the
region were busy with the tribal struggle happening there, the Hindu princes seized
the opportunity and moved to regain the areas that had been previously conquered by
Hisham. This also led to a resurgence by some of the Sindi groups, such as the Zutt
against the 'Abbasid authority.45 At this point, al-Mahdi found that he had no
alternative but to dispatch a punitive naval expedition against Sind and in particular
aganist the inhabitants of the town of Barbad, which was probably the locus of the
rebels and pirates. Describing this expedition, historical sources indicate that initially
41Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 543-4; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 373; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 423; Ibn Kathlr,
Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 115; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp. 45, 53.
"Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 398.
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al-Mahdl commissioned Muhriz b. Ibrahim to go to Basrah to supervise the
preparation of the expedition and supply it with everything needed. The command of
the expedition was handed to 'Abd al-Malik b. Shihab b. al-Masma'T, who set sail
late in 159/776. The expeditionary force comprised 10,000 soldiers, the size of this
company clearly reflecting the significance of the expected goals. The troops could
be categorized as follows: a levied force of 2,000 from the people of Basrah, led by
Ghassan b. 'Abd al-Malik; 1,000 volunteers from Basrah, led by al-Mundhir b.
Muhammad al-Jarudl; 1,500 volunteers, who were stationed in the frontier garrisons
(murabitat), led by 'Abd al-Wahid b. 'Abd al-Malik; a further 700 from the people
of Syria, led by Zayd b. Habab al-Madhhijl; and finally 4,000 of the Aswariyyin and
the Sayabijah.46 Early in 160/777, the expedition reached the town of Barbad and, by
the second day, the town had been invested. The raid was so sudden that within two
days Barbad was conquered. The 'Abbasid forces entered the town from all
directions, set fire to it, and put to death all the fighting forces inside. The losses on
the Muslim side were so negligible that, in all, only around 20 men were killed. The
end of the campaign was not, however, so gratifying to the Muslims as the
beginning, since about 1,000 of them succumbed to an epidemic of scurvy (humam
qurr). Moreover, many more perished on the return home when their ships were
struck by a storm in the Persian Gulf. Those who survived reached Basrah carrying
**Ibid.; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 544.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 116; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 234; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p.
140; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 228.
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with them some of the booty and captives, who included the daughter of the ruler of
Barbad.47
In dealing with the Zutt movement in Sind, it was sufficient for al-Mahdl to send his
Maw]a, al-Layth b. Tarif, who managed to finish off their movement in one month.
When the Zutt rebelled again in 165/781, al-Mahdl had to send enforcements from
among the people of Basrah to al-Layth, who again was soon able to bring the
situation under control.48
Al-Layth b. Tarif continued to govern Sind for some years to come, during which he
managed to forcibly put an end to the Arab tribal struggle in the region on the one
hand and to restrain the ambitions of the local Hindu principalities on the other. This
undoubtedly helped to consolidate political stability in the region and consequently
reduce the opportunities for Sindi pirates to work as freely as they had done
previously. The silence of historical sources seems to testify to this, as no mention
can be found in them of piracy in the Persian Gulf or military expeditions launched
against the people of Sind throughout the rest of al-Mahdl's Caliphate.
But tranquillity in the Gulf did not last long as piracy resumed from the early years
of al-Rashid's Caliphate.49 Again, this came as an expected result of the renewed
political unrest occasioned by a recrudescence of inter-tribal feuding among Arabs in
47TabarT, TirJkh, vol. 8, pp. 117, 128; Ibn al-Athir, Kami/, vol. 5, p. 235; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10,
p. 140; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 236.
4SYa'qubI, Tai-jkh, vol. 2, p. 398.
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Sind following the dismissal of al-Layth from his post around the year 171/ 788.50
While al-Rashld failed to bring the situation under control in Sind by appointing
capable governors who would also contain the pirate groups in their own
homeland,51 he turned his attention instead to means of enhancing the 'Abbasid fleet
operating in the Gulf in order to be able to counter these Sindi pirates. The 'Abbasid
anti-piracy naval operations reached their climax between the years 177/794 and
179/796, during which the 'Abbasid fleet succeeded in establishing stability in the
Persian Gulf after inflicting heavy losses on the pirate groups which included many
of their valuable warships (bawarij).52 The supremacy of the 'Abbasid fleet in the
Gulf seems to have remained throughout the reign of al-Rashld as there is no
indication of any piratic activities during this time.
But reports of acts of piracy in the Gulf recommence and became much more
frequent during the reigns of al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tasim. This may be explained in
light of the civil war between the two brothers al-Ma'mun and al-Amln. The civil
war had paralysed the power of the central government and the capital, Baghdad,
along with the Sawad area, which became sucked into the eddy of that war for five
years, during which Basrah as a trade centre was brought to ruin. The situation only
grew worse during the period of the Zutt rebellion, which threatened the terrestrial
49[bn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 368.
S0Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 409; Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 380.
5lThis failure is clearly indicated by the fact that within a period of 13 years more than ten governors
held the governorship of Sind. For full lists of their names, see Ya'qubi, Tai-ikh, vol. 2, p. 409; Ibn
Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 380.
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and maritime trade routes between Basrah and Baghdad for 20 years. All these
circumstances, which endured for more than 25 years, led eventually to the gradual
shift of the trade centre of Iraq from the port of al-Ubullah, near Basrah, to a more
secure harbour, namely SIraf on the Persian seacoast near Shlraz. The port of SIraf
was, in fact, deeper than the former, which meant that it was more convenient for the
large trading vessels, especially those coming from China. All these factors led SIraf
quickly to become the main trading anchorage on the Persian Gulf.53 Transporting
merchandise between SIraf and Basrah was done by loading the goods from Basrah
in small ships which then sailed to SIraf. There the goods would be transferred into
large ships and vice versa for the movement of goods in the direction of Basrah.54 It
is worth noting, however, that the shift to SIraf resulted in the small ships sailing
from Basrah now having to sail the long distance to SIraf, which usually took seven
days if the winds were favourable.55 This meant that these small Basran ships
became much more vulnerable to piratic attacks compared with the large ships
heading toward SIraf, which usually for defence carried on board marine fighters and
Greek fire-throwers (nafatah).ib
52Ibn Khayyat, TarSch, p. 368.
53This commercial shift led to an economic boom in SIraf. Muslim geographers expatiate in
describing the city and its wealth. Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, pp. 394-5; Idrlst, Nuzhat al-Mnshtaq, vol. 1,
p. 410; Istakhri, Masalik, pp. 128-9.
vlHourani, Arab Seafaring, pp. 68-70.
5>Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, pp. 394-5.
56MaqdisI, Ahsan, p. 12; Hourani, Arab Seafaring, p. 70.
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With the end of the civil war and upon his return to Iraq, al-Ma'mun sought to re¬
establish the authority of the central government over the various regions of the
Caliphate including the Persian Gulf. Thus, in 210/825, he ordered a large naval
expedition to be launched from Basrah against the pirates of the island of Bahrain
who used to attack ships coming from Iran, India, and China.57 Again, in 213/829,
he ordered the dismissal of Muhammad b. 'Abbad from the admiralty of the Persian
Gulf and replaced him with Ghassan b. 'Abbad,58 an action which could have meant
the beginning of the central government's refocus toward the Persian Gulf with the
aim of reasserting its authority there. A similar action was taken by al-Mu'tasim in
225/821 when he deposed Ahmad b. 'Ubaydallah al-'Anbari from his post as
admiral of the Persian Gulf. However, the latter seems to have been reappointed as
he is mentioned as leading a naval expedition in the following year (226/822).59
Regarding the direction of these expeditions, it seems clear that they targeted the
islands to which the pirates resorted in the Persian Gulf such as the island of
Bahrain.60
With regard to the outcome of these expeditions, it seems that in most cases they
were attended with success. Al-Mas'udi, for instance, mentions that one of the
greatest achievements of Caliph al-Mu'tasim was his naval expeditions against the
Hourani, Arab Seafaring, p. 66.
58Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 390.
S9Ibid„ pp. 393-4.
''"ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 60.
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pirates. He adds that the outcome of these naval operations was the capturing of
many of the pirates' ships (bawarij) as well as many of their crew members who
previously had managed to dominate the entire coast of Fars, 'Uman, and Basrah.61
It is clear that, after the time of Caliph Mu'tasim, offensives against the main bases
of the pirates in Sind were undertaken solely by the 'Abbasid governors and their
allies in the region. Historical accounts indicate that during the time of al-Ma'mun,
al-Fadl b. Mahan, a mawla of the Banu Samh, along with some of his followers,
independently managed to attack and conquer the Indian coastal town of Sindan.62
Following this success, al-Fadl did not hesitate to declare his full submission to the
authority of the 'Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. After his death, al-Fadl was succeeded
by his son as the new ruler of this small Muslim principality. As part of his military
operations, the latter is said to have amassed a fleet of 70 warships (bawarij), with
which he raided the Mayd, killed a great number of them, and conquered the town of
Fall.63
Sources also mention that 'Imran b. Musa b. Yahya al-Barmakl, who succeeded his
father as governor of Sind in 221/836, launched a military expedition on that year
against the Qiqan area, which was inhabited by the Zutt. 'Imran was able to defeat
the Zutt and to establish a new town, named al-Bayda', which he adopted as a
61Mas'udI, Tanbih, p. 355; Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, pp. 394-5.
b2Sindan is a town located midway between Daybul and al-Mansurah at a distance of half a farsakh
from the seacoast. Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 266.
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garrison base for his forces. 'Imran also did not forget to launch an expedition
against the Mayd, during which 3,000 of them were reported to have been put to
death. Moreover, it was not long before 'Imran, this time in collaboration with the
Zutt, launched another aggressive attack against the Mayd.64
In spite of the heavy losses suffered by the pirate groups, whether from among the
Mayd or other groups, in their confrontations with the 'Abbasids, this clearly did not
restrain them from continuing their piracy, which seems to have been the only
profession in which they really excelled. Naval expeditions against sea pirates
increased noticeably during the reign of al-Wathiq. Under the instruction of Ahmad
b. Rabah, the governor of Basrah, Ibrahim b. Hisham led three naval expeditions in
consecutive years (228-230/843-845), during the last of which Ibrahim is reported to
have pursued the pirates as far as the proximal part of Sarrast, in Sind, where he took
many of its inhabitants as captives.65
Undoubtedly, the shadow of piracy and its adverse effects on the sea trade in the
Persian Gulf were the reason behind these consecutive expeditions and the
determination of the central government in Baghdad to eradicate it. This
determination was also shared by the people of Basrah, amongst whom many
volunteered to join these expeditions. In 231/846, for instance, sources mention that
some of the volunteers' ships were wrecked between Janabah and Sinnin and many
"'Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 545; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 424.
MBaladhuri, Futuh, pp. 544-5; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 626; Ya'qubl, Tarrkh, vol. 2, p. 577.
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of them lost their lives.66 Among other measures that the central government took to
limit the adverse effects of piracy and encourage the movement of trade via the Gulf
was the decision of Caliph al-Wathiq to cancel the tax imposed on trading vessels
coming from India and China.67 This decision was no doubt intended to enhance the
position of Basrah as a trading centre as well as to compensate traders for any losses
that they might suffer through piracy.
6.2 Naval Organization
6.2.1 Dockyards and Naval Bases
With the conquest of Syria and Egypt, a long stretch of seacoast came into the
Muslims' hands, which in turn required protection against their only enemy at sea,
the Byzantines. Initially, the Muslims adhered to a purely defensive strategy,
concentrating on fortifying (tahsin) the coastal towns and fortresses and organizing
(tartlb) fighters in them, as happened in Acre and Tyre on the Syrian coast.68 This
strategy, which proved to be ineffective in many cases, continued from the days of
Caliph 'Umar (13-23/634-44) till the end of the first half of 'Uthman's Caliphate
(23-35/644-56). It was only then that the Muslims embarked on a new maritime
policy, which this time concentrated on taking the offensive in dealing with their
enemy, especially in the new climate of increased Muslim maritime expertise and
"Tbn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 395.
66Ibid.
67Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 483; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 150.
flSBaladhuri, Futuh, pp. 139, 152; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 258.
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more frequent Byzantine attacks against the of Muslim coastlands 69 This maritime
offensive policy centred on building the necessary fleets to confront the Byzantines'
fleet before they could reach Muslim territories, as well as on enabling the Muslims
to extend their conquests beyond their shores.70 Achieving this goal required in turn
well-furnished naval bases and dockyards (sing, dar al-sina'ah), which were the real
nucleus of any naval power. Therefore, since the early days of the Umayyad
Caliphate, the Muslims did not content themselves with utilizing the naval bases and
dockyards that they inherited from the Byzantines in North Africa and Syria, but also
sought to build their own.
Among the naval bases mentioned during the first century of the 'Abbasid Caliphate
were Qulzum and Alexandria, that of Qulzum being of particular importance. In
antiquity and in the early period of Islam, Qulzum owed much of its importance to its
being a point of departure for shipping in the Red Sea. Trajan's canal, uniting the
Nile at the Egyptian Babylon with Qulzum, had become silted up, but in 23/643
Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab had dredged and reopened it under the name Khali; Amir
al-Mu'minm.71 It was through this canal that the com ships of Fustat would pass to
Qulzum and from there to the ports of Jar and Jiddah, on the eastern coast of the Red
"Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 4, 260; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 2, p. 489.
7llThe first fruit of this offensive policy was the conquest of Cyprus in 28/648 and the destruction of
the Byzantines' fleet in the naval battle of Dhat al-Sawariin 34/655. Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 258-
262; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 181-2; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 2, p. 488; vol. 3, p. 13.
7!Ya'qtibI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 177; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 4, p. 100; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 79; Yaqut,
Mu'jam, vol. 2, p. 466; Qalqashandl, Subli, vol. 3, p. 331.
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Sea, to provision the inhabitants of the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah. 72 In
145/762, Caliph al-Mansur is reported to have partly filled in the canal as a means of
strangling the 'Alid rebels by preventing the flow of provisions to their stronghold in
Madinah.73 Regarding the Jewish merchants called the Radhaniyya74, Ibn
Khurradadhbih mentions that they came from the south of France to al-Faramah,
whence they carried their wares 35 farsakhs on camels to Qulzum, where they loaded
them on ships which sailed to India and China.75 In addition to the numerous
references that they make to the work of building and repairing ships in Qulzum,
Greek papyri of Aphrodito report that the port of Qulzum was also used as a naval
base, most probably against the Red Sea pirates, whose activities had been notorious
• • 76
since Roman times.
The port of Alexandria retained much of its fame in the Islamic period as one of the
most important naval centres in the eastern Mediterranean. Since the time of the
Ptolemies and later the Byzantines, Alexandria with its western and eastern harbours
was renowned for being the largest and busiest commercial and industrial centre in
the Mediterranean. It seems, however, that out of all the industrial arts carried out in
Alexandria, such as fabric, glass, and coral production, shipbuilding was the most
72
No less than 3,000 camel loads, counted by al-Maqdist, were exported every week to Hijaz.
MaqdisI, Ahsan, p. 195.
7,AzdI. Tarikh, p. 145; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 603, 621; Qalqashandl, Subh, vol. 3, p. 332; EI2,s.v.
"Kulzum".
74For more discussion on the Jewish Radhaniyya, see El2, s.v. "Radhaniyya".
7,Ibn Khurradadhbih, al-Masalik, p. 153; Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 27; EI2,5. v. "Kulzum".
7<'Hourani, Arab Seafaring, pp. 20, 34; El2, s.v. "Milaha"; Fahmy, Sea-power, pp. 24-7.
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important of all.77 It is not surprising therefore that, since its conquest by 'Amr b. al-
'As in 21/642, Alexandria was a vital city for the Muslim naval power as it provided
ships and sailors for the fleet as well as a base from which the Muslims were able to
launch their first raids across the Mediterranean.7
Rosetta, Damietta, and Tinnls were also important naval bases in Egypt since the
early days of Islam. While al-Maqdis! describes Damietta as being within ear-shot of
the Mediterranean, where the Nile flowed into it, al-Ya'qubl states that the Nile
divided into two at Damietta, one branch flowing into Lake Tinnls, in which ships
and large boats sailed and the other flowing into the Mediterranean.79 Besides its
importance as trading centre, the port of Damietta acquired great military importance
after the conquest of Crete in 211/826, for it then became the main base providing
anus and provisions to the Cretan Muslims. Because of this Damietta became a main
target for Byzantine raids from 238/853 onwards.80
Meanwhile, Tinnls, founded in an island near Damietta, is reported to have been an
ancient town with a harbour for ships coming from Syria and Maghrib.81 According
to Ibn Iyas, the town was populous till 573/1177 and was finally destroyed in
Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 27.
78Salim, Tarikh al-Babrtyah, pp. 25-8; Fahniy, Sea-power, p. 28; EI2, s.v. "Milaha".
7,MaqdisI, Ahsan, p. 202; Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 96.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 193-4; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 117; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p.
349; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 488; Brooks, "Relation", p. 385; Archibald, Naval Power, p. 141;
Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 31; Salirn, Tarikh al-Bahrlyah, pp. 46-9.
81
Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 96.
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624/1226.82 Lake Tinnls was not deep and al-Tabari mentions that after the
Byzantines had sacked Damietta in 238/853, their ships were unable to sail because
they feared that they would stick in the mud. They therefore went to Ushtum, a
harbour about four farsakhs away from Tinnls, having a wall and an iron gate
constructed by Caliph al-Mu'tasIm.83
Barqah and Tunis, in North Africa, also had naval bases. These had been founded by
the Umayyads and continued to operate throughout the 'Abbasid Caliphate. From
them raids were directed against the Byzantines' islands in the eastern part of the
Mediterranean, especially Sicily and Sardinia. Tunis, however, was of particular
importance as it owned a large dockyard (dar al-sina'ah). According to Muslim
historians, this was the oldest arsenal to be established by Muslims in North Africa.
The Umayyad governor al-Hassan b. al-Nu'man is credited with its construction in
about 80/699, for which he brought from Egypt 1,000 Copt families to supply this
new naval dockyard with experienced workmen.84 While describing the dockyard of
Tunis, al-Bakri and Ibn Qutaybah mention a lake, 24 miles long, east of Tunis, in the
centre of which was an island, two miles in length. Here the dockyard was founded
and linked to the harbour, 12 miles away, by means of a canal. The location of the
dockyard was thus unique as it provided an excellent shelter for ships from strong
:;
Ibn Iyas, Tarikh Misr, vol. 1, p. 50.
,S3Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 194.
S4BakrI, al-Mughrib, p. 38; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 253; Maqrizi, Khitut, vol. 2, p. 190; al-
Malikl, Riyadal-Nufus, p. 37.
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winds and winter storms.85 The harbour, the entrance to which could be closed by a
chain, was defended on the north by a strong wall and on the south by a stone-built
castle, known as the Castle of the Chain (Qasr al-Silsilah).86
Syria also acquired naval bases from the very beginning of the Umayyad period.
Al-Baladhuri points out that Mu'awiyah restored Acre and Tyre at the time of the
expedition against Cyprus, and in 42/662 he transplanted Persian colonists from
BaTabakk, Hims, and Antioch to the cities of Jund al-Urdun, namely Tyre and
Acre.87 In 49/669, the Byzantine fleets raided the Syrian coastal towns, which did
not yet have arsenals. Mu'awiyah thereupon built dockyards in the fortified city of
Acre, situated on the Palestinian seaboard, to act as the main naval base of the district
of Jund al-Urdun.88 The Umayyad Caliph 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwan is reported to
have restored Tyre, Qaysariyah (Caesarea), and the suburbs of Acre, which had
fallen into ruin after a series of Byzantine raids during the period of Ibn al-Zubayr's
QQ <
rebellion. When, later, Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik wished to purchase a mill and
storehouses from a man called Abu al-Mu'ayt, and the latter refused to sell them, he
had the arsenal removed from Acre to Tyre, where he built magazines and a
dockyard. Thus, Tyre replaced Acre under the Marwanids as a naval station and
remained so until 247/861 when the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil ordered the
"'Bakri, al-Mughrib, p. 38; Ibn Qutaybah, al-lmamah, pt. 2, p.111.
^'Bakrl, al-Mughrib, p. 39.
s7Baladhuii, Futuh, p. 140.
88Ibid.; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 88.
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transfer of shipbuilding from Tyre to Acre again. He also ordered the distribution of
the fleets and naval forces among all the Syrian coastal towns.90 In his description of
Acre, the Persian traveller Nasir-i Khusraw mentions that the harbour of Acre had a
chain fixed across its entrance which used to be lowered until it was deep enough in
the water to allow ships to pass into the harbour. It was then tightened to prevent any
enemy ship from getting inside to attack the base.91
Regarding Tyre, Muslim geographers point out that it was a strongly fortified city
surrounded by the sea on all sides. The city was only accessible from the mainland
through a single gate to which a bridge led, and almost all the way around, the city
was fortified by a wall which rose straight out of the sea. Its harbour, encircled by
triple walls, was gated by a chain, which was tightened across every night to prevent
the enemy's ships from sneaking into it.92 Al-Ya'qubl affirms that the city contained
a dockyard (dar al-sina'ah) and that from Tyre the Caliph's ships would set out on
expeditions against the Byzantines.93
Ladhiqlyah, Sayda, Beirut, and Tarabulus al-Sham were also amongst the principal
naval centres on the Syrian coast. According to al-Ya'qubl, Tarabulus possessed a
89Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 140, 170.
'"ibid., p. 140; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 188; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 88; Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 53; Kennedy,
"Towns", p. 95.
"Nasir-i Khusraw, Sqfarnamah, p. 51.
'"MaqdisI, Ahsan, p. 186.
)3Ya'qubI, Buldan, p. 88. For further description of Tyre, see Yaqut, Mu jam, vol. 1, pp. 124, 148;
vol. 2, pp. 17, 216; vol. 3, p. 434; vol. 4, pp. 143-4; Ibn Jubayr, Rihlat, pp. 212-3; Fahmy, Sea-power,
pp. 53-4; Salim, al-Bahrlyah, p. 51.
Rakan al-Mtdairi | PhD Thesis | Chapter (> | 'AbbOsid S*a M arfan HHI
magnificent harbour which was so large that it could offer anchorage to 1,000
ships.94 An excellent description of the town under the Fatimids is given by Nasir-i
Khusraw. He states that the whole countryside consisted of fields and gardens
growing sugar-cane, citrons, bananas, oranges, lemons, and dates. The town was
protected on three sides by the sea and, on the landward side, by a wall with a broad
ditch. On the eastern side of the city there was a battlemented fortress of glazed
stone, on the top ofwhich ballista machines ('aradat) were placed to defend the town
against any possible naval attack by the Byzantines.95 Beirut was one of the districts
of Damascus (Jund Dimashq) and, like Acre, Tyre, and many other harbours of that
time, its harbour had a chain that could be fixed across the entrance.96 Like many
other Syrian coastal towns, Beirut was also considered a ribat and the great Imam of
Syria, al-Awza'I, is reported to have installed himself there and to have been among
those who took part in the expedition against the Byzantines in 140/758. 7
Tarsus, suited on the coast of Asia Minor, was also an important naval base during
the early 'Abbasid era. According to Muslim authors, after a raid against the
Byzantine territories in 162/779, al-Hasan b. Qahtabah brought Caliph al-Mahdl a
description of the mined town of Tarsus and advised him of the great advantage of
building up and garrisoning the city to increase the power of Islam in the war against
"Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 88.
95Nasir-i Khusraw, Safornamah, pp. 47-8.
'MaqdisI, Alison, pp. 24, 65.
l7Basawi, al-Ma'rifah, vol. 2, p. 408; EI2 ,s. v. "Bayrut"; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 188.
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the enemy.98 However, it was not until 171/787, when Caliph al-Rashld learned that
the Byzantines intended to restore the town, that he ordered Harthama b. A'yan to
pre-empt them and rebuild it. Harthama thereupon entrusted Faraj b. Sulaym with its
reconstruction and the town was finally rebuilt in 172/788 and populated initially by
3,000 Khurasan! troops along with 2,000 warriors who were brought from Massisah
and Antakiyah in return for an increase in their pay.99 It was not too long before the
city became prosperous and its population was continually increased by immigrants
from adjoining lands, who wished in their glowing enthusiasm for Islam to engage in
the jihad till they met their death.100 The importance of Tarsus for the 'Abbasids lay
in the fact that its very close proximity to the Byzantine territories by sea and land
indicated its usefulness as a principal base from which to launch military expeditions
against their enemy by sea and land. In this connection, Qudamah mentions Tarsus
as being among the Syrian towns from which the holy war was pursued by sea and
land.101 Reflecting the importance of Tarsus as an important naval base in 'Abbasid
times is a passage in al-Tabari, who writes that after the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mu'tadid
put down the revolt of Waslf al-Khadim in 287/900, he ordered that all the ships
based at Tarsus along with all their equipment, which the Muslims had employed in
waging war, be burnt. The account proceeds to recount how about 50 old vessels,
on which a great deal of money had been spent in their construction and which could
wBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 200; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 310.
'wBaladhuri, Futuh, pp. 200-1; Qudamah, Kharaj, pp. 310-1; Yaqut, Mujam, vol. 4, p. 133, Tabari,
Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 234; Yaqubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 410.
ni"Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 60.
""Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 86.
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not be replaced at that time, were among those burned. The consequence of this
action, according to al-Tabari, was great damage to the Muslim power and a relative
increase in that of the Byzantines, who were thus safeguarded from any Muslim
attack by sea.102 Nevertheless, despite the loss of these ships, Tarsus soon regained
its naval power under the admiralship of Leo of Tripoli, who, by the end of the
third/tenth century, became the terror of the Aegean.103 Tarsus continues to be
mentioned in the historical sources as a veiy important naval base in the struggle
against the Byzantines until 357/965 when it was finally conquered by
Nicephorus.104
In Iraq, the centre of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the harbours of Basrah and its suburb
town of al-Ubullah were the main sea-gate of the whole region of Iraq to the open
sea via the Persian Gulf. In addition, to their significance as commercial and trading
centres, Basrah and al-Ubullah were also very important naval bases during the early
period of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. It was from there that the 'Abbasids launched
their naval expeditions against the pirates throughout the Persian Gulf as far as
Sind.105 In addition, the 'Abbasids employed the fleet based in these two Iraqi cities
to dispatch their land forces effectively and in sufficient numbers to disturbed areas
102Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. 10, p. 80.
lu3Brooks, "Relations", p. 354.
l04Yaqut, Mujam, vol. 4, p. 29; Falimy, Sea-power, p. 61; Salim, al-Bahrfyah, pp. 52-3.
!05Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, pp. 390, 393-5; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 33, 42, 116; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil,
vol. 5, p. 234; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 140; Ibn al-JawzI, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, p. 228;
Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 393.
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in other parts of the state such as 'Uman and Sind.106 Basrah, founded in 17/638 by
order of Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab, lay some four farsakhs west of the Shaft al-
'Arab, with which it was connected by two canals, Nahr al-Ubullah on the south and
al-Ma'qil on the north.107 Navigation in these two canals was affected by tidal ebb
and flow, by the expert management of which, seagoing ships of lesser tonnage could
reach Basrah's harbour of al-Kalla'.108 Large ships, however, did not proceed to
Basrah, but instead docked at al-Ubullah, situated on the western bank of the Shatt:
al-'Arab, where their cargoes were then off-loaded onto smaller craft that could reach
not only Basrah but also Baghdad and even further north.109 Unlike Basrah, al-
Ubullah, which was the old Apolougus that had been founded by Khusraw Ardashir
and survived into Muslim times, is also reported to have had a dockyard.110 One of
the difficulties facing ships heading for al-Ubullah was the treacherous shoal at the
estuary of the Shatt al-'Arab near 'Abbadan in which ships were often wrecked. To
keep ships off these shallows, three wooden scaffolds (khashbat) were erected some
distance offshore, supporting a watchtower with guards, who lit beacons at night to
1UfcIbn Khayyat, Tarikh, p. 365; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 462-4; vol. 8, pp. 23, 42, 116-7, 128; Ibn al-
Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 93, 234; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 140.
,u7Ibn Hawqal, Sural al-Ard, p. 235; Maqdisi, Ahsan, p. 117; Nasar-i Khusraw, Safarnamah, pp. 47-
8; IdrisI, Nuzhat, p. 384.
,08Ibn Hawqal, Sural al-Ard, p. 235; Maqdisi, Ahsan, p. 118; Istakliri, Masaiik, pp. 80-1.
lu,When founding Baghdad, al-Mansur is reported to have assessed the role of its location in the
following manner: "This is the Tigris. There is 'no obstacle between it and China; everything in the
sea comes to us by it, and the provisions from al-JazIrah and Armenia and from what lies beyond them
come to us. And this is the Euphrates. Everything from Damascus and al-Raqqah and from what lies
beyond them comes to us by it." Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 614.
"°E7 ', s.v. "al-Ubulla"; Hourani, Arab Seafaring, p. 69.
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forewarn arriving ships."1 A second danger was a large whirlpool (hawr, pi.
hawarat) inside the Shatt al-'Arab close to al-Ubullah's harbour, where many ships
met their doom until an 'Abbasid princess reportedly solved the problem by bearing
the expense of dumping large quantities of rocks on the site.112
6.2.2 Warships and Naval Tactics
Safhah, markab, and qarib were the term most commonly used by the Arabs, since
pre-Islamic times and throughout the Umayyad era, to denote means of transport that
could ride on water. With the exception of the suggestion that the qarib was most
likely a small boat, historical sources as well as Arabic dictionaries do not offer any
definite or significantly descriptive features enabling us to distinguish one from
another."3 By 'Abbasid times, however, new terms for ships came into use. The
available evidence offered by the different historical and adab sources indicates that
ships used by Muslims during this time were of different sizes, shapes, and
capability. Amongst various types of warship mentioned is the barijah (pi. bawarij),
which was used primarily in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and most
probably was a ship of Indian origin. The term bawarij was very closely associated
in early Islamic sources with a type of warship widely used by the Mayd pirates, who
raided across the Indian Ocean and on many occasions as far as the mouth of the
"'Mas'udI, Murvj, vol. I, pp. 106, 149; Idrlsl, Nuzhat al-Mushtaq, vol. 1, p. 358; Istakhri, Masalik,
pp. 32, 80; Nasir-i Khusraw, Safarnamah, p. 151.
u2Ibn Hawqal, Sural al-Ard, p. 237; Istakhrl, Masalik, p. 32; Hourani, Arab Seafaring, p. 69; EI1, s.v.
"Ubulla".
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Tigris and the southern part of the Red Sea.114 The sinister connotations of this word
led in course of time to its further development to mean sharr, signifying 'evil' in
Arabic. Ibn Manzur as well as Ibn Sidah point out that when the word barijah is
applied to a person, it means a person "full of evil".115 The first clear indication of
the use by Muslims of this type of warship comes in the time of the 'Abbasid Caliph
al-Ma'mun when, as al-Baladhuri mentions, 70 bawarij, led by Muhammad b. al-
Fadl b. Mahan, departed from Sindan and raided the Mayd's town of Fall in Sind.116
Al-Tabari includes a note on the crew of such a ship while speaking of the events of
the year 251/865. He mentions that ten ships (sufun) called bawarij were employed
against the Turks in Baghdad and that each of them was crewed by 25 men,
including the chief sailors (ashtiyam), three fire-throwers (nafatun), one carpenter
(najjar), one baker (khabbaz), and 39 oarsmen and marines (jadafun and
muqatilah).ni
The shin I, shmiyyah, or shani(p\. shawani), a vessel of the galley type, was the most
popular warship used by Muslims in the Mediterranean.118 It is described as a two-
banked vessel, with a special officer in charge of each bank and, like its counterpart
"3See, for example, the accounts of the naval battle of Dhat al-Sawari (34/655) in which these terms
are used: Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futub, p. 190; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 4, pp. 261, 290.
"4Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 2, p. 20; idem, al-Tcmbih, pp. 49, 355; Khallfah, Tarikh, pp. 368, 393;
Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 544-5.
1,5Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 2, p. 213; Ibn Sidah, Mukhassas, vol. 4, pt. 10, p. 26; Fahmy, Sea-power, p.
156; Nukhayll, al-Sujun, p. 10.
1'"Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 543, 545; see also Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 424.
117TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 307.
Rakan al-Mutairi { PhD Thesis | Chapter 6 | Sea W arfare 351
the Byzantine dromon, it had lateen sails, originally two and later three.119 The shanl
was propelled by sails and oars and, according to Ibn Mammati, it had 140 oars.120
In addition to these 140 oarsmen, as one person usually manned each oar in the Arab
warship, the vessel is mentioned to have carried on board an average of 150 foot
soldiers (muqalilah). 1 The ship was also reported to have been equipped with
towers from which white naphtha was thrown against the enemy.
122
The term shalandi (pi. shalandiyyat), was applied to a large warship believed to have
been modelled on the largest and heaviest vessel of the Byzantine fleet, the
cumbarii.m While describing the Byzantine raid against Damietta in 283/853, al-
Tabari gives some indication of the capacity of such a ship as he states that 100
Byzantine shalandiyyat carried on board 5,000 men, an average of 50 to 100 men on
each of them.124 The main distinguishing feature of the shalandi was that it was a
decked ship (markab musaqqaf), so that the soldiers could fight from above while the
rowers plied their oars beneath them.125 Besides building them, Muslims on some
occasions would seize a large number of this type of warship from their traditional
mEl2, s.v. "Safina".
1 '"'Christides, "Byzantine Dromon", p. 118; idem, "Naval Warfare", p. 143; Fahmy, Sea-power, p.
123.
12lJIbn Mammati, Qawanm, p. 340.
121Abu Shamah, Kitab al-Rawdatoyn, vol. 2, p. 335.
1'2Fahmy, Sea-Power, p. 132; Nukhayll, al-Sufiin, p. 84; Zaydan, Tamaddun, vol. 1, p. 210; Salim, al-
Bahriyah, p. 133.
li3Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 130.
l24TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 194.
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enemy the Byzantines. Ibn al-Athlr states, for instance, that in 244/858 a large
Byzantine army sailed from Constantinople in 300 shalandiyyat to Syracuse and that
al-'Abbas b. al-Fadl was able to capture 100 of them.126
The tarldah (pi. tara'id) was a Mediterranean transport ship. Besides begin used on
occasion to transport provisions and military equipment and troops, Muslim writers
emphasize that this ship was specially built and equipped to transport war-horses and
that it could carry up to 40 horses.127 Unlike other cargo ships, the taridah was open
at the rear to facilitate the embarking and disembarking of the horses.128
Amongst the large ships used specially for freight was the qarqur (pi. qaraqir). This
type of ship was known to the Arabs since pre-Islamic time and was mentioned later
as one of the vessels that took part in the naval expedition against the southern coast
of Fars in the time of Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab.129
In addition to these warships used in the open seas, there were numerous types of
river craft that Muslims used in 'Abbasid times for both military and civil purposes.
The Baghdadi, al-Azdl b. al-Mutahhar (d. fourth/tenth century) gives in his Hikayat a
I25Ibn MammatI, Qawanm, p. 340; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 114; Fahmy, Sea-Power, p. 131;
Salirn, al-Bahryah, p. 133.
12''Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, pp. 113-4.
1,!7Ibn MammatI, Qawanih, p. 339; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 10, p. 630; Abu Shamah, Kitah al-
Rawdatayn, vol. 2, p. 335; Ibn Mankall, al-Adillah, p. 243.
128Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 137; Nukhayll, al-Sufun, p. 89.
Rakan al-Mutairi } PhD Thesis ( Chapter 6 i 'Abbasid Sea Warfare MSI
list of nineteen of these craft, including the shadha, qarib, zabzab, sumayri, jas us,
harraqah, and payyarah.m It seems clear that some of these names are descriptive,
for example, the tayyarah (flier), which was a small, fast craft. Besides being widely
used by wealthy people of Baghdad, Basrah, and its neighbourhood for transport and
pleasure, this type of craft is also mentioned as having been used for military
purposes in time of war. Al-Mas'udI, for example, mentions that the fighting fleet of
the Barfdls in Basrah in 329/941 included payyarat.m
The harraqah (fire craft, pi. harraqat or hararlq) is often mentioned in the sense of
warship to a boat equipped with catapults from which fire could be hurled at the
enemy.132 On occasions, the harraqah is also reported to have been equipped with
grappling-irons (kalallb), which used to drag the enemy's burning boats from river
passages or harbours.133 When these craft were disarmed, they could be used for
transport and pleasure. In this sense, Caliph al-Amln is reported to have had five
129Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 3, p. 162; Nukhayli, Sufun, pp. 120-5; EI2, s.v. "Safina". It is worth noting
that the qarqur is also mentioned in some of the prophetic hadfths as being the type of ship that
Muslim sea martyrs would use for raids in paradise in the hereafter. Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 5, p. 90.
1J"Azdi, Hikayat, p. 107.
1JIMas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 340; see also Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 163; Nukhayll, al-Sufun, p. 92; Mez,
Renaissance, p. 433; EI2, s.v. "Safina".
132SuyutI, Tarikh al-Khulafa\ p. 302; Fahmy, Sea-power, p. 134; Nukhayll, al-Sufun, p. 33; Zaydan,
al-Tamaddun, vol. 1, p. 211.
"'"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 453.
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luxury harraqat constructed as pleasure boats in the Tigris, each in the shape of a
lion, elephant, eagle, dolphin, or snake.134
The shadha (pi. shadhawat or shadh'at) was also mentioned as a troop-carrying
craft. Al-Tabari states that the harraqah, used to transport Caliph al-Amin to
Baghdad after his capitulation, was attacked on the way by Tahir's troops, who were
using zawariq and shadhawat}1'5 During the long years of war between the
'Abbasid forces and the Zanj rebels (255-267/869-881), the term shadhawat was
often associated with another type of troop-carrying craft, that is the sumayriyyat,
used by both parties.136 The sumayriyyat craft seem to have varied in size, some
being large enough to require 20 oarsmen to propel them.137 Their swift movement
and manoeuvrability led to their sometimes being employed for scouting or secret
138
services.
Constructing ships for the fleet was a labour involving very long and different stages
of work. The first stage was providing the suitable timbers needed for building the
different parts of the ship: hull, masts, keel, planking, and oars. Timbers used for
shipbuilding differed from one dockyard to another according to the proximity of the
>MIbid., vol. 8, p. 508; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 411; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 242; SuyutI,
Tarikh al-Khulafa', p. 302; Nukhayli, al-Sufun, pp. 32-7; Fahmy, Sea-power, pp. 134-6; Mez,
Renaissance, p. 490; EI2, s.v. "Safina".
u5Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 484.
VM'Ibid„ vol. 9, pp. 420, 423, 521, 524, 543, 557-68, 590-2.
u7Ihid., vol. 9, 565.
mIbid., vol. 9, p. 439.
dockyard to the nearest source of available timber. While acacia (sinf), lebek, lotus
tree (sidrah), fig, and palm were very common trees in Egypt and thus were used in
shipbuilding there, the pine tree (sanaxvbar), oak, and cedar were largely used in the
Syrian dockyards as these types of timbers were drawn from the Syro-Lebanese
forests.139 In the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean it seems that in
addition to coconut wood (narjil), the teak (saj) grown in the hills of southern India,
Burma, and Indonesia was the most valuable and preferred timber for
shipbuilding.140
The techniques, as well as the materials, used in building the Muslim fleet during the
early centuries of Islam also varied from one area to another. In the Mediterranean,
Muslims used iron nails as a means of fastening the planks of the ship's hull whereas
in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean the planks were stitched
together with fibre (khiyatah) and not nailed.141 Al-Jahiz states that the Umayyad
governor al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf was the first to have constructed ships with their parts
nailed (musammarah) together and not stitched (mukharrazah).142 Al-Mas'udI tries
to explain the preference for stitching instead of nailing in ships sailing in the Red
Sea by stating that the sea-water there corroded the iron nails so that they did not last
l3'Salim, al-Bahriyah, p. 24; Fahmy, Sea-power, pp. 67-79.
14"Mas'udI, Mttruj, vol. 1, p. 163; Ibn Jubayr, Rihlat, p. 154. Teak is described as "the most valuable
of all known timbers. It is very durable, and once seasoned, teak timber does not split, crack, shrink,
or alter its shape. In contact with iron, neither the iron nor the teak suffers. It is not very hard, is
easily worked, and has great elasticity and strength." Hourani, Arab Seafaring p. 90.
14lMas'udi, Muruj, vol. 1, p. 163; Ibn Jubayr, Rihlat, p. 56; Idrlsl, Nuzhat al-Mushtaq, vol. 1, p. 94;
Ibn Battutah, Rihlat, vol. 1, p. 289; Hourani, Arab Seafaring, p. 91.
142Jahiz, al-Bayan, vol. 2, p. 303 : '>3^ Jf
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long as they grew soft and weak. Hence, the planks were joined with fibre and
besmeared with grease and pitch.143 As for Ibn Jubayr, al-Idrisi, and Ibn Battutah,
they see the advantage of the sewn hull compared with nailed timbers in the fact that
the former was more flexible and less breakable if vessels ran onto coral reefs in the
Red Sea or elsewhere.144
After the hull of the ship had been put together, it had to be protected from the
inroads of the sea. Generally, the Arabic sources indicate that cracks, holes, and
seams were blocked with a mixture of pitch (qar) or resin (ratmaj) and fish oil. In
addition, to prevent water from leaking into the ship, these substances also served to
safeguard the bottom against the desolation of the shipworm. Coating in general was
done with caster oil or fish oil, especially that of the shark, which is described by Ibn
Jubayr as the best of all fish oils.145 Usually, Arab warships were painted black and
their sails were white.146 Muslim warships in 'Abbasid times were still anned with
the typical main weapon of the ancient warship, the ram (lijam), but it seems that this
was no longer used as the prime weapon for sinking enemy ships. Instead, the aim
was to inflict minor blows on them and thereby immobilize them before shooting at
uiMas'udI, Muruj, vol. 1, p. 163.
1 HIbn Jubayr, Rihlat, vol. 1, p. 56; IdrisI, Nuzhat al-Mushtaq, vol. 1, 94; Ibn Battutah, Rihlat, vol. 1,
pp. 289-90.
145Ibn Jubayr, Rihlat, vol. 1, p. 56.
14'Christides, "Byzantine Dromon", p. 118.
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them with projectiles.'47 Similar to the land armies, some of the warships of the fleet
were equipped with hurling machines. At first missiles used consisted simply of
heavy stones or pieces of iron. Nevertheless, by the end of the first century of the
'Abbasid Caliphate, the Muslim forces were able to use the much more destructive
Greek fire or naphtha, which for decades, had been a weaponry monopolized by the
Byzantines.14 It seems though that the fire-missiles used at that time consisted
simply of sulphur and naphtha with stones, the whole being wrapped around with
tow and placed into the holder, where it was then set alight and hurled against the
enemy.149 Another possible form of fire-missiles used at that time was grenades.
These were small earth-pots (qarurah), filled with combustible substances, which
were hurled at the enemy by hand or by catapult.150 In a naval battle with the
Byzantines near the shores of Sicily in 220/835, the Aghlabids used fire ships from
which flammable substances were hurled at the enemy vessels. Similarly, at the
147Christides, Conquest, p. 44. However, contrary to the assumption that the use of hurling engines in
Muslim and Byzantine warships was marked by the abandonment of the ram in naval warfare, Ibn
Mankall (d. 778/1376) clearly indicates the use of the ram in Muslim warships in his time and
explains the best ways of using it in naval warfare. Ibn Mankall, al-Adillah, p. 247. For the
assumption of the abandonment of the ram, see El2, s.v. "Naft".
1+8 About the year 54/673, a Syrian architect from Ba'Iabakk called Callinicus defected to Byzantium.
According to the Byzantine sources, he brought with him the secret of a new incendiary weapon,
which was successfully applied in the Arab siege of Constantinople in 674-8 as well as in 717-718. In
Arab sources, the first indication of the use of Greek fire by Muslims comes during the siege of
Hcraclca in 190/806 by the 'Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashld. For more on the history of Greek fire
and its development, see J. R. Partington, A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder (Cambridge,
1960); H. R. Ellis Davidson, "The Secret Weapon of Byzantium", Byzantinische Zeitschrift, vol. 66
(1973), pp. 61-74; Haldon & Byrne, "A Possible Solution to the Problem of Greek Fire",
Byzantinische Zeitschrift, vol. 70 (1977), pp. 91-9; G. Lloyd, Greek Science after Aristotle (London,
1973); K. White, Greek and Roman Technology (London, 1984); V. Christides, The Conquest ofCrete
by the Arabs, (Athens, 1984); Ahmad & Hill, Islamic Technology (Cambridge, 1986); EI 2, s.v.
"Naff."
14<)IsfahanI, AghanI, vol. 18, p. 253.
''"Haldon & Byrne, "A Possible Solution", p. 98; Christides, Conquest, p. 65.
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siege of Salonika in 291/904, Muslim forces led by Leo of Tripoli used Greek fire
against the defending forces.151
The use of Greek fire by the 'Abbasid forces for the first time in the history of the
Muslim army was marked by their invention and use of fire-proof mantles to protect
their ships as well as their men from the enemy's fire weapon.152 Muslim writers on
warfare practice in later times such as Ibn al-'Amri and Ibn Mankall give details of
the way a protective mantle should be made and the substances used in making such
anti-fire garments. Amongst the main substances mentioned are: vinegar (khalI),
alum (shabb), myrrh (murr), borax (bawraq), albumen (bayad al-baydah), and, most
important of all, hollyhock (khaprti), which is described as being incredibly resistant
to fire.153
No details survive about the naval tactics that the Muslims adopted, but one can
picture, in general, the typical tactics used in naval warfare between Muslims and
Byzantines based on the naval weapons used by each side as well as from scattered
information obtained from Muslim and Byzantine sources of later periods. After the
famous naval battle of Dhat al-Sawarl in 34/655, neither Muslim nor Byzantine
sources record any large-scale naval engagement between the two opponents. There
may have been two particular reasons for this. First, the numbers of warships
involved in naval battles between the two sides were not many. Consequently, the
'^'Archibald, Naval Power, p. 156; Visiliev, Byzance, vol. 1, p. 132; Haldon & Byrne, "A Possible
Solution", p. 98.
1i2Isfahani, Aghanl, vol. 18, p. 274.
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defeat of one side did not inevitably lead to the collapse of the naval power of that
side as happened to the Byzantines at Dhat al-Sawarl, when they lost nearly all of
the 1,000 warships they deployed in that conflict.154 The second reason, emphasized
by the Byzantine sources, is that the Byzantines' fleets, and most probably the
Muslims' too, were trained to avoid as much as possible any direct confrontation
with the enemy's fleet unless it was absolutely necessary or when victory was
guaranteed.155 This was in recognition of the fact that the manufacture of the
warships was very expensive and that the replacement of crews was also extremely
difficult.156 The great care taken of warships is evident in their cautious
immobilization during wintertime, when they would be pulled ashore to safeguard
them from the high winds and storms of winter.157 Naval engagements between
Muslim and Byzantine fleets hardly ever took place on the deep, open water.
Instead, they usually happened near the shores of ports and islands. Similar to the
tactic used by their land forces, Muslims seemed to prefer to arrange their ships in
rows (sufuf) or in a crescent (hilal) formation. The actual fighting would usually
start with arrows, stone missiles, heavy pieces of iron, and Greek fire being shot
between the two sides. If no ship was destroyed in the first confrontation, then the
ram would be used, and if this also failed then the two opponents would come very
close ad sometimes one side would try to grapple their ships to those of the enemy by
b3Ibn al-'Aniri, Kitab al-Myal, pp. 160-63; Ibn Mankall, al-TadbFat, p. 365.
b,Mas'udi, al-Tcmbih, p. 158; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuh, p. 189; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 4, p. 288; Ibn
al-A'tham, Futuh, vol. 2, p. 354; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 3, p. 13; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 7, p. 157;
EI', Suppl., s.v. "Dhat al-SawarT".
'''Archibald, Naval power, p. 158; Christides, Conquest, p. 60.
',hDolley, "Naval Tactics", p. 325.
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using chains with grappling-irons. At this stage planks would be cast between the
two sides and the decks of their ships would thus act as the battlefield where the men
of each side would fight with swords and daggers.158
6.2.3 The Crew of the Warship and the Responsibilities of the Commander of
the Fleet
While describing the different seas, their physical characteristics, navigation in them,
and the marine life of each one, al-Mas'udl indicates that each warship of the
Muslim fleet serving in the Mediterranean was manned by a crew whose grades and
appellations differed according to the work that each person was entrusted with on
the ship.159 The greater part of the crews consisted of the nawatl, then the ru'asa',
and finally those who were entrusted with the command of the ships of war.160 The
nawatl (sing, nutJ) were the sailors, a tenn which seems to be equivalent to the term
mallahun, which was most commonly used in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.161 In each
warship the nawatl were under the direct command of a chief sailor, best known in
Syria and North Africa as qa'id al-nawati,162 whereas in Iraq and the Persian Gulf
the term ashtiyam (pi. ashatimah) was applied to this person.163 According to Ibn
1l7Bakri, al-Mughrib, pp. 38; Ibn Qutaybah, al-lmamah, pt. 2, p.l 11.
1,HChristides, Conquest, p. 62.
Ll,Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 1, p. 129.
""ibid.
16,The term nutl"sailor" is a loan word from Greek nauta. While Ibn Manzur {Lisan, vol. 2, p. 101)
says that nutl is a word commonly used in Syria to designate sailors, historians like al-Tabari use the
word mallahun when they speak of sailors in Iraq.
lh:ilbn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 254.
"'Tabari, Tai Jkh, vol. 9, pp. 307, 558.
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Khaldun, the duties of the qa'id al-ncrwatl included the care of weapons and the
direction of the naval action.164 Meanwhile, the ra'Is (pi. ru 'asa) was the captain
who was in charge of the warship's course, whether propelled by wind or oars
{majadtf), and its anchorage.165
The terms amir al-bahr, amir al-ma\ and amir al-rahl all appear to be synonymous
as they mean the general in command of the fleet, terms from which the word
"admiral" is derived.166 Almost on the same level (though in a different element)
with the governors of land provinces, the admiral or amir al-bahr enjoyed wide-
ranging authority as well as responsibility. His responsibilities were not confined to
commanding the naval forces in time of war but also extended to taking care of the
administration, financing, and safety of the fleet and its fighting forces in peacetime.
Details of these responsibilities are well illustrated in Qudamah's book, al-Kharaj,
through a letter of instruction directed by the 'Abbasid Caliph to one of his admirals
{ami- al-thughur al-bahrI)- Among these were the following duties:
Recruiting ofMen
Recruitment of men, whatever their ranks, was one of the main responsibilities of the
admiral. None but the best soldiers were to be chosen to serve in the fleet - those of
a high moral standard and great courage in the face of the enemy. Recruited naphtha-
104Ibn Khaldun, Mtiqaddimah, p. 254.
'bSIbid.
"'''Ameer, Short History, p. 443; Hasan, Tarikh cil-Islam, vol. 3, p. 473.
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throwers, sailors, oarsmen, artisans, and workmen on the ship had to be from among
persons who were highly skilled, patient, and qualified in carrying out any necessary
repairs to the ship. With regard to his police officers, the admiral had to choose men
who would uphold his sense of justice and his severe attitude towards suspects and
vicious men.
Treatment ofMen
The Caliph advised the commander to review his troops continually and remain in
constant contact with his ships, in order to gain a thorough understanding of his men
and their qualities. His men should be able to reach him easily to make complaints or
express their needs. He himself had to be an example to his soldiers and to anyone
who looked to him for guidance, encouraging them and correcting them in the best
possible way. His justice had to be clear to all and he must be, lenient towards the
obedient and severe towards the disobedient. He had to pay their allowances (arzaq)
in full and without delay.
Construction and Anchorage ofShips
An important duty of the commander was the supervision of shipbuilding, ensuring
that the best-quality timbers, irons, and tar were obtained along with the best oars,
masts, and nails. He must inspect newly-built ships for good construction, ensuring
that methods and tools were improved and highly qualified specialist craftsmen were
chosen for the work. When in harbour the ships needed to be guarded and in the
winter they must be drawn up on safe beaches to protect them from high winds. The
commander had to appoint men whom he knew and trusted for their courage and
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good advice to remain in charge of ships when they were in their ports of anchorage,
so that no ship would leave harbour without his knowledge. The Caliph urged the
commander to watch over the ships continually, ensuring they were in good repair
and always prepared for use with equipment in complete readiness, including
naphtha, ropes, and other materials.
Secret Services and Prevention ofLeakage ofNaval Information
It was the commander's responsibility to see that agents who gathered information
about the enemy were trustworthy, capable of giving sound advice, and also religious
and honest. They must be fully acquainted with the sea, its ports, little known areas,
and hiding places, so that they might report truthfully to him and give accurate
details of ship movements. If they met enemy ships that they could not deal with,
they should know where they could hide successfully. The commander had to
supervise distant outposts and naval bases in order to be fully informed about the
staff in charge. He had to keep a vigilant watch for enemy agents, and each senior
official he put in charge must know intimately the city where he was based and
ensure that gatekeepers and guards did not permit anyone to enter the city until they
knew all about him, whence he came, his features, his attitude of mind, and his
intention.
Preventing information about naval warfare from being leaked was one of the major
obligations of the commander of the fleet. He must see that enemies were prevented
from getting hold of weapons or knowledge of naval tactics from Muslim territory,
and that commercial traders did not carry information or goods to the enemy. Severe
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punishment must be meted out to anyone discovered to be doing this so that he
would be an example to others.167
The Caliph concluded his instructions by admonishing his commander not to betray
his trust and wishing him success and good guidance in the task assigned to him.
Maritime skills were one of those things that the Arabs at first lacked, as they were a
desert people. With the exception of the fighting men, the Arabs relied from the early
days of Islam and for many later centuries on the people of the conquered areas to
man their fleet.168 During the early 'Abbasid period, the Copts of Egypt are reported
to have continued the tradition of providing the Muslims with the warships needed
for their fleet as well as crew members including sailors, oarsmen, and helmsmen.
The recruitment of sailors, as recorded mainly in the papyri of Egypt, was managed
in a very organized manner, using a method which seems to have been the same as
that normally employed in the raising of taxes. Requisitions by the governor were
addressed to the community, which collectively was responsible to recruit its share of
sailors. The draftees, therefore, would come from various social classes of the
population including shepherds, bath-men, and fullers. In practice, however,
personal service was usually replaced by money compensation, by which a village or
a draftee could pay the wages of a substitute. Thus, while the maritime expenses fell
'"Unfortunately, the author does not give any clue to the Caliph's name. Qudamah, Kharaj, pp. 47-
50.
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upon the entire population of Egypt, the actual maritime duties seem to have been
performed mainly by professionals.1 In addition to sailors, Christian Copts in
Egypt also provided the Muslim fleet with artisans, such as carpenters, caulkers,
fullers, and skilled workmen. As with the sailors, the artisans were also raised by
means of conscription. In this regard, Bishop Severus Ibn al-Muqaffa' complained
that, unlike the situation under the Umayyads, during the reign of the 'Abbasid
Caliph al-Mansur the monks in Egypt, although not compelled to pay any sum of
money for the fleet, were instead required to carry out the tasks allotted to them daily
in the shipbuilding yards of Misr.170
Summary
Regarding the 'Abbasids naval power in the Mediterranean, they showed a distinct
disinterest in extending Muslim influence across those waters and merely viewed the
Syrian and African coasts as a bastion against Byzantine attack. Naval operations in
the Mediterranean were actually imposed on the 'Abbasids rather than the result of
their own military initiative and successive Caliphs (Abu al-'Abbas and al-Mansur)
were drawn into conflicts and necessary fortification works in the coastal regions.
168In this regard Ibn Khaldun (Muqaddimah, p. 253) says "When the Arabs established their authority
and became the dominant power... men of different races (umam) offered their services to them and
they employed boatmen and sailors to help them improve their maritime knowledge and activities."
In the naval battle of Dhat al-$awarlin 34/655, it is reported that there were only two Muslims on
board one of the ships while all the others were Copts. Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 4, p. 29; Ibn al-Athlr,
Kamil, vol. 3, p. 14; Ibn Kathlr, Bidayah, vol. 7, p. 158.
"'9Fahmy, Sea-power, pp. 98-102.
mIbid„ pp. 106-7.
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The defence of the Muslim coasts depended on a system of servicemen from inland
regions being stationed in the coastal towns during summer, while in winter these
points were manned by small companies of garrisoned troops (murabitw).
The people of Cyprus presented a particular problem to the 'Abbasids on account of
their support for the Byzantines, provoking an attack against the island by the
'Abbasid Syrian fleet in 146/763, but it was another ten years before the 'Abbasids
felt the need to launch a second naval attack in the Mediterranean, this time against
the southern coast of Asia Minor. The later naval campaigns during the reigns of al-
Mahdl, al-Rashld, and al-Ma'mun indicate a continued concern with Byzantine foes
in Cyprus and Crete, and, under the last of these Caliphs, Crete and Sicily were taken
by the Muslims, albeit by independent Muslim forces from Ifriqiya and Andalusia.
In the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the 'Abbasids' fleet remained weak during
the early years of their caliphate, their chief problem being the piratic attacks of the
Mayd and occasionally the Kurk peoples from the region of Sind. Decisive measures
were taken against them by Caliph al-Mansur, less however by naval successes than
by his affirmation of 'Abbasid authority in Sind. Nevertheless, there was a
resurgence of hostilities from Sindi groups such as the Zutt in the time of Caliph al-
Mahdl, when 'Abbasid governors in Sind were preoccupied in dealing with tribal
struggles between Qaysite and Yamanite Arab settlers in the region, and a major
military expedition had to be launched to suppress the rebellion. The same pattern of
events recurred during the caliphate of al-Rashld, initiated by the inter-tribal feuding
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among the Arabs of Sind about 171/788, but this time it was an enhanced 'Abbasid
fleet in the Gulf, rather than capable governors in Sind, that brought the situation
under control. During the civil war between the two brothers al-Ma'mun and al-
Amln, opportunity was once more taken by pirates to pursue their activities in the
Gulf, which was made worse by a renewed rebellion of the Zutt, leading eventually
to a shift of the trade centre from the port of al-Ubullah, near Basrah, to the more
secure harbour of SIraf, near Shlraz. Under al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tasim, however,
the 'Abbasids managed to re-establish their authority in the Persian Gulf, although
the problem posed by Sind-based pirates continued to the end of the first century of
the 'Abbasid rule.
Moving beyond an early system of coastal defence in the Mediterranean against the
Byzantine threat, the Muslims in Syria and Egypt constructed naval bases and
dockyards to accommodate their augmented fleets. The earliest of these were at
Qulzum and Alexandria. Other 'Abbasid naval bases, with varying histories and
importance (most constructed earlier by the Umayyads) were at Rosetta, Damietta,
and Tinnls in Egypt; Barqah and Tunis in North Africa; Acre and Tyre (both, like
some others, fitted with defensive chains across the entrances to their harbours),
Ladhiqiyah, Sayda, Beirut, and Tarabulus al-Sham on the Syrian coast; Tarsus on
the coast of Asia Minor; and Basrah and al-Ubullah in Iraq.
Among the warships employed by the 'Abbasids, it is possible to describe, as far as
evidence is available, the types and functions of different vessels, including the
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barijah, shin I, shalandl, taridah, and qarqur, all of which could be used on the open
seas. There were, in addition, certain vessels used as river craft by the 'Abbasid
military, which included the shadha, sumayri, harraqah, and tayyarah. With regard
to the various stages of and the materials used in shipbuilding, different types of
timber were required for different parts of the ship (hull, masts, keel, planking, and
oars) and these had to be supplied from trees that were locally available either in
Egypt, Syria, or the lands bordering the Persian Gulf. Concerning the techniques of
ship-construction, certain advantages were obtained by the stitched, rather than by
the nailed, hull, and details have been included on the methods used for
waterproofing and the weapons carried on board (including Greek fire).
In view of the high cost of replacing warships and crews, naval battles between
Muslims and Byzantines were avoided as far as was possible, but when they did
come into conflict, the tactics employed resembled in several ways those that were
used by land armies.
The final part of the chapter contains a discussion of the different ranks, who formed
the crew of the warship and the terms used to identify them. In addition, the various
duties of the commander of the fleet, as described in a caliphal letter preserved in
Qudamah's Kirah al-Kharaj, are detailed. Note is finally taken of the extent to
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The motives of city building in ancient and modem times differ from one to another.
In general terms, cities are built for administrative, military, commercial, or
recreational purposes. Although it is possible for some cities to combine more than
one of these characteristics at the same time, perhaps being administrative and
military or commercial and recreational, yet each characteristic requires specific
qualifications to be viewed as a genuine representative of the type. This chapter
attempts to shed light on the 'Abbasids' military bases and their most distinctive
martial characteristics.
7.1 'Abbasid Capital Cities
Unlike the early Islamic cities (amsar) such as Kufah, Basrah, Fustat, and
Qayrawan, which were built in the early days of Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate
initially as garrison towns for the conquering forces,1 the 'Abbasid capitals were
strategic cities from the very outset of their establishment. That is to say that, in
addition to being the seat of the 'Abbasid Caliphs and the main administrative
centres for the whole empire, the 'Abbasid capitals also served from the beginning as
military bases. This fact is evidenced by the careful choice of their locations, the
fortress nature of their structure, and the settlement of the army in and outside their
perimeters.
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One of the most important priorities for the 'Abbasids, having succeeded in their
revolution, was to search for the best capital city for their new-bom state, one that
would serve not only as the seat of their authority, but also as a garrison for their
revolutionary forces. From the 'Abbasids' military perspective, the city of
Damascus, the Umayyads' capital, did not possess the advantages that would make it
eligible as their own capital. This was not only because Damascus was the heartland
of Umayyad support, but also because it was situated in a province sharing long land
and sea borders with the Byzantines, thus making it strategically under perpetual risk
of attack.2 Equally, neither did any of the cities of Arabia, Egypt, or Khurasan meet
the needs of the 'Abbasids in their quest for an effective administrative and military
capital. While Arabia lacked human and natural resources, Egypt and Khurasan
were located at the fringes of the Islamic Empire, thus, from a military perspective,
making it difficult to deploy troops swiftly and sufficiently from there to other parts
of the state should a revolt break out.3 Having assessed all options in detail, the
'Abbasids subsequently found Iraq to be the object of their long-cherished wish.
Besides being the traditional hotbed of opposition to the Umayyads and a stronghold
of support for the right of the house of the Prophet to rule, it was also rich in natural
resources. Moreover, the easy accessibility it afforded to key provinces also placed it
'Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 338-350; Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 4, pp. 44-5. For some details on the
establishment of the Muslim garrison towns during the early days of Islam, see N. al-Sayyad, Cities
and Caliphs, pp. 43-76; El2, s.v. "Misr".
2A1-'A1I, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 21.
3Shakir, BanI al-'Abbas, vol. 1, p. 321.
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advantageously above other regions. However, it was not easy for the 'Abbasids to
decide on the most convenient place within Iraq itself. Although Abu al-'Abbas was
proclaimed Caliph in Kufah, he never thought of or regarded the city as his
permanent seat of authority. He knew quite well that making Kufah, with its pro-
' Alid sympathies, the seat of his government would involve great risk. Although the
city was a suitable place for spreading the 'Abbasid propaganda during its secretive
phase, it ceased to be so once the dynasty had been declared and its true objectives
had come to light, namely the exclusion of the 'Alid family from the right to rule.
Thus, Caliph Abu al-'Abbas, feeling insecure there, decided to abandon Kufah and
chose instead to position himself and his Khurasan! troops in a camp that had been
set up by Abu Salamah in Hamam A'yan, sited approximately three farsakhs (11
miles) away from Kufah.5 Having resided there for only a few months, the Caliph
left Hamam A'yan for HIrat al-Kufah region. There, along the Euphrates, he
founded a new capital for himself and his troops on the very site where the last
Umayyad governor of Iraq, Yazld b. Hubayrah, had begun to build a new city, only
to abandon the project on the order of Caliph Marwan.6 Caliph Abu al-'Abbas
named his new residence al-Hashimlyah, but the people persisted in calling it by its
former name, Madinat Ibn Hubayrah. This persistence caused the Caliph to change
his mind before the city was ever completed and to build a new Hashimiyah directly
4
Lassner, Shaping, p. 143; Kennedy, 'Abbasid Caliphate, p. 87.
5Tabari, Tartkh, vol. 7, pp. 418-9, 429, 431; Azdl, TarJkh, p. 123; Akhbar, p. 388; Mas'udI, Muruj,
vol. 3, p. 253; Lassner, Shaping, p. 146.
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opposite the site of his first choice. Yet again, the caliph did not stay long in his
new capital, as, in 134/752, he moved to al-Anbar region, where he founded a new
capital on the east bank of the Euphrates, some ten farsakhs west of Baghdad.8 In his
new capital, which he once again named al-Hashimlyah, Caliph Abu al-'Abbas
settled with his Khurasan! troops, whose commanders received plots of land for
building in the area surrounding the Caliph's palace.9
Upon succeeding his brother as Caliph in 136/754, al-Mansur continued to stay in
the city,10 though not for a long. For reasons that remain unknown, he returned to
the former capital in Hirat al-Kufah in 137/755.'1 No sooner, however, had he taken
up position there, than it become clear to al-Mansur that the Hashimiyah of Kufah
was not the best option for situating his seat and his troops. Besides its neighbouring
Kufah, with the danger that pro-'Alid elements there might influence the Khurasan!
troops, the city's lack of security arrangements proved also to be a source of danger
during the mutiny of the Rawandiyah in 141/759, when al-Mansur almost lost his
6Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 351; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 4, p. 365.
7Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 351; Lassner, Shaping, p. 153; Duri, al-'Asr al-'Abbasi, p. 52.
8Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 464; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 358; idem, Buldan, p. 10; Dinawarl,
Akhbar, p. 357; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 155; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 351; Mas'udI, Tartbih, p. 339. According
to al-Baladhuri (Ansab, vol. 2, p. 150), the transference of the Caliph's residence from HIrat al-Kufah
to al-Anbar is said to have been suggested by Abu Muslim, who reminded the Caliph of the close
proximity of Kufah and its pro-' Alid sympathies to his seat.
9DInawari, Akhbar, pp. 375, 378; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 358.
10Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 379, 480, 483-4.
uBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 351; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 10.
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life.12 The combination of these factors eventually convinced al-Mansur of the need
to search for a location in which to build a fortified city that would serve both as a
seat of authority and as a garrison for his troops.13 Nevertheless, it took four years
before Caliph al-Mansur finally chose the site of Baghdad and started the actual
process of building in 145/763.
Besides the economic, commercial and climatic advantages of Baghdad, which have
been discussed at length in sources speaking of the establishment of the city, the
most important military characteristics of Baghdad can be summarized in two key
points: location and fortification.
The location chosen by the 'Abbasid Caliph as his capital was very important as it
was right in the middle of Iraq, halfway between major Iraqi cities - Kufah, Basrah,
Wasit, Mawsil, and Sawad. It was also the meeting point of land and water routes.14
Hence, strategically, it was feasible for the 'Abbasid authorities to deploy their
central troops in all directions, in Iraq or to other areas of the empire, efficiently and
swiftly. Moreover, the location of Baghdad on the west bank of the Tigris, in the
area where the two great rivers (Tigris and Euphrates) come close together, and the
presence of many tributary canals, provided an excellent means of defence for the
city against any external attack.15 The two great rivers - Tigris to the east, Euphrates
12Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 614-5; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 165; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 3, p. 312.
13Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 614.
l4Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 373; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 617.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 617.
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to the west - formed a defence line for the capital. An invading army from the west
or the east would find it extremely difficult to cross those rivers when the bridges
were cut off. At the same time it would be easy for the 'Abbasid army to foil any
attempt by an invading army to construct a crossing.16
The fact that the military consideration was the most important reason for founding
Baghdad was reflected in its lack of any luxury buildings or recreational
establishments such as theatres, gymnasia, or gardens.17 Instead of recreational
facilities, attention was paid to providing the city with an elaborate defence system,
made up of a trench, walls, and gates. The trench (khandaq) measured 60 feet in
width and acted as a water barrier. It encircled the city's outer wall and took its water
from a feeder channel flowing from the Karkhaya canal, a tributary of the
Euphrates.18 In order to prevent water from the trench escaping towards the wall's
base, a quay (musannah) made of burnt brick (ajurr) and quicklime (saruj) was built
on the side of the trench adjacent to the wall.19 The function of the trench was to
prevent invasion forces from reaching the outer wall, a defence technique known to
•jo
the Arabs since pre-Islamic times."
I6Lassner, Shaping, p. 185.
17KhatIb, Tarikh, vol. 1, p. 87; al-'AlI, "The Founding of Baghdad", p. 93. It seems that the first
recreational facility to be founded in Baghdad was the hippodrome, which was established in the time
of Caliph al-Hadl, 30 years after the founding of the city.
l8Ya'qubI, Buldan, p. 12; Lassner, Shaping, p. 199.
"Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 12; Lassner, Shaping, p. 199; al-Ali, Baghdad, vol. 1, pp. 296-7.
70EI2, s.v. "Khandak".
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In addition to the trench, the city was also protected by two walls separated by an
91 • «
intervallum (fasil). The outer wall, which was shorter and thinner than the inner
wall, seems unlikely to have been the main defence line, for the methods used to
defend the Round City reveal that the inner wall, which is described as "the great"
-yy
(al-a'zam), was the one relied on as a means of additional defence. As an
additional defensive arrangement, the inner wall was provided with many projecting
towers (shurafat)23 whereby troops could position themselves to monitor and shower
the assailants with arrows and other projectiles such as rocks and iron balls.
The walls were pierced by four massive iron double gates, each of which was
guarded by a force of 1,000 men and named after the province or the main city to
which it led: Khurasan Gate, al-Sham Gate, Kufah Gate, and Basrah Gate.24 Among
the most distinguishing features of the city's gates was an important architectural
motif known as azwirar or "the bent entrance".25 This feature is such that anyone
approaching the city from the outside gate could not enter it directly, as he had to
96 * /•»
turn left into a corridor leading to the second gate." This style of entrance offered
means of concealment as part of an elaborate military defence technique. It is
suggested that this bent entrance with a corridor tilting to the left would have
2lKhatib, Tarikh, vol. 1, p. 73; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 651; al-'Ali, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 298.
22Ya'qubI, Buldan, p. 12; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 651. For some observations on the dimensions of
the walls, see Lassner, Shaping, p. 288, n. 3; al-'Ali, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 299.
2iYa'qubi, Buldan, p. 12; Khatib, Tarikh, vol. I, p. 74.
24Khat!b, Tarikh, vol. 1, pp. 76-7; Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 11; idem, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 373.
25Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 156.
26KhatIb, Tarikh, vol. 1, p. 74; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 156.
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compelled assailants, after entering the first gate, to turn left, thereby exposing their
right sides, which were not covered by shields since the common practice was for
soldiers to hold their shields with their left hands and their swords or spears with
their right hand, which would then be targets for the arrows of defenders firing from
the top of the inner wall.27
As might be expected of a city intended to be both an administrative centre and a
military base, the settlement of the army in Baghdad was carried out according to a
very careful plan. After completing the construction of Baghdad, which some of the
military commanders were detailed to take part in supervising the construction
work,28 the Khurasan! troops, as individuals and groups, were allotted fiefs (qata'i',
sing. qatTah) within and outside the city walls. Apart from his close mawall and
advisers, Caliph al-Mansur only allotted lands for building within the walls of the
city to his most trustworthy commanders and their men."* A particularly privileged
part of them the Marwarrudhiyah, who resided in the quarter located between the
gates of Basrah and Khurasan.30 Regarding the lands outside the walls of the city,
although the fiefs of the Khurasanls were scattered all over the outskirts of the city, a
large proportion of them seem to have been concentrated more on the north and the
north-west, especially in and around the vast area known as al-Harblyah suburb
27Creswell, Early Muslim Architecture, vol. 2, pp. 23-5.
28During the construction period, Baghdad was divided into four quarters (arbi?, sing, rub'), each of
which was entrusted to a military commander (qa'id) with the mission to supervise the workers and
urge them to finish the work. Tabarf, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 619, 651.
39Ya'qubI, Buldan, p. 14.
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(,rabad).31 Nevertheless, unlike the common practice in the organization of the
garrisons cities (amsar) in early days of Islam and the Umayyad Caliphate, when the
worriers were settled according to their tribes and clans, the Khurasanls settled in
Baghdad according to their cities and districts of origin in Khurasan and other
eastern provinces. Thus, when the geographer-historian al-Ya'qubi names, for
example, the people (ahl) who settled in the suburb of al-Harblyah, he points out that
they were from the people of Balkh, Marw, Khuttal, Bukhara, Khwarizm, Kabul
Shah, AsbTshab, and Istakhnaj.33 Each of these groups, he adds, was under the
command of an army commander {qa'id) and a second officer called a chief (ra 'is),34
whose responsibility seems to have been to look after the administrative and civil
affairs of the soldiers in peace-time.35
Although the careful planning and the security measures taken by Caliph al-Mansur
in the establishment of Baghdad guaranteed him a capital that was impregnable
against any outside threat, time however proved that they were not sufficient to
ensure his personal security, especially when internal unrest broke out among his
troops. This weakness became obvious in 151/768 when different factions of the
30Ibid., pp. 13-4. On the distinguished and extensive military role of the Marwarrudhlyah in the early
'Abbasid period, see Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 7, pp. 462-3, 474, 498, 509; vol. 8, pp. 29, 142, 530.
31Ya'qubI (Buldan, pp. 14-21) lists 60 fiefs outside the walls of the city, 40 of them situated on the
north and north-west, the remainder located on the other sides of the city. For a more in-depth study
on the settlement pattern of Baghdad during its early period, see Lassner, Shaping, pp. 208-17; al-'
All, Baghdad, vol. 1, pp. 134-172.
32Ya'qubt, Buldan, pp. 15, 18.
nlbid.
34Ibid., p. 20.
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army mutinied against the Caliph for unspecified reasons. This led the Caliph to take
the decision not only to foster rivalry between the different factions of his army but
also to break their unity by separating them into two detachments. Thus, while a part
of the army remained in Baghdad on the west bank of the Tigris, the other faction
was moved to encamp with his son and heir apparent, al-Mahdl, on the east bank just
opposite the Round City in an area originally known as 'Askar al-Mahdl and later as
al-Rusafah.36 By creating these two military centres, the Caliph could now use one
detachment against the other. Should an insurrection break out on the left bank of
the river, the Caliph would still have access to military support and provision on the
opposite bank; the reverse would of course be true for the right bank.37
Al-Rusafah, which grew fast and became a part of Baghdad soon after its founding,
was protected by a trench and wall and connected to the west bank of the Tigris by
four pontoon bridges, two of which were installed for the exclusive use of the Caliph
and his household.38
Before completing the construction work on al-Rusafah in 159/776, Caliph al-
Mansur also founded in 155/772 another garrison city, called al-Rafiqah, on the left
bank of the middle Euphrates at about 300 ells' distance (200 m.) west of the old city
35A1-'A1I, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 160; Lassner, Shaping, p. 213.
36Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 361; Khatlb, Tarikh, vol. 1, p. 83; Mas'udI, Tanbih, p. 360; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol.
8, p. 37.
37Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 37; Lassner, "Rusafah", p. 97; ibid., Shaping, p. 205; Sayyad, Cities and
Caliphs, p. 130; Omar,'Abbasiyyat, p. 109.
38Lassner, "Rusafah," p. 97.
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of al-Raqqah in northern Mesopotamia.39 Planned by Mu'awiyah b. Salih and
Mu'adh b. Muslim,40 al-Rafiqah was built after the model of Baghdad 41 It was a
Round City with a defence system consisting of double walls supported by 132
projecting towers and a moat on the outside42 Moreover, like Baghdad and al-
Rusafah, al-Rafiqah was founded with the purpose of garrisoning a considerable
number of Khurasan! troops whose main duty was to reinforce the Byzantine frontier
and to keep a close eye on the Arab tribes in Jazlrah and Syria 43 Al-Rafiqah, which
lost its name in course of time and took instead the name of the old city al-Raqqah,
reached its apogee under Caliph al-Rashld, who adopted it as his permanent
residence from 180/796 until his death in 193/809.44
Although within the first 50 years of its establishment Baghdad had lost its position
as the seat of authority to other cities such as al-Rafiqah or Marw in Khurasan,
throughout that period it nevertheless remained the main base of the 'Abbasid central
army. This situation continued unchanged until 221/836, when Caliph al-Mu'tasim
laid the foundation of Samarra'. All sources speaking of Samarra' unanimously
report that the main reason for the founding of the city was closely connected to al-
Mu'tasim's policy of large-scale introduction of Central Asian troops (so-called
39Tabari, Tirikh, vol. 8, p. 44; Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 213; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 370; Azdl, Tarikh,
p. 224;EI2, s.v. "al-Rakka".
^Azdi, Tarikh, p. 224.
41Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 213; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 315.
A2EI2, s.v. "al-Rakka"; Le Strange, Lands, pp. 101-2.
43Kennedy, ''AbbasidCaliphate, p. 90; Duri, al-'Asral-'Abbasi, p. 74; Omar,'Abbasiyyai, p. 106.
Rakan al-Mntairi } PhD Thesis | Chapter 7 | 'AbbAvd Military Bam SBBk
Turks) into the central army in Baghdad. This policy eventually provoked a deep
resentment amongst all elements of Baghdad's population. It seems that, the streets
and suburbs of Baghdad were becoming cramped by the new soldiers, whose number
at the time is estimated by some sources, most likely with a sense of exaggeration, to
have been 70,000.43 What tended to worsen the situation was the unruly behaviour of
the Turks, who used to gallop on their horses through the streets of Baghdad, hitting
men and women and trampling children under foot.46 Behaviour of this kind on the
part of the Turks enraged the people of Baghdad, who would on many occasions pull
them from their saddles, beating some and killing others, without the authorities'
being able to learn who had killed them.47 The feeling of resentment against the
Turks and al-Mu'tasim, who brought them, was not limited to the general populace
of Baghdad, but was shared by the old Baghdad! troops from among the Abna, who
deeply resented the clear preference of al-Mu'tasim for his Turkish troops at their
expense 48 All these reasons were enough ultimately to convince al-Mu'tasim of the
scale of danger this set for his personal safety and the safety of his Turkish troops on
44Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 266; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 213; DInawari, Akhbar, p. 390.
45Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 173; Nizam al-Mulk, Siyasatnamah, p. 85; QazwinI, Alhar al-Bilad, pp.
318, 385; Ibn Tiqtaqa, Fakhri, p. 210.
46Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 18; Ya'qubT, Buldan, p. 27; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 53; idem, Tanbih, p.
356; K. al-'Uvun, p. 487.
47Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 18; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 27.
48Ibn Tiqtaqa, Fakhri, p. 211; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 53; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 17.
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whom his authority rested. Thus, al-Mu'tasim decided that the best solution was to
find another seat for the Caliphate and for his troops.49
Like his predecessors, al-Mu'tasim tried several locations near Baghdad before
finally settling on the site of Samarra', which was about 125 km. north of Baghdad,
on the east bank of the Tigris.50 Unlike Baghdad, which was protected by an
elaborate defence system comprising walls and trenches, Samarra' lacked any such
kinds of defence arrangements.51 The most important aspect in connection with the
establishment of Samarra' is the segregation policy that had been adopted by Caliph
al-Mu'tasim in settling the different military groups of his army. The various
military groups were separated from one another, but in the siting of their respective
quarters the proximity of their original homeland was taken into consideration.52
Thus, the Turkish troops were settled in quarters near the troops from Farghanah and
Ushrusanah.53 These troops, on the other hand, were kept apart not only from the
local populace but also from the Khurasanls, who settled, along with the common
people, on both sides of the main street of the city.54 hi order to discourage any
interaction between the Turkish troops and other sections of the population, the
Turkish neighbourhoods were provided with their own shops, bath-houses, markets,
49Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. pp. 17-8; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 54; Ya'qubl, Buldan, p. 27; Ibn Tiqtaqa,
FakhrT, p. 210; Ismail, "Samarra' p. 4; Rogers, "Samarra' ", pp. 128-9.
50EI2, s.v. "Samarra' ".
slDuri, al- 'Asr al- 'AbbasI, p. 199; Ismail, "Samarra' ", p. 7.
"Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 55.
53Ya'qubI, Buldan, p. 29; Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 55.
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and mosques.55 Moreover, to preserve the ethnic purity as well as the military spirit
among his Turkish troops, the Caliph went further in his segregation policy by
forbidding his Turkish troops to marry anybody who was not from their own ethnic
stock.56 For this purpose al-Mu'tasim sought to purchase female Turkish slaves and
have them manned to his Turkish troops, so that their offspring would in turn
intermarry (exclusively) amongst themselves.57 Al-Mu'tasim took yet another step
in his social programme related to his Turkish troops in Samarra' by entering the
names of the slave women assigned to his Turkish troops in the registers (dawawin)
and giving them fixed allowances (arzaq qa'imcth), thereby making it impossible for
• 58
their husbands to divorce or abandon these wives.
While the establishment of the 'Abbasid garrison-capitals in Iraq led to complete
demilitarization of the old Iraqi cities such as Kufah, Basrah, and Wasit, nearly all
the amsar in other regions continued to retain their prime roles as military garrisons
in addition to their administrative one. Nevertheless, in the time of the 'Abbasids
their military roles were no longer to house the troops who would wage the jihad and
expand the state borders, but rather to maintain order and occasionally to take part in
^Ya'qubi, Buldan, p. 29.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.\ Mas'udI, Muruj, vol. 4, p. 55.
5SYa'qubI, Buldan, p. 29; Ismail, "Samarra' p. 8; Ayalon, "Reform", pp. 32-3. For farther
discussion of the motives as well as the social, political, and cultural impact of al-Mu'tasim's
segregation policy used toward his Turkish troops in Samarra' , see G. M. Spalckhaver, The Breaking
ofa Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish Community ofSamarra' (218-264/833-877), Ph.D.
thesis, Columbia University, 1993, pp. 310-34.
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the collecting of local taxes.59 Among the many amsar that are frequently mentioned
during the early 'Abbasid time and which housed companies of troops were Mawsil,
Qayrawan, Tunis, Tubnah, Fustat, Marw, Rayy, and al-Mansurah in Sind. The
number of troops stationed in these various amsar varied from one city to another
and from one time to another, depending inevitably on the extent of the threat in each
region. In some regions such as Ifriqiyah where there were many Kharijites,
Berbers, etc., who always sought to establish their own authority in the region, there
was always a need for a large number of troops, whose number in some years
reached as many as 40,000 as in the case of the Khurasanls in Qayrawan.60
Meanwhile, in other, less troublesome areas such as Mawsil, control only required
between 2,000 and 4,000 locally recruited militia men to be stationed in the city to
handle the frequent raids conducted by small Kharijite forces against the city and the
cultivated areas.61
Apart from these old garrison towns, situations sometime required that the 'Abbasid
authority build new, limited-size garrison towns to handle new threats that previously
did not exist. For example, in the district of Hamdan, in Jibal province, the 'Abbasid
authority under Caliph al-Mahdi was driven to build a well-fortified garrison town in
Sisar. Its mission was to counter the highwaymen who were spread abroad in the
mountainous areas, causing a major threat to the traffic routes as well as to the
'^Kennedy, "Central Government", p. 30.
'""Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 8, p. 639.
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Caliph's livestock that grazed in the area. During the reign of Caliph al-Rashid,
STsar was laid waste at the hands of the highwaymen, whose number had increased
considerably over time. Nevertheless, by the order of the Caliph, SIsar was soon
rebuilt and garrisoned this time by 1,000 militia-men who were recruited locally.62
7.2 Frontier Strongholds
Other than the military bases in the heartland of their empires, the 'Abbasids also
possessed an inclusive system of strongholds, packed with troops, stretching all
along their land frontiers. Special attention, however, was paid to those situated
along the northern and north-eastern borderlines with the Byzantines and the
Khazars, who represented the most serious remaining outer threats to the sovereignty
of the Islamic state at that time. Regarding the northern frontier with Byzantium, the
Muslim armies' conquest of Syria and Mesopotamia around 20/641 and their
persistent offensive against Armenia compelled the Byzantine armies to withdraw
from these regions into Asia Minor.63 In order to protect the heartland of Asia Minor
from the advances of the Muslim armies, the Byzantines initially relied on a complex
two-phase defence system. First, by destroying all the strongholds, towns, and
villages in the Cilician plain and deporting all of their inhabitants into the Byzantine
hinterland in Asia Minor. By this, the Byzantines aimed to create an empty buffer
zone that would separate their lands in Asia Minor from the Muslim's newly gained
61AzdI, Tarlkh, pp. 177, 192, 267-9; Tabari, TarJkh, vol. 8, p. 632; Kennedy, "Central Government,"
p. 30.
62Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 381.
63Ibid., p. 162; Bosworth, 'The Byzantine Defence System", pp. 116-117.
territories in Syria. Thus, when the Muslim raiders entered the region, they would
find virtually nothing apart from small groups of Byzantine forces who would wait
for them and take the opportunity to launch ambushes against any Muslim troops
who became separated from the main body of the army.64 The second phase of the
Byzantine defence system was reliance on the natural barrier presented by the
elevated Taurus mountain range with its difficult terrain as well as the harsh winter
climate of Asia Minor as means of halting the advance of the Muslims into Asia
Minor.65 Nevertheless, it was not long before the Byzantines realized the deficiency
of their defence system, as the Muslims succeeded in 41/662 in crossing the
mountainous passes of the Taurus and penetrating deep into the Byzantine territories
in Asia Minor.6 To produce a more effective defence system, the Byzantines had no
other choice but to reorganize their defence system by introducing a fundamental
reform into the administration of their regions in Asia Minor, so that they could
achieve the best way of defending themselves against Muslim raids. The key
element of the new Byzantine defence system was the redeployment of the troops
withdrawn from Syria and Annenia, by settling them in the various strongholds and
towns in the Asia Minor regions, especially those bordering Muslim lands. In their
new settlements, each of the Byzantine military contingents was obliged in course of
time to rely on local resources. Thus, gradually the military commanders in each city
and area started to take responsibility for the civil administration of their areas, in
addition to their military duties. This development was the nucleus of the
MBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 194; Bosworth, "The Byzantine Defence System", p. 119.
65Bosworth, "The Byzantine Defence System", p. 118.
"ibid., p. 120.
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administrative-military system which gradually began to crystallize in the Byzantine
frontier regions in Asia Minor and was known as the "theme system".67
The organizational effort that the Byzantines made along their borders, which finally
provided them with a defence line able to contain the Muslim threat and counter any
attempt made by the Muslims to establish a military presence in Asia Minor, was met
in turn by the Muslims, who similarly developed a complex military system along
their own frontiers. The Muslims' system, known as the thughur system, consisted
of a long chain of fortresses and strongholds, stretching from Malatyah on the upper
Euphrates to Tarsus near the Mediterranean coast. This long line of strongholds was
commonly divided into two groups: those guarding Mesopotamia (thughur al-
Jazirah) to the north-west, and those guarding Syria (thughur al-Sham) to the south¬
west.68
Although the frontier system began in the early days of the Umayyad Caliphate, it
became fully developed during the first 50 years of the 'Abbasid rule, reaching its
optimum state by the end of al-Rashld's reign in 193/809. After the fall of the
Umayyad Caliphate, the 'Abbasids inherited the problem of facing the Byzantine
threat and the best means of protecting the frontiers of their state. The 'Abbasids first
67The word "theme", used in this context, originally meant a military contingent; it later signified the
province or region where the military contingent was based and, consequently, the 29 provinces into
which the Byzantine Empire was divided, (ibid., pp. 118-121).
680n the geographical division of the Muslim frontiers, see Ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 252;
Qudamah, Kharaj, pp. 186-7; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 194-203. On the historical geography of the
Muslim frontier in Asia Minor, see W. Ramsay. The Historical Geography ofAsia Minor (London,
1890), pp. 281 ff., 349-57.
tasted the bitterness of this problem in 133/750, when the Emperor Constantine V
(reg. AD 741-775) seized the opportunity represented by the 'Abbasids'
preoccupation with consolidating their authority following the success of their
revolution and launched a successful attack against the Muslims' northern frontier,
destroying many of its strongholds, including those of Malatyah and Qallqala
(Theodosiopolis or Erzurum). Thereafter, the 'Abbasids embarked on a concerted
effort to establish and rebuild frontier strongholds and to garrison them with the
necessary troops.
Within the framework of the Syrian frontier zone, Masslsah (or Mopsuestia) was one
of the earliest towns that the 'Abbasids sought to fortify, as it was the key pass used
by the Romans to penetrate into Antakiyah (Antioch).70 Massisah itself was a town
divided by the River Pyramos (or Jayhan) into two parts, and was linked by a stone
bridge. While the old Masslsah was located on the right bank of the Pyramos, the
suburb of the Kafarbayya, which was established during the days of the 'Abbasids,
was situated on the right bank of the river.71 The Muslims first fortified the town of
Masslsah in 84/703 when 'Abd al-Malik's son 'Abdallah managed to wrest the town
Tj
from the Byzantines and to rebuild the citadel on its old foundations. In the
following year 'Abdallah is reported to have stationed a garrison in the town
69Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 222-3, 236 ff.; Brooks, "Byzantines", pp. 731-2; Bosworth, "Byzantium", p.
56; Duri, al- 'Asr al- 'Abbas i, pp. 73-4.
70Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 196.
71lstakhri, Masalik, p. 63; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 196-7; Yaqut, Mu'jum, vol. 5, p. 145.
including 300 hand-picked soldiers and to have built a mosque on the citadel hill {tall
al-hisn).13 In addition to its permanent garrison forces, Masslsah used to receive
every year between 1,500 and 2,000 men of the advance troops {tawall'') of
Antakiyah, who would usually come and winter in the town before returning to their
rear base in springtime.74 Under the 'Abbasids, Masslsah received a great deal of
attention. The first 'Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-'Abbas, strengthened the garrison by
400 men, to whom he allotted plots of land {khitat) for building.75 The garrison was
further strengthened under Caliph al-Mansur, who, upon his accession, increased the
garrison force in Masslsah by another 400 men who also received plots of land.76
Nevertheless, between the years 137/755 and 139/757, most probably on account of
the recurrent incursions by the Byzantines and, in addition, the devastating
earthquake which hit the town around the year 139/757, many of Massisah's
inhabitants were forced to abandon the town.77 Consequently, in 140/758, Caliph al-
Mansur rebuilt the town, which he then renamed al-Ma'murah, and increased its
garrison to 1,000 men. Additionally, as a means of boosting the population of the
town, al-Mansur brought released prisoners {ahl al-mahabis) and also specialist
groups {ahl al-khusus), consisting of Persians, Slaves {Saqalibah), and Christian
72Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 196; Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 6, p. 385; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 127; Ibn al-Athir,
KamiI, vol. 4, p. 398; Ya'qubT, Tarlch, vol. 387.
73BaladhurT, Futuh, pp. 195-6; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 307.
74BaladhurT, Futuh, p. 196; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 308.
15Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 197.
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Nabataeans, and gave them plots of land for building within the walls of the town.78
Under Caliph al-Mahdi, the garrison in Masslsah was enhanced by an additional
2,000 levied troops (fard). Furthermore, Masslsah continued to receive annually the
tawali' corps from Antakiyah who used to winter in the town. This military practice
continued unchanged until Salim al-BaralusI became governor (wall) and increased
the garrison by 500 standing soldiers instead.79
As for the suburb of Kafarbayya, it is reported that Caliph al-Rashld built it (or,
according to another report, he only altered its plans after it had been originally built
by Caliph al-Mahdl) and fortified it with a ditch. Kafarbayya was also protected by a
wall, the construction of which started in the time of al-Ma'mun and stood
completed after his death during the reign of Caliph al-Mu'tasim.80
To the west of Masslsah, approximately 18 miles away on the right (western) bank of
the River Sorus or Sayhan, lies the frontier garrison town of Adhanah. This town,
the ancient history of which can be traced back to the Lydian kingdom, was first
populated by Muslims in 141/759, when Caliph al-Mansur rebuilt it and settled it
with Muslim inhabitants brought from Damascus and Urdunn. It seems, however,
that the town was laid waste sometime later as a result of a Byzantine incursion.
Thus, the town is said to have been rebuilt again in 194/810 by the 'Abbasid Turkish
nlbid., pp. 196-7; Ya'qubl, Tarlkh, vol. 2, p. 387; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 509; Qudamah, Kharaj, p.
308; Bosworth, "Byzantium", p. 57.
79Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 197; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 308.
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commander Faraj al-Khadim, who then garrisoned it with Khurasan! troops who
received in return an increment above their normal pay.81 Because of its close
proximity to the Byzantine lands, Adhanah was used on some occasions by the
'Abbasid forces as a base from which to launch their raids into the Byzantine
territories.82 According to Muslim geographers, Adhanah was well protected, as its
defensive system consisted of a trench and a wall with eight gates.83
Among the other strongholds of the Syrian thughur was 'Ayn Zarbah.84 This town,
located north of Masslsah and renowned for its fertile land, was first rebuilt and
fortified in 180/797 by Caliph al-Rashld, who then garrisoned it with Khurasan!
troops who received in return plots of land for housing in the town.85 In 190/806, the
town was raided by the Byzantines, who initially managed to take captive many of its
inhabitants before they had be rescued by the people of Massisah.86 As a means of
enhancing the military position of 'Ayn Zarbah against incursions of the Byzantines,
'Abdallah b. Tahir, the governor of the region between Raqqah and Egypt, sought to
swell the number of its population by bringing and settling in the town people from
wlbid.
81Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 199; Qudamah, Kharaj, pp. 309-10; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 133.
S2Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 8, p. 625; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami/, vol. 5, p. 496; Ya'qubl, Tarlkh, vol. 2, pp. 466-7.
83Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 133; Ibn Shihnah, Tarlkh Halab, p. 80.
84Ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 100; Istakhri, Masalik, p. 63; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 311; Ya'qubl,
Buldart, p. 118; Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 202.
S5BaladhurI, Futuh, p. 202; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 311.
86TabarI, Tarlkh, vol. 8, p. 320; Baladhuri, Futu/i, p. 203; Khallfah, Tarlkh, p. 376; Ibn al-Athlr,
Kamil, vol. 5, p. 343.
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Egypt.87 Likewise, in 220/835, Caliph al-Mu'tasim brought into the town some of
the 20,000 Zutt who have been captured after the failure of their rebellion in the
marshlands of southern Iraq. In 'Ayn Zarbah, they were the objects of a Byzantine
attack in the same year and another one in 241/856, during which they were captured
along with their families and buffaloes and were taken to Constantinople.88
The most important of the garrison towns of the Syrian frontier was Tarsus, which,
according to Muslim geographers, was the key point separating the Muslim and
Christian worlds in Asia Minor.89 Moreover, its very close proximity by sea and
land to the Byzantine territories made it a unique and prime base from which the
'Abbasids would launch their naval and land attacks against the Byzantine lands.90
Tarsus, which was divided by the River Bardan (or Cydnus) before it flowed into the
sea six miles away,91 was first conquered by Muslim armies during the reign of
Mu'awiyah in 53/673 by Junadah b. Abi Ummayah al-Azdl.92 According to Muslim
authors, al-Hasan b. Qahtabah raided the Byzantine territories in 162/779 and, upon
his return, he brought Caliph al-Mahdl a description of the ruined Tarsus, which in
his estimation could accommodate 100,000 inhabitants if it were rebuilt. Although
Qahtabah was able to persuade Caliph al-Mahdl of the great advantage of building,
87Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, vol. 3, p. 60; Fiey, "The Syriac Population", p. 47.
88Tabari, Tarjkh, vol. 9, pp. 10, 201; Ibn al-Athlr, Kami!, vol. 6, p. 16; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 203;
Miskawayh, Tqjarib, pp. 472-3.
89MaqdisI, Ahsan al-Taqasim, pp. 14-5.
<x,Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 86.
<JIMas'udI, Tanbih, p. 58; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 553.
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fortifying, and garrisoning Tarsus to increase the power of Islam in order to
overcome the enemy, yet the construction of the town itself took ten years before it
actually started. It was not until 171/787, when Caliph al-Rashid learned that the
Byzantines intended to restore and fortify the town, that he ordered Harthamah b.
A'yan to anticipate them and build it. Harthamah in his turn entrusted Faraj b.
Sulaym al-Khadim with its construction, which was completed in 172/788. Tarsus
was then garrisoned by 3,000 Khurasan! troops along with another 2,000 warriors
who were brought from Masslsah and Antakiyah with an increase of ten dinars over
their usual pay.93
Al-Haruniyah and al-Kanlsah al-Sawda', lying in the hill country between 'Ayn
Zarbah and Mar'ash, were also an integral part of the Syrian frontier strongholds and
were both first built and garrisoned by Muslims in 'Abbasid times. Al-Harunlyah, at
a distance of one stage (marhalah, sing, marahil) to the west of Mar'ash, owes its
name to its founder, Caliph Harun al-RashTd, who built it in 183/799 and garrisoned
it with regular troops (/muqatilah), in addition to many other volunteers, who moved
into the town to take part in the jihad.94 According to Yaqut, the town was fortified
with double walls and iron gates.95
92Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 240.
93Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 200-1; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 310; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 410; Yaqut,
Mu jam, vol. 4, p. 133; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 234.
MBa!adhurI, Futuh, p. 202; Yaqut, Mu'jom, vol. 5, p. 388; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 311.
95Yaqut, Mu 'jam, vol. 5, p. 388.
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On the other hand, al-Kanlsah al-Sawda', or "the Black Church", was a very ancient
Greek fortress built of black stones.96 According to al-Baladhurf, the fortress was
first built and very well fortified by Caliph al-Rashld, who also garrisoned it with
regular troops who received as a bonus an increase in their regular pay.97
Although Muslim geographers do not include it as one of the Syrian frontier
strongholds, Tuwanah, lying at the northern end of the pass of the Cilician Gates,
was for some time the most advanced Muslim frontier stronghold on the north-west
border with the Byzantines. Tuwanah was first conquered by Muslim armies in
88/707, during the days of Caliph al-Walld b. 'Abd al-Malik, by Maslamah b. 'Abd
al-Malik and al-'Abbas b. al-Walld b. 'Abd al-Malik.98 Thereafter, like the other
frontier towns, Tuwanah was taken and retaken alternately by the Byzantines and the
Muslims. In 'Abbasid times, Tuwanah was first mentioned as being rebuilt and
fortified in 218/833, when Caliph al-Ma'mun entrusted his son al-'Abbas with its
reconstruction.99 The site of the town is reported to have occupied a square mile and
to have been surrounded by a wall three farsakhs (18 km.) in circumference, with
four gates, each of which had a fortified tower (hisn). The town was then garrisoned
by more than 6,000 levied troops, who were drawn from the people of Damascus,
Hims, Urdunn, Filastln, Egypt, Qinnasrin, Jazlrah, and Baghdad. In return for their
%Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 302; Yaqut, Mu jam, vol. 4, p. 485; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 311.
"Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 302.
98Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 6, p. 434; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 190.
"Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 631; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 412; lbn al-Athlr, Kami], vol. 5, p. 413.
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service, these troops were paid 100 dirhams for each cavalryman and 40 for each
infantryman.100 Nonetheless, soon after the death of al-Ma'mun late in 218/833, the
new Caliph, al-Mu'tasim, ordered the destruction of Tuwanah and the dismissal of
its garrisoned troops.101
On the Mesopotamian frontier (thughur al-Jazirah) was the stronghold of Mar'ash
(Germaniceia), which lies east of the River Jayhan at the intersection of the roads
that run to Antakiyah, 'Ayn Zarbah, Massisah, Albistan (Abulustian), and Yarpuz;
via the Caucasus to Qaysariyyah, via Behesnl to Sumaysat; and via al-Hadath and
Zibatrah to Malatyah.102 Mar'ash was first captured in 16/637 by Muslim troops led
by Khalid b. al-Walid, who decided to demolish the town after the surrender of its
Byzantine garrison.103 Later, Caliph Mu'awiyah rebuilt Mar'ash and installed a
garrison in it. However, after the death of Caliph Yazid b. Mu'awiyah (36/683), the
Byzantine incursions against the town were so severe and frequent that its inhabitants
felt compelled to abandon it.104 Mar'ash, however, was restored, fortified, and again
populated by al-'Abbas, the son of Caliph al-Walld b. 'Abd al-Malik. But, by
exploiting the opportunity presented by Caliph Marwan's preoccupation with his
struggle against the people of Hims, the Byzantine Emperor Constantine V marched
100AzdI, Tarikh, p. 412; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 631; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 5, p. 413; Ibn Kathir,
Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 298.
10!TabarI, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 667; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 415.
mEl2, s.v. "Mar'ash".
103Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 224; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 319.
mIbid.
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toward Mar'ash, besieged it, and had it finally destroyed after driving out its Muslim
population in 129/746.105 After suppressing the uprising in Hims in 130/748, Caliph
Marwan had Mar'ash rebuilt, including the castle at the centre of the town, which
came to be called al-Marwanl after him.106 Once again, however, in 137/754, the
Byzantines sacked the town. It was not until 151/768 that Caliph al-Mansur had it
rebuilt and fortified by Salih b. 'All, who also installed there a garrison, which was
later strengthened by Caliph al-Mahdi.107 According to Yaqut, the town was
protected by double walls and a ditch.108
Al-Hadath (Adata), situated between Malatyah, Mar'ash, and Sumaysat on the upper
course of the Hurith (Aksu), one of the main tributaries of the River Jayhan
(Pyramus), was another important stronghold of the Mesopotamian frontier.109 Al-
Hadath, which was also known as al-Hamra' (the Red) because of the colour of the
soil thereabout, was conquered in the days of Caliph 'Umar I by Habib b.
Maslamah.110 Under Mu'awiyah, the town was fortified and garrisoned and was
used as a starting point from which Muslims would launch their raids against the
Byzantine territories. During the strife between the Umayyads and the 'Abbasids,
the Byzantines took advantage of the opportunity and launched an attack during
i05Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 224.
!06Yaqut, Mu jam, vol. 5, p. 107.
107BaladhurI, Futuh, p. 225; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 319.
10SYaqut, Mujam, vol. 5, p. 107.
mIbid„ p. 320; Le Strange, Lands, p. 122; idem, Palestine, pp. 443-4.
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which they succeeded in laying waste al-Hadath.111 It seems that it was not until
161/778, after a successful raid into the Byzantine lands, that the 'Abbasid
commander al-Hasan b. Qahtabah advised Caliph al-Mahdl of the advantage of
rebuilding al-Hadath. In fact, the construction started in the same year and was
completed in 169/786, the year in which the Caliph himself died.112 Under the short
rule of Caliph al-Hadi, al-Hadath, which also came to be known as al-Mahdtyah and
al-Muhammadlyah, was garrisoned with 4,000 levied troops from Syria, Jazlrah, and
Khurasan. As a reward these troops received plots of land for housing, pay of 40
dinars, and a one-off bonus of 300 dirhams.113 Sometime during the same year, the
garrison was augmented by another 20,000 warriors, who were transferred from the
fortresses of Malatyah, Shimshat, Sumaysat, Kaysum, Duluk, and Ra'ban.114 The
buildings of al-Hadath, which were constructed of sun-dried brick, could not
however long withstand the harsh climate of the region and the town, including its
protective wall, was seriously damaged by heavy rain and snow. This seems to have
encouraged the Byzantines to overrun the town once again and destroy it completely
ll0Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 223; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 320; Yaqut, Mujam, vol. 2, p. 228.
"'Baladhuri, Futiih, p. 223; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 320.
1121hid.; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 369.
u3Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 223; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 320.
nAIhid.
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by fire in 170/787.115 Nevertheless, soon afterward, Caliph al-Rashld had it rebuilt,
fortified, and garrisoned once again.116
Malatyah (Melitene), situated near the upper course of the Euphrates, was the largest,
strongest, and most important Muslim stronghold on the Mesopotamian frontier.117
Like al-Hadath, Malatyah was first conquered in the time of Caliph 'Umar by Hablb
b. Maslamah but it was soon after retaken from Muslim hands. When Mu'awiyah
became the governor of Syria and Jazirah, he had to send Hablb again against
Malatyah. In 36/657, Hablb managed to recapture the town by storm, after which he
garrisoned it with troops brought from Syria, Jazirah, and other parts of the Islamic
State. Subsequently, Malatyah became one of the frontier strongholds and was used
as an important base from which the Muslims launched their raids against the
Byzantine lands.118 During the strife between Caliph 'Abd al-Malik and 'Abdallah
b. al-Zubayr, the people of Malatyah, for an unspecified reason, are reported to have
abandoned the town, which encouraged the Byzantines to raid it and demolish its
structures.119 Under Caliph 'Umar II, the town was rebuilt and settled by Muslim
inhabitants brought from the neighbouring town of Turandah, three stages distant
from Malatyah itself. After an unsuccessful attempt in 123/741, the Byzantines were
"5Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 227; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 320.
mIbid.
"7Istakhri, Masalik, p. 82; Le Strange, Lands, p. 120; idem, Palestine, pp. 499-500; EI 2 , s.v.
"Malatya".
"sBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 222; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 317.
U9Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, vol. 2, p. 506; Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 223; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 317.
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able in 133/750 to launch an attack on the town, drive its Muslim inhabitants out of
it, and raze it to the ground. During the same incursion the Byzantines also
destroyed the fortress {hisn) of Qalawdhiyah, located near Malatyah, after driving
out its people.120 Six years later, in 139/757, Caliph al-Mansur directed 'Abd al-
Wahhab b. Ibrahim and al-Hasan b. Qahtabah to take charge of rebuilding and
fortifying the town. Accompanying Khurasan! troops, who were reinforced by
70,000 troops recruited from Syria and Jazirah, thousands of builders and workmen
(fa'lah) of all professions, brought from all parts of the State, commenced the
construction sometime in 140/758 and completed it six months later. The
construction work also included the rebuilding of Hisn Qalawdhiyah and two new
military guard posts (masalih, sing, musallahah), one of which was 30 miles from
Malatyah while the other was positioned on the bank of the River Qubaqib.121 As
for Malatyah itself, it was then garrisoned by 4,000 warriors from nearby
Mesopotamia!! tribes. As a reward, each man was allotted 10 dinars over and above
his normal pay, as well as an extraordinary allowance (ma'unah) of 100 dinars.
However, unlike the common practice in other frontier strongholds, the garrison
troops in Malatyah were given arable lands (mazari\ sing, mazra'ah) and provided
at the same time with collective accommodation. Each company ('arafah) of 10 to
120Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 223; Michael the Syrian, Chronicle, vol. 2, p. 518.
121Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 223; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 392; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 319.
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15 men was given two habitations, one above and one below, and under both was a
stable.122
To the south-west of Malatyah, approximately five farsakhs away, lay the frontier
stronghold of Zibatrah (Sozopetra), which is reported to have been named after the
daughter of al-Rum, grandson of Shem, son of Noah.123 Like al-Hadath, Zibatrah
was first conquered by Muslim armies in the time of Caliph 'Umar I by the renowned
commander Hablb b. Maslamah al-Fahrf. Having been destroyed by the Byzantines
in the time of the last Umayyad Caliph, Marwan b. Muhammad, Caliph al-Mansur
had it rebuilt and refortified. Zibatrah is also mentioned to have been rebuilt and
regarrisoned in the time of Caliph al-Rashld after having been destroyed by the
Byzantines in 169/785.124 Thereafter, the town was twice subjected to Byzantine
destruction, the last occasion being in 223/838 when Byzantine forces, led by
Emperor Theophilus, laid waste the town after killing and taking captive thousands
of its Muslim inhabitants.125 During his retaliatory campaign against the Byzantine
stronghold of 'Ammuriyah in 223/838, Caliph al-Mu'tasim sought to enhance
Zibatrah militarily not only by rebuilding and fortifying the town itself, but also by
P2Baladhun, Futuh, p. 223; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 319; Yaqut, Mujam, vol. 5, p. 193; Le Strange,
Palestine, p. 499.
I23Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 3, p. 131; Ibn Khurradadhbih, Masalik, p. 97; Le Strange, Lands, p. 121; idem,
Palestine, p. 554.
l24Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 228; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 321; Bosworth, "Byzantium", p. 59.
,25Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 228; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 321; Tabarl, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 55-6; Ya'qubl,
Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 581; K. al-'Uyun, p. 389; Ibn al-Athlr, Kamil, vol. 6, p. 39.
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erecting in its vicinity numerous new fortresses such as the fortresses of Tabaraji, al-
Husaynlyah, Ban! al-Mu'min, and Rahwan.126
Among other strongholds of the Mesopotamian frontier was Hisn Mansur (Perrhe),
which lay west of the Euphrates about one day's journey from Zibatrah. The fortress
owed its name to its builder, Mansur b. Ja'wanah b. Harith al-'Amirl, of the Qays
tribe. After superintending its building and restoration during the days of the last
Umayyad Caliph, Marwan, Ibn Ja'wanah was stationed there along with a
considerable number of troops from Syria and JazTrah with orders to counter any
Byzantine incursion against the Muslim territories.127 During the 'Abbasid time,
Hisn Mansur is reported to have been rebuilt, fortified, and garrisoned by Harun al-
Rashld during the reign of his father, Caliph al-Mahdl.128 According to Yaqut, the
fortress was well protected. Its defensive system consisted of a wall with three gates
and a ditch, and it had in its midst a fort, which also defended by double walls.129
126Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 186.
l27Baladlvuri, Futuh, p. 228; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 321; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 2, p. 266. According to
Baladhuri, Ibn Ja'wanah was killed in 140/758 by Caliph al-Mansur after supporting 'Abdallah b.
'All in his rebellion.
mIbid.
l29Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 2, p. 265; Le Strange, Lands, p. 123; idem, Palestine, p. 454.
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The last recognizable stronghold of the Mesopotamian frontier was the fortress of
Bahasna, which lay near Mar'ash, to the west of Hisn Mansur and was described as
one of the most impregnable of fortresses.130
As part of the defensive system of the Muslim northern frontiers, the Syrian and
Mesopotamian strongholds were backed at their rear by another line of fortified
towns stretching from Antakiyah to the westward bend of the Euphrates. During the
early days of Islam and the Umayyad Caliphs, this line of fortified towns was
administratively and militarily part of the so-called northern frontier. Nevertheless, in
170/787, it was separated off by Caliph al-Rashld into an independent province
(jund) under the name al-'Awasim.131 Within their military function, the fortified
towns of the frontier province of al-'Awasim acted not only as a second defence line
against any penetration by Byzantine forces, but also as depots capable of reinforcing
the advance frontier strongholds with the arms and manpower needed in time of
crisis. Moreover, the 'Awasim towns could also provide shelter for Muslims
returning from their expeditions or issuing from the thugur.132 The most notable
fortified towns of al-'Awasim in the early 'Abbasid period were Manbij, Duluk,
Ra'ban, Qurus, Antakiyah, and TTzIn.133
130Yaqut, Mu jam, vol. 1, p. 516.
131Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 234; Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 156; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 262; Bonner, Aristocratic
Violence, pp. 86-91; Le Strange, Palestine, pp. 25-6, 36; Bosworth, "Byzantium", p. 54; Kennedy,
'Abbasid Caliphate, p. 130.
l32Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 156; Qudamah, Kharaj, p. 186.
133Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 156.
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The 'Abbasids' efforts in restoring, fortifying, and establishing new fortress towns
did not in fact end along their northern frontier, but extended to include the north¬
eastern frontier stretching along the lands of Armenia and Adharbayjan. Since the
time of its conquest by Hablb b. Maslamah al-Fahri in the days of Caliph 'Uthman,
Muslim authority in Armenia had to face three different threats: the Byzantines from
the north-west, the Khazars from the north-east, and the local Armenian princes
(.batariqah, sing, batrlq), who, despite their peace treaties with the Muslims, always
looked for a chance to rebel.134 In order to counter these challenges and thus affirm
their authority in this part of their empire, the Muslims sought from the very
beginning to establish a permanent and strong military presence in the region. As in
many other parts of their conquered lands, this was accomplished by transplanting
many Arab tribes from Iraq, Syria, and Jazlrah into some of Armenia's main towns,
which thereupon were transformed into Islamic administrative and military
centres.135 Among the most recognizable of these fortress towns, which continued to
play a military role in 'Abbasid times, were Bardha'ah, Baylaqan, Bab al-Abwab,
Shamkur, Nashwa, Kisal, Tiflls, Dabll, and Qaliqala, the last of these being rebuilt,
fortified, and garrisoned by Jazlrian troops in 133/751, after having been destroyed
B4Ibid„ p. 247.
U5Ibid., pp. 234, 242, 244; Tabarl, Tarlkh, vol. 7, p. 90; Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, p. 112.
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by the Byzantines in 139/757.136 In addition to these old administrative and military
centres, the 'Abbasids also rebuilt, fortified, and garrisoned other Armenian's towns.
In order to counter the continuous incursions of the Khazars, Caliph al-Mansur is
reported to have rebuilt and garrisoned the Armenian fortress towns of Kamkh, Bab
Waq, Allan, Muhammadlyah, and the two towns of Arjll al-Sughra and Aijll al-
Kubra, which were then garrisoned by troops brought from Palestine.137
Besides the regular troops stationed in the various Armenian towns and fortresses,
the 'Abbasid had to compensate the indignation of many of the old Arab settlers and
consequently their transformation from being muqatilah into mundane traders,
landlords, and rebels. Hence, by following the line of Muslim old policy, the
'Abbasids sought to transplant many new Arab tribesmen into the region. Thus,
during the reign of Caliph al-Rashld, the governors Yusuf b. Rashid al-Sulaml of
Nizar, Yazid b. Mazyad al-Shaybanl of Rabi'ah, and 'Abd al-Kablr b. 'Abd al-
Hamld of Taghlib are all reported to have transplanted many Arab tribesmen, mainly
from their own tribes, from Jazlrah to Armenia.138
136Baladhun, Futuh, p. 236; Taban, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 500; Bonner, Aristocratic Violence, pp. 50-1;
Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, p. 73. According to al-Baladhuri {Futuh, p. 236), Qalxqala was the
subject of another Byzantine incursion during the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mu'tasim and,
although the Byzantine army failed to capture the town, they did manage to cause great damage to its
protective wall. Subsequently, al-Mu'tasim spent 500,000 dirhams in fortifying Qallqala, including
the rebuilding of its wall.
137Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 246; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 372.
l38Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 427; Shakir, Ban! al-'Abbas, vol. 2, pp. 284-5; Fukuzo, 'Abbasid
Autocracy, p. 73.
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Unlike Armenia, in Adharbayjan the 'Abbasid authority faced no direct external
challenges. Instead, the main threats were internally confined. The first of these was
represented by some of the old Arab families who had settled in the region since the
days of Caliph 'All and its governor al-Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindi. In course of time,
having claimed a vast tract of land, some of these Arab families eventually became
local rulers, resisting on many occasions any intervention on the part of the central
government or its representatives in the region, especially when it came to tax
collecting.139 The second most serious challenge was represented by the uprising of
Babak al-Khurrami, who was most probably one of the indigenous lords of
Adharbayjan. His uprising, which started in 201/817 and lasted for more than 20
years, finding support among the indigenous lords as well as some of the Arab
leaders in the region, constituted a real threat to the 'Abbasids' sovereignty in this
part of their empire.140 In order to affirm their authority in Adharbayjan, the early
'Abbasid Caliphs resorted to the same policy that they used in Armenia. They
handed the governorship post in Adharbayjan to notable Arab chiefs and
encouraging them to take with them many of their fellow tribesmen, mainly from
Iraq and Jazlrah, so that in their new situation they could serve as instruments of state
control.141 Among the towns and villages that these tribal militias settled in and
eventually transformed into strong fortresses were Marrand, Miyanij, Barzah, Shahi,
l 39Baladhurf, Futuh, pp. 404-6; Fukuzo,'Abbasid Autocracy, pp. 109-11.
140TabarT, Tarikh, vol. 9, p. 54-5. For more on the Arab settlement in Adharbayjan and Armenia as
well as the uprising of Babak and his origins, see Fukuzo, 'Abbasid Autocracy, pp. 108-123.
l41Ya'qubI, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 371; Azdl, Tarikh, p. 386; Fukuzo, 'AbbasidAutocracy, pp. 108-10.
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Tabriz, Wahash, and Arsaq.142 In addition to these regional strongholds, the
'Abbasid authority in the Adharbayjan continued to make use of the old
administrative and military centres, which they had inherited from the Umayyads.
The most important amongst these were Ardabll and Maraghah. Ardabll, situated on
the upper course of the River Andarah in eastern Adharbayjan, was the seat of the
Marzuban at the time of the Arab conquest.143 Like most other parts of
Adharbayjan, Ardabll was taken by peace treaty (sulh), in 22/643.144 Under Caliph
'All, his governor in the region, al-Ash'ath b. Qays, took Ardabfl as his main
administrative and military base, where he brought and settled many Arab fighters.145
Under the Umayyads, the town remained the seat of authority until 112/230, when it
was captured by the Khazars.146 Although, soon after, the Muslims regained Ardabll,
its administrative and military weight seems to have shifted to the town of
Maraghah.147 Under the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'tasim, Ardabll finally reacquired its
142Baladhuri, Futuh, p. pp. 404-6; Ya'qubl, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 371; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp.
12, 16.
l43BaladhurI, Futuh, p. 400.
144The sulh stipulated that the Muslims must not kill or enslave the inhabitants, nor destroy the fire
temples, nor prevent the people from observing their religious rites, and that they had obligations to
protect them from depredation at the hands of the Kurds of Balasajan, Sablan, and Satrudan. In
return, the inhabitants were to pay them 800,000 dirhams. Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 400; Yaqut, Mu'jam,
vol. 1, p. 129.
145Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 404.
146Azdi, Tarikh, p. 32; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 7, p. 70.
147AzdI, Tarikh, p. 383.
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military significance as it was fortified and became the base from which the
'Abbasid forces launched their final campaign against Babak.148
Maraghah, which lay to the south-east of Lake Urmiyah, was first constructed by the
Umayyad Caliph Marwan b. Muhammad.149 Under the 'Abbasids, Maraghah grew
quickly in status as it is recorded to have been the seat of the 'Abbasid authority
(manzil al-Sultan) in Adharbayjan.150 Such a distinguished position, however, made
the town a potential target in the region for rebel forces such as those of Sadaqah b.
'All and al-Wajna' b. Rawwad. Therefore, in order to counter any attack, the
governor of Adharbayjan in the time of Caliph al-Rashid, Khuzaymah b. Khazim,
had to fortify Maraghah by building a protective wall and garrisoning it with a
considerable number of troops.151
In addition to the main military centres in the heartland and the frontiers, there were
thousands of small-scale military posts, packed with troops, spread all over the lands
of the 'Abbasid state. From a military perspective, these military posts could be
classified into two categories: look-out posts (arbipah, sing, ribat) and guard posts
(masalih, sing, musallahah). The difference between the two is that the arbitah
tended to be more confined to the far limits of the frontier lines, especially those
14STabari, Tarikh, vol. 9, pp. 11-3.
149Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 404.
150AzdI, Tarikh, p. 383.
15lBaladhuri, Futuh, p. 405; Yaqut, Mu'jam, vol. 5, p. 93; Le Strange, Lands, p. 164; Fukuzo,
'Abbasid Autocracy, pp. 109-10.
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along the seacoast. Besides their mission of countering any small-scale attacks by
enemy forces, the main purpose of the arbitah was to give early warning of any
anticipated attack by the enemy. By so doing, they would give the people in the
various villages and towns in their vicinity the chance to secure themselves and their
livestock, as well as to mobilize their forces to face the enemy's incursion.152 In
addition to regular troops, the arbitah were usually manned by a considerable
number of volunteers, who would come and station themselves there with the wish to
take part in the jihad against the infidels.153
The masalih in their turn could be classified into two types. First were the
permanent type, usually erected along the land borders, most frequently at the
intersection of passes between the Islamic territories and the enemy's lands.154 The
second type of guard post was temporary in nature. These sort of masalih were
usually set up along the routes used to deliver provisions to the army while on
campaign, around military encampments in time of war, and around a city or a region
where an uprising or disturbance was taking place.155 In addition to the prime
purpose of both types of guard post as early warning posts against any suspicious
movement by the enemy, they were also responsible for preventing the enemy's
agents from sneaking from or into the hostile areas, which could be either non-
152MaqdisI, Ahsun al-Taqaslm, p. 177.
l53Shakir, Bamal-'Abbas, vol. 2, p. 298; EI2,s.v. "Ribat".
I54Yaqut {Mu'jam, vol. 1, p. 385), for example, indicates that in the time of Caliph al-Ma'mun there
were 31 musaUahah situated all along the boundary line between Khurasan and Tabaristan right up to
the Daylarn territories. The number of soldiers stationed in each of these musallahah ranged between
200 and 2,000.
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Muslim neighbouring territories or zones of civil strife. This task was usually
fulfilled by monitoring, searching, interrogating, and detaining those travellers whose
activities caused suspicion. These security procedures might become much tighter in
times of crisis, during which these guard posts would set up a well-knit siege
situation. Thus, they would prevent people from travelling from or into the affected
area, the only exception being granted to very well-known merchants and those who
bore permission from the authority to return to their homes. Still, even these people
were not allowed to pass before everything that they were carrying had been
searched thoroughly, including their letters.156
Finally, it should be noted that although these security measures taken by the guard
posts were effective in limiting the enemy's threat, they did not always succeed in
preventing the enemy's agents from penetrating the siege and thus delivering their
secret reports. A good example of such a case occurred during the years of the civil
war in 194/810. In order to prevent al-Ma'mun's agents, who had been previously
planted in Baghdad, from delivering their reports, al-Fadl b. al-Rabl' set up guard
posts all along the border with Khurasan. Nevertheless, al-Ma'mun's agents were
able to deliver their reports by depositing them in the hollowed-out board of a
packsaddle, which they then sent out with a woman. The woman was able to pass
l55Tabari, Tarkh, vol. 7, pp. 565, 623, 631; vol. 8, pp. 379, 386, 435, 490, 493, 497; vol. 9, pp. 14,47.
1:>6Tabari, Tarlkh, vol. 8, pp. 379, 386. It is worth noting that in some cases the siege enforced by
these guard posts could be very comprehensive, to the point that whoever tried to break it for any
reason would be beheaded without questioning. See Tabarl, Tarlkh, vol. 7, pp. 565, 623, 631-2;
Ya'qubi, Tarlkh, vol. 2, p. 376; Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol. 10, p. 98.
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through the guard posts unmolested and unsearched, as she was taken to be simply
travelling from one village to another.157
Summary
The 'Abbasids' capitals were strategically placed not only as administrative centres
but also as military bases. Forsaking Damascus (the centre of Umayyad support),
Arabia (lacking in resources), Egypt, and Khurasan (both at the fringes of the Islamic
Empire), 'Abbasids settled on Iraq as their natural base of support and operations.
After tentative efforts to settle on the appropriate site in Iraq, Baghdad was finally
chosen during the reign of al-Mansur. It had the great advantage of centrality at a
meeting place of land and water routes, and this area on the west bank of the Tigris,
where the two great rivers of Mesopotamia approached each other, had a natural
defensive advantage. The city's natural defences were enhanced by the construction
of an elaborate defence system consisting of a trench and two walls (the inner wall
having many projecting towers), separated by an intervallum, which were pierced by
four iron gates, double in construction with an intervening angled corridor.
The Khurasan! troops, as individuals and groups, received land for building within
the walls of the city as well as in its outskirts. A great proportion of them
concentrated in plots north and north-west of the Round City where they settled
according to a regional rather ethnical or tribal basis. Despite the careful planning of
the city and its military settlement, mutiny of army personal did brake out under al-
l57Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 386; Ibn al-Athir, KamiI, vol. 5, p. 367.
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Mansur, necessitating him to divide his army into two separate detachments, one in
Baghdad while the other in the newly built suburb of al-Rusafah, on east bank just
opposite the Round City. Caliph al-Mansur also founded a military centre at al-
Rafiqah, which was used to reinforce the Byzantine frontier and keep a close eye on
the Arab tribes in Jazirah and Syria. In 221/836, al-Mu'tasim laid the foundation of a
new 'Abbasid capital at Samarra', a shift which was associated with the large-scale
introduction of Central Asian troops into the central army, since their chaotic
behaviour in Baghdad had enraged the whole city. In Samarra' the different groups
of soldiers were settled in quarters reflecting their original homelands.
Apart from their capital cities, the 'Abbasids also continued to militarize many of the
old garrison cities (amsar) such as Mawsil, Qayrawan, Tunis, Tubnah, Fustat,
Marw, Rayy, and al-Mansurah in Sind. Some new garrison towns were also built to
handle new threats, e.g. Sisar in the district of Hamdan, in Jibal province. The
'Abbasids also had a system of strongholds stretching all along their land frontiers,
the importance of which is demonstrated in the two-phase defence system of the
Byzantines on the other side of the Muslims' northern border. The Muslims' frontier
defence system, known as the thughur system, consisted of fortresses and
strongholds set intermittently along the border from Malatyah in the east to Tarsus in
the west. Massisah (Mopsuestia) was one of the earliest towns of the Syrian frontier
zone (thughur al-Sham) that the 'Abbasids sought to fortify and, by taking
appropriate measures, to man. They also put in place a system of organization for
the Syrian frontier towns of Kafarbayya, Adhanah, 'Ayn Zarbah, al-Haruniyah, al-
Kanisah al-Sawda', Tuwanah, and, the most important, Tarsus, which held the key
position separating the Muslim and Christian worlds in Asia Minor. Similarly, on
the Mesopotamian frontier (thughur al-Jazirah), the strongholds of Mar'ash, al-
Hadath, Zibatrah, Hisn Mansur, and Malatyah (the largest, strongest, and most
important of these strongholds) underwent various fortunes throughout the first
century of ' Abbasid Caliphate.
The Syrian and Mesopotamian strongholds were backed by another line of fortified
towns stretching from Antakiyah to the westward bend of the Euphrates, marking the
line of the northern frontier under the Umayyads. Under the 'Abbasids this became a
separate province (fund) known as al-'Awasim and the fortified towns in this
province acted not only as a second line of defence but also as supply depots for the
more advanced positions.
In addition, the 'Abbasids maintained fortress towns in the north-east frontier region
bordering the lands of Armenia and Adharbayjan. In Armenia, where the threat
represented by the indigenous Armenian and the Khazars, these included the fortress
towns of Bardha'ah, Baylaqan, Bab al-Abwab, shamkur, Nashwa, Kisal, Tiflls,
Qallqala, Kamkh, Bab waq, Allan, and Muhammadlyah.
In Adharbayjan, where there were no direct external challenges to their power, the
'Abbasids sought to pacify the region by encouraging the settlement in it of Arab
tribesmen from Iraq and Jazlrah. In addition to towns and villages settled by these
tribal militias, which eventually became strong fortresses (e.g. those at Marrand and
Tabriz), the 'Abbasids continued to make use of the old administrative and military
centres inherited from the Umayyads, such as those at Ardabil and Maraghah.
In addition to these principal military posts on the frontiers and in the 'Abbasid
heartland, there were also thousands of smaller look-out (arbipah, sing, ribat) and
guard posts (masalih, sing, musallahah) (either permanent or temporary) scattered
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In the first chapter of this study we have examined the elements that composed the
early 'Abbasid army, including the Khurasanis, the abna', the Arabs, the mawalf, the
Turks, and some additional minor elements from more distant parts of the Islamic
Empire.
The original fighting forces of the early 'Abbasids were composed of men recruited
in Khurasan, principally Arabs tribesmen who, for various reasons, felt aggrieved by
the policy of the Umayyad and their agents in Khurasan. In addition to these, there
were also a considerable numbers of local mawalland even slaves who found the key
to their freedom in the 'Abbasid revolution.
For the major part of the first century of the 'Abbasid rule, the Khurasan! continued
to be the most distinguished unit of the central forces in Baghdad. However, during
that period the composition of the Khurasan! forces underwent a transformation, as
from the time of al-Ma'mun the non-Arab elements became the more predominant
part of its composition.
At the time of the civil war between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun, the descendants of the
old Khurasan! veterans, best known as abna', emerged as the most important
component of the central army in Baghdad. Nonetheless, from the time of Caliph al-
Mu'tasim, the position of the abna' in the central army started to become eclipsed by
the growing number of the Turkish (i.e. Central Asians) recruits and the shift of the
capital from Baghdad to Samarra'.
Rakan al-Mutairi j PhD Thesis | ComJitsim 416
In the earlier stage of the 'Abbasids' rule, the central forces in Baghdad also included
among their ranks many Arab tribesmen, mostly Iraqis. Yet, their role seems to have
ended in the time of al-Mansur when, most likely, they were dispatched to Ifrlqiya
not only on military service but to settle there permanently. Thereafter, no further
tribesmen from Iraq, Jazirah, and Syria were admitted to the central armies. Instead,
recruits from these regions were most often stationed in the frontier zones and
encouraged to resettle there. The replacement of the 'a/a' by the artizaq system of
remuneration also marked the end of the Arab prerogative in the Muslim military
institution.
The mawali, predominantly manumitted slaves, who served in the early 'Abbasid
consisted mainly of two groups: those who were attached directly to the 'Abbasid
Caliphs and those were affiliated to various state dignitaries and army commanders.
In addition to these, from the time of Caliph al-Mahdl but mainly in the time of al-
Ma'inun and more under al-Mu'tasim, increasing numbers of Turks, principally
slaves, were recruited to the ranks of the 'Abbasid central army. Other elements who
played a role in the 'Abbasid armies included black Africans, Sayabijah, Saqalibah,
Nubians, Indians, and other groups from the margins of the Islamic Empire.
In the second chapter, centred on the Diwan al-Jwrd, attention has been given to the
modifications introduced by the 'Abbasids to the system for registering soldiers and
remunerating them on a regular basis. The most obvious modification was the move
from enlistment by nasab to enlistment in the Diwan according to the geographical
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origins of soldiers. Those who administered this system, the Kuttab al-Jund, required
specialist knowledge of the distinguishing features of men, their characteristics, the
distinguishing marks of beasts, and ability in arithmetic.
In our examination of the mechanism employed to ensure regular payment of the
troops, we described the 'document of authorization' (sakk), the involvement of the
Caliph or his vizier, and the work of the Paymaster General, the Award Office, and
the officials known as munfiqm (or mu'pn) and 'urad. The main problem in
applying this system was the tendency for pay to fall into arrears, provoking soldiers
to mutiny, and the efforts taken to circumvent this problem included taking loans
from wealthy people, postponing the pay-day until taxes had been received,
substituting foodstuffs for pay, or passing on to the army commanders the
responsibility for soldiers' pay.
With regard to the 'ata' institution, under the 'Abbasids, this became, as far as the
military were concerned, principally a cash allowance paid to the Arab tribal forces
as long as they were on active military service. The arzaq, similarly, ceased to be
state-sponsored hand-outs of foodstuffs and evolved instead to become a system of
cash allowances paid to those registered in the central Diwan in Baghdad. In
assessing rates of pay, the 'Abbasids took into account two main factors—military
division and location—with the cavalrymen generally receiving double that paid to
infantrymen on account of the former's responsibility to provide out of their pay for
their riding beasts. Even so, the rates of pay fluctuated a great deal as they depended
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to a very large extent on the amounts of booty taken from the enemy, so that this
often became a cause of dispute between the Caliphs and their fighting men.
In the third chapter of this study, in which we dealt with the military units and
support services, we looked in turn at the cavalry, infantry, and the non-combatant
groups which supported the army from its setting out on the march to the end of the
fighting and the dividing of the booty.
From small beginnings, the 'Abbasids' cavalry quickly increased as large numbers of
additional horses were seized from the defeated Syrian armies and put into the
'Abbasid fighting machine. With the later introduction of Turks into the 'Abbasid
army, the strength of the cavalry reached an all-time peak. Our discussion of the
training of the 'Abbasid cavalry included information concerning the tactics and
skills of evasion, jousting, hit and ran, use of the bow and lance from horseback, and
the skilful manoeuvres practised in polo. We have discussed also the weapons used
by the cavalry (including the bow and lance and, later with the recruiting of Turkish
cavalry, such new types of weapons as the lasso) and the cavalry's position on the
battlefield and their other duties, including reconnaissance, guard duty, and setting
ambuscades.
The infantry would often lead in the initial clash with the enemy and their value was
most clearly demonstrated when facing unmounted foes and in difficult terrain.
Among the weapons they employed were swords, long lances, bows, shields, battle-
axes, various kinds of clubs, and slings. The archers, a fighting body that brought
into the 'Abbasid forces a particular skill of Khurasan, usually led off" the battle by
Rakan al-Mutairi | PhD Thesis | Conclusion 419
firing a heavy salvo of arrows. Their numbers and abilities were later enhanced by
the introduction of Turkish fighters famed for their great skills in mounted
bowmanship. To the earlier arsenal of hurling machines, the 'Abbasids brought new
innovations as they employed, for the first time in Muslim history, flaming naphtha,
necessitating its practitioners' use of specially made fire-proof suits.
The 'Abbasid forces were regularly attended by pioneer and labour corps (fa'alah),
whose duties included road-making and mending, bridge construction, digging work,
and fortress-building and demolishing. There were, in addition, the army police,
whose work was to maintain order in the ranks, track down spies, and execute
punishments. Further, among the non-combatant units, there were guides,
physicians, chemists, judges, provisioners, translators, and spies.
In the fourth chapter we discussed the 'Abbasid armies' means of communication,
army supplies and provisioning, levies, volunteers, the exchange of captives, and
army command and ranks.
Within the area of communications, we first described the system of mounted post-
riders (barld), used for transmitting messages and delivering military reinforcements
with the utmost of speed. The mounts used could be either horses, camels, or mules,
depending on the terrain to be traversed. Carrier-pigeons were also used in
conveying messages and, over shorter distances, messages might be transmitted
using drums, trumpets, banners, or, occasionally in the relief of besieged cities, the
shooting of arrows with messages attached.
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With the extending of the artizaq system under the 'Abbasids, the state now became
responsible for provisioning the troops in time of war. Supplies carried with the
army could be supplemented by contributions from fellow-Muslims along the route
of march or near the battlefront, or by plunder seized from the enemy. While dried
food would be the soldiers' staple during the march, they could enjoy freshly cooked
meat during encampment.
The 'Abbasids would sometimes need to raise additional forces by a system of levy
and, in addition, they would sometimes employ volunteers (mutatawwi 'ah), most of
whom were Arab tribesmen of Iraq, Jazlrah, or Syria who joined the army for
religious or financial motives. Other supernumeraries would include camp-followers
(slaves, freemen, and fellow tribesmen), locally recruited militias, and even freed
prisoners.
While captured fighters were usually executed immediately after the conclusion of
battles, there was a fairly elaborate system for the exchange of captured volunteers
and civilians, frequently across the River Lamos in Western Cilicia, every effort
being made to balance those exchanged in terms of number, age, gender, and social
status.
At the head of army command stood the Caliphs, who would frequently take direct
command of their armies, or delegate the task to their sons. Next came the army
commanders (quwwad), who, since political considerations outweighed military
qualifications, might come from a whole variety of races. Tribal allegiances gave
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way to geographical considerations in the organization of men under their
commanders and a chain of command ran down through the commander of 10,000
men (the ami•), commanders of 1,000 (quwwad), commanders of 100 (nuqaba'), and
commanders of 10 ('arafa'). Moreover, unlike the chain of command under the
Umayyads, the 'Abbasid chain of command had no deputy (khalifah) to the
commander-in-chief.
In the fifth chapter of this study we have examined the mobilization and tactics of the
'Abbasid armies in marching, camping, field fighting, and in summer and winter
raiding. First, came the selection by the Caliph of the commanders and his
presentation to them of the banners, after which the commanders would make all the
necessary preparations for the task assigned to the men under their command. After
the founding of al-Rusafah in 151/768, the 'Abbasids adopted two new troop
assembly grounds—al-Bardan and Nahrawan—on the east bank of the Tigris near
Baghdad and later, in Samarra', the area of 'Uyun on the west bank of the Tigris.
From these sites the Caliph would usually escort the troops on the first leg of their
campaign journey.
Usually, on the march, the army would be divided into five main divisions and would
be headed by a scouting party and groups of workmen who prepared the road ahead.
The men would break into a single squadron when passing through hostile areas and
difficult natural obstacles. The army's camp would be chosen with a view to both
sustenance and defence. What nature provided in the latter case might be
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supplemented by man-made defences and the stationing of guards around the
encampment.
Among the battle tactics employed by the 'Abbasids were 'hit and run', the 'row',
and the old Byzantine formation of 'squadrons'. The soldiers' armour would consist
of the coat of mail (dir') or lighter jawshan, the wide belt, the helmet, vambraces,
and greaves. After giving the signal for battle, the commander would take up a
viewpoint from which he could survey the progress of the fighting. In 'Abbasid
times the banners and standards to which the warriors rallied with their leaders were
arranged according to military contingents and not on a tribal basis.
In their conflict with the Byzantines, the 'Abbasids not only sought to defend their
northern borders, but also engaged in a regular system of summer and (less
frequently) winter raids into Byzantine territory, the purpose of which, in addition to
enhancing the Caliph's prestige, was to keep the soldiers occupied and restrain them
from committing unnecessary disturbances and acts of violence.
We have dealt, in the sixth chapter, with a special aspect of 'Abbasid military history
and that is sea warfare. This was strictly a defensive, rather than offensive, aspect of
military activity, as the Syrian and African coasts had to be defended against possible
attacks from the Byzantines. Because of the island's support for the Byzantines, the
'Abbasids attacked Cyprus in 146/763, but it was another ten years before they
launched their second naval attack in the Mediterranean, this time against the coast
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of Asia Minor. Cyprus, Crete, and Sicily were the concerns of fleets commanded by
later 'Abbasid Caliphs.
In the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the main problem faced by the 'Abbasids was
the piratic raids of the Mayd and occasionally Kurk peoples from the region of Sind,
against whom they employed both political measures in Sind itself and the naval
action of an enhanced 'Abbasid fleet in the Gulf.
The earliest Muslim naval bases and dockyards were constructed at Qulzum and
Alexandria, and others were later constructed at Rosetta, Damietta, and Tinnis in
Egypt; at Barqah and Tunis in North Africa; at Acre and Tyre, Ladhiqlyah, Sayda,
Beirut, and Tarabulus in Syria; at Tarsus in Asia Minor; and at Basrah and al-
Ubullah in Iraq.
We have described, as far as evidence permits, the various warships employed by the
'Abbasids, which included the barijah, shlnl, shalandl, taridah, and qarqur (used on
the open seas), and the shadha, sumayrl, harraqah, and tayyarah (used as river-
going vessels). We have further described the craft of shipbuilding under the
'Abbasids and the sources of the different kinds of timber employed for fashioning
various parts of these vessels. Among other details contained in this chapter, we
have described the different ranks who formed the crews of the 'Abbasid warships
and the terms used to identify them.
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In the final chapter of this study, dealing with the 'Abbasid military bases, we looked
first at the cities chosen by the 'Abbasids to be the capital of their empire. First,
forsaking Damascus, Arabia, Egypt and Khurasan, they chose Iraq as their centre of
operations and ultimately settled on Baghdad as their capital until later, in 221/836,
they laid the foundation of a new capital at Samarra'. We have described the ways
in which the 'Abbasids fortified these cities, using a system of trenches, walls, an
intervallum, and double iron gates with an intervening angled corridor. In addition,
under al-Mansur, Baghdad's military suburb of al-Rusafah was built on the east bank
of the Round City and the military centre of al-Rafiqah was also established.
The 'Abbasids also continued to maintain many of the old garrison cities such as
Mawsil, Qayrawan, Tunis, Tubnah, Fustat, Marw, Rayy, and al-Mansurah in Sind,
as well as constructing new garrison towns, for example, at Sisar. The 'Abbasids'
frontier defence system, the thughur system, consisted of fortresses stretching along
the northern border from Malatyah in the east to Tarsus in the west. These Syrian
and Mesopotamian strongholds were backed by another line of fortified towns
stretching from Antakiyah to the westward bend of the Euphrates. Furthermore, the
'Abbasids maintained frontier towns in the north-east of their lands bordering on
Armenia and Adharbayjan. In addition, there were thousands of smaller look-out
and guard posts scattered across the lands of the 'Abbasid State.
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The meanings and definitions given below are according to the context in which the
words are used in this thesis.
a
'abd (pi. 'abld): a slave or serf.
ablaq (pi. bulq)\ a piebald horse.
abna' al-awla: the sons and
grandsons of the Khurasan!
revolutionaries settled in Iraq.
adam: hide.
ahl al-bayt: the House of the
Prophet.
ahl al-hadirah: the urban
settlers.
ahl al-kitab: lit. 'the People of
the [holy] Books', i.e. Christians
and Jews and to some extent
Magians or Zoroastrians
(Majus) and Sabaeans.
'allafalr. a foraging party.
aman\ a safe-conduct or pardon.
'am11 (pi. 'ummal): a tax-
gatherer; a governor of a
province or district, especially
one having financial
responsibilities.
amm (pi. umana'): a man
charged with distributing booty
to the troops.
amir (pi. umara') an army
commander; a governor of a
province with command of
troops.
amir al-baht*: the admiral. Cf.
amir al-ma' and amir al-rabl.
amir al-mu'minm: the Caliph.
'ammah: the common people.
'amud: a mace, war-club.
ansar (sing. ansari): lit.
'helpers', i.e. the Companions of
the Prophet from the inhabitants
of Madlnah, who embraced
Islam and supported him, and
received and entertained the
Muslim emigrants from
Makkah.
a'rab: Arab nomads, Bedouin.
'arid (pi. 'urrad): an officer
responsible for inspecting the
troops by reviewing their
identity, weapons, mounts, as
well as military skills.
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'arf {pi. Lurafa'): an officer in
command of ten to fifteen
soldiers.
'arfch: an arbour or roofed
enclosure.
'arradah: a ballista, i.e. a type
of mangonel used for casting
stones over distance.
'asabiyyah: tribal solidarity.
ashtiyam (pi. ashayimah): chief
sailors.
'askar (pi. 'asakir): an army; a
military camp.
'afa': a grant, salary, or stipend
paid to a soldier.
atbd (sing, tabi'): a camp-
follower.
athqal: baggage, materials.
'ayn (pi. 'uyun): a spy.
'ayyar (pi. 'ayyarim): a vagrant,
especially one who is armed.
b
bab (pi. abwab): a gate.
baghl: a mule, the product of the
union of a donkey and a mare.
bardhaqah: a small armed
escort party accompanying a
caravan along its journey.
barid: a system of
communication between the
provinces and the caliphal
offices; a post-beast.
basmalah: the invocation of the
name of God in the saying 'In
the Name of Allah, Most
Gracious, Most Merciful'.
bafihah (pi. bata'ih): a swamp,
especially marshland in southern
Iraq.
batrlq (pi. bafariqah): an
indigenous lord in Armenia.
bayat: an unexpected night
attack or night raiding.
baydcth: a helmet covering the
top of the head.
bayt al-mal: the Public
Treasury.
buzz: linen.
birdhawn: a hinny, the product
of the union of a she-donkey
and a stallion.
burjas: a target placed over the
head of a lance or similar item.
d
dabbabah: a movable wooden
tower designed to protect troops
while boring into the wall of a
fortress.
dabbus: a mace made of iron or
steel with a cubical head.
daftar: a register or a note book.
Cf. jarldah.
da'iiyA. du'at): a missionary of
a da 'wah.
dalil (pi. adil/a'): a guide.
dar al-sina'ah: the dockyard.
darrajah: a patrolling cavalry,
who would carry out their task
beyond the encampment.
da'wah: political propaganda for
the 'Abbasids, 'Allds, and
others.
daydaban (pi. dayadibah): a
watchman positioned on a
mountaintop. Cf. khvhbani.
dhimmf. a non-Muslim whom
the Islamic State undertakes to
protect in the practice and
profession of his religion.
dihqan (pi. dahacjlh): an
indigenous landlord residing in
a village in the old Sassanid
land; a hereditary lord of a
district in Khurasan.
dinar: a gold coin, equivalent to
ten to twenty dirhams.
dira coat of mail.
dirham: a silver coin.
diwan (pi. dawawin): a register
of individuals entitled to pay
from the government; a
government department.
diyah: the payment of
compensation for inflicted
injury or death; blood-money.
I
fa'alah: workmen.
faqih (pi. fuqaha'): a jurist,
specialist in Islamic Law.
fard 'ayn: an essential
obligation that Allah makes
incumbent upon all Muslims,
such as prayer, fasting, and
witnessing to the truth.




fatwa (pi. fatawa): a technical
term used in Islamic Law to
indicate a formal legal opinion.
fay: booty gained without
fighting, especially lands.
fida': ransom.




ghazw, or ghazwa: a raid into
enemy territory.
ghilalah: a garment worn under
a coat of mail. Cf. shaikh.
ghulam (pi. ghilman): a slave; a
young man.
ghulul: taking or stealing from
the booty before it is divided.
L_ _ _
hadIth (pi. ahadIth): a tradition
of a deed or saying of the
Prophet.
hajj: pilgrimage to Makkah
performed in the month of Dhu
al-Hijjah.
haras: a bodyguard for caliphs
or governors.
hasak: thorns; caltrop.
hasir: a soldier fighting without
a shield.




hisab al-taqdir: the field of
arithmetic.
hisn: fortress.
harr (pi. ahrar): a free man.
1
ibrafr. a small needle.
imam: a prayer leader in a
mosque; a supreme head of the
Muslims qualified to interpret
the religion.




ja 'bah: a quiver.
jafir: a wooden quiver.
janah. a wing or flank of the
army.
jarib: a quantity of crops
cultivated from 60x60 cubits of
land.
jawshan: a coat of mail made to
protect only the front part of the
fighter's body.
ji'alah: a wage, pay, or like
which one gives to another who
goes to war as a substitute for
him.
jihad: an effort or striving; holy
fighting in the cause of Allah or
any other kind of effort to make
Islam prevail. Jihad is regarded
as one of the principles of Islam.
jins: a race, ethnic group.
jizyah: originally tax in general,
especially in the old Roman
lands; later poll tax imposed on
individual dhimmis under
Islamic law.
jund: a government army; a
military district in Syria.
jurazah (pl.juraz): a mace.
k
Jca 'k: dry-biscuit.
kalab (pi. kalalib): a grappling-
iron.
kamin: an ambush.
kardus: formation of squadrons.
karr wa farr: hit and run.
kalib (pi. kuttab): a government
secretary.
kattan: linen.
khaditn (pi. khudam): a servant;
a eunuch.
khalifah: a deputy of the
commander-in-chief.
khamis: classical Arabic battle-
formation in which the army
would be divided into five main
divisions.
khandaq: a moat encircling a
city or a camp.
khanjar: a dagger.
kharaj: originally tax in general,
especially in the old Sassanid
lands; later land tax in Islamic
Law.
khariji(pi. khawarij): originally
a rebel who left the Islamic
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community, especially one of
the Kufan Arabs who became
estranged from 'All b. AbT
Talib; later a non-'Alid, non-
Umayyad Muslim rebel against
the 'Abbasids in Jazlrah,
Maghrib or Sijistan.
kharlfah: a bag.
khassah: privileged men, the
elite, the ruling class in contrast
to 'ammah.





khil'ah: a garment of honour
bestowed by the Caliph upon a
subject.
khizanal al-silah. the arms
warehouse.
khums (pi. akhmas)-. a fifth.
khuttah (pi. khutat): residential
or collective land, especially at
the frontier towns.
kinanalr. a quiver made of
animal skin.
kuhbanl (pi. kuhbaniyyah): a
watchman posted on a
mountaintop. Cf. daydaban.
I
lijam: a ram, used in ancient
warships to batter and sink the
enemy's ship.
liwa' (pi. alwiyah): a banner.
al-liwa' al-a'zam: the great




ma'ir: a person who carries the
food, prepares it, and serves it to
the troops.
majlis al-i'ta': the wards
Office.
mallah(pi. mallahuri): a sailor.
mamluk (pi. mamaliky. a slave,
especially a Turkish or white
slave; later, a white slave
soldier.
manjanlq'. a mangonel, ballista,
machine for casting missiles.
marhalah (pi. marahil). a stage;
a distance of one day's journey.
markab: a ship. Cf. safmah.
marzubarr. a Sassanid frontier
lord or hereditary governor.
masir\ a march.
maslahah (pi. masalih).& guard
post.
ma'unah: a sum of money
occasionally paid to soldiers
before their going to war in
order to assist them in preparing
their arms and beasts.
mawla (pi. mawall): a liberated
slave; a client of an Arab
tribesman; a non-Arab Muslim
convert; a follower, a patron of a
client.
mawqid (pi. mawaqid): a beacon
or cresset.
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maydan: a parade ground.
maymanah: an army's right
flank.
maysarah: an army's left flank.
mighfar: a helmet covering the
head and all the face except the
eyes.
mikhlah: a horse's nose-bag.
mikhsah: an awl.
minpuqah: a wide belt made of
skin to protect the waist and to
hold the dagger.
miqlaa sling.
miqrad. a pair of scissors.
misallah: a pack-needle.




muhajirun: early Muslims who
emigrated to Madlnah in the
lifetime of the Prophet, before
the conquest of Makkah.




mujawalah: a tactic of evasion.
mujthamah. shooting a couching
animal using the bow or lance.




distributing the pay among the
troops. Cf. mu'tun (sing.
mu 'ti).
muqaddimah: an army's van.
murabit (pi. murabitun or
murabitm)'. a frontier guard.
murtaziq (pi. murtaziqah): a
full-time professional soldier.
mutatawwi 'ah: volunteers.
muwallad (pi. miiwaUadimy. a
man of mixed origin.
n
nafadah: a nocturnal scouting
party.
naffat (pi. naffatun): a naphtha-
hurler.
naff, naphtha, "Greek fire".
naqib (pi. nuqaba'): one of the
Prophet's representatives in
Madinah before the Hijrah; a
leader of the 'Abbasid partisans
in Khurasan.
nar al-harb: a fire lit to call the
tribe together when the enemy
was sighted.
nasab: tribal pedigree.
nashib (pi. nashabah): an
archer.
naf : a leather mat.
nazu. leaping over horseback.
nutl (pi. nawatiy): a sailor. Cf.
mallah.




qaha: a short coat.
qubilah (pi. qaba'il): an Arab
tribe.
qadl (pi. qudat): a judge who
judges according to Islamic
Law.
qa'id (pi. quwwad): an army
general.
qalansuwah: a cap made of fur
or other material to protect the
head from the helmet.
qar: pitch.
qarib: a general term usually
applied to small riverboats.
qarurah: a small earthenware
pot.
qasab: dried date.
qatf'a (pi. qata'i): a parcel of
land given as a private estate; a
fief.
qiblah: the direction to which
Muslims turn in praying, i.e.
toward Makkah.
raid, a scout, the officer
responsible for finding a
suitable place for encampment.
ra'ts (pi. ru'asa): a chief or
leader.
rajil (pi. rajjalah): an
infantryman.
ratmaj; resin.
rayah (pi. rayat): a standard, or
flag.
ribat (pi. arbitah) a look-out
post.
rida min A/ Muhammad: an
approved leader from the family
of the Prophet.
rizq (pi. arzaq): food
subsistence given to a Muslim
enrolled in the Dhvan; (in
'Abbasid times hard cash paid
to a soldier.
rub * (pi. arbd): a quarter of the
suburbs of Baghdad.
rainl (pi. rumah): a soldier
armed primarily with bows and
arrows. Cf. nashabah.
r
rabad (pi. arbad): a suburb of a
city.
rabfah (pi. rahaya): the guard
who watched over the
encampment during the nightly
break.
radkh: a paltry gift in money or
in kind, taken from the booty,
then given to a slave, dhimmi\ or
woman.
s
sabr. a women or child captives.
sadaqah (pi. sadaqat): a
donation, or voluntary alms.
saff (pi. sujfuf): a row, line, or
rank.
safihah (pi. sufun): a ship. Cf.
markab.
sahib al-akhmas: the person
who took the state's fifth of the
booty from the battlefield for the
Public Treasury.
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sahib al-aqbad the officer
responsible for the booty before
its distribution.
sahib al-liwa': the banner-
bearer.
sahib al-maqasim: the officer
who divided the booty into
fifths.
sahib al-shurta: the commander
of the police force.
sa'ifah (pi. sawa'if): a summer
raid against the Byzantine
Empire.
scikk (pi. sikak): a document of
authorization.
salibf. a full-blooded Arab.
saqah: the army's rear.
sardaq: a pavilion.
sawiq: barley-mush.




shalil: a garment worn under a
coat of mail. Cf. ghilalah.
sharPah: Islamic Law.
shatiyah (pi. shawatl)'. a winter
raid against the Byzantine
Empire.
shiyah (pi. shiyat): a marking.
sikkah (pi. sikak): a postal stage.
siIah: a grant.
siwar (pi. asawir): a golden
neck chain.
sudan: black slaves, especially
from sub-Saharan West Africa.
sulh. a peace treaty.
sunnah: the model behaviour of
the Prophet.
t
tabar or tabarazih: a battle-axe.
ta'biyah: mobilization for battle;




tajfaf (pi. tajafif): a coat of mail
or cuirass placed upon a horse.
takbir: the exclamation 'Allah is
great'.
talPah: a daytime scouting
party.
tanahud: contributions given by
the troops toward the expenses
of the campaign they are take in
it.
powq (pi. atwaq): a golden
bracelet.
thaghr (pi. thughur): border
area.
tillBah: a horse's feed-basket
made of palm leaves.
turjuman: a translator.
turs: an iron shield.
u








wall (pi. wulat): a provincial
governor.
walTal-'ahd: a heir apparent.
z
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